Communist Legacies, Postcommunist Transformations, and the Fate of Organized Labor in Russia and China

This study aims to generate fresh hypotheses concerning emergent variations in labor politics across postcomunist settings. Although labor may be weak throughout the postcommunist world, a historical comparison of labor politics in Russia and China reveals consequential differences in the extent and sources of union weakness. Taking these differences seriously, the study asks why organized labor in Russia—in spite of a steeper decline in union membership, greater fragmentation, and a conspicuously low level of militancy—wasrelatively more effective in advancing working-class interests during economic liberalization than the growing, organizationally unified trade union apparatus in China. The comparisons suggest that some constraints on organized labor are more malleable than others, allowing for openins where labor can affect outcomes in ways that surprise, if not scare, state and business. Specifically, key differences in historical legacies and in the pace and ynamics of institutional transformation have conferred upon Russian unions key organizational, material, and symbolic resources that Chinese unions do not possess to the same degree. These differences reflect mechanisms capable of generating increasingly divergent prospects for organized labor mobilization over long-time horizons. Calvin Chen is Luce Assistant Professor of Politics at Mount Holyoke College. His research interests include the industrialization of the Chinese countryside, the political economy of East Asia, and labor politics in postsocialist countries. He is presently working on a book on the role of social ties and networks of trust in China’s township and village enterprises. Rudra Sil is associate professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania. His research interests include the political economy of development, comparative labor relations, postcommunist transitions, Russian and Asian studies, and the history and philosophy of social science. He is author ofManaging “Modernity”: Work, Community, and Authority in Late-Industrializing Japan and Russia (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002) and coeditor ofThe Politics of Labor in a Global Age (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001). He is presently working on a book comparing the evolution of labor politics across postcommunist countries. We gratefully acknowledge helpful comments and suggestions offered by Hilary Appel, Harley Balzer, Ruth Collier, Eileen Doherty, Todor Enev, Tulia Falleti, David Ost, Lü Xiaobo, and three anonymous reviewers on drafts of this article.     

How Stable and Reasonable is Postcommunist Public Opinion? The Case of the Czech Republic

The quality of democracy depends on both politicians and citizens. While most attention has focused on politicians, this paper looks at citizens. There has been some scepticism about whether the postcommunist public is prepared to rule their countries. The legacies of communism and the rigours of the transition may have produced citizens whose opinions are unstable and ill-informed and therefore a poor basis for democratic policy making. This paper tests this proposition by considering the nature of public opinion in the Czech Republic. Its main conclusion is that postcommunist public opinion is more reasonable than conventional wisdom suggests. Opinions on most policies change slowly if at all and when they do change the changes are prompted more by gradual shifts in mores than by political manipulation. This suggests that citizens in the region are prepared to have a significant voice in policy making.     

Postcommunist divergence: A comparative analysis of the transition to capitalism in Poland and Russia

This article critiques the dominant neoliberal transition paradigm. The implementation of neoliberal reforms in the postcommunist world has fostered the creation of two different types of capitalism. Rather than enabling a transition to Western European-style capitalism, these reforms have produced divergence within the postcommunist world. This article uses comparative firm-level case studies from Russia and Poland to construct a “neoclassical” sociological alternative to neoliberal theory that can explain this divergence. In this account, intra-dominant class structure (the pattern of alliances between the Party bureaucracy, the technocracy, and humanistic intellectuals) at the time of the transition produces different “paths to capitalism,” or policy regimes, which, in turn, have different effects on the ability of firms to restructure. In Russia, this creates a system of “patrimonial capitalism” that will produce long-term economic stagnation. In Poland, a variety of modern rational capitalism emerges. This latter system is distinguished by its very high levels of dependence on capital imports in comparison to the advanced capitalist countries. As a result, this type of economy will be quite vulnerable to economic shocks. Lawrence King is an assistant professor of sociology at Yale University. His book includeThe Basic Features of Postcommunist Capitalism in Eastern Europe (2001) andAssessing New Class Theory (with Ivan Szelenyi, forthcoming). He is currently working on a book entitledPostcommunist Capitalisms. I am grateful for a Yale Junior Faculty Research Fellowship, and the support of the Yale Center for Comparative Research, the Social Science Research Fund at Yale, and the Yale Center for International and Area Studies. I would also like to thank Aleksandra Sznajder and Evgenia Gvozdeva for their invaluable research assistance, and Ivan Szelenyi, Andrew Schrank, Hannah Brueckner, Alison Pollet, and the editors and anonymous reviewers atStudies in Comparative International Development for their comments and suggestions.     

The Trouble with History

The essay discusses the phenomenon of a recent upsurge of so-called “politics of history” in Poland, and in other postcommunist democracies. The upsurge, as the author argues, is caused by a growing anxiety following the collapse of the communist order.     

Global Capitalism and the Transformation of State Socialism

The article outlines the footprint of international economic interests under state socialism, and considers in more detail the economic integration of the postcommunist countries into the world system in the post-1989 period of the building of capitalism. The focus of the article is on the extent of economic globalization of countries and their economic corporations. It is contended that the globalization of capitalist companies and the direct role of global economic forces had little importance under state socialism. Since 1989, policy in the former state socialist countries has been geared to “joining” the world system, optimistically its core. Important differences have developed between the postsocialist states with respect to economic penetration and exposure to the world market. The outcomes have not fulfilled the expectations of early advocates of transformation and entry to the world economy. Although the new member states of the European Union have entered the world economy as formal members of the “core,” they are not economically equal to the dominant “old” members of the EU. In all the postcommunist countries, there is an absence of large scale global companies, of comparable levels of innovation, research and development. Russia is a resources rich country, a “hybrid” social formation containing elements of state economic control, national capitalism, and global capitalism. I conclude that the semi periphery is not a transient category in the world economy; it has potential for persistence and renewal.     

The Invisibility and Centrality of Class After Communism

Just as the availability of new ideas can drive the development of new institutions, the unavailability of ideas also has powerful political effects. The article demonstrates the paradoxical absence of class discourse in postcommunist Polish political debates—paradoxical because the same actors who eschewed class discourse believed that postcommunist class formation and inequalities were the central problems shaping the country and driving the political agenda. The paper documents the early thinking about class and politics on the part of key political activists. It traces their fear of class discourse to their limited knowledge of postwar European capitalisms and the role played by strong labor movements in stabilizing those systems. Ironically, Poles understood capitalism in too Marxist a way, as a perennially raging struggle between classes. Knowing that workers would lose out in the new system, they feared that speaking about class would empower workers as a class and thus weaken the market economy they were determined to build. Not generally aware how class compromise in the post-World War II era worked to stabilize capitalism, Polish (and most other eastern European) oppositionists did their best to thwart the emergence of class identities on the part of those left behind, even at the cost, for liberals, of reconciling themselves to political defeat. The result of the refusal to countenance class discourse was not a block on the emergence of class anger, but a displacement of that anger from class “others” to identity-based others, and thus a weakening of the liberal politics that most postcommunist liberals had wished to reinforce. A final section explores recent Polish thinking about class in the context of reactions to the Polish edition of my Defeat of Solidarity book showing continued mainstream reluctance to talk about class but new interest in this category among youth.     

Leninist beneficiaries? Pre-1989 legacies and the radical right in post-1989 Central and Eastern Europe. Some introductory observations

A central topos in the study of Central and Eastern European contemporary politics in general, and of its radical right politics in particular is the emphasis on the extraordinary relevance of history and geography. In fact, the entire transformation process after 1989 is often clothed in terms of historical and geographical categories, either as a “return of history” or a “return to Europe”, or both. In these various scenarios, the radical right claims a prominent place in this politics of return, and the study of this current echoes the more general concern, in the analyses of the region, with historical analogies and the role of legacies. Sometimes analogies are drawn between the post-1989 radical right and interwar fascism, in terms of a “Weimarization” of the transformation countries and the return of the pre-socialist, ultranationalist or even fascist past – the “return of history”. Others argue that since some Central and Eastern European party systems increasingly resemble their Western European counterparts, so does the radical right, at least where it is electorally successful – the “return to Europe”. According to yet another line of thought, the radical right in the region is a phenomenon sui generis, inherently shaped by the historical forces of state socialism and the transformation process and, as a result and in contrast to Western Europe, ideologically more extreme and anti-democratic while organizationally more a movement than a party phenomenon. In all these approaches, the key concepts of “legacies” and the radical right are often underspecified. This volume takes a closer look at the intersection of history or particular legacies, and the mobilization of the radical right in the post-1989 world of the region, while attempting to provide a sharper focus on key concepts. Regardless of the different approaches, all contributions show that with the radical right, a peculiar “syncretic construct” (Tismaneanu) has emerged in Central and Eastern Europe after 1989, which is derived from both pre-communist and communist legacies.     

Revolution,longevity and legitimacy in communist states

This article examines key linkages in the dramatic turn of events in totalitarian states by reviewing the literature on regime legitimacy and longevity in communist regimes. But that longevity is a poor substitute for legitimacy. Eastern Europe states, where communist rule was externally imposed, were relatively “easy” to overcome. However, changes occurring in countries where quasi-legitimacy was achieved by mass movements, as in China or the Soviet Union; and those under family dictatorships, such as North Korea and Cuba, are not as subject to collapse. These pseudo forms of legitimacy resist liberalization in political terms, although economic changes are increasingly feasible as a half-way house. Still it is now clear that longevity in and of itself is not a substitute for legitimacy. The former is a function of time, the latter of social structure. This paper was written and accepted for publication in the wake of events following the collapse of communist power in most states of Eastern Europe during 1989. It does not cover the events which led to the collapse of communist power in the Soviet Union during 1991. Rather than simply adjust the paper to reflect current events, I take this opportunity to simply note the time frame during which the paper was produced. Indeed, I would also note that the Russian Revolution of 1991 served to delegitimize communist power by the exposure and then collapse of the coup attempt orchestrated by the KGB, a sector of the military elite and the upper stratum of the Communist Politburo. Such delegitimation accelerated a process of communist disintegration that could have taken a much longer period of time, and with possibly a different set of outcomes. [ILH] Irving Louis Horowitz is Hannah Arendt distinguished professor of sociology and political science at Rutgers University. He has written widely on developmental subjects, includingThree Worlds of Development (1965);Equity, Income, and Policy: Comparative Studies in Three Worlds of Development (1977); andBeyond Empire and Revolution (1982); all published by Oxford University Press.     

Centralization in the Marxist and in the Leninist tradition

The very different positions of Marxists and Leninists on the issue of centralization of political and economic institutions show that, though using the same terminology, they were committed to different ideologies. Leninists were modernizing revolutionaries in underdeveloped countries seeking their rapid industrialization. They relied on centralized revolutionary movements, which, in power, formed centralized bureaucracies that advanced industrialization through mass persuasion, regimentation and terror as well as central planning.Marxists, associated with multifarious labor movements in industrialized countries, hoped to advance and empower the working class. Marx and Engels were vague on the subject of centralization, but condemned bureaucracy and came to favor the decentralization identified with the Paris Commune. Karl Kautsky and Otto Bauer advocated the operation of industry by local governments, cooperatives and trade unions and only minimal state ownership and sharply attacked bureaucracy. Policies of centralization were appropriate to the character and goals of Leninist movements but inappropriate to those of Marxist ones.     

After the fall of the soviet union: the changing status of local governments in the republic of latvia

When the Republic of Latvia gained its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, one of Latvia's first priorities was to rebuild its system of local government. This article describes many of the problems local governments in Latvia faced after 50 years of communist rule. The article also discusses the new Latvian laws which changed the structure of local government in that country. Also discussed are Latvian central government institutions which impacted on local governments in general and local government finances in particular. The unique status of the Capitol City of Riga, Latvia's largest municipality is also reviewed in detail.     

Piteşti: a project in reeducation and its post-1989 interpretation in Romania

The purpose of this article is twofold: to provide a critical account of the Pite?ti experiment and its significance within the history of Romanian Communism and to examine current public disputes relative to memorializing the Pite?i experiment that concern issues of legitimacy, collective memory, and identity construction. The main argument pursued here is that within the recent postcommunist politics of memory, one major prevailing trend is to reincorporate a nationalist ideology within a postcommunist rhetoric. This leads to the conclusion that such mnemonic practices indicate a strong relationship between collective memory and political culture.     

The emergence of political pluralism in Romania

This paper puts forward arguments supporting the idea that the essence of political evolution in Romania since 1989 has been the same as in other former communist countries of East Central Europe. In spite of some specific features, of some delays, and of difficulties, it is a process of democratization. As political practice has revealed, pluralism is first associated here with the establishment of a multi-party system and also with the proliferation of different non-party groups. The most important moments of the pluralization process in Romania are evoked, focusing on the elections and the adoption of the new Constitution.     

Dealing with the communist past: Its role in the disintegration of the Czech Civic Forum and in the emergence of the Civic Democratic Party

The end of the communist regime in Czechoslovakia in 1989 has opened the thorny question of how to deal with the communist legacy. This paper focuses on important aspects of decommunization at the beginning of the 1990s and analyzes the role they played in the disintegration of the Civic Forum and in the emergence of the Civic Democratic Party. The paper shows that the decommunization agenda gradually became a significant divisive factor within the Civic Forum and served as one of the key issues through which the Civic Democratic Party defined itself. It also provided an opportunity for politicians skilled enough to grasp this issue to do so and to incorporate it into their wider political agendas.     

Language,nation and citizenship: contrast,conflict and convergence in Estonia's debate with the international community

This paper investigates the clash of (language) ideologies in Estonia in the post-Communist period. In an analysis of changing Western recommendations and Estonian responses during the transition of Estonia from Soviet Socialist Republic to independent state, we trace the development of the discourses on language and citizenship rights. Different conceptions of the nation-state and of how citizenship is acquired, together with different approaches to human rights, led to disagreement between Estonian political elites and the political actors attached to international institutions. In particular, the Soviet demographic legacy posed problems.

We use a context-sensitive approach that takes account of human agency, political intervention, power, and authority in the formation of (national) language ideologies and policies. We find that the complexities of cultural and contextual differences were often ignored and misunderstood by both parties and that in their exchanges the two sides appeared to subscribe to ideal philosophical positions. In the following two decades both sides repositioned themselves and appeared to accommodate to the opposing view. In deconstructing the role of political intervention pressing for social and political inclusion and in documenting the profound feeling of victimhood that remained as a legacy from the Soviet period and the bargain that was struck, we hope to contribute to a deeper understanding of the language ideological debates surrounding the post-Communist nation-(re)building process.     

The myth of a finno-ugrian community in practice

Poland's post-communist development is often depicted as a contrast between a unified, engaged society of pre-1989 and a passive, divisive society of post-1989. What explains the displacement of political solidarity with a fragmented political scene? A factor specific to Poland is rooted in the struggle of Solidarity against communist power. The consequences are subsequent attempts to appropriate the values of Solidarno?? as political capital by competing political voices, leading to contestation about the nature of the country. This normative discourse was evident first in the post-communist divide, between forces stemming from the former communist regime and those affiliated with the opposition. More recently, the saliency of the post-communist division has receded, and a new contested discourse has surfaced among voices coming out of the Solidarity tradition. This rhetoric seeks to define a contrast between a “Solidaristic Poland” dedicated to traditional and Christian values affirming notions of exclusivity and superiority, and a “liberal Poland” dedicated to market and pluralist principles based on competition and individualism. In both political divides, the legacy of Solidarity provides useful political capital to advance distinctive visions of Poland.     

Interwar fascism and the post-1989 radical right: Ideology,opportunism and historical legacy in Bulgaria and Romania

Do contemporary Bulgarian and Romanian radical right movements represent a legacy of interwar fascism? We argue that the key element is not that interwar movements provided legacies (of structures, ideologies, or organizations) but rather a symbolic “heritage” that contemporary movements can draw upon. The crucial legacy is, rather, the Socialist era, which in asserting its own definitions of interwar fascism created a “useable past” for populist movements. The Peoples’ Republics created a flawed historical consciousness whereby demonized interwar rightist movements could be mobilized after 1989 as historical expressions of “anti-Communist” — and, ergo, positive symbols among those of anti-Communist sentiment. Although radical right parties in both countries may cast themselves as “heirs” to interwar fascism, they share little in common in terms of ideology. Their claims to a fascist legacy is, rather, a factor of how their respective Socialist states characterized the past.     

The Exceptionalism of Housing in the Ideology and Politics of Early Communist Romania (1945–1965)

The article analyses the exceptionalism of housing during the early communist period in Romania, in particular the extent to which the regime's ambivalent policies regarding housing undermined the overall political and ideological goal of dismantling private property. Focusing on appropriations, restitutions and new construction in the city of Timi¸oara and the surrounding region, the article emphasises conflicting and inconsistent policies regarding housing and the consequences of these policies. Housing's double meaning as home and asset further complicated the overall ideological mission of denaturalising bourgeois private property, and provided a basis for the continuing relevance of pre-communist legal ideologies and consciousness of property rights during this period. The article is based on documentary and archival research conducted in the city of Timi¸oara, Romania, in 2007–2008.     

East Central Europe on the eve of the changeover: the case of Poland

In contrast to the voluminous literature dealing with the post-communist transformation, much less attention has been paid to the circumstances that led to the communist collapse. The purpose of this paper is to redress the imbalance by trying to examine the socio-political and economic situation on the eve of the changeover and to determine which factors, taken collectively, produced a trigger which ignited the implosion of 1989. The focus will be on Poland, the country which—it is generally agreed—was the first one to launch the process of change and to initiate the “domino effect” which ultimately affected the entire region.     

Communist regimes,legitimacy and the transition to democracy in Eastern Europe

The purpose of this article is to clarify the relationship between forms of political legitimacy employed by communist regimes in East and Central Europe and subsequent models of revolutionary change in 1989. The conceptual basis of the analysis lies in Max Weber's theoretical framework of legitimacy. The four cases selected for comparison are Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and Romania. The attempts of de-Stalinization and reformation of these party-state regimes through the introduction of paternalistic and also more goal-oriented measures could not prevent their disintegration in the 1980s and their subsequent collapse in 1989. But, I argue, it was the withdrawal of ideological support by elites that ultimately brought communism to an end. The differences in revolutionary scenarios and transitions to democracy in the four cases indicate the importance of a shift in both rulers and masses towards interest in dialogue and compromise. Hungary and Poland represent the clearest scenarios in which communist parties acted as agents of regime change in a rational-legal direction. The Bulgarian case stands as an intermediary case between these two and Romania. Finally, Romania represents an extreme case of violent revolution and the overthrow of a traditionalist and sultanistic regime and illustrates the difficulties following a complete collapse of political authority.     

Small business in Russia—factors that slowed its development: an analysis

In Russia the growth of small business has been much slower compared with the leading transition countries (Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary). In Poland, and to a lesser degree in the Czech Republic and Hungary, this sector has been the engine of the economic recovery. A natural question is why Russia differs. Apart from the fact that in contrast to these countries Russia does not have an entrepreneurial tradition and has experienced communist rule longer what is especially distinctive about Russia has been the strong influence of interest groups during the transition process which favoured the allocation of entrepreneurship to largely unproductive activities.