Strategic Interaction Between Rebels and the State: A Study of the Maoist Conflict in Nepal

The “people's war” in Nepal during 1996–2006, led to two significant outcomes—the elimination of monarchy and political victory for the Maoists. These political outcomes raise important questions about the process of Maoist conflict in Nepal. While several studies on political conflict are concerned about “why” such conflicts happen, I focus on “how” the strategy of conflict unfolded in Nepal. In this article, I argue that strategic interaction between rebels and the state explain why the conflict led to negotiated settlement in Nepal. To discuss the sequence of rebel–state interaction, I introduce a game theoretic model. In addition, I show how territorial control, target selection, and levels of violence used by the rebels in comparison to the state are crucial in understanding the conflict process. The case study in this article analyzes the relevance of rebel–state interaction to reveal micro processes of political conflict and further suggests that negotiation can become an important tactical choice in resolving conflict.     

Decentralisation,Economic Inequality and Insurgency

This paper investigates if devolution of political power in conflict-affected areas can reduce violence. Political decentralisation has been widely recognised to improve access to local public services. By providing institutional means to address local grievances, its role in diffusing social tensions has also been suggested. However, there is lack of systematic evidence on the role of local self-government in mitigating social-unrest arising due to local socio-economic issues. Our paper addresses this gap in the literature by assessing the impact of a local government institution, introduced in the Adivasi districts in 1996, on Maoist insurgency in India. The local councils aimed at addressing Adivasi grievances by recognising their traditional lifestyle and land, forests, and water rights, thereby reducing their incentive to participate in insurgency. However, empirical analysis performed using difference-in-difference methodology suggests that Maoist insurgency, as reported in Global Terrorism Database, increased post-decentralisation. We make sure this result is robust to various alternative explanations including state-level policy changes and political environment. Drawing on extensive empirical tests as well as existing qualitative studies, we show that an unequal local power structure and weak state-capacity in implementing the decentralisation programme resulted in local elites appropriating its benefits. This increased Adivasis grievances and consequently insurgency.     

Commentary: The Logistics of Actionable Intelligence Leading to 9/11

Uncertainty is a hallmark of conflict behavior, and other forms of violence that accompany civil and international war—such as low-intensity warfare, guerrilla, insurgency, and asymmetric conflict—are no exception. This study applied the theory of political uncertainty and complexity theory to the analysis of conflict events during the first three years of the second Iraq war, 2003–2006, limited to the Diyala province. Findings show that neither the time between attacks T or the severity of attacks S (fatalities) have the “normal” (bell-shaped) or lognormal distribution that is characteristic of equilibrium systems. Instead, both variables showed heavy tails, symptomatic of non-equilibrium dynamics, in some cases approximating a power law with critical or near critical exponent value of 2. The empirical hazard force analysis in both cases showed that the intensity was high for the first epoch in both variables (March 2003 to June 2004) but even higher in the latter period from July 2004 to March 2006. Selected policy implications are discussed, including the possibility that real-time or near real-time analysis of the data analyzed through the uncertainty-complexity computational methods would have revealed the gathering momentum of adversarial attacks perhaps in time to have prevented the insurgency.     

Remittances in Nepal: Boon or Bane?

Nepal is one of the highest recipients of remittances (percentage of GDP) in the world. For a small land-locked economy battered by a decade-long Maoist insurgency (1996–2006), prolonged political instability, slow growth rate and large exodus of youths for employment overseas, high inflow of remittances bears a huge significance both at micro and macro levels. Exploring various facets of high migration and remittances, this article shows remittance-induced Dutch disease effects and policy laxity to improve investment climate in Nepal. Since it is costly to sterilise the impact of remittances each year, it might be prudent to learn to live with it and gradually channel remittances to productive usages with a goal to boost productivity.     

Swords into plowshares: The organizational transformation of rebel groups into political parties

How do the features of a rebel group and the external political environment interact to affect the internal dynamics within a rebel group after it transforms into a political party? In this paper we combine literature on organizational change in parties in new democracies with the emerging literature on rebel group-to-party transformation, to develop a framework by which to understand these dynamics. Using the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) as a case study, we find that the legacies of the conflict, the organizational legacies of the rebel group, and the post civil war incentives for electoral gain, create political cleavages within parties that generate considerable organizational centripetal pressures, pressures that will need to be accommodated in new party organizational structures.     

Authority in rebel groups: identity,recognition and the struggle over legitimacy

This article asks how rebel leaders capture and lose legitimacy within their own movement. Analysing these complex and often uneasy relations between elites and grassroots of insurgency is important for understanding the success or failure of peace processes. This is because internal contestation over authority between rival rebel leaders can drive a movement’s external strategy. Based on ethnographic research on the Karen and Kachin rebellions in Myanmar and insights from Political Sociology, the article suggests that leadership authority is linked to social identification and the claim to recognition among insurgent grassroots. If rebel leaders manage to satisfy their grassroots’ claim to recognition, their insurgent orders are stable. Failing this, their authority erodes and is likely to be challenged. These findings contribute to understanding insurgency and peace negotiations in Myanmar and civil wars more generally by showing how struggles over legitimacy within rebel groups drive wider dynamics of war and peace.     

The al Houthi Insurgency in the North of Yemen: An Analysis of the Shabab al Moumineen

The Yemeni government has fought an insurgency in the north of Yemen against a group called the Shabab al Moumineen, (Believing Youth) since 2004. The insurgency is portrayed by the Yemeni government in the press as a localized phenomenon led by the single al Houthi family and state that their ranks have been decimated by near-continuous fighting. However, the al Houthi Insurgency, led by the Shabab al Moumineen, is far more than a localized uprising: it is a full-blown insurgency–and one that Yemen's government and people may not be prepared to combat. This article explains the origin of the Shabab al Moumineen and conveys the importance of this conflict in Yemen and its potential multiple impacts on the broader Middle East.     

Repression,co-optation and insurgency: Pakistan’s FATA,Southern Thailand and Papua,Indonesia

Scholars have long identified state repression as playing a key role in the onset of insurgency. Violence by security forces increases anger against the state and assists with rebel recruitment. Yet scholars have also recognised that repression does not always lead to rebellion: in some cases it successfully quashes movements before they have begun. This study advances an argument for when and why repression leads to insurgency and sometimes does not. We contend that violence by state security forces can fail to trigger rebellion if local elites within the repressed community are simultaneously co-opted with political and economic opportunities. When elites are satisfied with local autonomy and patronage they deprive the dissident movement of local leadership and coordination. When the state uses repression against a community and at the same time abandons this mutually beneficial relationship, the insurgency has both the leadership and grassroots support it requires. We illustrate our argument by examining three cases of state violence in Asia. In two of our cases, Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Southern Thailand, repression led directly to insurgency. In the third, Papua in Indonesia, ongoing co-optation of local elites has left the movement factionalised and weak.     

A Subnational Study of Insurgency: FARC Violence in the 1990s

This article examines the traditional political and economic factors that have been purported to explain the prevalence of insurgency. It tests the following hypotheses at the subnational level in Colombia: guerrilla violence is positively associated with exports; higher levels of insurgency are associated with low levels of GDP per capita or negative growth rates; guerrilla violence emerges in the context of weak state presence; and higher levels of state repression are associated with higher levels of insurgent violence. The analysis utilizes a zero-inflated negative binomial to capture dynamics of both intensity and onset of violence. The econometric analysis is supplemented with cartographic visualization and qualitative analysis.     

Protecting buildings against explosives

This article sets out to establish the links between classical military doctrine as applied to general war and the empirical development of any doctrine with regard to insurgency and counterinsurgency. The theme is developed by covering both the attrition theory and the maneuver theory of warfare in outline, and then by examining the essential tenets of maneuver warfare in detail and applying these tenets to the experience gained by the United Kingdom in countering insurgency. The scope and role of the newly fashionable “information warfare” in counterinsurgency operations is examined, followed by an assessment of the important task of integrating all the separate aspects of these operations into an overall plan of action for a counterinsurgency campaign. The author concludes that there is a clear and positive link between classical doctrine for the application of force in general war and doctrine that can be usefully applied in counterinsurgency operations.     

Turmoil in Assam

Abstract

Thousands of Assamese have perished in ethnic, religious, and linguistic clashes. The native population has been outnumbered by Bengali‐speaking immigrant Hindus and Muslims, reducing the Assamese to a minority status in their home state. This human onslaught and the failure of the state and central governments to formulate a viable solution have given rise to an upheaval in the form of militant activities, largely headed by the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA). Two military operations have been conducted in the last 18 months to rout the separatist Maoist militants. In December 1991, ULFA declared a unilateral indefinite ceasefire. Negotiations for a permanent solution to the turmoil are currently underway. This article traces the origin, nature, and content of these developments.     

U.S. Counterterrorism Operations during the Iraq War: A Case Study of Task Force 714

U.S. counterterrorism (CT) forces that deployed to Iraq in 2003 as Task Force 714 (TF 714) faced an ugly surprise. Tasked to dismantle the al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) dominated insurgency, the organization could not achieve that mission. General Stanley McChrystal, who commanded TF 714 concluded, “we were losing to an enemy … we should have dominated.” But TF 714 transformed in the midst of war and during 2006-2009 was able to largely dismantle AQI's clandestine networks to a degree that they could no longer function in a cohesive manner. By developing the capacity to operate inside those networks, TF 714 was able, in the words of General McChrystal, to “claw the guts out of AQI.” This transformation runs counter to what organizational experts identify as barriers inhibiting militaries from learning, innovating, and changing, especially in wartime. To decipher the puzzle of how TF 714 overcame these barriers, two questions are addressed in this study: 1) How did TF 714 transform from a specialized and compartmented unit customized for executing infrequent CT missions in peacetime to a wartime industrial-strength CT machine that by 2009 dismantled AQI's networks that operated across Iraq; and 2) Why was TF 714 able to achieve this remarkable transformation?     

Critical barriers to joint production: datu politics and insurgent fragmentation in Southern Philippines

Abstract

In understanding how groups overcome collective action problems of mass mobilisation in civil wars, a joint-production explanation was put forth in the civil war literature. According to this explanation, collective action can be successful when leaders at the centre tie the public good – violence towards the overall goal of the movement – inextricably to private interests of actors at the peripheral levels of the conflict. It is through this logic of joint production that we can understand the failures of the Islamic insurgencies in Southern Philippines and the spiralling levels of violence. Where other movements cohered under a common identity, the Islamist insurgency in Southern Philippines saw high degrees of fragmentation. In this paper, I argue that cleavages of regionalism created by colonial disruptions of land and social relations became a critical barrier for insurgent joint production. Furthermore, interactions between these identities and the state can pose further collective action problems. In Southern Philippines, insurgent leaders are unable to cut across these cleavages, resulting in increasingly fragmented movements and protracted conflict. Therefore, I argue that a joint-production approach to understanding civil wars can be especially promising when culturally and historically situated to explain why collective action often fails in civil war.     

Endings and Beginnings? Republicanism Since 1994

This article traces the political and ideological development of the various strands of Irish Republicanism since 1994, with particular focus on the transition of the Provisional movement from insurgency to government party. In particular, it explores some of the external and internal dynamics shaping this process, such as the origins of Provisionalism as a social movement organization and the changing relationship between the nationalist population and the British state. It concludes by considering both the possible future trajectory of the Provisionals and the potential of dissident republicans to mount a serious political challenge to the status quo in Northern Ireland.     

The Strategic Hub Concept: Plan C for Iraq?

This article will apply what shall be termed a “strategic hub” concept of counterinsurgency to the war in Iraq. This concept posits that the development of insurgent and militia nodes or “hubs” of activity could provide a more relevant way to address the key dilemmas of the Iraq equation in light of the Coalition and Iraq government's inability to secure Iraq. The article will argue that ceding the insurgency and militias ground on a temporary basis may be required to maintain both military and political momentum in the post “surge” Iraq given the draw down of U.S. forces, the immaturity of the Iraqi Security Forces, and the present state of American and Iraqi politics.     

The Congo war and the prospects for state formation: Rwanda and Uganda compared

This article analyses the effect of the Congo war on state power in Rwanda and Uganda. Drawing on theories of European state formation, it asks whether the Congo war has led to a strengthening of the state in the two countries. It is argued that this has not been the case. Neither the Rwandan nor the Ugandan state has been strengthened as a result of the war. While the war has weakened the state in Uganda, the remarkable strength of the Rwandan state just a few years after the 1994 genocide must be understood as a result of the security threat faced by the regime from Hutu militias, and not as a result of the Congo war. This means that security threats against the regime can, in certain circumstances, have the same effect on state formation as war had in early modern Europe. I also argue that changes in the state system have altered the links between war and state formation. The ‘war makes states’ connection presupposes a positive relationship between war, regime survival and state formation. In contemporary Africa there is no such link. On the one hand, state survival is guaranteed anyway, no matter how weak the state is. On the other hand, regime survival does not depend on mobilisation of resources through taxation, since resources are available from elsewhere.     

The Topography of Sino–Romanian Relations in the Post-Cold War Era (1990–2015)

This article looks, from a Romanian perspective, at developments in Sino–Romanian relations over the past 25 years, with a focus on two factors that shaped bilateral cooperation: the political matrix of interactions and the mutual pursuit of economic and security benefits. In this context, the article argues that, although the existing pattern of cooperative outputs and the two states’ behavioural dynamics were largely by-products of a divergent interplay of endogenous variables and exogenously-articulated influences, Sino–Romanian relations in the post-1989 era were mainly characterised by an adaptive inertia, circumscribed by a tradition of tacit, formal, and informal (positive) cooperation.     

Foreign Fighters and Transnational Jihad in Syria

Foreign fighters arrive in Syria from across the Muslim world, yet the configuration of their countries of origin remains a puzzle. Examining alternative explanations for joining transnational jihad, the article draws insights from the cases of Tunisia and Saudi Arabia, two major countries of foreign fighters' origin, compared with Egypt, from where limited figures of volunteers have joined the Syrian war. The article shows that the sources of volunteering fighters may be well understood in combined terms of religious sentiments and national politics. Foreign fighters come largely from Muslim countries where restrained state–Islamists relations channel Islamic grievances to transnational arenas.     

Crime,Irregular Warfare,and Institutional Failure in Latin America: Guatemala as a Case Study

This article examines the current crisis in Guatemala as a case study in the phenomenon of “criminal insurgency” in Latin America. Since the close of Guatemala's civil war in 1996, crime—especially violent crime—has increased dramatically, to the point that drug traffickers, organized crime syndicates, and youth gangs are effectively waging a form of irregular warfare against the state. The police, the judiciary, and entire local and departmental governments are rife with criminal infiltrators; murder statistics have surpassed civil-war levels in recent years; criminal operatives assassinate government officials and troublesome members of the political class; and chunks of territory are now effectively under the control of criminal groups. All this has led to growing civic disillusion and eroded the authority and legitimacy of the government. Rampant crime is causing a crisis of the democratic state.     

Suicide Terrorism in Iraq: A Preliminary Assessment of the Quantitative Data and Documentary Evidence

This preliminary assessment of suicide terrorism in Iraq sheds light on why some groups in the insurgency employ suicide attacks although others do not. The unequal utilization of suicide bombings corresponds to divergent strategies in the insurgency. Some groups fight to achieve system reintegration, whereas others send suicide bombers to collapse the emerging political order. Quantitative data and documentary evidence substantiate the finding that suicide terrorism is carried out by groups that cannot compete in any future political and institutional alignments in Iraq's new coalition politics. Suicide terrorism is intended to produce system collapse, sectarian warfare, and a failed state.