Burgeoning Transnationalism of Taiwan's Social Movement NGOs

So far as Taiwan's foreign relations are concerned, in parallel to the state's diplomacy and state-blessed Track-II maneuvering, there has emerged a more natural and meaningful phenomenon: i.e. grassroots solidarity between Taiwanese activist NGOs and their foreign counterparts, as a result of the joint pursuit of common social justice goals. It is high time that voluntary transnational activism was studied for a more comprehensive understanding of Taiwan's foreign relations in the era of democratization and surging activism of transnational social movement campaigns. This paper discusses the internationalization of Taiwan's social movement NGOs: their background, motivations, activities, and roles in transnational politics. Special attention is paid to the fact that while Taiwanese NGO activities in the transnational NGO community by nature ignore and disregard the state's diplomatic interests, both the quality and quantity of such activities have been severely restricted by Taiwan's poor diplomatic status in the inter-state community. This is a unique paradox not studied in the mainstream discourse on transnational civil society.     

Explaining Taiwan's Revisionist Diplomacy

Taiwan is a revisionist power. Its independence movement challenges a vital status-quo interest of mainland China's opposition to a de jure Taiwan declaration of independence and maintaining, however ambiguously, Taiwan's commitment to the ‘one-China’ formulation. Why is it that a small and vulnerable island off the coast of a great power has continued to challenge the vital interest of that great power and risk war? Adopting a ‘levels of analysis’ approach to Taiwan's mainland policy, this paper addresses this question by examining four prevalent explanations for Taiwan's revisionist diplomacy: (1) the mainland deterrent is ineffective, reflecting Taiwan doubts about either mainland capabilities or mainland resolve to wage a retaliatory war; (2) in an example of the security dilemma in alliance politics, US commitment to Taiwan, although aimed at deterring PRC use of force, encourages Taiwan to challenge the status quo because the Taiwan leadership is confident of US intervention and US ability to defend Taiwan; (3) because of the development of a ‘Taiwan identity’ and of corresponding domestic political pressures, the Democratic Progressive Party has been compelled to adopt a pro-independence policy; (4) Chen Shui-bian has a personal commitment to Taiwan independence and has been willing to challenge the mainland's interest in one-China, despite risk of heightened conflict and regardless of domestic political considerations.     

Political Earthquake and Aftershocks: The DPP after the 2000 presidential election

The 2000 presidential election marked a major turning point in Taiwan's political development. For the first time since 1949 the government of Taiwan came under the control of a political party other than the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, KMT). The seemingly peaceful transfer of power after the 18 March election leading up to the 20 May inauguration has been widely cited as evidence of Taiwan's democratic consolidation, even though the alternation of ruling power was undoubtedly a major political earthquake in Taiwan history. Since the major political earthquake took place in March 2000, numerous aftershocks have occurred. They include the opposition attempt to recall the newly elected president and vice president; the formation of a 'major opposition alliance'; a dramatic economic downturn; and the 2001 Legislative Yuan elections that resulted in another KMT defeat. Different political parties, especially the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), have been trying to learn how to cope with the new political situation.     

China in the North Korean Nuclear Crises: ‘interest’ and ‘identity’ in foreign behavior

China reacted very differently to the first and second North Korean nuclear crisis: engaging in passive and ‘behind-the-scenes’ diplomacy in the first and choosing more proactive and ‘stage-managing’ diplomacy in the second. This article has sought to explain this striking contrast in China's foreign behavior. Though most studies tend to rely on Chinese strategic and security interests in explaining China's proactive diplomacy as demonstrated in the six-party talks, those strategic and security interests do not explain directly the contrasting foreign behavior of China. China faced basically equal strategic and security concerns and equally dangerous potential military conflict between the US and North Korea through the first and the second nuclear crises. This article, then, argues that ‘same interests, but different behaviors’ should be explained not by China's external interest calculus but by internal changes within China itself. By the turn of the new millennium, China had undergone an evolutionary change of state identity from a cautious accommodator to an active constructor, or from a state of ‘taoguang yanghui’ to a state of ‘fuzeren daguo’. The contrasting foreign behaviors in the first and second nuclear crises are profoundly reflective of this identity shift of China.     

The Taiwan Problem in the Second George W. Bush Administration—US officials' views and their implications for US policy

The behavior of Taiwan leaders and people in 2003–2004 raised the salience of Taiwan's assertive movement toward permanent independence for US policy makers. No longer did US officials responsible for assessing cross-Strait relations and their implications for US policy take it for granted that such assertiveness and moves toward independence would be held in check by the mainstream opinion in Taiwan, previously but no longer viewed as pragmatic by US decision makers. In response to the new situation, US policy makers intervened in Taiwan politics, trying to channel Taiwan assertiveness along lines less likely to lead to war with China. US interventions were widely seen to have had a moderating effect on the Taiwan elite and public opinion in the lead-up to the December 2004 legislative election that resulted in a significant setback for President Chen Shui-bian's push toward greater independence. Taiwan's political opposition leaders pursued high-level contacts with China. Chinese leaders warmly welcomed the Taiwan opposition leaders who renounced Taiwan independence. However, Taiwan politics remained sharply divided over cross-Strait issues, with President Chen unwilling to renounce Taiwan independence or accept a version of the so-called one China principle seen by China as a prerequisite for improved relations with the Taiwan government. President Bush and other US officials encouraged both governments to show greater flexibility in order to promote dialogue that would reduce misunderstanding and ease tensions. The uncertain outlook for cross-Strait relations included the possibility of talks, improved relations, and agreements on managing cross-Strait tensions between the Taiwan and Chinese governments. On the other hand, the impasse between China and Taiwan could deepen. The Bush administration appeared to have settled on a policy that endeavored to deter China from using force against Taiwan and deter Taiwan from taking provocative steps toward independence. The main alternatives to this approach seemed less acceptable to US policy makers under prevailing conditions, suggesting that US policy is likely to persist with a dual deterrence policy for the rest of President Bush's term in office.     

Corruption Perception in Taiwan: reflections upon a bottom-up citizen perspective

Taiwan's transition from authoritarian to democratic rule has not necessarily resulted in lower levels of perceived corruption on the island. Indeed, many Taiwan citizens have come to view the problem of corruption as worsening in recent years. To understand what these perceptions are and why they have emerged, this study examines Taiwanese attitudes toward corruption and its control from a bottom-up approach. By utilizing data from an original, nationwide public opinion survey, the authors identify the most prevalent corrupt behaviors and the institutions in Taiwanese society that are most susceptible to corruption. The paper then investigates three ‘bottom-up’ factors that help explain variations in the perception of corruption by citizens: encounter with government bureaucracy, party identification, and the effect of media. Analysis of survey data indicates that all three factors influence how Taiwanese people feel about corruption and corruption-related issues.     

US Arms Transfer Policy to Taiwan: From Carter to Clinton

The US has maintained a keen interest in Taiwan's military security for decades, and US arms transfer to Taiwan has become an especially important issue for both China and Taiwan since the normalization of US-China relations. This study attempts to examine US arms transfer policy toward Taiwan since the late 1970s. What factors have been involved in the formulation and implementation of US arms transfer policy? How have structural changes in the international system, such as the end of the Cold War, affected the policy? Since the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979 allowed continued sales for Taiwan's security and the US-PRC Joint Communique on 17 August 1982 agreed to decrease arms sales to Taiwan, how has the US resolved the contradiction between the two sets of policies? Finally, what is the effect of US arms transfer on Taiwan's national security and defense industry?     

The cross‐strait talks of 1993—The rest of the story: Domestic politics and Taiwan's mainland policy

In April 1993 ‘unofficial’ representatives of the mainland and Taiwan met in Singapore. This was the most important cross‐strait meeting since the end of the civil war in 1949 and was held against a background of growing contact that had begun in the late 1980s. However, these meetings also came at a time when the political system in Taiwan was undergoing a process of dramatic change. The development of an opposition party, divisions within the ruling KMT party, a more assertive Legislative Yuan and the sprouts of interest group politics all provided a domestic context for the meetings in Singapore. This paper looks at the manner in which these domestic factors shaped the tone and substance of Taiwan's bargaining position at these talks.     

Constituting Taiwanese Statehood: the world timing of un-Chinese consciousness

This paper argues against the popular impression that the rise of Taiwan's national consciousness is a result of democratization. Instead, it looks to the world timing of Taiwan becoming an independent reference point internationally for explanation of the changing identity in contemporary politics.     

US 'Dual Track' Policy: Arms sales and technology transfer to China mainland and Taiwan

This article analyzes the United States 'dual track' policy on arms sales and technology transfers to the China mainland and Taiwan. Despite its 'one China' policy, the US has continued to sell arms to Taiwan and provide Taiwan with military technology. At the same time, Washington is unwilling to transfer certain technology to the China mainland. The US 'dual track' policy of arms sales and technology transfer to both sides of the Taiwan Strait has maintained a strategic balance by developing closer relations with Beijing while maintaining the security of the Republic of China on Taiwan. Washington's objectives are to enhance Sino‐American relations and to maintain Taiwan's security while not unsettling the generally positive Sino‐American relationship. While this policy has caused tensions in US‐PRC relations, this 'unbalanced balance' has served US interests in maintaining Taiwan's security and has not strained Washington‐Beijing relations to the breaking point.     

China Goes to Africa: a strategic move?

Entering the twenty-first century, particularly under the reign of Hu Jintao, China began to pursue an increasingly pro-active diplomacy in Africa. Most analysis on China's offensive diplomacy in Africa focuses on Beijing's thirst for energy and raw materials, and for economic profits and benefits. That is why it is often called ‘energy diplomacy’ or ‘economic diplomacy’ as if China, just like Japan in the 1980s, became another ‘economic animal’. But if one looks at the history of the PRC's foreign policy, Beijing has seldom pursued its diplomacy from purely economic considerations. Is this time any different? This article exams China's diplomacy in Africa from a strategic and political perspective such as its geo-strategic calculations, political and security ties with African countries, peacekeeping and anti-piracy efforts in the region, support for African regionalism, etc. It argues that China's diplomatic expansion in Africa, while partially driven by its need for economic growth, cannot be fully understood without taking into consideration its strategic impulse accompanying its accelerating emergence as a global power. Africa is one of China's diplomatic ‘new frontiers’ as exemplified by new Chinese leader Xi Jinping's maiden foreign trip to Africa in 2013.     

Taiwan's Foreign Policy and Africa: The limitations of dollar diplomacy

The search for status, or more correctly, the desire to maintain status, lies at the heart of the Republic of China on Taiwan's (ROC) foreign policy. This is particularly so vis-a ¤ -vis its official state-to-state relations. In this regard, the ROC has been constrained by a conscious policy by the People's Republic of China (PRC) to try and marginalize Taiwan on the international stage. Due to objective realities, Taiwan has had to become satisfied with maintaining official state relations with small states only. All, with the exception of the Vatican, are in the developing world, with a number in Africa. This paper examines Taiwanese foreign policy and its diplomatic initiatives, with particular reference to its use of 'dollar diplomacy' in its activities in Africa. The constraints and limitations of such policies are drawn out.     

China's good neighbor policy and its implications for Taiwan

Chinese leaders in recent years have been following a coherent policy toward Asia that emphasizes moderation and accommodation while preserving core PRC interests. China's prevailing ‘good neighbor’ policy approach—backed by improvement in US–China relations—provides important opportunities and challenges for Taiwan. It clearly inclines the PRC leaders to avoid more aggressive or harder‐line tactics in the mix of carrots and sticks that makes up China's recent approach toward Taiwan. To follow a more disruptive course would undermine the influence and advantage Beijing has been seeking with its ongoing moderate approach toward the United States and other Asian powers. The main challenge for Taiwan is how to deal with the current balance of carrots and sticks in China's policy. Much depends on the ability of Taiwan's leaders and populace to turn the prevailing balance in PRC policy to Taiwan's advantage. This presumably will involve reviving their economy, promoting effective governance and prudent defense, while consolidating relations with the United States and managing tensions in cross‐Strait relations to the advantage of Taiwan's future security and development. Unfortunately, there is no political consensus on Taiwan to mobilize domestic resources and opinion in a concerted effort to protect Taiwan's future as an entity independent of PRC control. Those outsiders who have followed with positive interest Taiwan's remarkable development over the past decades hope that Taiwan makes good use of the opportunities posed by China's good neighbor policy to adopt prudent and concrete measures beneficial to Taiwan's long range prospects.     

The PLA and Diplomacy: unraveling myths about the military role in foreign policy making

The PLA's role in Beijing's foreign policy-making process is a closed book but it is a key research topic in our study of Chinese diplomacy. This paper argues that generally the PLA abides by a fine division of labor with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) in managing Beijing's international pursuits. The civilians are in charge of China's generic foreign affairs and daily diplomacy. The Central Military Commission (CMC) is responsible for security/military-related foreign affairs and defines the bottom-line for employing force in conflicts. Institutionally the PLA's role is more directional than detailed and is often behind the scenes. This complicates our research of the subject matter, as the line between this division of labor is thin over many diplomatic issues. Often times it is hard to demarcate where Beijing's normal diplomacy ends and where security/military dynamics begin. This paper adopts a two-layered analysis on civil–military interaction on foreign and security affairs: the broad consensus of CCP–PLA leaders on CCP regime stability at a time of drastic domestic change and world pressure; and the PLA's directional role in China's security/military-related foreign affairs under a generic civilian guidance.     

The Education of Chen Shui-bian: Taiwan's experience of divided government

From its founding, Taiwan's Democratic Progressive Party emphasized the role of the president. It advocated a variety of measures aimed at strengthening the presidency, including direct presidential elections. However, it was only when a DPP politician was elected president in 2000 that the party discovered just how weak Taiwan's president is. During his first year in office, President Chen Shui-bian repeatedly found himself stymied by an intransigent and uncooperative legislature. The conflict between the presidential office and the legislature climaxed in a confrontation over the executive's decision to cancel construction of Taiwan's fourth nuclear power plant. In the wake of the decision, some legislators attempted to recall Chen from office. In the second year of his presidency, Chen was more effective in working within the constraints of a divided government. Despite the difficulties its leaders faced in managing a divided government, however, the DPP has not changed its position in favor of presidentialism.     

Taiwan's New Grand Strategy

Since Ma Ying-jeou assumed the presidency, Taiwan's relations with Mainland China have been profoundly transformed. This article uses the perspective of a grand strategy to interpret and explain Taiwan's new approach to cross-Strait relations. It suggests that Ma's government has adopted a grand strategy of accommodation that uses assurances, confidence building, and economic integration to enhance Taiwan's security. This new grand strategy has both ideational and materialist roots. The article also assesses the preliminary results of Taiwan's new security approach and its future sustainability.     

Accounting for Taiwan's economic policy toward China

This article explores the ideas, institutions, and interests in which Taiwan's economic policy toward China is embedded. The authors indicate that the ideas behind Taiwan's economic policy toward China are as vibrant as ever, the political foundation for a coherent and feasible policy is eroding, and commercial interests are digressing from the Taiwan government's policy goals. Political forces around ideas have strong hearing on the formation of Taiwan's economic policy toward China. The truthfulness or falseness of the security argument is of intrinsic value to Taiwan's decision makers. The authors also point out that in order to have a complete picture of cross‐Strait economic relations, we need to specify how trade and investment with China influence Taiwan's distribution of political interests.     

Comparing Jiang Zemin's Impatience with Hu Jintao's Patience Regarding the Taiwan Issue, 1989–2012

Although the essence of China's Taiwan policy has not changed from the era of Jiang Zemin to the present, the era of Hu Jintao, Jiang's and Hu's attitudes are different. Jiang was impatient with the delay in the unification of China and Taiwan, talking about timetables for unification; however, Hu has so far been patient, saying that he is not afraid of delaying unification. The purpose of this paper is to explain why their attitudes are different. I argue that two factors combine to result in Jiang's impatience and Hu's patience: conflicting ‘perceptions of Taiwan's domestic politics and Taiwan's China policy’ and differing ‘perceptions of the US behavior and attitude regarding Taiwan’.     

Community Volunteers' Associations in Contemporary Tianjin: multipurpose partners of the party–state

The Community Volunteers' Associations (CVAs) are among the oldest grassroots organizations in contemporary China and as such provide a valuable case for a study of China's fast-growing non-profit sector. The author defines CVAs as multipurpose partners of the party–state in its pursuit of social stability and maintenance of legitimacy. In this role, the CVAs have served three major tasks. They have provided social services, acted as a link between the party–state and urban residents, and served as a medium for shaping values. The article explores the definition and redefinition of these tasks as well as the actual operations of the associations since the late 1980s.     

协商治理与社会矛盾化解

协商民主是实现党的领导的重要方式,是中国社会主义民主政治的独特优势。党的十八大以来,随着社会主要矛盾的变化,实施民主协商逐步成为中国基层预防和化解社会矛盾的重要方式。党的十九届四中全会上,"民主协商"成为社会治理体系的基本组成部分。协商民主对于实现利益整合、降低决策风险、培育社会自治和增进公共理性具有显著功效。在化解基层社会矛盾方面,协商民主制度在不同的决策阶段发挥着重要的治理效能。中国共产党的群众路线的传统、各级党委政府对协商民主制度的倡导、基层社会协商民主实践的创新,构成了中国基层社会协商治理发展的动力。