财政分权理论对中国经济与社会发展失衡的解释及反思

近年来经济与社会发展失衡问题引起了较多关注,一些学者从财政分权的角度进行了解释。本文在回顾第一代财政分权理论关于政府间职能分工和第二代财政分权理论关于地方政府行为的主要观点基础上,梳理了第二代财政分权理论的市场维护型财政联邦主义对中国经济高速增长的分析及政治晋升锦标赛理论对地方政府片面追求经济增长造成基本公共服务供给不足的分析。最后,对市场维护型财政联邦主义和政治晋升锦标赛理论进行了反思,认为追求可视政绩和自主财政收入是地方政府经济增长取向行为的双重驱动力。     

浅析财政集权与分权

政府间的财政关系一直是财政学研究的一个重要问题。我国政府间的财政关系一直处于非规范化的运动中,分税制改革并没有彻底改变这种情况。本文从财政集权和分权的角度进行了分析与阐述,并认为就我国的财政现状来看应进一步分权。     

财政分权、经济增长与地方财政转移支付依存度——基于省级动态面板数据分析

财政分权理论肯定了分权对经济增长的促进作用。但现有研究表明,中央财政转移支付作为财政分权的产物,在实现财政纵向均衡的同时。加剧了地区间横向的财力失衡。本文基于中国1995-2010年的省级面板数据,考察了财政分权水平与地方转移支付依存度间的关系。研究表明．财政分权与地方财政转移支付依存度正相关,财政支出分权较之财政收入分权的影响更为明显。财政支出分权对中西部地区经济发展转移支付依存度的影响最大．中西部地区的经济增长高度依赖中央财政的转移支付。     

财政分权、晋升竞争与保障房供给——基于江苏县级面板数据的实证分析

目前,无论相对于政府的最大供给能力,还是相对于保障房需求量而言,我国保障房供给量均为不足。因此,保障房供给不足的根源及对策研究显得十分必要。县级政府是提供保障房的职责主体,然而,在现行财政分权与政府治理架构下,提供保障房无法给县级政府带来地方财政收入的增加与地方官员晋升竞争力的提升,因而地方政府缺乏保障房供给激励。本文理论分析并利用江苏县级层面数据实证检验财政分权、地方官员晋升竞争对保障房供给的影响。研究结果表明,地方官员晋升竞争是保障房供给不足的主要根源;财政分权总体上对保障房供给产生负向影响,但区域差异较大。因此,增加保障房供给,需要改革目前政府治理架构,完善财政分权体制。     

基于宪政视角下的我国财政分权体制研究——以社会保障建设为例

本文从宪政的视角切入,以限制政府权力和保障公民权利作为思考和解决问题的立足点,对我国现行财政分权体制进行了研究。我们认为,在限制政府权力和保障公民权利两方面,现有的财政分权体制发挥了积极作用,但也产生了很多消极影响。要理顺中央与地方的财政关系,切实保障公民权益,要求中央与地方能逾越＂画地为牢＂的怪圈,在宪政的框架内谋求一个长期稳定、合法合理的良性互动。     

财政分权视域下地方性政府债务的经验分析

本文构建了一个财政分权视域下地方政府债务理论模型,探寻财政分权机制与转轨背景下地方政府性债务的形成机理及当前的财政体制改革对地方政府性债务的影响。利用2010年财政部门统计的全国地方政府性债务的截面数据来进行实证分析。结果表明,经济发展是省、市地方政府举借债务的最主要推动力;对县级政府而言,财政收支压力是驱动其负债的重要因素。未来的财政分权化改革应是结构性的调整和优化,而非地方政府财权的整体性持续扩张。     

美国府际关系及其演进——一种联邦主义解说

府际关系,即国内政府间关系,直接关系政府的稳定和治理效率。作为世界上最发达国家的美国,其府际关系的建构及其演进历程值得我们深入研究和探讨。而联邦主义则是我们剖析该问题的一个很好的分析工具,美国府际关系的方方面面,均与联邦主义的理论和实践密不可分。     

地方政府行为视角下的区域金融绩效差异分析

本文在已有研究基础上,提出了一个从财政分权与地方政府行为视角来分析我国地区金融绩效差异的理论框架,并通过采用Geweke分解检验方法对我国地区财政能力差异与地区金融绩效差异的因果关系进行实证检验,研究表明:由于外部约束与目标函数的差异使得地方政府在金融资源控制的方式、程度上表现出不同的特征,特别是分税制的实施,欠发达地区的政府趋于加大了对金融部门的干预,从而恶化了当地的金融绩效。     

财政分权、人力资本与高质量就业

更加充分、更高质量的就业是实现经济高质量发展的应有之义。本文选取2005—2021年30个省级面板数据,基于固定效应模型和面板门槛模型,实证检验财政分权、人力资本与高质量就业之间的关系。研究发现,财政分权对就业质量具有显著的促进作用,在经过系列稳健性检验后结论仍然成立。地区异质性检验结果表明,财政分权对西部地区的促进作用比东、中部地区更加明显。传导机制分析发现,财政分权通过提高人力资本水平,进而促进高质量就业水平的提升。人力资本在财政分权对高质量就业作用的关系中存在显著的门槛效应。随着人力资本水平的提升,财政分权对就业质量的作用呈现边际效应递增的规律。因此,我国应当进一步完善财政分权制度,实行多元化的地方政府绩效考核体系,多渠道提升地区人力资本水平,从而推动实现更高质量的就业。     

中国国内市场整合的一个理论解释——基于产业政策视角

本文在考察中国国内市场分割演变趋势的基础上,通过构建一个包含中央政府与地方政府间竞争博弈模型来解释财政分权和产业政策在促进中国国内市场整合过程中的作用。结果发现：中央政府执行的以税制改革为特征的财政分权和以市场竞争优化产业结构为特征的产业政策在一定条件下能够有效激励地方政府放弃地区间贸易壁垒,鼓励不具有比较优势的企业参与市场竞争与市场分工,从而能够带来中国的国内市场整合。     

Fiscal Federalism: a refined theory and its application in the Chinese context

China's central–local relations have been marked by perpetual changes amidst economic restructuring. Fiscal decentralization on the expenditure side has been paralleled by centralization on the revenue side, accompanied by political centralization. Hence, our understanding of China's fiscal relations is not without controversy. This paper aims to make a theoretical contribution to the ongoing debate on ‘fiscal federalism’ by addressing crucial questions regarding China's central–local fiscal relations: first, to what extent do Chinese central–local fiscal relations conform to fiscal federalism in the Western literature? Second, are there any problems with existing principles of fiscal federalism and, if so, how to refine them? Third, how are refined principles relevant to the Chinese case and what policies should the Chinese government pursue in the future? Based on an in-depth and critical review of the theories on fiscal federalism, we develop a refined prototype of fiscal federalism. The model shows that quasi-traditional fiscal federalism is a much closer reality in China, while we argue that the refined fiscal federalism should be the direction of future reform in China.     

Fiscal Decentralization: guilty of aggravating corruption in China?

The relationship between fiscal decentralization and corruption is highly controversial but insufficiently tested with respect to China. This article empirically tests whether fiscal decentralization aggravates corruption in China's local governments. To acquire more robust results, we employ multiple corruption and fiscal decentralization measures and collect data for 31 provinces from 1998 to 2008. Fixed effects panel models estimate the impact of fiscal decentralization on corruption after controlling for gross regional product per capita, the relative wage in the public sector compared to the private sector, political leadership changes, education levels, law enforcement and the number of NGOs. Our findings suggest that China has experienced a trend towards fiscal recentralization rather than decentralization in the 2000s. We also find the moderating effect of the level of law enforcement on corruption: fiscal decentralization in local governments with strong law enforcement deters corruption but the opposite relationship is found when their law enforcement is weak. The implication of our research is that a sound legal system and political will are prerequisites for successful fiscal decentralization.     

Deconstructing decentralization in China: fiscal incentive versus local autonomy in policy implementation

This article examines the congruent and conflicting effects of fiscal decentralization and power devolution—two main types of decentralization in post‐reform China—in order to tackle the insufficient distinction between them in current academic analyses. Derived from the two types of decentralization respectively are fiscal incentive and local autonomy, which influence local states' policy implementation in turnover taxation. By uncovering the unique logic of either factor, this article argues that contrary to what is widely presupposed, local autonomy is not necessarily congruent with fiscal incentive in affecting local compliance with centrally imposed policy rules during policy implementation. When power devolution and fiscal decentralization follow an internally consistent logic of decentralization as a whole by proceeding at the same pace and favoring the same specific locality, they inevitably generate conflicting effects on local states' implementation strategies. Congruent effects arise only if incoherent evolution occurs between the two types of decentralization. This paradox highlights the contradiction inveterate in the dynamics of decentralization. This argument is first developed through theoretical reasoning, and then substantiated by an empirical comparison between Guangzhou and Shanghai during 1984–1988 and 1992–1995.     

政府财政支持高新技术发展的理论与对策研究

本文以高新技术的准公共性分析为切入点,分别从规范分析与生产函数模型分析角度论证高新技术产业发展中政府财政支持的必要性与理论依据,并进一步分析在高新技术领域中我国财政投融资总量与结构以及财税优惠政策等方面存在的问题,在此基础上提出财政支持高新技术发展的政策建议。     

论我国财政政策的积极效应

无论是扩张性财政政策还是收缩性财政政策都存在积极效应问题。财政政策的积极效应同一定的社会经济及制度、财政的性质密切相关。研究财政政策不仅要讨论其反周期的阶段性目标效应 ,而且应关注其稳定性或功能性作用。财政政策的积极效应应反映我国转轨期的发展要求和传统“建设性财政”向公共财政转变的客观需求 ,应以不损害市场配置资源的作用和不影响公共财政机制的形成为前提。为此 ,应科学界定政府职能和政府活动范围 ,防止计划经济模式复归 ,并完善相应的机制。     

政府间公共服务职责划分及其财政管理体制支持问题研究

本文简要阐述了财政管理体制与政府公共服务职责的关系,介绍了我国财政管理体制与政府公共服务职责的现状和问题,分析了其原因,并从基本公共服务范围和标准、财政转移制度、法制建设等方面,提出了完善财政管理体制,保障各级政府履行公共服务职责实现的政策建议。     

Fiscal Federalism and Provincial Foreign Tax Policies in China

This paper employs province-level data between 1992 and 2000 to assess the impact of fiscal federalism and pro-internationalization industrial groups on provincial foreign tax efforts in China. It argues that part of the provincial variation in tax efforts on foreign investors is related to the level of fiscal autonomy, the strength of pro-internationalization industrial groups, and provincial economic conditions. The level of fiscal autonomy is found to be positively associated with provincial governments' tax efforts on foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs). Transfer-dependent provinces tend to have lower effective tax rates on FIEs than transfer-contributing provinces. The transfer systems designed to combat regional inequality and absorb regional shocks may undermine incentives for local governments to be fiscally responsible, potentially resulting in over-consumption. In addition, provinces that have strong pro-internationalization industrial groups or disadvantaged economic conditions tend to have lower effective tax rates on FIEs.     

How Does Decentralized Governance Work? Evidence from China

Decentralized governance is often viewed as an effective way to improve public services and government accountability. Many also document the negative dimensions of fiscal decentralization, especially in transition economies; thus, the combination of decentralization and centralized control has gained currency in some countries in recent years. Based on first-hand data and other documentary sources, and using civil service remuneration as an example, this paper attempts to explore how decentralized governance works in China and what hinders decentralization from performing better. The findings show that Chinese centralized control over expenditure in public sector remuneration primarily serves to enhance ministry control. Local bureaucrats, meanwhile, exploit better remuneration to boost their personal interests. This paper argues that political commitment rather than central transfer is greatly needed for utilizing the benefits of decentralized governance.     

关于利用财政政策促进贵州地方金融发展的思考

在经济欠发达的贵州这类省份,有效运用财政政策能够对当地金融发展起到导向和促进作用,最终实现财政政策与金融的良性互动,为地方经济发展增添活力。     

激励结构与中国地方政府对内对外行为差异

对内地方保护与对外开放合作是我国地方政府行为的两个显著特征。本文通过一个简单的理论模型说明,晋升激励结构是决定中国地方政府在对内和对外行为选择差异的主要原因之一。在财政分权和地方政府竞争的条件下,中央政府以经济增长为核心的晋升锦标激励机制,导致地方政府实施地方保护和分割市场行为。而由于在对外合作中不存在晋升竞争的影响,使得地方政府积极开展对外经济合作。本文还进一步揭示了地方政府对内竞争与对外合作的动机、表现、后果,以及两种行为之间的内在联系,最后提出相关对策建议。