Do the personal characteristics of finance ministers affect changes in public debt?

Using a unique dataset of the personal characteristics of national finance ministers in Western Europe (1980–2010), I show that a finance minister’s experience affects the national debt-to-GDP ratio. The increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio is smaller if the finance minister stays in office for an additional year. This result is robust to the inclusion of the personal characteristics of prime ministers and a measure of political stability. However, the magnitude of the effect is sensitive to how finance ministers are selected in the econometric model when more than one minister holds office during a particular year. The estimation of interaction terms further reveals that experience particularly matters in election years or in times of negative GDP growth because an experienced finance minister has the power to restrict the usual increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio. In contrast, a finance minister’s educational background and ideological leaning have no significant impact on the debt-to-GDP ratio.     

After Number Ten: What Do Former Prime Ministers Do?

The article reviews the experience of former British prime ministers in the twentieth century. There is no fixed or predetermined role for former prime ministers. What they do after they leave office depends on personal choices and on circumstances. Some have largely disappeared from the political stage. Others have become active international 'elder statesmen'. A couple-Heath and Thatcher-were embittered 'models to avoid'. A quarter of the former prime ministers since 1900 have served in other government posts in their successors' Cabinets, while a handful have turned down such appointments. Most have gone to the Lords, which offers a political platform, but sometimes they do not think much of the quality of the second chamber. The retirements of some former prime ministers have been clouded by money worries, but they nowadays get substantial pensions and can make money from business directorships, international lectures and writing memoirs. The article concludes with speculation about what Tony Blair's post-premiership might hold.     

Survival of the Ministers: On Ministerial Durability in Postwar Norway

The field of ministerial durability, showing why some ministers are dismissed and others not, has increased in size over the last decade. Specifically, linking ministerial performance through resignation calls with durability has been applied to both majoritarian and semi‐presidential systems, whereas this link is less explored in consensual electoral systems. Thus, this study explores the relationship between ministerial performance and durability in postwar Norway, drawing on the principal‐agent theory for parliamentary democracies and the accountability link between party leaders and ministers. The main finding is that there are many similarities to other studies’ ministerial durability and performance. By measuring performance in resignation calls coming through the media, it is found that ministerial durability is decreased when performance is low: the more resignation calls a minister gets, the more likely the minister is to be removed by the party leader. Consequently, it is argued that ministers generally are held accountable by their party leaders whenever they are perceived to perform badly. Even though it is argued in the article that studies on ministerial durability and performance would benefit from alternative performance measures, the analysis shows that resignation calls give a good indication of how party leaders hold ministers accountable.     

MINISTERIAL STAFF IN AUSTRALIAN COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT

Abstract: This study examines the ministerial staff in Australian commonwealth government to discover what they do and how they assist ministers in achieving political control of departments. The data consist of interviews with ministers, departmental secretaries and ministerial staff. The study finds that ministerial staff offer policy advice in much the same way as found by James Walter in his study almost a decade before this one. But there does appear to be more emphasis on monitoring departmental implementation of policy and brokering positions within government than was the case in the earlier study. The study concludes that the relationship between ministers and their offices and the departmental secretaries is characterised by a conditionally cooperative approach, which is similar to that recommended by several public administration scholars.     

Defensive versus Offensive Approaches to Administrative Reform in France (1988–1997): The Leadership Dilemmas of French Prime Ministers

From 1988 to 1997, all French prime ministers launched administrative reform programs with numerous concerns for increasing efficiency, strengthening responsiveness, or redesigning political and administrative roles within the state. However, these initiatives have never led to radical and disruptive changes. The institutional legacy seems to have strongly constrained the politics of administration. What, then, is the meaning of launching administrative reforms within the French political power configuration, and how does it “fit” with the way leaders try to establish their political authority? This article provides two empirical studies of different prime ministers (Michel Rocard under the Mitterrand presidency and Alain Jupp under the Chirac presidency) that can explain the nature of the French governments' commitments to these issues. It argues that understanding administrative reforms requires a mixture of institutional and actor‐centered explanations, because these policies are really leadership challenges to the preexisting institutional order. As such, they are reflexively shaped or constrained by what they try to control and define. This paper shows that for a French prime minister to define the administration as a problem while building his own leadership can jeopardize the resources he will get from that same bureaucratic administrative system. This “power‐reform dilemma” may explain why administrative reforms have proven more politically effective as an instrument of order‐affirming impulses rather than as a disruptive strategy.     

Surviving Information Overload: How Elite Politicians Select Information

Information in politics is overabundant. Especially elite politicians are bombarded with information. Politicians must be selective to stay on top of the information torrent. Aggregate‐level work within the bounded rationality framework showed that information selection is at the core of decision making. Yet, an answer to the question as to how individual elite politicians go about selecting information is lacking. We know that they unavoidably do, but how exactly they perform this selection task remains largely unknown. The article draws on interviews with 14 party leaders and ministers in Belgium about their information processing. We present a typology, and a funnel, of consecutive information selection mechanisms and attitudes. Politicians partially outsource their information selection to procedures and/or staffers, they personally apply rigorous rules of thumb about what to attend to and what not, and they compensate the pressure and constant risk of messing up with a large dose of self‐confidence.     

The Push and Pull of Ministerial Resignations in Germany, 1969–2005

When and why are cabinet ministers forced out of office? We argue that ministerial resignations cannot be understood as mechanistic consequences of serious personal or departmental errors as the classical responsibility hypothesis implies. Rather, they follow a systematic political logic. Cabinet ministers have to resign whenever the prime minister perceives the political costs of a minister staying in office to be higher than the benefits of keeping the status quo. We test this argument with resignation events in Germany in the period 1969 to 2005. Based on detailed data collection, we find 111 resignation events, i.e. serious public discussions about a cabinet minister's future, 14 of which ended in resignation. These data are analysed employing statistical as well as Qualitative Comparative Analysis based on Boolean algebra to detect patterns of ministerial resignations.     

Disentangling Concepts of Ministerial Responsibility

Debates on ministerial responsibility have too often gone around in circles. The application of the principle is related to the incidence of resignations; analysis considers the reasons given for resignation or, rather more often, the reasons given for not resigning. The usual conclusions are that ministers resign occasionally when their personal involvement is unquestioned and when the prime minister determines that the political costs are less to let the minister go. But the ideas remain at a broad level because they relate to all the ministerial activities. This article seeks to disentangle these concepts, developing the ideas in Thompson and Tillotsen's article in this symposium, to see if a different set of concepts can better define this old notion.     

LET THE MANAGERS GOVERN: MINISTER-BUREAUCRAT RELATIONSHIPS IN NEW SOUTH WALES

Abstract: This article considers the relationships between ministers and chief executives in the New South Wales Liberal-National government. It looks at how ministers have set about taking charge of the public service against the background of the new political and economic realities confronting the state government. Senior ministers have consciously sought to limit their dependence on public servants and they have used a range of strategies to do so. They have remoulded the public service in a new "managerialised" form. Policy-making has been further internalised into ministerial offices and party circles and away from departments. The role of cabinet has been strengthened to impose a new corporate purpose as a counterbalance to traditional departmental interests. New incentive systems, based on contract employment and performance agreements, have been introduced to focus public service loyalties on the goals of the government. Advocates of managerialism, usually career public servants, have been appointed to key positions. Ministerial advisers have been used as countervailing sources of advice and as extensions of ministerial authority. Many ministers themselves have assumed an involved style of ministerial management of departments.     

Prime Ministers, Presidentialism and Westminster Smokescreens

This article asks, 'how do practitioners understand the relationship between the prime minister, ministers and the rest of Westminster and Whitehall?' We focus on three topics. First, we review tales of a Blair presidency. Second, we explore the governance paradox in which people tell tales of a Blair presidency as they recount stories of British governance that portray it as fragmented with several decision-makers. Finally, we argue that this paradox reveals the distorting influence the Westminster model still exerts on many accounts of British politics. It acts as a smokescreen for the changes in executive politics.     

The Postwar Premiership League

The article reports the results from the latest survey of academic experts polled on the performance of post‐1945 prime ministers. Academic specialists in British politics and history rate Clement Attlee as the best postwar prime minister, with Margaret Thatcher in second place just ahead of Tony Blair in third place. Gordon Brown's stint in Number 10 was the third‐worst since the Second World War, according to the respondents to the survey that rated his premiership as less successful than that of John Major. The article compares public and academic opinion and rankings of prime ministers and their performance, noting significant discrepancies in contemporary and retrospective evaluations. Academic respondents to the survey also provided detailed ratings and evaluations of the performance and policy impact of the four prime ministers since 1979: Margaret Thatcher, John Major, Tony Blair and Gordon Brown.     

The Public Service: Independence, Responsibility and Responsiveness

In recent years there has been controversy surrounding the issues of the independence, responsibility and responsiveness of our public services. Critics come from two opposing directions: (i) there have been charges of politicisation of the public service, with the implication that it has lost its independence and become dominated by the government; (ii) Pusey (1991) has accused 'economic rationalists' in the public service of pursuing their own neo-classical agenda and dominating government policy. Both criticisms reveal a misunderstanding of the respective roles and responsibilities of ministers and public servants and the proper relations between them. In our system of democratic government, it is the prerogative of ministers to decide and the role of departments to propose and advise and then implement the decisions of ministers. This contribution begins by considering the respective responsibilities of ministers and officials, before canvassing the charges of politicisation and what should be expected from public servants in contributing to policy development. Finally there is consideration of the ethical values of public servants and what responsibility they might have for the 'public interest'.     

War over framing: base politics in South Korea

When do anti-base movements manage to influence policy, and when do they fail to do so? Base scholars have largely overlooked what I argue is a significant factor that can shape public and government response to anti-base movements: political opportunities associate with framing efforts by key actors involved. Based on two cases of anti-base movements in South Korea, I show how framing battles between activists and media shape political opportunities afforded to anti-base movements and can ultimately influence movement success.     

Swimming for Their Lives—Waving or Drowning? A Review of the Evidence of Ministerial Overload and of Potential Remedies for It

There is a range of evidence pointing to the problem of overload on government ministers in both the UK and other Westminster-system countries. This article reviews evidence from the time of Gladstone to the present day, concentrating on evidence relating to the last twenty five years. It surveys the comments and opinions of serving and retired politicians and of academic commentators, assessing the contention that the burden on ministers has increased, is likely to continue to increase, and ought to be diminished. It goes on to look at what have been put forward as potential solutions and explores the extent to which they might offer some respite. Finally, the article concludes that the remedy to the problems involved largely lies in the hands of ministers and their closest advisers, and suggests that it is in all our interests that options to reduce overload should be further explored and implemented.     

The Three As of Government Formation: Appointment,Allocation, and Assignment

How does the Prime Minister organize her government so that she can implement her policy agenda? In our model, a Prime Minister appoints individuals to her cabinet, allocates their portfolios, and assigns their policy tasks—that is, she decides the relevant jurisdiction of departments and the type of proposals a minister can make. Upon appointment, ministers obtain expertise on policies specific to their jurisdiction and strategically communicate this information to the Prime Minister before a policy is implemented. Assignment allows the Prime Minister to implement her agenda even when she is constrained to appoint ministers whose policy preferences are far from her own. A Prime Minister weakly prefers a diverse cabinet. In equilibrium, the Prime Minister is indifferent between delegating policy or implementing policy herself.     

Ministerial careers and the nature of parliamentary government: the cases of Austria and Belgium

Abstract. The characteristics of parliamentary government vary markedly from one Western European country to another. Although we still do not know in detail the nature and amplitude of these variations, they are sufficiently manifest to warrant close examination. One way in which these variations can be assessed is through the analysis of the career patterns of ministers. These are interesting both in themselves and because they provide information about the nature of the decision-making process: for instance, ministers who stay in office for very short periods are less likely to be involved in collective decisions than ministers who stay in office for a decade or more. Differences are particularly marked among ministerial career patterns in the Austrian and Belgian cabinets. Not only do Austrian ministers stay in office longer: they tend to come to office only once and then remain in the same post; they often do not come to the government by the parliamentary route, many coming from the civil service, industry, or interest groups. In all these respects, Belgian ministers have opposite characteristics. Thus it does seem that while both governments are ostensibly parliamentary, the Austrian government tends to be managerial, while the Belgian government is parliamentary and more truly 'political'.     

Do budgetary institutions mitigate the common pool problem? New empirical evidence for the EU

We analyze how budgetary institutions affect government budget deficits in member states of the European Union during 1984–2003 employing new indicators provided by Hallerberg et al. (2009). Using panel fixed effects models, we examine whether the impact of budgetary institutions on budget deficits is conditioned by political fragmentation (i.e., ideological differences among parties in government) and size fragmentation (i.e., the effective number of parties in government or the number of spending ministers). Our results suggest that strong budgetary institutions, no matter whether they are based on delegation to a strong minister of finance or on fiscal contracts, reduce the deficit bias in case of strong ideological fragmentation. In contrast, the impact of budgetary institutions is not conditioned by size fragmentation.     

Advising Ministers – The Special Problem of Defence

Successive Australian Defence Ministers have been frustrated and occasionally embarrassed by the quality of advice and information provided to them by the Defence organisation. Decades of reviews and reorganisations have failed to find solutions to the special difficulties that Defence faces in providing accurate, timely information and advice to ministers across the broad spectrum of their responsibilities. This article argues that there are multiple explanations for the concerns that are frequently expressed about its policy advisory capacity – most of which are inherent to Defence organisations around the world. While the Defence culture of secrecy is partly responsible, other factors such as the scale of Defence's operations, the multiple cultures that exist within it (military, civilian, and intelligence) that make coherence harder than in more homogenous departments, the long‐time horizons of defence planning as well as the high costs of procurement, must also be considered. The erosion of trust between the organisation and minister has been exacerbated by the intense scrutiny of the media that overburdens ministers and adds another layer of complexity to their role. As history shows, there are push and pull factors that continue to embroil ministers in the minutiae of defence difficulties, while the complexity and scale of operations will undoubtedly continue to impact on the timeliness of advice.     

INADEQUACIES IN THE PROCESSES OF POLICY DEVELOPMENT IN AUSTRALIA

Abstract: Policy and policy development have received considerable attention in Australia over the last decade or more. This attention has resulted in many recommendations on policy in the series of major public service inquiries of the 1970s, in a number of books and journal articles on varied aspects of public policy, and in the considerable strengthening of the policy development capacities of many government agencies. This attention has to date been inadequate, because it has in almost all cases concentrated on the questions of where within the bureaucratic structure policy development should occur and what procedural mechanisms are needed to allow ministers or cabinet to choose between alternative policies and to facilitate the coordination of policies. These questions are of course important, but questions of how a well-considered policy option that can be considered by a cabinet or a minister is actually developed appear to have been almost totally ignored. In the public service inquiries, in the published literature, and in public accounts of the work of policy units, there appears to be virtually no analysis of the process of policy development. There is little or no discussion of how the standard formal models of policy development match or fail to match the techniques used in Australia, and although there have been many individual case studies of policy issues, there are no comparative case studies from which general observations might be drawn. Lastly, there are very few positive suggestions as to how policy development in Australia could be improved. Overcoming these inadequacies provides a major challenge to Australian policy workers.     

The 2004 Greek Election: PASOK's Monopoly Ends

What determines a government's position inside the Council of the European Union? This article takes up recent arguments according to which Council decision-making is driven not only by ‘objective’ national interests but also by the ideological preferences of the member states' representatives. On the basis of a study of Germany, Austria and Sweden and their positions with regard to the Services Directive, it seeks to advance the debate by specifying the conditions under which ideological preferences are more likely to dominate. Applying a principal–agent model it is argued that the relative impact of ideological preferences crucially depends on the relationship between the ministers sitting in the Council and the governing parties at the national level: the less a minister is exposed to parliamentary and intra-governmental control, the more a country's position is susceptible to the ideological preferences of the minister.