转型后俄乌两国经济联系探析

苏联时期俄罗斯与乌克兰两个加盟共和国间的经济联系是一个有机的整体，苏联解体后，俄乌转变为两个相互间有着内在紧密联系的独立国家。由于乌克兰特殊的地缘经济政治地位，与欧洲经济一体化也同样是乌克兰优先发展的对外政策，在政治因素的影响下两国在能源、农产品和军工领域的合作进程发展缓慢。从长远来看，发展两国间的内在经济联系，促进两国间多领域合作是符合两国经济发展共同利益的方向。     

Whose House is this Anyway? IDP and Refugee Return in Post-Saddam Iraq

Although many people displaced by Saddam's regime over the yearslooked forward to returning as soon as the 2003 war ended, anumber of problems emerged which continued to bedevil the returnprocess as late as one year after the war. These problems includedan unclear political future for the country, competing politicaland sectarian forces that often view IDPs and refugees as strategictools or weapons, a hesitant and initially undecided Coalitionpolicy on the return issue, unclear mandates for the variousactors that could assist with returns, lack of funding, andmost importantly of all, an extremely poor security situationwhich has impeded or even blocked all progress on the returnissue. Nonetheless, because Iraq's Ba'athist dictatorship wasthe overwhelming cause of displacement in the country to beginwith, the future does hold some hope for Iraqi displaced persons.This paper examines the causes of return problems in Iraq andhow various authorities in post-Ba'athist Iraq are addressingthe return issue. Particularly around the contested city ofKirkuk, problems relating to the return issue risk ignitingethnic conflict and possibly even civil war in Iraq as a whole.The article examines the return issue for the period from March2003 to June 2004, focusing especially on northern Iraq andKirkuk. The research presented here is based on fieldwork conductedin Iraq by the author between September 2003 and May 2004. Theauthor went to Iraq independently, with the assistance of aCanadian Department of National Defence post-doctoral researchgrant. Interviews were conducted with US and Coalition ProvisionalAuthority officials, Iraqi Interim Government officials, KurdistanRegional Government officials, NGO workers, and IDPs themselvesduring visits to camps around Kirkuk and Baghdad.     

Post-civil war democratization: promotion of democracy in post-civil war states, 1946–2005

Post-civil war democratization is a critical element of building sustainable peace in post-civil war states. Yet studies of democratic transition and survival suggest that the post-civil war environment is not hospitable to either the transition toward or the survival of democracy. This inhospitality may be due to the fact that post-civil war environments are contentious. After a civil war, the former protagonists fear for their security and also want to protect their political and economic interests. The central argument of this study is that former rivals can agree to a transition toward democracy to the extent that a stable balance of power exists between the government and rebel groups; a balance that eliminates the sort of security dilemma that would encourage one or both parties to resume armed conflict. Such a balance should ensure access to political power and economic resources. This study identifies factors that contribute to the establishment of a balance of power between former protagonists and factors that affect its stability. The presence of these factors should affect the decision of former protagonists on whether or not they can achieve their political and economic interests if they agree to a transition toward democracy once the civil war ends. Based on this theoretical argument, I have derived empirically testable hypotheses. In the survival analysis performed, I find support for the theoretical arguments. The findings of this study have some policy implications.     

Fixing the Meaning of 9/11: Hegemony,Coercion, and the Road to War in Iraq

As the costs of the invasion and occupation of Iraq mount, scholars have sought to explain how the United States came to launch this war in the first place. Many have focused on the “inflation” of the Iraq threat, and indeed the Bush administration did frame the national dialogue on Iraq. We maintain, however, that the failure of most leading Democrats to challenge the administration's case for war in 2002–2003 cannot be explained fully by the bully pulpit, Democrats' reputation for dovishness, or administration misrepresentations. Rather, we argue that leading Democrats were relatively silent in the run-up to war because they had been “rhetorically coerced”, unable to advance a politically sustainable set of arguments with which to oppose the war. The effective fixing of the meaning of the September 11 attacks in terms of the “War on Terror” substantially circumscribed political debate, and we explain why this discourse became dominant. The Bush administration then capitalized on the existing portrait of Saddam Hussein to bind Iraq tightly into the War on Terror and thereby silence leading Democrats and legitimate the war. The story of the road to war in Iraq is not only one of neoconservative hubris and manipulated intelligence. It is also the story of how political actors strove effectively after 9/11 to shape the nation's discourse of foreign affairs and of how the resulting dominant narratives structured foreign policy debate. Behind the seemingly natural War on Terror lurk political processes of meaning-making that narrowed the space for contestation over Iraq.     

Business as Usual

In the years since 9/11, there is no doubt that the emphasis of U.S. global strategy has been on counter-terrorism and the war in Iraq. During this period of time, the U.S. investment in strategic, political and military resources in the Middle East, Iraq, and the war on terror, which are the top priorities on the list of Bush＇s foreign policy, has been far greater than in any other fields. However, there are some in the U.S. who believe that China＇s rise has been much ignored by the U.S., due to the global war on terror （GWOT）, and that America should, in fact, be focusing more on China, not the Middle East. However, as we see it, China has by no means been ignored by the U.S., neither has China＇s rise been the result of U.S. ignorance.     

The Cold War and Counter-Insurgency

Due to the American-led interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, theories surrounding counter-insurgency, or COIN, have aroused intense debate in political, military, and academic circles in the United States, Britain, and other Western countries. This article shows that current thinking about how to fight and defeat insurgent movements is based primarily on Cold War-era theories and conflicts. It traces the evolution in COIN thinking both before and during the Cold War—incorporating Western and Eastern bloc experiences of war against insurgents from Malaya to Afghanistan—but also illustrates the conceptual difficulties of applying doctrines based on the historical record of this era. The article concludes by arguing that theories derived from the experiences of states involved in COIN campaigns from 1945 to 1991 still retain utility, but that there are significant differences between Cold War insurgencies and current conflicts associated with the “war on terror”/“long war” which affect the applicability of doctrines based on historical analysis and the works of Thompson, Kitson, Galula, and other “classic” theorists.     

John Barrett and collective approaches to United States foreign policy in Latin America, 1907-20

As the United States was becoming a major power in the early years of the twentieth century, it was confronted by a dilemma in its desire to promote a democratic free-enterprise system among the republics of the Western hemisphere. Should the United States act unilaterally or collectively to pursue its goals? The rise of the Pan American Union as a collective political and economic organization provided the means to deal with such issues as revolution and economic instabiliry in Latin America. Nations such as Cuba, Nicaragua, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic provided early opportunities to test US policy approaches. However, the Mexican Revolution of 1910, and subsequent civil war, provided a major testing ground for both the Taft and Wilson administrations. Ultimately Woodrow Wilson chose to pursue unilateral military intervention in Mexico despite the offer from the Pan American Union and its director, John Barrett, to provide collective negotiations to avoid war and establish political stabiliry in Mexico. As we enter the twenry-first century, the United States finds itself still confronted by these choices on a global scale.     

The American Way of Going to War: Mexico (1846) to Iraq (2003)

Prior to the Iraq War, there had been a long series of American wars in which U.S. leaders often maneuvered the other side into “firing the first shot.” This strategy of “passive defense” amounts to an American way of going to war, and it dates back at least to the U.S.-Mexican War. The United States thus retained the moral and legal legitimacy, an asset which is especially important in a democratic political system. The Iraq War represents a fundamental departure from this American way. It might be the worst crisis since Vietnam. but that war was just another entry in the U.S. playbook for how to go to war. The Iraq War not only contradicts longstanding practices in American foreign policy, but it has the potential to issue in far greater international disorder than the Vietnam War. This catastrophe may make future presidents more heedful of John Quincy Adams’ prophetic words: go not abroad in search of monsters to destroy.     

Saddam and Israel: What Do the New Iraqi Records Reveal?

This article uses newly available Iraqi records to examine Saddam Hussein's strategic view of Israel, from the time of his political ascendancy in the late 1970s to the Persian Gulf War of 1990–1991. It sheds light on a variety of issues: the sources and motives of Saddam's bitter hostility to Israel, his desire for a bloody war of attrition against the “Zionist entity,” the role of Israel in motivating the Iraqi nuclear programme, Iraq–Israel relations during the Iran–Iraq War, Saddam's fears of an Israeli strike in the run-up to the invasion of Kuwait in 1990, and his motives for attacking Israel with SCUD missiles in 1991.     

South Korea's Faustian Attitude: The Republic of Korea's Decision to Send Troops to Iraq Revisited

South Korea sent troops to Iraq not because of any perceived threat from an Iraqi nuclear programme, but to seek influence over American foreign policy towards North Korea. At no point did the general public support the American invasion and war in Iraq; most South Koreans also opposed sending troops to Iraq. However, the government chose to send first non-combat and later combat troops to Iraq, and the public approved of the former choice and support was growing for the latter. The liberal President Roh Moo-Hyun had to persuade the public on this issue, even in opposition to his core supporters, risking political isolation. What the public and the President aimed at was a peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue and business opportunities. The national interest that South Korea pursued in sending troops to Iraq was policy influence over the US guarantee not to use military power against North Korea.     

From Jerusalem to Baghdad? Israel and the War in Iraq

The prevailing opinion that the Bush administration took the United States to war against Iraq in March 2003 under false pretenses has led many to believe that Israel's security was the secret rationale for the war. According to this "war for Israel" thesis, neoconservative policymakers in the Bush administration, the pro-Israel lobby in the United States, and Israel's government all pushed the United States to go to war with Iraq for the sake of Israel's security. This article critically assesses this controversial claim and examines Israel's role in the U.S. decision to invade Iraq. I argued that while neoconservatives were instrumental in promoting the Iraq war, Israel was not their primary concern and that although American Jewish organizations and the Israeli government did largely support the Iraq war, they did not seek it or actively lobby for it.     

An Autopsy of the Iraq Debacle: Policy Failure or Bridge Too Far?

This article examines whether the outbreak of an insurgency after the U.S. invasion of Iraq was an avoidable policy failure or whether the structural conditions surrounding the occupation made such an outbreak inevitable. Several U.S. policy mistakes, in particular the deployment of too few troops, a lack of comprehensive political and military planning for the occupation, disbanding the Iraqi military, the failure to establish a government in waiting, and overly aggressive de-Baathification, greatly exacerbated rather than ameliorated the various structural problems. More fundamentally, structure and policy choices interacted at all levels to explain the Iraq failure. The unavoidable conditions that coalition forces encountered in Iraq—a divided society devastated by years of war, sanctions, and misrule—and the political context in the United States made the challenge for successful policy execution difficult. This structure constrained and delimited the options open to U.S. policy makers but, even within those narrow limits, the United States made many bad choices that further diminished the chances of success.

A particularly important series of policy mistakes occurred well in advance of the buildup to war itself. The orientation of the U.S. armed forces away from counterinsurgency, the failure to establish a political settlement before invasion, and other controllable policy choices in the prewar period all led to enormous difficulties during the occupation itself. Thus, by the time of the invasion, these policy choices had become almost like structural constraints and the failures had a snowballing effect, making policy corrections far more difficult.     

Determinants of civil war in post-colonial Asia, 1950-1992: the role of trade openness and economic development

Although Asia has experienced civil war about as often as Sub-SaharanAfrica during the post-World War II era, there have been fewsystematic investigations into the determinants of civil warin Asia. This article examines the effects of trade opennessand economic development on the onset of civil war in post-colonialAsia, controlling for political, demographic, and geographicfactors. Analyzing data on post-colonial Asian states between1950 and 1992, we find that the onset of civil war is less likelywith increased trade openness. However, when taking into accountinteraction between trade openness and economic development,we discover that increased trade openness reduces the likelihoodof civil war onset significantly only in the context of higheconomic development. This result is robust with different modelspecifications.     

奥巴马治下美国“大中东”政策前瞻

奥巴马治下的美国对外政策的重点仍将是“大中东”。从伊拉克撤军，与伊拉克在政治、经济和安全关系协议方面作出规划，以解决美国在伊拉克长期利益和军事存在；可能与伊拉克进行谈判．但难度很大；中东和平进程有可能取得进展；阿富汗和巴基斯坦将成为美国的反恐重点地区；中国因素会受到越来越多的关注。     

Let’s not jump (over) the guns: response to Christina Hellmich

This reply explains several decisions I made as author of “Terrorwars: Boston, Iraq.” Among points raised is the central comparison of the Boston counterterrorist operation in 2013, which I call a one-day war, with techniques of the early Iraq war. Relatedly, I use war knowledge presented in a “novel” by an American veteran of the Iraq war to make that comparison, plus my own experiences with the Boston lockdown, all of which raise questions about who or what is a legitimate source of information on war. I close with events of August 2013 in Ferguson Missouri that confirm the idea that the USA is bringing tools and techniques from contemporary wars into urban policing, and doing so in ways that many ordinary people on the ground are identifying as war.     

Is anyone watching? War,cinema and bearing witness

War-on-terror-themed fictional films, particularly those focused on the war in Iraq, have largely failed at the box office and have been subjected to stinging criticism by right-wing political commentators and film reviewers. Critics on the political right have been upset by a perceived lack of patriotism in the films, often arguing that they are dangerous incitements to new acts of violence. However, unlike many earlier war films, including those made about the conflict in Vietnam, directors of films about the war on terror are quite self-consciously making political films that question United States (US) policy and practice, that focus on the effects of war on US service personnel and civilians in Iraq and Afghanistan and that, significantly, attempt to rehabilitate Arabs, Muslims and Islam from decades of Hollywood demonization. Moreover, the films are being made and released into a media environment in which quality news reporting has declined even as the intensity of feeling about ‘otherness’ has sharpened. This article argues that war on terror film directors are themselves bearing witness to the tragedy of war and thereby inviting film audiences to see the effects of war.     

War, Economic Development, and Political Development in the Contemporary International System

The European state-building experience has led many scholars to argue that war forces states to increase their fiscal-administrative capacity, or what we might refer to as political development, in order to compete in the international system. War also requires states to generate wealth to support such competition, which should lead to progressively increased levels of economic development. Yet, in contemporary empirical studies, war is often studied as a dependent variable, with economic and political development modeled as affecting its origination. This reading of theory and empirical work suggests that war, economic development, and political development constitute an endogenous system. In this paper, we develop expectations about how these three processes interact and test them using a three-stage least squares regression model. The results show significant simultaneous relationships between the three processes. We conclude that war, economic development, and political development are mutually constitutive processes in the contemporary international system.     

Iraq: A Look Back

Although the diversity of the Iraqi people has in the past hindered any sense of national identity, their suffering before and since the 2003 war has given most Iraqis a common desire to live normal lives. This desire can be a valuable asset for transformation. But the many displaced Iraqis, political prisoners, and families of executed and disappeared persons need healing, which will require considerable time. The prospects for postwar rehabilitation look poor now, with many observers claiming that civil war has already begun. Moreover, until the rule of law can be established, the country will be condemned to another generation of suffering, which will not be confined to Iraq. The current situation might have been averted, but it was not, and now Iraqis and Americans are intimately and problematically linked.     

Grand Strategy for the Next Administration

With the current administration's attention, resources and reputation so tied to Iraq, the prospect for significant changes in American foreign policy are limited in George W. Bush's remaining months in office. A new administration coming into power in January 2009, however, gives the United States a chance to revisit the changes to American foreign policy implemented after 9/11, as well as to consider any needed course corrections. The opportunity such changes in administration offers is a major strength of the American political system. Clearly, now is the time to start thinking about such issues.     

How European integration is perceived in Asia

From modern Asian academicians point of view European integration is multidisciplinary phenomenon. It is considered as such simply because those educators view the phenomenon from various perspectives e.g. trade and business, economics, security, law, politics, social and other relevant issues. Even though focal points of interest among Asian educators are diverse in nature but they can, perhaps, be categorised into following groups: The first group pertains to economics interest, particularly for those who wish to explain and analyze the effect of economic integration within and outside the EU. Equally interested are those who are active in the subject of world economy such as global trade and commerce. They view the EU as world economic major player similar to USA, Japan and newly emerging economy such as China–more or less as competitors between each other. The second group has a political motivation and views the EU as the most successful modern political integration. Particularly those academicians who wish to learn from the process of political integration, e.g. regionalism and enlargement of the EU. Pertaining to this group are international relations people, who, in some cases, shifted their focus to the EU as a result of the initiatives of the institutions of the European Union itself. They are also interested in the true understanding and relations among the EUs member and non-member countries. Other international relations concern such as the extent to which security and defense are becoming issues in the EU falls within this group as well. The last and perhaps the largest group views the EU social order through the method of comparative analysis among civilized societies. Comparative studies of the EU social structure and its development with other societies may bring solutions to various social problems. This group hopes to discover the strengths and weaknesses of the societal aspect of integration and hope that experiences gained through comparative analyses such as comparative law, comparative government and its welfare system, political economy of regional integration, the true effect of the acquis communautaire, etc. would contribute to new knowledge.