ASEAN at 40: Prospects for Community Building in Southeast Asia

In 2007, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations attempted to celebrate its 40^th founding anniversary with a bang as it was about to set another milestone, which is the signing of the ASEAN Charter. However, the celebration was overshadowed by the political crisis in Myanmar following the military's crackdown on protesting monks and their democratic supporters. The inability of ASEAN to influence events in that country became the focus of public attention in the region and the international community. Even the much-vaunted milestone of finally having an ASEAN Charter was a major disappointment for many in Southeast Asia as the final document signed by ASEAN leaders was everything but bold, forward-looking, and transformative. It became an object of criticism mainly by some think tanks and civil society groups in the region because it paled in comparison to the recommendations of the Eminent Persons Group that drafted the blueprint of what the ASEAN Charter should look like.

This article describes the major milestones and turning points of ASEAN's regionalism project over the last forty years. It also attempts to identify the major issues and challenges to ASEAN's community building efforts in the future. The main argument of this article is that ASEAN's continuing relevance to the people of the region can be ensured only if it seriously opens up to greater participatory regionalism. Only then can ASEAN be transformed into a truly people-centered organization.     

A US-Japan Foreign Policy Alliance for Myanmar

Rarely before has such a large and potentially consequential country tried to reform itself politically and economically as Myanmar is now attempting, following an extended period of extreme isolation and amid unprecedented international and digital connectedness that exists today. This is a challenge not only for Myanmar, but also for the United States and Japan as they try to facilitate this transformation in productive ways, in a coordinated fashion, and consistent with their own foreign policy and commercial interests. A pertinent question, therefore, is whether or not Washington and Tokyo are inclined and prepared to address Myanmar's transition as an alliance issue, and if they are, then what is an efficient and effective way to go about this task.

The answer is mixed, for despite their pursuit of many common interests, the policy priorities and policy making environments in the United States and Japan differ significantly. In simple terms, the United States has a “democracy first” agenda in Myanmar that sometimes limits its options, while Japan takes a more flexible approach in order to maximize engagement and business opportunity. Still, President Obama and Prime Minister Abe provided a mandate in April 2014 to strengthen alliance cooperation in Southeast Asia (and in Myanmar in particular), and the two countries have complementary strengths and local networks that can be leveraged more effectively for the benefit of all.

Despite US concerns about stalled political liberalization and human rights abuses in Myanmar, Washington should take a longer-term horizon for evaluating reforms and consider enhancing its leverage with Myanmar through more effective policy coordination with Japan (which is a major player in the country), rather than the maintenance or reapplication of sanctions.     

The Financial Crisis and America's Capital Dependence on Japan and China

In the Post-Bretton Woods financial system (1972–2009), the United States has been able to borrow heavily from savings-rich countries like Japan and China. Its access to international capital has allowed the US to cover years of extravagant spending and to enjoy unmatched levels of power and plenty. For lenders, like Japan and China, access to the huge US export market has stimulated aggregate demand, which, in turn, has facilitated economic growth, high rates of employment, infrastructure expansion, and technological development.

Notwithstanding the mutual benefits, the massive scale of Post-Bretton Woods imbalances has placed the financial system under stress. Such macro-economic imbalances usually require a major rebalancing—either immediately through a financial crash or gradually through a “soft” landing.

The financial implosion in 2008 constituted a crash landing. To arrest the steep slide into a possible world depression, most of the leading economies, including especially the United States, have taken bold monetary and fiscal measures. However, these expansionary measures will deepen deficits and generate strong inflationary headwinds while placing pressures on currency exchange rates.

Following the 2008 financial earthquake and its wave of after-shocks, America's access to foreign capital is apt to become more restricted and increasingly expensive. This will erode one of the central structural sources of US power—its extraordinary fiscal flexibility, monetary autonomy, and global economic clout. With a weakened financial superpower, the world may become less prosperous, less stable, less predictable, and considerably more dangerous.     

ASEAN's Indispensable Role in Regional Construction

The main objective of this paper is to answer the question why the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) should play a central role in constructing new security architecture in East Asia. The main argument of the paper is that, unlike other regions, a number of factors account for the complicated conditions observed in the East Asian region that provide a chance for ASEAN to be a central player in this process, promising because small and middle powers rarely can abuse power.

In order to achieve this objective, the paper is divided into three parts. The first part will analyze the major obstacles to the building of a constructive new China-Japan relationship akin to the post-World War II (WWII) ties between France and Germany. The second part analyzes the pivot to Asia by the United States to consolidate its role as regional facilitator. The third part shows why ASEAN can take the lead as a driving force or catalyst in fostering regional cooperation, because as mentioned above neither China nor Japan can do it at this stage. The paper concludes that despite the fact that ASEAN still faces many weaknesses and limitations, it continues to serve as a central player in an emerging architecture where, so far, no new alternative has appeared.     

Regional transport challenges within the Southern African Development Community and their implications for economic integration and development

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) seeks to deepen economic integration among its members through the SADC free trade area that came into effect in January 2008. The thrust for a progressive reduction of tariff and no-tariff barriers, which the market integration model emphasises, has serious implications for the impact of transport and communication systems on economic integration and development within SADC.

Transport and communications systems have an important bearing on economic integration and development because they can be significant non-tariff barriers. The SADC Protocol on Transport, Communications and Meteorology is the instrument through which transport and communications constraints are to be addressed. Through this protocol, some institutions have been established and others proposed to ensure that projects designed to deepen economic integration and development are implemented effectively.

The neo-functional integration approach is a relevant theoretical framework for analysing transport and communications issues and for implementing joint sectoral projects in areas that impact on overcoming development-related deficiencies in production and infrastructure. Transport and communications fall in this category of projects and the SADC region has benefited from functional co-operation in this sector.

As integration proceeds, polarisation of industries could occur, raising concerns about the distributional effects of economic integration as this affects development. However, polarisation is not inevitable: it depends on transport costs. This might seriously address transport and communications constraints because, if these are greatly reduced and eventually removed, weaker SADC countries need not lose industries to the core with the SADC Free Trade Area in place.     

Military Change in Asia

Asia's growing share of the global economy provides one of the strongest themes in contemporary analysis of international affairs. The remarkable economic achievements of Japan, Korea, and Taiwan over the past 50 years have been compounded more recently by the rise of the Chinese and Indian economies. While the significance of this change in the way international wealth is shared was beyond doubt before the onset of the current global financial crisis, many commentators expect that when the world eventually emerges from the crisis Asia's share of the global economy will have grown even further.

This shift clearly has strategic importance: economic decisions made in Asia, whether by governments or business, are now more important for the rest of the world than they have been for centuries. If military power were moving in the same direction, and at the same pace, the strategic consequences would be even greater.

This paper examines trends in Asian military spending and modernisation. It begins with a summary of defence spending among Asian countries.1 In this paper the term “Asia” is used to include the 22 countries from Pakistan to Japan. It does not include Afghanistan or any of the countries of central Asia, or Russia, Australia, New Zealand, or the Pacific Island countries. As explained above, data is not equally available for all 22 countries. View all notes It next considers the nature of the capabilities and equipment they are acquiring, and comments on the way in which forces are being structured, commanded, and managed. It then comments on the range of different factors that are driving military spending and modernisation in Asia, and offers particular comment on China in this regard. The paper then concludes with brief comments on United States and Australian military spending and development.     

Japan's Economy and the Global Financial Crisis

After the prolonged stagnation that followed the post-Bubble economic collapse at the end of the 1980s, from 2002 onwards the Japanese economy exhibited its longest period of economic expansion (albeit gradual) since World War Two. As this expansion came to an end and the economy was on the verge of the downward curve of the economic cycle, it was confronted with the current financial and economic crises, which originated in the USA. Nevertheless, Japanese financial institutions had invested little in sub-prime-related financial products, and with the lessons learned from the issue of bad loans in the 1990s, Japan's financial system enjoyed greater stability than that of any other major nation. However, in the period from the end of 2008 to early 2009, Japan experienced the sharpest economic decline of any major nation.

Yet, with the worst period having ended in the spring of 2009, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has predicted in its October 2009 forecasts that Japan will experience real economic growth of 1.7% in 2010—a higher rate than the USA (with 1.5%) or the Euro Zone (with 0.3%). Despite forecasts of a protraction of excessive US imports as a direct result of excessive US consumption, Japan is being forced to reduce its degree of reliance on exports to the USA and to make major adjustments to its export structure—both in terms of the regions to which it exports and the products that it exports. Japan also faces the task of setting itself on the path to economic growth, using the twin drivers of foreign demand and domestic demand, and this will necessitate the cultivation of domestic demand. Now, the long-term strategy for Japan is to promote the expansion of regional demand in Asia, to couple this regional demand with domestic demand, and to latch on to Asia's economic dynamism.     

The Trump Administration and Japan: Challenges and Visions for Japan’s Foreign and Security Policy in the New Era

It is possible that Donald Trump’s success in the US presidential election of November 2016 will touch off the greatest transformation in world politics since World War Two. This is because, for the first time, the presidency of the United States—a country that since World War Two has consistently upheld the liberal world order—has been won by a man who asserts that the US national interests will take precedence over international cooperation.

If so, Japan could be one of the most profoundly affected countries. Japan has thus far accepted its status as a junior partner within the US security framework and—without any significant military power of its own—has devoted itself to economic development.

Although it is difficult to predict what Mr. Trump’s policies will be, there is a possibility, based on the statements he has made to date, that he will be calling for Japan to become more self-reliant. Although his comprehension of the Japan-US security arrangements is fraught with misconceptions, there is ample possibility that he will ultimately opt to maintain the current Japan-US security framework. However, given that the average defense expenditure of NATO countries is 2% of their GDPs, and that the average expenditure of OECD countries on official development assistance (ODA) is 0.7% of their GDPs, it is highly questionable whether Mr. Trump will approve of Japan’s level of defense spending (less than 1% of its GDP) or of its level of spending on ODA (approximately 0.2% of its GDP).

It would not be such a bad thing for Japan to become more self-reliant in terms of security. It is almost unnatural for Japan to maintain this relationship as it is, in the form that it has taken since before Japan’s postwar reconstruction. However, in the context of international relations in East Asia, it has long been taken for granted that this is Japan’s basic stance. Changing this will be no easy task—either domestically or in terms of Japan’s relations with neighboring countries.

In these respects, the authors of this paper decided to consider the question of how Japan should develop its foreign and security policy, and to offer some proposals in this regard.     

India in the Asia–Pacific: Rising Ambitions with an Eye on China

It is almost a conventional wisdom now that the centre of gravity of global politics has shifted from Europe to the Asia–Pacific in recent years with the rise of China and India, gradual assertion by Japan of its military profile, and a significant shift in the US global force posture in favour of Asia–Pacific. The debate now is whether Asia–Pacific will witness rising tensions and conflicts in the coming years with various powers jockeying for influence in the region or whether the forces of economic globalization and multilateralism will lead to peace and stability. Some have asked the question more directly: Will Asia's future resemble Europe's past?1 ¹See Aaron Friedberg, “Will Europe's Past be Asia's Future?” Survival, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Autumn 2000), pp. 147–159. View all notes It is, of course, difficult to answer this question as of now when major powers in Asia–Pacific such as China, India and Japan are still rising and grappling with a plethora of issues that confront any rising power in the international system. But what is clear is that all major powers are now re-evaluating their policy options vis-à-vis the Pacific.

This paper examines India's foreign policy in the Pacific as it has emerged on the last few years. First, the emerging balance of power in Asia–Pacific will be examined in light of the theoretical debate on the issue followed by a broad assessment of the role that India envisages for itself in the region. Subsequently, India's relationship with the three major powers in Asia–Pacific—China, Japan, and the US is analysed. Finally, some observations will be made about the future trajectory of Indian foreign policy in the region.     

Malaysia's Role in Asian Regional Cooperation: A Look at Foreign Policy Themes

Blessed with a vastly diverse multiracial population comprising a plethora of divergent political views and religious aspirations, Malaysia's nation-building efforts have been a unique experiment. Since the colonial period, the country had to contend with three large and distinct ethnic groups, which largely, due to history, could be identified most closely by their role and place in Malaysia's society and economy. Upon gaining independence, this nascent polity was confronted with a colossal task—to unite the various ethnic groups in the country under a single national vision and a cohesive economic development strategy.

Today, despite several shortcomings, Malaysia has hitherto been relatively successful in building a competent economic model based on a complex formula of multiracial unity in the country. Malaysia can be said to be one of the few countries that has been successful in balancing national imperatives with ethnic and religious realities.

It is this understanding of and response to a uniquely pluralistic demographic landscape that has served as the underlying philosophy of Malaysia's foreign policy. The country's approach to building relationships in the region starts from a deep appreciation of the diverse ethnic, religious and cultural nature of Asian societies. Her many policies over the past fifty years aimed at strengthening ties with her Asian neighbors based on enlightened self-interest and mutual political, social and economic benefit. Her domestic experience in dealing with a multitude of Asian races and cultures enabled Malaysia to empathize with the challenges that Asian nations face. This allowed her to forge close cooperation with many Asian countries over the years. Overall, it would appear that Malaysia not only was able to achieve her national motto “Unity is Strength” within its borders but was able to work with her neighbors to attempt to achieve it internationally.

This paper therefore seeks to analyze how Malaysia's outlook came about, how it manifested in her foreign policies and in the approach of her partners.     

GULF STATES' POLICY TOWARDS SYRIAN REFUGEES: CHARITY BEFORE HOSPITALITY

The regional turmoil in the Middle East since December 2010 has provided researchers with many topics for research. Despite a relatively large number of studies in recent years, none of them deal with one of the central questions – namely, the attitude of the Gulf States toward the misery of the Syrian refugees. While more than six million Syrians fled their homeland and became refugees, 1.5 million in Europe, few, if any, succeeded in relocating to the Gulf States.

This paper endeavors to explore the Gulf States' policy toward Arab (mostly Syrian) refugees. The major finding is that GCC members prefer to grant financial support to refugees outside of the Gulf region (this is justified as charity – Zakat) instead of hosting refugees. The combination of a fragile demographic structure, fear of political and social instability, and constant concern about infiltration by terrorists under the guise of refugees are the main reasons for the policy of closing the gates entirely to the refugees. These concerns also indicate that the idea of the nation state prevails over pan-Arab nationalism.     

The Rhythms of the Yards: Urbanism,Backyards and Housing Policy in South Africa

Modernist planners became thieves of memory. Faustian in their eagerness to erase all traces of the past in the interest of forward momentum, of growth in the name of progress, their drive-by-windscreen surveys of neighbourhoods that they have already decided to condemn to the bulldozer, have been, in their own way, as deadly as the recent drive by gang shootings in Los Angeles. Modernist planners embracing the ideology of development as progress, have killed whole communities, by evicting them, demolishing their houses, and dispersing them to edge suburbs or leaving them homeless. They have killed whole communities by not understanding the loss and grieving that go along with losing one's home and neighbourhood and friends and memories. (Sandercock 1998:208)

When watching the news, you find that the government is only concerned with shack dwellers. What about us? We are sitting with big expectations that they will build us houses. We have grown so old sitting in the backyards.

Backyard shack-dweller, Johannesburg, 1999     

The Mindanao Conflict: Efforts for Building Peace through Development

In its 2003 Official Development Assistance Charter (ODA Charter), the Japanese government made peace-building one of its areas of focus. Since then, the government and Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) have been active in organizing and implementing peace-building support projects in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. One of the government’s initiatives is a peacebuilding project in Mindanao, the Philippines, an effort that represents a break from the traditional mold: the development support efforts started contributing to the peace process before the signing of any peace agreement took place.

This article examines how the development support initiatives by the Japanese government and JICA have contributed to the peace process in Mindanao from 2003 to 2016.

Despite the unfamiliarity and uncertainty clouding the initial stages of the project, the development support efforts by the Japanese government and JICA are considered to have played a substantial role in paving the way toward the signing of the Comprehensive Agreement on Bangsamoro in March 2014.     

Book reviews

Central Asia and the Caucasus After the Soviet Union: domestic and international dynamics Mohiaddin Mesbahi (Ed.) Gainsville, Florida: University Press of Florida, 1994, x, 353 pp, $49.95 cloth, $24.95 paper

Central Asia in Historical Perspective Beatrice F. Manz (Ed.) Boulder, Colorado and Oxford, UK: Westview Press, 1994, xii, 254 pp, $54.95/£40.95

The New Central Asia and its Neighbours Peter Ferdinand (Ed.) The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, Pinter Publishers, 1994, 120 pp, £9.99, paper

Central Asia. 130 Years of Russian Dominance, a Historical Overview Edward Allworth (editor) Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, London: Academic & University Publishers Group, 1994, 647 pp, illus., £25.50/£65

Commonwealth or Empire? Russia, Central Asia, and the Transcaucasus William E. Odom and Robert Dujarric Indianapolis, Indiana: Hudson Institute, 1995, 290 pp, $12.95 paperback

The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Russia and the former Soviet Union Archie Brown, Michael Kaser and Gerald Smith (editors) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, 604 pp, illus, index, £40

Kyrghyzes and Their Ancestors: untraditional overview on the history and modernity T. Koychuev, V. Mokrynin and V. Ploskih Kyrghyzy i ih predki: Netraditsionnyi vzglaid na istoriu i sovremennost.Bishkek: Kyrghyzskaia Ensiklopedia, 1994, 128 pp, ISBN 5–89750–058–6

Independent Kyrghyzstan: Third Approach T. Koychuev & A. Brudnyi Nezavisimyi Kyrghyzstan: Tretii put. Bishkek: Ilim, 1993. 143 pp

Russians in the Former Soviet Republics Paul Kolstoe London: Hurst & Company, 1995, 272 pp, biblio, index, £37 hardback

The Revenge of the Past. Nationalism, Revolution and the Collapse of the Soviet Union Ronald Grigor Suny Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press/Cambridge University Press, 1993, 200 pp, £10.95 paper

Black Sea Neal Ascherson London: Jonathan Cape, 1995, 306 pp, chronology, index, £17.99

Turkey in Post‐Soviet Central Asia Gareth Winrow London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1995, 53 pp, £9.50

The Rise of the Indo‐Afghan Empire, c. 1710–1780 Jos J. L. Gommans Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1994, 219 pp, appendices, index, biblio, $65.75

Revolutionary Horizons. Regional Policy in Post‐Khomeini Iran John Calabrese Basingstoke, Hampshire, UK: Macmillan Press, 1994, 221 pp, biblio, index, £40

The Cambridge History of China/Volume 6, Alien regimes and border states, 907–1368 Dennis Twitchett (Ed.) Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994, xxix + 864 pp, £80

China Deconstructs. Politics, Trade and Regionalism David S. G. Goodman and Gerald Segal (Eds) London: Routledge, 364 pp, 1994, £40/£12.99 paperback     

Book reviews

The New Geopolitics of Central Asia and its Borderlands Ali Banuazizi and Myron Weiner (editors) London: I. B. Tauris, 1994, 284 pp, £39.50

The Central Asian Republics. Fragments of Empire, Magnets of Wealth Charles Undeland and Nicholas Platt New York: The Asia Society, 1994, 143 pp

Does Russian Democracy Have a Future? Stephen J. Blank and Earl H. Tilford, Jr. (editors) Pennsylvania: US Army War College, 1994, 162 pp

Between Marx and Muhammad. The Changing Face of Central Asia Dilip Hiro London: Harper Collins, 1994, 402 pp

The Boundaries of Modern Iran Keith McLachlan (editor) University College London: 1994, 150 pp

Islam and Romantic Orientalism. Literary Encounters with the Orient Mohammed Sharafuddin London: I. B. Tauris, 1994, 296 pp, £34.50

Critical Terrains. French and British Orientalisms Lisa Lowe Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1991, 216 pp, $31.85

The Art and Architecture of Islam 1250–1800 Sheila S. Blair and Jonathan M. Bloom Yale University Press, New Haven and London: 1994, biblio, 280 pp, £45

Culinary Cultures of the Middle East Sami Zubaida and Richard Tapper (editors) London: I. B. Tauris, 302 pp, biblio, index, £34.50     

Book reviews

The Partition of the Steppe. The Struggle of the Russians, Manchus, and the Zunghar Mongols for Empire in Central Asia, 1619–1758: A Study in Power Politics Fred W. Bergholz New York: Peter Lang, 1993, vi + 522 pp, hardcover

On Secret Service East of Constantinople: the plot to bring down the British Empire Peter Hopkirk London: John Murray, 1994. xvi, 431 pp. illus., £19.99

The Soviet Union and its Southern Neighbours: Iran and Afghanistan Mikhail Volodarsky London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1994, 196 pp, $37.50

Moscow's Lost Empire Michael Rywkin Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1994, 214 pp, biblio, index

Russia and the Third World in the Post‐Soviet Era Mohiaddin Mesbahi (editor) Gainesville, USA: University Press of Florida, 1994, 414 pp, $49.95 cloth, $19.95/£18 paper

Central Asia and the World: Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan Michael Mandelbaum (editor) New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1994, viii, 251 pp, $16.95 paperback     

The Bank of Japan’s Monetary Policy Lacks a Strong Driving Force for Building Inflation Expectations

The Bank of Japan has been failing to create the 2% inflation expectations. This article presents the author’s views about why the Bank of Japan’s monetary easing measures have not led to achievement of the inflation target of 2%, as well as on measures required to achieve the 2% inflation (and base wage increases of over 3% which is the flip side of a 2% inflation). The major points of this article are outlined below.

First, while many Japanese economists pay little attention to importance of mild inflation, the achievement of mild inflation of 2% is vital in ensuring a stable macroeconomic environment. Its achievement would enable lowering of real interest rates (i.e., reducing the real interest rate to minus 2% as against the 0% nominal interest rate) in the situation where the nominal interest rates are drifting at the lower limit against a backdrop of various economic shocks. It would also facilitate reduction in real wages against the downwardly rigid nominal wages, thereby helping companies revive their businesses, and also facilitating adjustments in the overall economy.

Second, the reasons why the current Bank of Japan’s monetary easing measures have been unsuccessful in attaining the inflation target of 2% are as follows: 1) most of the Japanese do not understand the importance of mild inflation and so the specific content of the inflation target (achieving 2% inflation and base wage increases of over 3%) is not clearly shared; 2) on top of the fact that deflation/zero inflation has become rooted in Japan’s economy over the past two decades, Japan has never adopted a monetary policy that would anchor a mild inflation expectation of 2% (until 1990, the Bank of Japan’s primary task was to be mindful of curbing the accelerating cost-push inflation associated with wage growth); and 3) the current Bank of Japan’s monetary policy lacks a strong driving force for building inflation expectations to induce a change in people’s behavior.

Third, in order to build mild inflation expectations of 2% under such circumstances, it is important that the parties concerned with employer’s associations and labor unions become fully aware of this target so that the 2% inflation and base wage increases of over 3% becomes a code of conduct. On that basis, the government and Bank of Japan need to clearly demand substantial base wage increases with concrete numerical targets combined with the achievement of mild inflation towards the goal of building inflation expectations.

Fourth, I propose as the first step that, along with the economic measures recently taken, the government and the central bank either mediate or participate in a specific attempt to build a consensus between the employer’s associations and labor unions on achieving, in a neutral manner, inflation of 2% and base wage increases of (at least) 2%. The aim is to establish an inflation of 2% and base wage increases of over 3% as a new code of conduct shared by employer’s associations and labor unions through continued labor-management agreement.

It is desirable that mild inflation is attained gradually by stimulating aggregate demand continuously, if time and cost permit and if the international environment tolerates weak yen. However, the current economic environment would not allow it and the leeway to ease monetary policy has also been limited. It is also difficult to continue to boost aggregate demand through fiscal policy in a sustained manner against a backdrop of a low birthrate and aging population. Although successful achievement of mild inflation is not a panacea for all economic problems, unless we first achieve mild inflation and restore the function of monetary policy, we will not be able to implement the subsequent structural reforms of the labor markets, etc. or fiscal consolidation, which are both painful. And thus, the long-term economic outlook of Japan is dismal. The author strongly hopes that the Abe Cabinet and Bank of Japan under the leadership of Governor Kuroda implements a drastic regime change similar to the one launched by the Roosevelt administration, overcome deflation and achieve mild inflation, restore the function of monetary policy at the earliest possible time, and get on the path to a true revitalization of the Japanese economy.     

POLITICS WITHOUT PARTIES: AFGHANISTAN’S LONG ROAD TO DEMOCRACY

Democracy has not brought stability to Afghanistan in the almost two decades since the fall of the Taliban. But it would be wrong to conclude that the soil of Afghanistan is not conducive to the tree of democracy, when in reality it was never planted with any skill. Democracy did not fail in Afghanistan; it was never even tried.

A series of connected mistakes began with the introduction of a flawed electoral system, no insistence on a transparent register of voters, lack of proper scrutiny of polling, and a lack of support for the development of reformist political parties and other functioning civil society institutions. From the start the US did not see this as a ‘nation-building’ project, but nevertheless US officials made far-reaching decisions about the nature of Afghan democracy. These were seriously unsound, and the electoral system introduced itself operated against the development of strong democratic institutions.

This article outlines the problems inherent in the Single Non-Transferable Vote system, examines the history of Afghan political parties through the twentieth century and asks whether alternative and traditional forms of Afghan government provide any real obstacles to the development of modern politics. The 2004 constitution was the seventh since 1923: this was not a green field site in terms of institution-building as it was seen by many of the international officials who flooded in after the fall of the Taliban.     

Book reviews

Nations and Politics in the Soviet Successor States Ian Bremmer and Ray Taras, (editors) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, 577 pp, £35

Central Asia in World History S. A. M. Adshead London: Macmillan Press, 1993, 291 pp, £40

Turkey and the West: Changing Political and Cultural Identities Metin Heper, Ayse Oncu and Heinz Kramer (editors) London: I. B. Tauris, New York: St Martins Press, 1993, 289 pp, £39.50

Endurance and Endeavour. Russian History 1812–1992 J. N. Westwood Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993, 624 pp, £40

State, Religion and Society in Central Asia. A Post‐Soviet Critique Vitaly Naumkin and Sergei A. Panarin (editors) Reading: Ithaca Press, 1993, 289 pp, £35

Communism Ferdinand Mount (editor) London: Harvill, 1992, 321 pp, £9.99     

The Second-Term Obama Administration and Japan

The controversy in the Unites States on how to deal with the “fiscal cliff” revealed not just a deep ideological difference between the Democratic Party and the Republican Party but also a new sign of a possible crack of the conservative Republican ranks between those Republicans close to the Tea Party and those who favored the tax hike for the wealthy in order to save the tax cut for the rest of the people.

The planned deep cuts in the defense expenditure will have important implications for national security of Japan, which recently experiences increasing tension with China over the Senkaku Islands. The Obama Administration adopted a tough stance with China over the territorial issues in the South China Sea in July 2010. Rebalance to Asia could be understood, at least in part, to be a response to the rise of China, in a financial situation with fewer resources available for the national defense in the US.

The logical conclusion for Japan and the US would be for both of them to deepen security cooperation. Shinzo Abe, the new Prime Minister of Japan, should further clarify his foreign and national security policy priority and concentrate his efforts on strengthening the alliance with the US and building up the capabilities to defend Japan's territory, while exerting caution in jumping into “history” issues with China and South Korea so that Japan's message on the Senkaku Islands issue is crystal clear and focused: that it is against the established international norm to try to change the status quo by force or intimidation; this message should have universal appeal to a wider international community.