Real Property, Spontaneous Order, and Norms in the Gold Mines

This article contributes to the current debate about why people follow the law even when they are not subject to legal sanctions, as when there are no police and little danger of a lawsuit. Most recent scholarship in this area takes the form of norms theories, suggesting that social norms rather than laws shape behavior and that deviations from the norm are punished by either social or internal sanctions. Robert Sugden, however, proposes that order may develop "spontaneously" in the many areas of life where abiding by the rules minimizes the risk of costly confrontations with others and is thus in the interest of all parties. When this is true, the threat of little or no sanctions plays no role in regulating behavior. This article tests Sugden's theory against a simple property system, that of the California gold mines, in which individual miners held small claims subject to strict work requirements. The evidence of eyewitnesses shows that the stability of the regime did not depend on norms, but on the reasonable prediction that other claim holders would themselves stand up for their rights under the local mining code. Disputes about the rules and their application were submitted to arbitrators, whose decisions were accepted by the parties and did not need to be enforced. The California experience thus provides an example of a stable property regime for which game theory has a more satisfying explanation than do any of the norms theories.     

Ruling by Favors: Prison Guards' Informal Exercise of Institutional Control

This ethnographic research addresses the control strategies employed by Norwegian guards in everyday interactions with inmates under institutional conditions in which the use of official negative sanctions is restricted. The article explains how a complicated informal system of favors develops that forms a new basis for punishment through the withdrawal of rewards. By distributing favors liberally, giving an inmate only what he is entitled to serves as a substitute for negative sanctions. Inmates are not opposing the informal system, and its effect on ensuring institutional control does not challenge the intentions of formal prison rules. Still, the informal system must be monitored and protected against overuse by inmates and must also be kept hidden from the officials making up the prison administration who oppose all departures from the official rules.     

Examining the Effects of Community-Based Sanctions on Offender Recidivism

Offenders who violate their conditions of release (parole violators) pose a threat to public safety and a unique challenge for parole officials. Historically, parole officers have simply revoked the parole of these offenders and returned them to prison; however, increases in state correctional populations have forced many jurisdictions to experiment with sanctions administered by parole officers in the community. Community‐based sanctions are sanctions administered by parole officers as consequences for noncompliance with release conditions that are ultimately intended to reduce parole violators’ odds of recidivism. Yet, the effects of these types of sanctions are still relatively unknown. Drawing from perspectives on formal and informal social control, this study involved an examination of the effect of community‐based sanctions on parole violators’ odds of recidivism. Findings revealed that formal controls such as community‐based sanctions that were applied with certainty, severity, and in a swift manner along with informal controls such as measures of offenders’ stake in conformity had effects on parole violators’ odds of recidivism and time to recidivism.     

Norms,Institutions, and Institutional Facts

Norms explained as grounds of practical judgment, using example of queue. Some norms informal, inexact, depend on common understanding (‘conventions’); some articulated in context of two-tier normative order: ‘rules’, explicit or implicit. Logical structure of rules displayed. Informal and formal normative order explained, ‘institutional facts’ depend on acts and events interpreted in the light of normative order. Practical force of rules differentiated; either ‘absolute application’ or ‘strict application’ or ‘discretionary application’, depending on second-tier empowerment. Discretion can be guided by values, principles standards. Pervasiveness of institutions and institutional facts, especially but not only in relation to institutions of state-law, including constitution and state-institutions. Searle's and Ruiter's theories of institution, institutional fact, considered: ‘constitutive rule’ rejected in favour of ‘underlying principle’, structure of ‘institutive, consequential and terminative’ rules explained and defended. Ruiter's conception of ‘institutional’régime' considered and adopted, validity of norms and normative 'régimes' considered and differentiated from truth of statements of institutional fact.     

Morality, social norms and the rule of law as transaction cost-saving devices: the case of ancient Athens

The importance of the institutional framework for economic development is widely accepted today and it is duly stressed in the economic literature. The protection of property rights, the enforcement of contracts and an efficient legal system are the pillars of the contemporary rule of law. However, formal institutions cannot function without being internalized by the citizens and without the strong backing of social norms. Morality and social norms are the major elements of the informal institutional structure, the social capital, which is also critical for social welfare and economic development. In this paper we will discuss both the formal and the informal institutional framework of Ancient Athens, which was a free market society with economic problems similar to contemporary market societies. Athenians developed a highly sophisticated legal framework for the protection of private property, the enforcement of contracts and the efficient resolution of disputes. Such an institutional framework functioned effectively, cultivating trust and protecting the security of transactions. This entire system however was based on social norms such as reciprocity, the value of reputation and widely accepted business ethics. Conformity to social norms as well as moral behavior was fostered by social sanction mechanisms (such as stigma) and moral education. The Athenian example is a further proof of the importance of morality and social norms as transaction cost-saving devices even in quite sophisticated legal systems. Their absence or decline leads inevitably to the need for more regulation and litigation and to a growing preference for clear-cut rules instead of discretionary standards. Athenian law was pioneering in the development of rules and institutional mechanisms suitable for the reduction of transaction costs, many of them surviving in the most complex contemporary legal systems.     

What happens when a reform works? The need to study unanticipated consequences of mandatory processing of domestic violence

One of the primary facets of the sociology of law is concerned with the relationships between formal rules and regulations having the force of governmental social control and the values, norms and practices of those who enforce them (or not). This “law in action” perspective enables research to test out the differential impact on legal decisions of both formal and informal aspects of social control (Hawkins, 1992). One of the limitations of recent work on domestic violence is that it focuses too narrowly on one or two negative sanctions, e.g., arrest or restraining orders, to the exclusion of the other options and the mix of formal and informal decisions in the criminal justice system as a whole (Reiss, 1974). This research attempts through a close analysis of the workings of the Quincy, Massachusetts criminal justice system in response to domestic violence, to identify the consequences, unanticipated and anticipated, of decisions made in several domains (public, police, prosecutors, and courts) of the criminal justice system. This study uses in-depth interviews with batterers, victims and criminal justice agency and related personnel as well as agency policies, training materials and records to examine possible unintended consequences of aggressive intervention in cases of domestic violence. This study will explore the impact of the Quincy Domestic Violence Program, considered to be a national model, on the lives of victims and offenders who are treated by the court. We have selected the District Court at Quincy, Massachusetts as our research site. It has a well deserved national reputation treating abusers systematically from the initial intake by arresting officers through close supervision in probation.     

PERCEIVED SANCTION THREATS,GENDER, AND CRIME: A TEST AND ELABORATION OF POWER‐CONTROL THEORY*

This research addresses the need to incorporate the perceived threats of informal sanctions, specifically, shame and embarrassment, into the power‐control model. First, the possibility that gender differences exist in the perceived threats of shame and embarrassment, as well as legal sanctions, and that these differences vary between more patriarchal and less patriarachal households of origin is explored. Second, the relative impact of the informal sanction threat variables compared with the formal legal sanctions is ascertained. Results indicate that significant gender differences exist in the perceived threats of embarrassment and formal sanctions, and that these differences vary by household of origin type. In addition, among those individuals reared in more patriarachal households, the perceived threat of shame accounts for a significant proportion of the gender‐crime relationship.     

从排队秩序到宪法秩序——麦考密克的制度法律理论核心命题

使得规范成为规范的并不是规范本身,而是在规范之外的共同信念。这种信念是包括宪法秩序在内的所有秩序得以成立的基础。这就是英国学者麦考密克在他的《法律的制度》一书中阐释的内容,他用排队这个通俗易懂、每个人都有的实际经验阐明了不依赖于明确表述的规范的社会实践和社会秩序的存在,并分离出了不同于规范的事务,即实践者之间相互的行为期待。而正是这种信念才是秩序的最终来源,而正式规则和权威等概念同样建立在这种秩序之上。     

Misperceived Neighborhood Values and Informal Social Control

Social disorganization theory explains the effects of neighborhood structure and culture on crime and delinquency. Within this perspective, the role of neighborhood informal social control is argued to be an important protective factor against many social problems. While a growing body of research supports the importance of informal social control, we still have limited understanding of its development. Of the research that does exist in this area, most examines structural processes supporting informal social control, while cultural aspects of communities have only rarely been examined. We further develop this limited body of research by drawing on the prevention literature that focuses on social norms and their misperceptions. Specifically, this study examines the role of pluralistic ignorance regarding neighborhood values on the likelihood of informal social control. The results are discussed in relation to social norms theory and their relevance for crime‐prevention strategies.     

Can young pups teach an old Dog new tricks? Lessons for British reformers from eastern Europe's new constitutional democracies

This article analyses the process of constitutional reforms in eastern Europe and draws lessons for similar reforms in British politics. It looks, first, at electoral engineering and shows how political actors, pursuing their particular interests, try to turn proportionality back into majoritarianism, and how and why such moves do not necessarily result in their projected outcomes. In a similar vein, it then goes on to analyse parliamentary formal rules, such as standing orders, and demonstrates how attempts to manipulate them can be offset, not just by counter‐manipulation, but by underlying informal rules and cultural norms. Overall, we argue that, because constitutional change is an ongoing and crucially political process, its results are neither wholly predictable nor always welcomed. On the basis of the eastern European experience, we also suggest that constitutional change does not necessarily lead to increased legitimacy of the system, thus undermining one of the major hopes of reformers in Britain.     

Informal,Inquisitorial, and Accurate: An Empirical Look at a Problem‐Solving Housing Court

Substantive justice is often seen as elusive in courts dominated by low‐income individuals. Complex court rules, coupled with pervasive lack of counsel, can make it difficult for the traditional adversary process to identify and redress legitimate grievances. This article takes on the social problem of substandard housing and examines whether inquisitorial procedure has the potential to produce accurate outcomes in a tribunal dominated by the unrepresented. Relying on in‐court observations of nearly 300 hearings, and a longitudinal review of nearly seventy‐five cases, this article surfaces the regularized procedures utilized by a purported “problem‐solving” housing court, and theorizes that the inquisitorial features of judicially controlled investigation and enforcement may motivate landlords to repair substantiated housing code violations. This article adds nuance to our understanding of informal justice by identifying the hidden procedural formalisms that may guide alternative decision‐making processes. Furthermore, it evaluates the relationship of one iteration of experimental formalism to substantive justice, and suggests that inquisitorial procedures may be correlated with improved accuracy in case outcomes.     

Back to Basics: A Theory of the Emergence of Institutional Facts

In order to account for the mode of existence of social rules and norms, the author develops a theory of the emergence of institutional facts. Just as other kinds of institutional fact, rules and norms are meanings. Therefore, insight into the emergence of social rules and norms can be achieved by studying the recognition and the communication of meanings. Following accounts of meaning and factuality, institutional facts are characterized as unquestionable shared typifications. It is argued that, in becoming an institutional fact, a typification goes through two phases. First, it becomes a social habit. Second, this habit turns into an obligation by being objectified.     

LEVELS OF SOCIAL INTEGRATION IN GROUP CONTEXTS AND THE EFFECTS OF INFORMAL SANCTION THREAT ON DEVIANCE*

Contextual data from a unique study (Notre Dame Study of Catholic Parish Life) are used to test multilevel models predicting three types of deviance ranging from excessive drinking to tax evasion. Measures representing informal sanction threat and aggregate-level social integration as well as the interaction of these variables displayed the net effects that were predicted only for those types of deviance that appear to be less impulsive. In general, the deterrent effects of informal sanctions were found to be strongest in communities characterized by high levels of social integration.     

POLICE SUBCULTURE RECONSIDERED

Most comprehensive discussions of the police acknowledge the inability of legal and bureaucratic regulations to determine officer behavior. Attention is turned instead toward the informal norms developed within the police subculture. These discussions, however, tend to overstress the chasm between the formal and informal. They also provide inadequate tools for understanding differentiation, conflict, and change within police departments. I address these shortcomings here by mobilizing a particular conceptualization of the term "normative order"—as a set of rules and practices oriented around a central value. Six such orders are crucial to policing: law, bureaucratic control, adventure/machismo, safety, competence, and morality. I illustrate the importance of each by drawing upon ethnographic observations of the Los Angeles Police Department, and explain how my conceputalization offers a comprehensive yet flexible means to understand the social world of policing.     

When Do We Think About Detection? Structural Opportunity and Taxpaying Behavior

Past studies have generally found that perceptions of the likelihood of formal and informal sanctions have lower explanatory power of noncompliance with laws than do internalized norms. Using data from two telephone surveys, we examined a situational characteristic, structural opportunity, that may prod individuals to think about the likelihood of detection from the Internal Revenue Service for underreporting income. Structural opportunity is the degree to which an individual's economic or social situation provides ways to avoid detection. Individuals with high structural opportunity perceived a lower likelihood of IRS detection and indicated that they were less likely to feel guilty if they engaged in tax cheating. Our data also suggested that some individuals with high structural opportunity may be in social networks which condone tax cheating. As expected, structural opportunity provided a condition under which individuals took into consideration the perceived likelihood of formal and informal detection in formulating intentions to engage in tax cheating. Our findings suggest that an examination of the interaction between situational and individual characteristics will provide a more complete understanding of decisions to engage in illegal behavior. Implications for deterrence theory are discussed.     

The Social Side of Sanctions: Personal and Social Norms as Moderators of Deterrence

In a survey of Australian citizens (valid N = 1,406), personal and social norms were found to moderate effects of deterrence on tax evasion. Personal, internalized norms of tax honesty were negatively related to tax evasion and moderated the effects of deterrence variables (i.e., sanction severity), suggesting deterrence effects only when individual ethics were weak. Perceived social norms, beyond those internalized as personal norms, were not directly related to tax evasion but moderated the effects of sanction severity. Only when social norms were seen as strongly in favor of tax honesty was sanction severity negatively related to tax evasion. This result held only for respondents who did not identify strongly as Australians. Hence, when internalized, norms delimit effects of deterrence; when considered external to one's self norms boost deterrence effects, giving social meaning to formal sanctions.     

The Evolutionary Game‐Theoretic Foundations of Law

Interdisciplinary work in the law often starts and stops with the social sciences. To produce a complete understanding of how law, evolutionary game‐theoretic insights must, however, supplement these more standard social scientific methods. To illustrate, this article critically examines The Force of Law by Frederick Schauer and The Expressive Powers of Law by Richard McAdams. Combining the methods of analytic jurisprudence and social psychology, Schauer clarifies the need for a philosophically respectable and empirically well‐grounded account of the ubiquity of legal sanctions. Drawing primarily on economic and social psychological paradigms, McAdams highlights law's potential to alter human behavior through expressions that coordinate. Still, these contributions generate further puzzles about how law works, which can be addressed using evolutionary game‐theoretic resources. Drawing on these resources, this article argues that legal sanctions are ubiquitous to law not only because they can motivate legal compliance, as Schauer suggests, but also because they provide the general evolutionary stability conditions for intrinsic legal motivation. In reaction to McAdams, this article argues that law's expressive powers can function to coordinate human behavior only because humans are naturally and culturally evolved to share a prior background agreement in forms of life. Evolutionary game‐theoretic resources can thus be used to develop a unified framework from within which to understand some of the complex interrelationships between legal sanctions, intrinsic legal motivation, and law's coordinating power. Going forward, interdisciplinary studies of how law works should include greater syntheses of contemporary insights from evolutionary game theory.     

When sanctions convey moral norms

Sanctions not only have the instrumental function of deterring people from undesired behavior but they also have the ability to convey moral norms. As such, they may create a moral motivation not to engage in the sanctioned behavior. This is desirable as this makes the success of a sanctioning system depend less on quality of enforcement. However, sanctions may not always succeed in conveying moral norms. In this paper, three conditions are highlighted that, in the psychology literature, have been empirically proven to influence whether a sanction succeeds to evoke moral norms. First, a sanction should not be regarded as a way to make up for the negative consequences of a transgression a sanction. So, they should be communicated in a retributive way rather than in a compensatory way. Second, as punishments communicate an obligatory rule and rewards communicate a voluntary rule, punishments are a better way to incur moral norms than rewards. Third, severe sanctions more strongly convey a moral norm than mild ones as long as these severe sanctions are not unreasonably severe, are installed by trustworthy authorities and in a fair way. The value of the moral expressive function of sanctions, as well as its drawbacks, are discussed.     

Economic analysis of pension fund’s laws for female heirs: case of Iran’s civil servants pension fund (CSPF)

The key twin objectives of pension and retirement system are income security and consumption smoothing for members and their family (heirs). Accordingly, pension funds worldwide devise laws that preserve and improve these key objectives. Laws that failed to take into account these objectives not only impose extra financial burden on the pension system, but also may pose undesirable social and economic effects. In this respect, economic analysis of pension laws would help lawmakers to make workable and implementable laws. Generally, economic analysis of law seeks to answer two basic questions regarding legal rules: what are the effects of legal rules on the behavior of relevant actors? And are these effects socially desirable? This paper examines the pension law of Iran’s civil servant pension fund (CSPF) for female heirs in light of the afore-mentioned key objectives of pension system, and from social justice point of view. The results from the analysis reveal that this does not only adhere to social justice and pension system’s main purpose, but also it imposes economic and social costs. The weak side of the law also creates financial burden on the pension fund, the young generation (paying pension benefits to the considered heirs from its contribution) and the public at large. The study also shows that life time payment of pensions to heirs by CSPF encourages late or informal marriages hence defecting acceptable social norms and may increase informal labor supply, creating a further problem in the labor market. The study thus recommends the need for reforming the existing law and rules of CSPF for female heirs.