Rectification of the Register – Prospective or Retrospective?

In Gold Harp v MacLeod the Court of Appeal considered paragraph 8 of Schedule 4 of the Land Registration Act 2002 and interpreted this provision to mean that the priority between mistakenly de‐registered interests and registered interests can be altered following rectification. The court can give the de‐registered interest the priority which it ‘would have had’ but for the mistake. In other words, it allows for retrospective rectification. This case note concludes that this is the correct interpretation of paragraph 8 and of the words ‘for the future’. However, it argues that the current range of options available to the court in terms of rectification are producing uncertainty, and that a better approach may be to rely on the priority provisions in sections 28 and 29.     

Living in a Policy State: From Trust for Sale to Trust of Land

The Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996has transformed the nature of co-ownership interests in land.The trust for sale, which governed dealings in co-ownedproperty under the Law of Property Act 1925, and whichmade sale the presumptive object of co-ownership, has been replaced by a trust of land, under which co-owners retainan interest in the land itself, rather than its capital value.This article considers the likely impact of this legislativepolicy departure, particularly in relation to the court'swillingness to grant an order for the sale of co-owned propertyon application by a creditor, and against the wishes of anon-debtor co-owner occupier.     

A Suicidal Woman, Roaming Pigs and a Noisy Trampolinist: Refining the ASBO's Definition of 'Anti-Social Behaviour'

This article discusses the definition of anti-social behaviour employed by section 1(1)(a) of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 for the purposes of the Anti-Social Behaviour Order. It argues that, if the ASBO is to remain at the forefront of the Government's campaign against anti-social behaviour, this section should be amended. The article begins by outlining the claimed benefits of, and critics' concerns about, the definition, arguing that the difference of opinion stems from different views of state power. It then argues that the ASBO has been employed for social control, often at the expense of more constructive forms of intervention, and that this has shown New Labour's willingness to vest enforcement agencies with the wide discretion conferred by section 1(1)(a) to have been misplaced. Finally, it proposes a refined version of section 1(1), which focuses the Order on the cases for which it was purportedly designed whilst maintaining any benefits of the broad definitional approach currently taken in section 1(1)(a).     

Section 994 of the Companies Act 2006 and the Primacy of Contract

The Court of Appeal's decision in Fulham Football Club (1987) Ltd v Richards & Anor is both of interest and significance. By embracing the idea of the parties’ ability to ‘contract out’ of their statutory right to petition the court for relief under section 994 of the Companies Act 2006 (the so‐called ‘unfair prejudice’ remedy), their Lordships have not only contrived to stunt the future development of unfair prejudice as a minority shareholder remedy but, and more importantly for the purposes of this case note, their decision has reasserted and extended the contractual analogy in modern UK company law.     

What does it mean to suffer loss? Haxton v Philips Electronics

In Haxton v Philips Electronics the Court of Appeal considered whether a widow could recover the diminution in value of her dependency claim following the defendant's tortious reduction of her life expectancy. The note outlines the development of the common law, demonstrating that Haxton is novel but not unorthodox, and tests whether Haxton's principles can provide a sound foundation for future cases. Positing three hypothetical scenarios, it argues that the disparity in outcome, rather than indicating a lack of unifying principle, as was suggested in Jobling v Associated Dairies, may be explained by combining Austin's division between primary and secondary rights with Gardner and Stevens' contributions as to how they are protected. Restitutio in integrum requires consideration of the reasons and values underlying the right in question and these are discernible in the jurisprudence. The note also considers whether Haxton could have been decided on the basis that a defendant should not profit from its own wrongdoing.     

How about me? The scope of personal information under the Australian Privacy Act 1988

A recent Australian Federal Court decision has raised the issue of the scope of information protected under the Australian Privacy Act 1988. The Court failed to adequately address this question, leaving Australians unsure as to whether sections of their information, such as the IP addresses allocated to their mobile devices, will be considered personal information under the Act. The main consideration the Court dealt with was what it means for information to be “about” an individual. In this paper I address two questions: a) how is information determined to be “about” an individual under the Act; and b) how should this determination be made in the future? I conclude that currently available guidance from the courts, the Australian Information Commissioner and scholarly commentary are inadequate to enable individuals, organisations and agencies to consistently make such determinations. Accordingly I draw on approaches to this question taken in Canada, New Zealand, the European Union and the United Kingdom to argue that the definition should be broadly interpreted in a technologically-aware manner. This will help to ensure that personal information is more comprehensively protected under the Privacy Act.     

The Strange Death of Blasphemy

Recent years have witnessed a considerable growth in legislation and litigation concerning religion. This article examines the implications of the latest change, namely the abolition of the offences of blasphemy and blasphemous libel by section 79 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008. First, the article provides the context by examining what has been lost, analysing the ambit of the offence, focussing on litigation in the twentieth century both in domestic courts and at the European Court of Human Rights. Second, the article seeks to explore why blasphemy has been abolished now, scrutinizing five developments that led to the abolition. The article concludes by examining the extent to which the criminal law continues to protect religious beliefs and believers, contending that while the body of the blasphemy laws is dead, its soul lives on in a plethora of other criminal laws and, more problematically, in non‐legal means of control.     

Provocation and Pluralism

What is the best way to reflect human diversity in the structure of the provocation defence, and similar excusatory defences in the criminal law? The House of Lords recently concluded that the right way is to allow the jury to personalise and thereby qualify the apparently uniform ‘reasonable person’ standard mentioned in section 3 of the Homicide Act 1957. In this paper we argue that this is not the right way at all. We argue that the reasonable person standard, unqualified, already accommodates the only variations between people that the law should want to accommodate in an excusatory defence. To defend this view we revive the common law's tripartite analysis of the ‘objective’ (or impersonal) issues in the provocation defence: first, was there an action capable of constituting a provocation? second, how provocative was it? and third, how much self‐control should have been exhibited in the face of it? We show that these questions each have a built‐in sensitivity to certain variations between different defendants' situations, but that this does not detract from their objectivity (or impersonality). We argue that no more sensitivity is needed in the name of human diversity, and what is more that no more sensitivity is desirable.     

Barriers to the ballot: implications for the development of state and national crime policies

In 2013, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled in Shelby County v. Holder that Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act, which included the preclearance formula for determining which state and local jurisdictions needed to obtain federal approval before changing their election laws and voting procedures, was unconstitutional. By requiring federal approval, this provision prevented historically repressive jurisdictions from enacting covert policies to hinder non-whites from voting. The ruling in Shelby County is problematic because methods in use across the country prevent non-white citizens from casting their ballots, leaving their interests unaddressed. As people of color hold different attitudes and views than whites towards specific criminal justice measures, contemporary barriers to the ballot have potential implications for criminal law and policy. Consequently, analyses of two contemporary methods of denying non-whites a voice in government are warranted: felon disenfranchisement and voter identification laws. After considering the disproportionate effects of these laws on non-white voting, the paper reveals the potential harm that may result from Shelby County if similar laws spread to jurisdictions no longer covered by the Voting Rights Act.     

Restitution, Rectification, and Mitigation: Negligent Solicitors and Wills, Again

A solicitor, when drafting a will, can owe a duty of care in tort to the intended beneficiary of a bequest under that will. The Court of Appeal has recently confirmed that where a solicitor has misdrafted the will, the intended beneficiary can sometimes rectify it, and recover the intended gift. The pattern of this rectification is restitutionary, raising the question analysed in this article of whether an intended beneficiary can have a direct personal action in restitution to reverse the unjust enrichment of an unintended recipient. It seems that, though fraught, such an action may indeed in principle lie.     

‘Supportive Parenting’, Responsibility and Regulation: The Welfare Assessment under the Reformed Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (1990)

Section 13(5) of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 requires fertility clinics, before offering regulated treatment services, to take account of the welfare of any child who may be born as a result of the treatment and any other child affected by that birth. This paper presents the findings of an empirical study examining the impact on practice of the controversial reform of this section in 2008. While the broad values underpinning section 13(5) appear well embedded in clinic staff's engagement with ethical issues, there is little evidence that practice has been influenced by the 2008 amendments. A complex picture emerged regarding the implementation of section 13(5), particularly in its interaction with other factors, such as funding criteria and professional norms around counselling, implying a higher level of ongoing attention to likely parenting ability – particularly that of single women – than might be expected from a reading of the statute and guidance alone.     

Google liability for misleading or deceptive conduct: Australian perspective

On 6 of February 2013, the Australian High Court handed down an important decision in respect of the Google Inc's (Google) appeal against the decision of the Full Federal Court of Australia, holding that Google a search engine operator was not liable under s 52 of the Trade Practices Act (TPA) 1974 (Cth) for misleading or deceptive conduct (in respect of misleading advertisements published using Google's online ‘AdWords program’). The decision of the High Court is of great significance for jurisprudence on misleading and deceptive conduct with its broad implications for search engine providers such as Google, advertisers and trademark owners.     

Withdrawal of Parental Responsibility: Lost Authority and a Lost Opportunity

This comment examines Re D (Withdrawal of Parental Responsibility), the first reported Court of Appeal decision on withdrawal of parental responsibility pursuant to section 4(2A) of the Children Act 1989. It demonstrates that the Court overlooked earlier Court of Appeal authority, resulting in tension in the Court's guidance. The comment criticises the Court of Appeal's characterisation of parental responsibility as entirely child‐centred and its uncritical acceptance that the child's welfare is the paramount consideration in applications for withdrawal of parental responsibility. It argues that such an approach may not adequately respect the parent's interests in retaining parental responsibility, especially in the context of an order which is more draconian in effect than a care order. The impact upon applications for removal of parental responsibility of the new presumption of parental involvement, which was implemented shortly after the decision in Re D, is also considered.     

Denying Foreign State Immunity on the Grounds of the Unavailability of Alternative Means

Granting immunity from suit to a foreign state or an international organisation, deprives the plaintiff of access to court and appears incompatible with the rule of law. Since the European Court of Human Rights judgment in Waite v Germany (1999), the availability of alternative means for dispute settlement has been emphasised in the context of international organisation immunity. However in the case of foreign state immunity, this approach was not taken by the European Court of Human Rights in Al-Adsani v United Kingdom (2001) nor by the House of Lords in Jones v Ministry of the Interior of Saudi Arabia (2006). Likewise, foreign state immunity would be granted under the UN State Immunity Convention of 2004, regardless of whether there are alternative means. This Convention, rather than enhancing the rule of law, could lead to its attenuation. That several of these cases involve immunity in cases of torture sharpens their sensitivity.     

Legislating Dangerously: Bad Samaritans,Good Society,and the Heroism Act 2015

The Social Action, Responsibility and Heroism Act 2015 is a troublesome statute. The Act requires that, when considering a claim brought against a defendant in negligence or for breach of statutory duty, the court must assess whether that party was ‘acting for the benefit of society or any of its members’ (section 2), or ‘demonstrated a predominantly responsible approach towards protecting the safety or interests of others’ (section 3), or was ‘acting heroically’ (section 4). However laudable the Coalition Government's attempts to foster a ‘Big Society’ might have been, this enactment was not the proper vehicle to achieve it. Some provisions merely repeat longstanding common law principles. Others may have been intended to amend the common law to encourage ‘good citizenship’, but fall well short of that aim. And some aspects of the Act's drafting have the (perhaps unintended) potential to sit uncomfortably with established common law negligence principles.     

Insurance Fraud and the Role of the Civil Law

Two UK Supreme Court decisions have considered insurance fraud. The first, Versloot Dredging BV v HDI‐Gerling Industries Versicherung (The DC Merwestone), concerned the use of a fraudulent device being harnessed to support a legitimate claim which, in the view of the majority, was an area of insurance law in need of re‐evaluation. The second, Haywood v Zurich Insurance Co, concerned the use of fraud to increase the settlement paid by the insurer and whether an insurer, which suspects fraud but has nevertheless chosen to settle a claim, is entitled to set aside the settlement under the tort of deceit where it subsequently discovers proof that it was in fact fraudulent. This case note examines not only the legal implications of the decisions and their likely impact on industry practice, it also focuses on the broader issue of the proper province of the civil law and whether general deterrence can be justified as a proper objective where the criminal law is deficient in punishing fraud because of its higher standard of proof.     

How to control interception-does the UK strike the right balance?

This Article critically analyses the regime for intercepting the content of communications under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 in the light of the recent ruling by the European Court of Human Rights in Kennedy v the UK. It looks at the safeguards for privacy protection provided such as the requirement for a warrant and the roles of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal and the Interception of Communications Commissioner and whether these safeguards are compliant with Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights.     

《谢尔曼法》第2条意义上的“垄断”

《谢尔曼法》第2条所调整的＂垄断＂行为,有三个构成要件：行为人必须具有垄断力,而且从事了限制竞争行为,并且这种行为是出于＂特定的意图＂。长期以来,前两个要件的含义与证明方法相对确定,但在＂意图＂的证明上,不同时期有不同的做法。而进入新经济时代以后,在新经济产业,评价垄断地位的传统反垄断法理论受到挑战,市场份额不再是最主要的衡量标准,适用第2条的重心很大程度上转移到市场进入壁垒的考察上。通过经典判例进行考察,可以阐明第2条发展演进的一般过程,从而澄清其含义与分析方法。