Benefit adequacy among elderly Social Security retired-worker beneficiaries and the SSI federal benefit rate

Both target effectiveness and administrative simplicity are desirable properties in the design of minimum benefit packages for public retirement programs. The federal benefit rate (FBR) of the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program has been proposed by some analysts as a potentially attractive basis of establishing a new minimum benefit for Social Security on both of these grounds. This type of proposal is related to a broader array of minimum benefit proposals that would establish a Social Security benefit floor based on the poverty rate. In contrast to Social Security, the SSI program is means tested, including both an income and asset screen and also a categorical eligibility screen (the requirement to qualify as aged or disabled). The SSI FBR provides an inflation-adjusted, guaranteed income floor for aged and disabled people with low assets. The FBR has been perceived by proponents as a minimal measure of Social Security benefit adequacy because it represents a subpoverty income level for a family of one or two depending on marital status. For this same reason it has been seen as a target-effective tool of designing a minimum Social Security benefit. An FBR-based minimum benefit has also been viewed as administratively simple to implement; the benefit can be calculated from Social Security administrative records using a completely automated electronic process. Therefore-in contrast to the SSI program itself-an FBR-based minimum benefit would incur virtually no ongoing administrative costs, would not require a separate application for a means-tested program, and would avoid the perception of welfare stigma. While these ideas have been discussed in the literature and among policymakers in the United States over the years, and similar proposals have been considered or implemented in several foreign countries, there have been no previous analyses measuring the size of the potentially affected beneficiary population. Nor has there been any systematic assessment of the FBR as a measure of benefit adequacy or the tradeoffs between potential target effectiveness and administrative simplicity. Based on a series of simulations, we assess the FBR as a potential foundation for minimum Social Security benefits and we examine the tradeoffs between administrative simplicity and target effectiveness using microdata from the 1996 panel of the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). Our empirical analysis is limited to Social Security retired-worker beneficiaries aged 65 or older. We start with the assessment of the FBR as a measure of benefit adequacy. We are particularly concerned about two types of error: (1) incorrectly identifying some Social Security beneficiaries as "economically vulnerable," and (2) incorrectly identifying others as "not economically vulnerable." Operationally we measure economic vulnerability by two alternative standards. One of our measures considers beneficiaries with family income below the official poverty threshold as vulnerable. Our second measure is more restrictive; it uses a family income threshold equal to 75 percent of the official poverty threshold. We find that a substantial minority of retired workers have Social Security benefits below the FBR. The results also show that the FBR-based measure of Social Security benefit adequacy is very imprecise in terms of identifying economically vulnerable people. We estimate that the vast majority of beneficiaries with Social Security benefits below the FBR are not economically vulnerable. Conversely, an FBR-level Social Security benefit threshold fails to identify some beneficiaries who are economically vulnerable. Thus an FBR-level minimum benefit would be poorly targeted in terms of both types of errors we are concerned about. An FBR-level minimum benefit would provide minimum Social Security benefits to many people who are clearly not poor. Conversely, an FBR-level minimum benefit would not provide any income relief to some who are poor. The administrative simplicity behind these screening errors also results in additional program cost that may be perceived as substantial. We estimate that an FBR-level minimum benefit would increase aggregate program cost for retired workers aged 65 or older by roughly 2 percent. There are two fundamental reasons for these findings. First, the concept of an FBR-level minimum benefit looks at the individual or married couple in artificial isolation; however, the family is the main consumption unit in our society. The income of an unmarried partner or family members other than a married spouse is ignored. Second, individuals and couples may also have income from sources other than Social Security or SSI, which is also ignored by a simple FBR-based minimum benefit concept. The substantial empirical magnitude of measurement error arising from these conceptual simplifications naturally leads to the assessment of the tradeoff between target effectiveness and administrative simplicity. To facilitate this analysis, we simulate the potential effect of alternative screening methods designed to increase target effectiveness; while reducing program cost, such alternatives also may increase administrative complexity. For example, considering the combined Social Security benefit of a married couple (rather than looking at the husband and wife in isolation) might substantially increase target effectiveness with a relatively small increase in administrative complexity. Adding a family income screen might increase administrative complexity to a greater degree, but also would increase target effectiveness dramatically. The results also suggest that at some point adding new screens-such as a comprehensive asset test-may drastically increase administrative complexity with diminishing returns in terms of increased target effectiveness and reduced program cost. Whether a broad-based minimum benefit concept that is not tied to previous work experience is perceived by policymakers as desirable or not may depend on several factors not addressed in this article. However, to the extent that this type of minimum benefit design is regarded as potentially desirable, the tradeoffs between administrative simplicity and target effectiveness need to be considered.     

Income and assets of Social Security beneficiaries by type of benefit

The SIPP data have provided a first look at the relative economic status of various types of Social Security beneficiaries. They have shown that the different types of Social Security beneficiaries face very different economic circumstances. Retired workers and wife beneficiaries have the highest family incomes adjusted for family size. Aged widows and minor children have the lowest family incomes, with high proportions of poor or near poor. And disabled workers are in between, but also have high proportions of poor or near poor. Retired-worker and wife beneficiary households also have considerably more asset holdings than disabled-worker or widow beneficiary households. Beneficiaries with high family incomes are very likely to live with relatives and to rely heavily on the relatives' income. The high-income families tend to have non-means-tested sources of family income other than Social Security amounting to substantial proportions of their total income and to have high asset holdings. Conversely, beneficiaries with low family incomes are very likely to live alone or with nonrelatives, to rely heavily on Social Security and means-tested benefits, and to have low asset holdings. A majority of ever-poor beneficiaries (with the exception of widow beneficiaries) are poor in only some months of a year. This situation is not consistent with the stereotype of beneficiaries living on fixed incomes. But the change in poverty status is often due to a change in the income of other family members rather than of the beneficiary. And in some cases, a change in poverty status occurs with little or no change in income as the cost of living rises.     

Development and evaluation of a survey-based type of benefit classification for the Social Security program

This attempt to classify Social Security beneficiaries by type of benefit using the new Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) has yielded promising results. Evaluations of the classification algorithm based on comparison of the estimated number of beneficiaries in each of the several categories to independent estimates of the number of beneficiaries indicate that in most instances a high percentage of each category has been identified. For the most part, age and monthly benefit amount size distributions seem reasonable. Furthermore, very few persons in the sample who were identified as Social Security beneficiaries could not be assigned to one or another of the benefit groups. The classification procedure also represents a marked improvement over earlier efforts to classify type of beneficiary that relied on data from the March Supplement to the Current Population Survey (CPS). Most importantly, the benefit classification scheme based on SIPP data appears to provide reasonably reliable distinctions between retired-worker and widow benefits for widowed women and permits the identification of retired-worker benefits for those women dually entitled to retired-worker and spouse benefits. In addition, the distinction between disabled- and retired-worker benefits for recipients aged 62-64 appears to be reasonably reliable, and for women under age 65, the classification procedure distinguishes between disabled-worker benefits on the one hand and widow and widowed mother benefits on the other. Finally, SIPP procedures for identifying minor child beneficiaries yield markedly better estimates than those available from the Current Population Survey. These improvements in the SIPP context are due entirely to the presence of information not collected in the CPS. The enhancement of the SIPP data set in turn resulted directly from an assessment of earlier work carried out by Projector and Bretz in the CPS context and on extensive research into the nature of Social Security reporting errors in the CPS. The superiority of the SIPP data set is linked principally to the presence of three pieces of information: the Medicare BIC, the direct question on reasons for benefit receipt asked of persons under age 65, and the direct measurement of recipiency and amount of benefits for minor children. Other items of some import include self-reported work disability, retirement status (ever retired from a job), previous marital status for currently married women, age first prevented from working due to a health condition, and Supplemental Security Income misreporting items.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 400 WORDS)     

Characteristics of the longest job for new disabled workers: findings from the New Beneficiary Survey

This article describes the characteristics of the longest job held by new disabled-worker beneficiaries responding to questions in the 1982 New Beneficiary Survey, conducted by the Social Security Administration in October-December 1982. The characteristics include pension coverage, job duration, employer type, occupation, and industry. Many disabled workers (about half the men and two-fifths of the women) reported having been covered by a pension plan. Pension coverage, pension receipt, and job tenure all increased with age, and older disabled workers had pension coverage similar to that of retired workers. Disabled and retired workers often differed in other job characteristics, but tended to become more similar with increasing age. Disabled workers were more likely to have had longest jobs with private employers and in operator-laborer occupations. When they were compared with the job characteristics of retired workers, the characteristics of disabled women exhibited less difference than did those of disabled men.     

Income of new disabled-worker beneficiaries and their families: findings from the New Beneficiary Survey

In 1982, disabled workers who came on the social security disability insurance rolls from mid-1980 to mid-1981 had median monthly incomes of less than $500 if they were unmarried and less than $1,300 if they were married. These median monthly income levels, which include the income of a spouse and minor children if present, are roughly half those of the noninstitutionalized population aged 25-64. Social security benefits are the most important source of income for disabled workers and their families: They account for 40 percent of the total family income of married disabled workers and 65 percent of the total income of unmarried disabled workers. Social security benefits provide at least half of all income for more than 80 percent of unmarried disabled-worker beneficiaries and for 50 percent of the married beneficiaries. For married disabled-worker beneficiaries, earnings of the spouse are the second most important income source. Spousal earnings account for 28 percent of total income. Pensions and asset income each account for about 10 percent of total income for these married beneficiaries. Earnings are not an important source of income for unmarried disabled-worker beneficiaries for whom they amount to only about 3 percent of total income. Pensions, asset income, and public transfers each account for about 10 percent of total income of the unmarried beneficiaries.     

A note on sampling variance estimates for Social Security program participants from the Survey of Income and Program Participation

The Census Bureau's Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) provides data that can be used to study the characteristics of Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program participants. It is important that estimates of sampling errors accompany such studies because the estimates may have large sampling errors due to the small number of sample cases available for specific analyses. The generalized sampling variances provided by the Census Bureau did not identify separately either program's participants and, therefore, do not pertain directly to analyses of these groups. This article describes an approach to the direct computation of sampling variances for OASDI and SSI program participants. The approach uses the pseudo stratum and half-sample codes available in SIPP public use data files. A table of generalized standard errors is constructed for participants of both programs aged 18 or older. Generalized standard errors could not be computed for child beneficiaries under age 18 because of a wide variation of design effects across subpopulation estimates.     

Social Security's special minimum benefit

Social Security's special minimum primary insurance amount (PIA) provision was enacted in 1972 to increase the adequacy of benefits for regular long-term, low-earning covered workers and their dependents or survivors. At the time, Social Security also had a regular minimum benefit provision for persons with low lifetime average earnings and their families. Concerns were rising that the low lifetime average earnings of many regular minimum beneficiaries resulted from sporadic attachment to the covered workforce rather than from low wages. The special minimum benefit was seen as a way to reward regular, low-earning workers without providing the windfalls that would have resulted from raising the regular minimum benefit to a much higher level. The regular minimum benefit was subsequently eliminated for workers reaching age 62, becoming disabled, or dying after 1981. Under current law, the special minimum benefit will phase out over time, although it is not clear from the legislative history that this was Congress's explicit intent. The phaseout results from two factors: (1) special minimum benefits are paid only if they are higher than benefits payable under the regular PIA formula, and (2) the value of the regular PIA formula, which is indexed to wages before benefit eligibility, has increased faster than that of the special minimum PIA, which is indexed to inflation. Under the Social Security Trustees' 2000 intermediate assumptions, the special minimum benefit will cease to be payable to retired workers attaining eligibility in 2013 and later. Their benefits will always be larger under the regular benefit formula. As policymakers consider Social Security solvency initiatives--particularly proposals that would reduce benefits or introduce investment risk--interest may increase in restoring some type of special minimum benefit as a targeted protection for long-term low earners. Two of the three reform proposals offered by the President's Commission to Strengthen Social Security would modify and strengthen the current-law special minimum benefit. Interest in the special minimum benefit may also increase because of labor force participation and marital trends that suggest that enhancing workers' benefits may be a more effective means of reducing older women's poverty rates than enhancing spousal or widow's benefits. By understanding the Social Security program's experience with the special minimum benefit, policymakers will be able to better anticipate the effectiveness of other initiatives to enhance benefits for long-term low earners. This article presents the most recent and comprehensive information available about the special minimum benefit in order to help policymakers make informed decisions about the provision's future. Highlights of the current special minimum benefit include the following: Very few persons receive the special minimum benefit. As of December 2001, about 134,000 workers and their dependents and survivors were entitled to a benefit based on the special minimum. Of those, only about 79,000 received a higher total benefit because of the special minimum; the other 55,000 were dually entitled. (In effect, when persons are eligible for more than one type of benefit--that is, they are dually eligible--the highest benefit payable determines total benefits. If the special minimum benefit is not the highest benefit payable, it does not increase total benefits paid.) As of February 2000, retired workers who were special minimum beneficiaries with unreduced benefits and were not dually entitled were receiving, on average, a monthly benefit of $510 per month. That amount is approximately $2,000 less than the annual poverty threshold for an aged individual. Special minimum benefits provide small increases in total benefits. For special minimum beneficiaries who were not dually entitled as of December 2001, the average special minimum monthly PIA was just $39 higher than the regular PIA. Most special minimum beneficiaries are female retired workers. About 90 percent of special minimum beneficiaries are retired workers, and 77 percent of those retired workers are women. The special minimum benefit has never provided poverty-level benefits. Maximum payable special minimum benefits (unreduced for early retirement) equal 85 percent of the poverty level for aged persons, down from 96 percent at the provision's inception. Major public policy considerations raised by this analysis include the following: Social Security benefits alone do not protect all long-term low earners from poverty. Low earners with 30 years of earnings equal to the annual full-time minimum wage who retired in selected years from 1982 to 2000 received benefits that were 3.9 percent to 20.1 percent below the poverty threshold, depending on the year they retired. For 40-year earners, the range was 3.9 percent to 15.3 percent below poverty. Furthermore, in 1993, 29.2 percent of retired-worker beneficiaries who were poor had 30 or more years of coverage. The size of the universe of persistently low earners with significant attachment to the covered workforce is unknown. Available research that examines two 28-month periods suggests that only 4 percent to 6 percent of full-time, full-period earners had below-minimum wages for more than 12 consecutive months. Targeting enhanced benefits only toward long-term, regular workers who are low earners is difficult under the current Social Security program. All else being equal, if total wage-indexed lifetime covered earnings are the same for both a full-career low earner and for a high earner who has worked only occasionally, then their Social Security benefits will be identical. Social Security has no information on number of hours worked, hourly wages, or other information that could distinguish between two such persons.     

Medicare utilization by disabled-worker beneficiaries: a longitudinal analysis

Medicare eligibility for Social Security disabled-worker beneficiaries begins after 2 years of cash benefit receipt. Extension of the current coverage is often proposed as a way to encourage beneficiaries to return to work. Little is known, however, about the long-run Medicare costs for the disabled and how costs vary by demographic and health characteristics. This article describes Medicare utilization and reimbursement amounts for 1974-81 for a cohort of disabled-worker beneficiaries under age 62 and first entitled to cash benefits in 1972. The data come from a first-time linkage of Disability Insurance program data with data on Medicare utilization. The tables provide a detailed look at several factors that are associated with variation in Medicare costs among beneficiaries and over time.     

Earnings histories of SSI beneficiaries working in December 1997.

Disabling conditions previously considered to be permanent and total are no longer viewed as automatic barriers to work. Medical advances, improved accommodations in the workplace, and changes in the nature of work for the working disabled have allowed many disabled people to rejoin the workforce. The Social Security Administration (SSA) has followed those developments with a view toward encouraging people receiving disability benefits to consider returning to work. To effectively target SSA's efforts and evaluate their success, information about previous work histories of the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) beneficiary population is used to provide baseline data. This article examines the earnings histories of 300,000 disabled SSI beneficiaries--one of the populations targeted by the expanded work-incentive measure under Public Law 106-70--who were working in December 1997. The article also investigates whether beneficiaries who are working have significant lifetime earnings and whether earnings patterns exist that might assist with SSA's work-support activities. SSI program records were matched to data in the Master Earnings File to explore the characteristics and earnings patterns before and after a person applies for benefits. The article addresses several questions: What are the general characteristics of disabled SSI beneficiaries? What are their earnings histories? Did they have an earnings record when they applied for SSI? Of the SSI beneficiaries working in December 1997, most tended to be younger than other disabled beneficiaries, to have some sort of mental disability, and to have earnings well below levels that would suggest their eventual, complete independence from the SSI cash benefits program. A look at past covered earnings revealed that the vast majority of SSI workers had a history of earnings before they applied for SSI benefits. Despite their severe impairments and age at the time of first eligibility, nearly 40 percent had earnings in 11 years or more. The amounts of those earnings were quite low, however, and were usually not high enough to preclude SSI eligibility. Examining the years immediately before and after the point of application indicated whether recent pre-application earnings were consistent with post-application return to work. Results were a bit surprising. They revealed that one-third of the 1997 SSI workers had no earnings, and another 28 percent returned to work despite having no earnings in the 4-year period before application. Persons receiving SSI because of mental retardation seemed to have poorer earnings histories than other workers but were more likely to return to work after application. That may be explained by their younger ages or may reflect the outside assistance they received in responding to SSA work incentives.     

Stochastic models of the Social Security trust funds

Each year in March, the Board of Trustees of the Social Security trust funds reports on the current and projected financial condition of the Social Security programs. Those programs, which pay monthly benefits to retired workers and their families, to the survivors of deceased workers, and to disabled workers and their families, are financed through the Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) Trust Funds. In their 2003 report, the Trustees present, for the first time, results from a stochastic model of the combined OASDI trust funds. Stochastic modeling is an important new tool for Social Security policy analysis and offers the promise of valuable new insights into the financial status of the OASDI trust funds and the effects of policy changes. The results presented in this article demonstrate that several stochastic models deliver broadly consistent results even though they use very different approaches and assumptions. However, they also show that the variation in trust fund outcomes differs as the approach and assumptions are varied. Which approach and assumptions are best suited for Social Security policy analysis remains an open question. Further research is needed before the promise of stochastic modeling is fully realized. For example, neither parameter uncertainty nor variability in ultimate assumption values is recognized explicitly in the analyses. Despite this caveat, stochastic modeling results are already shedding new light on the range and distribution of trust fund outcomes that might occur in the future.     

Income of new retired workers by age at first benefit receipt: findings from the New Beneficiary Survey

Using data from the New Beneficiary Survey (NBS) of the Social Security Administration (SSA), this article examines how income sources and total monthly income received by newly retired social security beneficiaries vary with the age at which the first benefit check was received. The NBS respondents who received a first benefit at age 65 or older were better off economically than were those who received a first benefit at ages 62-64. At the time of the interview, 18-30 months after receiving a first benefit, these older beneficiaries had higher levels of total income and were more likely to have income from earnings and assets. Pension receipt rates did not vary by the age at which the first social security benefit was received except for married women retired workers, for whom the rate was higher at the older ages. The largest proportion of aggregate income (slightly more than one-third) was derived from social security benefits. More than 90 percent of the NBS Medicare-only respondents--a sample of nonbeneficiaries who were eligible for monthly cash benefits but had established their entitlement only for the purpose of enrolling in the Medicare program--reported earnings income. They had lower rates of pension receipt and higher rates of asset income receipt than the retired workers. The Medicare-only respondents had substantially higher incomes than did retired workers, and most of their aggregate income was from earnings. The NBS retirees were generally in better financial condition than a group of social security beneficiaries aged 65 or older from all benefit categories in the Current Population Survey Income Supplement with whom they were compared.     

Reported reasons retired workers left their last job: findings from the New Beneficiary Survey

About a third of all new retired-worker beneficiaries who had stopped work reported that the main reason they left their last job was a desire to retire. The existence of health problems was the next most frequently given reason, and it was reported by about a fourth of the group. These responses were made to questions in the 1982 New Beneficiary Survey, conducted by the Social Security Administration (SSA) in October-December 1982. Recently retired workers not only said they wished to retire, but more of them began receiving benefits at age 62 than at older ages; by age 65 most were beneficiaries. Forty-five percent of the men and almost 54 percent of the women had already left their last job at the time they received their first benefit. Married women in particular had not only stopped work but frequently had left their last job more than 3 years before they received their first benefit check.     

Disability benefit coverage and program interactions in the working-age population

Over three-fourths of the working-age population in the United States is insured for Disability Insurance (DI); this group is protected against a total loss of earned income typically associated with severe disability. However, little is known about the role the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program plays in protecting against the financial consequences of severe disability for this population. We find that over one-third (36 percent) of the working-age population is covered by SSI in the event of a severe disability. Three important implications follow, which we discuss in sequence below: (1) SSI increases the overall coverage of the working-age population; (2) SSI enhances the bundle of cash benefits available to disabled individuals; and (3) interactions with other programs also enhance the safety net, most notably in the area of health insurance coverage. Ignoring these implications could lead to inaccurate inferences about disability program coverage, health insurance coverage, and the well-being of working-age individuals with disabilities. The first major finding is that SSI substantially increases overall cash benefit coverage. Thus SSI dramatically increases protection against the financial risk of disablement in the working-age population. While roughly 23 percent of the U.S. working-age population was not insured for DI in November 1996, SSI provides coverage for more than half of this seemingly "uncovered" population. An important innovation of our analysis is that we account for the possibility that many of those who appear ineligible for SSI based on current income could become eligible as a result of a disability shock that causes their earnings to drop. Thus the estimated proportion that is protected by SSI increases when the possibility of earnings loss because of disability is considered. Considering DI and SSI together, roughly 90 percent of the working-age population would be potentially covered for benefits in the event of a disability. Those who are covered by SSI--as opposed to those covered by DI alone-tend to be relatively young, less educated, and in relatively poor health. The remaining 10 percent or so are not covered by either DI or SSI. This group is economically vulnerable in some sense (they are poorer, older, and more likely to be women than those covered only by DI), but they are not as economically vulnerable in terms of income, resource holdings, and private health insurance coverage as those who are eligible for SSI. A disproportionate share of those who are not covered by either DI or SSI consists of married women. The second major finding is that SSI substantially enhances the bundle of available cash benefits. Roughly one-third of those covered by DI are initially covered by SSI as well. SSI enhances the bundle of available cash benefits through two mechanisms: (1) SSI provides cash payments during the 5-month DI waiting period, and (2) SSI supplements the DI benefit after the DI waiting period for people whose initial SSI payment is larger than the DI benefit. We find that the role of SSI cash payments is temporary for most of those who are initially covered by both SSI and DI: They would receive SSI during the DI waiting period, but would lose SSI eligibility afterwards because the higher DI benefit completely offsets the SSI benefit. However, a smaller group of DI beneficiaries with low DI benefit levels would continue to be covered by both SSI and DI after the DI waiting period because the relatively low DI benefit would not completely offset the SSI benefit. The third major finding is that interactions with other programs also substantially enhance the safety net. The most important interactions involve health insurance coverage. In the working-age population, Medicare is available to DI beneficiaries, but only after a 24-month waiting period. By contrast, SSI is an important pathway to Medicaid benefits for severely disabled adults with limited income and resources and has no waiting period. SSI can provide a pathway to health insurance coverage during the 24-month Medicare waiting period for some DI beneficiaries through providing access to Medicaid. Interactions with other programs, such as Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), Food Stamp, Unemployment Insurance (UI), workers' compensation (WC), and veterans' disability programs, modify the role of DI and SSI in protecting people against the adverse financial effects of disablement. The nature of the interactions with other programs differs depending on individual circumstances. Employment-related programs (including UI, WC, and veteran's disability programs) are particularly important for those who are covered by DI. By contrast, the means-tested programs (including TANF and Food Stamp) are more important for those who would be eligible for SSI. In conclusion, SSI plays a substantial role in protecting working-age people against the adverse financial consequences of disablement through three mechanisms: (1) providing coverage to many who are not DI insured; (2) providing additional cash benefits to many who are DI insured and also covered by SSI; and (3) enhancing the social safety net by interacting with other programs, most notably Medicaid. Through these mechanisms, the role of SSI is substantial enough that it cannot be safely ignored in econometric and policy research on DI.     

Income change at retirement

Less than one-fourth of SIPP retirees made the transition from full-time work and no benefit receipt to benefit receipt and no work during the 32 months of the 1984 SIPP panel, and these full retirees appear to differ economically from those who had not fully retired during the 32 months. Income declined to 60 percent of preretirement levels for those who received Social Security benefits and employer pensions, and to 46 percent for those who received only one type of benefit after ceasing full-time work. Family income cushioned the decline. About one-third of retirees had larger changes in income shortly before or after observed retirement transitions than right at the retirement transitions. Larger changes in income were associated with changing one's work effort. Asset income was quite variable across the entire panel. A monthly view of persons in various stages of retirement has brought into sharper focus than has previously been recognized the many paths into retirement, often over an extended period of time, during which status may change back and forth. A one-time or occasional extension of the SIPP to perhaps a 5-year period for the near-retirement-age population would increase the proportion of retirees for whom the full process is observed in such great detail. Alternatively, information on the timing of changes in labor-force and pension status may be collected in a proposed new Retirement History Study that calls for interviewing persons at 2-year intervals over a 10-year period for a more accurate picture of the retirement process.     

Using data for couples to project the distributional effects of changes in Social Security policy

Under Social Security program rules, the aged receive Social Security benefits either as retired workers, spouses, divorced spouses, or widow(er)s. Retired-worker benefits are paid to workers who have 40 quarters of coverage over their lives. Auxiliary benefits are paid to spouses, divorced spouses, and widow(er)s of retired workers. Spouse benefits are computed using the earnings history of the current spouse for individuals who are married when they apply for benefits. Divorced spouse and widow(er) benefits are computed using the earnings history of the ex-spouse or deceased spouse with the highest PIA. A large number of retired women are entitled to auxiliary benefits. Some women receive only auxiliary benefits, while the majority of women have their retired-worker benefit supplemented by auxiliary benefits. Because the level of Social Security benefits can reflect the relative lifetime earnings of both spouses, as a couple, using individual data to estimate Social Security benefits will tend to underestimate actual benefits, particularly for women. However, detailed data for couples are often difficult to obtain. There is currently no known single data source that includes both marital and earnings history information. As a result, many researchers resort to estimating Social Security benefits using individual data or aggregate data, such as the average earnings of men and women. The Social Security Administration's Office of Research, Evaluation, and Statistics, with substantial assistance from the Brookings Institution, the Urban Institute, and the RAND Corporation, is developing a model that overcomes this problem by using the marital and earnings histories of both marital partners to estimate Social Security benefits. The Modeling Income in the Near Term (MINT) model projects retirement income (Social Security benefits, pension income, asset income, and earnings of working beneficiaries) from 1997 through 2031 for current and future Social Security beneficiaries using a unique data source--the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP)--matched to Social Security Administration records. Using MINT data, this article establishes the importance of using data for couples rather than individuals by examining the impact of changing Social Security benefits to reflect 40 years of lifetime earnings rather than the 35 years required under current law. We compare the effect of this policy change on married women by estimating their benefits with data for couples and with individual data. Results indicate that: Using individual data overestimates the projected reduction in retirement benefits brought about by the policy change and makes the effects on women look more severe than they actually are. Because older birth cohorts are more likely than younger cohorts to receive auxiliary benefits based on their husbands' average lifetime earnings, the bias created by using individual data is projected to be much larger for older cohorts than for younger cohorts. This article emphasizes the importance of using data for couples to estimate Social Security benefits, particularly for women. Although our focus is on married women, using data for couples is just as important for calculating the retirement benefits of divorced and widowed individuals. For individuals who are divorced or widowed at retirement, their Social Security benefits are based on their own earnings history, as well as the earnings histories of each of their previous spouses.     

Asset holdings of the newly disabled: findings from the New Beneficiary Survey

About 3 out of 4 new disabled-worker beneficiaries or their spouses owned some type of financial asset in 1982, but the median value of these assets was quite small, according to data obtained by the Social Security Administration in its New Beneficiary Survey. A smaller majority reported owning their own homes, and home equity accounted for most of the reported wealth. Barely a tenth reported that they owned farms, businesses, or commercial property. Differences in age and marital status within the newly disabled population were associated with large differences in asset holdings. Married couples and older disabled workers generally were more likely to own each kind of asset, and generally reported higher values for these assets. Older married men--the largest subgroup among the disabled--are also relatively well-off, though their median asset portfolios were worth only +3,600 when home equity was excluded. Younger single men, the third largest subgroup, reported median total assets worth less than +50, however home equity was treated. The asset ownership rates and median values reported by the new disabled-worker beneficiaries are much lower for every type of asset considered than the rates and values reported by a comparable sample of new retired-worker beneficiaries.     

Unearned income of Supplemental Security Income recipients, May 1982

About 3 out of 5 Supplemental Security Income recipients have some type of unearned income. The major source of this income is Social Security benefits. Other sources are veterans' pensions, pensions from employment, asset income, and support and maintenance in-kind. This article presents for the first time detailed estimates of the distributions of these income sources, based on a 1-percent sample of May 1982 recipients. In two-thirds of the cases, the Social Security benefits were between $100 and $260 a month. Unearned income from sources other than Social Security was usually smaller. Only 5 percent of the SSI population received less tha $100 in Social Security benefits. Differences in distributions for retired-worker and disabled-worker benefits, and for widow's and children's benefits are noted.     

Disabled-worker beneficiaries under OASDI: comparison with severely disabled PA recipients.

The 1972 Survey of Disabled and Nondisabled Adults found that more than 1 million severely disabled persons aged 20-64 were receiving payments under Federal-State public assistance programs. To determine the reasons why most of these individuals did not qualify for disabled-worker benefits under the social security program, their characteristics were compared with those of the approximately 1.5 million disabled-worker beneficiaries. The public assistance recipients were found to be younger and less well educated than their disabled-worker beneficiary counterparts. A greater proportion of them were women and more were members of minority races. Public assistance recipients became disabled at an earlier age and had been disabled longer. Compared with disabled-worker beneficiaries, they had held less skilled jobs, had earned less money, and had had a weaker attachment to the labor force. These characteristics greatly reduced their chances of qualifying for disabled-worker benefits. Lack of knowledge about the program was also an important contributing factor.     

Modeling SSI financial eligibility and simulating the effect of policy options

This article simulates eligibility for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) among the elderly, analyzes factors affecting participation, and looks at the potential effects of various options to modify financial eligibility standards for the federal SSI program. We find that in the estimated noninstitutional elderly population of 30.2 million in the United States in 1991, approximately 2 million individuals aged 65 or older were eligible for SSI (a 6.6 percent rate of eligibility). Our overall estimate of the rate of participation among eligible elderly is approximately 63 percent, suggesting that more than a third of those who are eligible do not participate in the program. The results of our analysis of factors affecting participation among the eligible elderly show that expected SSI benefits and a number of demographic and socioeconomic variables are associated with the probability of participation. We also simulate the effects of various policy options on the poverty rate, poverty gap, annual program cost, the number of participants, and the average estimated benefits among participants. The simulations consider the potential effects of five policy alternatives: Increase the general income exclusion (GIE) from $20 to $80. Increase the earned income exclusion (EIE) from $65 to $260. Increase the federal benefit rate (FBR) by $50 for individuals and $75 for couples and eliminate the GIE. Increase the asset threshold to $3,000 for individuals and $4,500 for couples. Increase the asset threshold to $6,000 for individuals and $9,000 for couples. Using 1991 microdata from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) matched to Social Security Administration administrative records and making adjustments reflecting aggregate program statistics, we present the results of our simulations for December 1999. The results show substantial variation in the simulated effects of the five policy alternatives along the various outcome dimensions considered. The simulated effects on the poverty gap of the elderly population range from a 7.9 percent reduction ("Increase the GIE from $20 to $80") to a 0.1 percent reduction ("Increase the EIE from $65 to $260"). All simulated interventions are expected to increase the rate of SSI participation among the elderly from a high of 20.3 percent ("Increase the GIE from $20 to $80") to a low of 0.5 percent ("Increase the EIE from $65 to $260"). We also find that the interventions that have greater estimated effects in terms of increased participation and reduced poverty tend to cost more. At the high end, we estimate that increasing the GIE from $20 to $80 could raise annual federal SSI cash benefit outlays by about 46 percent, compared with only 0.9 percent for increasing the EIE from $65 to $260. Similar to the EIE intervention, raising the resource thresholds by 50 percent would reduce the overall poverty gap of the elderly by only 0.2 percent, would increase SSI participation only modestly (by 1.3 percent), but would entail slightly higher program costs (by 1.4 percent). Increasing the asset threshold by 200 percent would have higher estimated effects on all three outcomes, but it would still be associated with relatively low increases in both costs and benefits. Finally, the simulated effects on the three key outcomes of increasing the FBR by $50 for individuals and $75 for couples, combined with eliminating the GIE, are relatively large but are clearly less substantial than increasing the GIE from $20 to $80. This work relies on data from the SIPP matched to administrative data on federal SSI benefits that provide a more accurate picture of SSI participation than has been feasible for previous studies. We simulate eligibility for federal SSI benefits by applying the program rules to detailed information on the characteristics of individuals and couples based on the rich array of demographic and socioeconomic data in the SIPP, particularly the comprehensive information SIPP provides on assets and monthly income. A probit model is estimated to analyze factors affecting participation among the eligible elderly. Finally, we conduct the policy simulations using altered program rules represented by the policy alternatives and predicted participation probabilities to estimate outcomes under simulated program rules. We compare those simulated outcomes to observed outcomes under current program rules. The results of our simulations are conditional on the characteristics of participants and eligibles in 1991, but they also reflect aggregate adjustments capturing substantial changes in overall participation and program benefit levels between 1991 and 1999.     

Eligibility for the Medicare buy-in programs, based on a survey of income and program participation simulation.

Medicare buy-in programs are designed to reduce out-of-pocket expenses of beneficiaries with modest income and assets. This article provides estimates of the size of the Medicare beneficiary population eligible for the Qualified Medicare Beneficiary (QMB) program, the Specified Low-Income Medicare Beneficiary (SLMB) program, and the Qualified Individual-1 (QI-1) program. The buy-in programs use the same resource limits (twice those used in the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program) but different thresholds for determining income eligibility. The QMB program uses 100 percent of the poverty line as the cutoff, QI-1 covers persons above 120 percent but at or below 135 percent of the poverty line, and the SLMB program is in between. Making informed judgments about the rate of participation in the buy-in programs and the need for outreach requires an accurate estimate of the size of the eligible population. If that population is underestimated, policymakers might come to unduly optimistic conclusions about current buy-in participation. In contrast, an overestimate may make current participation seem too low. If policymakers react to an upwardly biased estimate of the eligible population by increasing outreach, they are bound to be disappointed by the results of that effort. Estimates of the eligible population from past studies of the QMB and SLMB programs range from 5.1 million to 9.1 million. In the absence of new information, it is difficult to judge the accuracy of those estimates because the methodologies had substantial shortcomings that might bias the results. The most common shortcomings include the lack of high-quality, monthly income data and the lack of information on assets from the same data file that was used to estimate participation and income eligibility for Medicare. The current study uses the most recently available (as of August 2000) Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) file that is matched to the Social Security Administration's (SSA's) administrative records. The data file covers 1995 information. Estimates were also obtained using 1991 data to assess the sensitivity of eligibility estimates to the year chosen. The SIPP has several major advantages over other data sources because it contains relevant, high-quality information on both income and assets for establishing financial eligibility for the buy-in programs. First, the SIPP collects detailed and conceptually appropriate information on monthly, rather than annual, income and therefore has more complete information about income than do other surveys. As a result, SIPP-based estimates of poverty are substantially lower than estimates based on the Current Population Survey. Second, the SIPP also collects information on assets at the individual level. Thus, the survey provides enough detail to measure the major income and asset exclusions directly. Finally, the SIPP data are matched to SSA administrative records: Medicare eligibility can therefore be accurately measured, and self-reported data on Social Security and SSI benefits can be replaced with more accurate monthly information. Our 1995 simulation estimates that approximately 4.8 million persons in the U.S. noninstitutionalized population were eligible for the QMB program and an additional 1.6 million for the SLMB program. The total--roughly 6.5 million--is within the range of estimates from past studies but is closer to the lower end, suggesting that the eligible population is smaller than was previously believed. When the estimated QI-1 eligible population of 0.9 million is added, the total for the three buy-in programs is 7.4 million. Because the QI-1 program did not exist in 1995, only the estimated 6.5 million QMBs and SLMBs would actually have been eligible to receive benefits. The 7.4 million figure represents the 1995 Medicare beneficiaries who would be eligible for buy-in under program rules for 2000. Adjusting that number to account for increases in the Medicare population between 1995 and 1999 yields an estimated eligible population of 7.8 million in 1999. Compared with other elderly Medicare recipients, eligible elderly QMBs and SLMBs have poorer health, more functional limitations, and higher rates of health care use. Thus, not only are their income resources relatively limited, but their need for potentially expensive medical care is also greater. Similar differences were not found in health, functional limitations, and health care use among disabled participants in the QMB and SLMB programs. Our estimates imply that about 2.5 million noninstitutionalized individuals were eligible for but not enrolled in the QMB and SLMB programs in 1999. That finding suggests that fewer eligibles may be available for targeting by outreach efforts than was previously believed. Outreach may be more difficult than it would be with a larger eligible population. (ABSTRACT TRUNCATED)