Strength of Evidence,Extraevidentiary Influence,and the Liberation Hypothesis: Data from the Field

To examine relationships between strength of evidence (SOE) and extraevidentiary variables in the context of Kalven and Zeisel’s (The American Jury, 1966) liberation hypothesis, post-trial questionnaire data were collected from judges, attorneys, and jurors associated with 179 criminal jury trials. SOE ratings were strongly correlated with jury verdicts on the three most serious charges against the defendant, and several extraevidentiary variables (i.e., pretrial publicity, trial complexity, charge severity, and foreperson demographics) were moderately correlated with verdicts. Extraevidentiary-verdict relationships remained significant when SOE was controlled, although extraevidentiary variables yielded only modest improvement in classification accuracy beyond SOE. In partial support of the liberation hypothesis, several case-related extraevidentiary variables were significantly related to jury verdicts only when the prosecution’s evidence was rated as moderately strong.     

On Finding for Defendants Who Plead Insanity: The Crucial Impact of Dispositional Instructions and Opportunity to Deliberate

One hundred twenty participants functioned as mock-jurors and as members of deliberating juries in an experiment designed to assess the impact of dispositional instruction on verdicts rendered in an insanity trial. Consistent with prior research (K. E. & J. R. Ogloff, 1995), dispositional instruction had no effect on the verdict preferences of individual jurors prior to deliberating. Yet, as expected, the instruction manipulation had a major impact on postdeliberative decisions (i.e., group verdicts; individual juror verdict preferences). Content analyses of jury deliberations revealed that postdeliberative shifts toward harsh verdicts in uninstructed juries and toward lenient verdicts in instructed juries were mediated by the impact of the Instruction manipulation on the content of jury deliberations: uninstructed juries feared that an acquitted-insane defendant would be freed to act again, whereas instructed juries recognized that finding for an insane defendant implied his retention and treatment. Implications of these results for both legal policy and the conduct of mock-trial research are discussed.     

Capital Jury Deliberation: Effects on Death Sentencing,Comprehension, and Discrimination

This study focused on whether and how deliberations affected the comprehension of capital penalty phase jury instructions and patterns of racially discriminatory death sentencing. Jury-eligible subjects were randomly assigned to view one of four versions of a simulated capital penalty trial in which the race of defendant (Black or White) and the race of victim (Black or White) were varied orthogonally. The participants provided their initial “straw” sentencing verdicts individually and then deliberated in simulated 4–7 person “juries.” Results indicated that deliberation created a punitive rather than lenient shift in the jurors’ death sentencing behavior, failed to improve characteristically poor instructional comprehension, did not reduce the tendency for jurors to misuse penalty phase evidence (especially, mitigation), and exacerbated the tendency among White mock jurors to sentence Black defendants to death more often than White defendants.     

The objective reality of evidence and the utility of systematic jury selection

Significant relationships between jurors' demographic characteristics, attitudes, and verdicts have stimulated an interest in systematic jury selection. However, critics of this approach argue that verdicts are based on the strength of the evidence presented rather than on the composition of the jury. This analysis of demographic and attitudinal data and the responses to a vignette collected from a jury-eligible sample explores the association between perception of strength of evidence and both case-relevant attitudes and demographic characteristics and then examines the amount of variation in verdict explained by juror characteristics when strength of evidence is already taken into account. The findings point to the inclusion of strength of evidence in systematic jury selection procedures.     

Jury nullification

The present study was conducted to determine the effects of nullification information to the jury from two sources, judge's instructions and lawyers' arguments, on juries' verdicts and decision making in three criminal cases. In addition, the research tested the impact of challenges to nullification information on trial outcomes. The results, gathered from 144 six-person juries, indicated that when juries are in receipt of nullification information from the judge or defense attorney they are more likely to acquit a sympathetic defendant and judge a dangerous defendant more harshly than when such information is not present or when challenges are made to nllification arguments. Analysis of the juries' decision-making processes suggested that nullification information may alter the way in which juries perceive and use the trial evidence. In those trials in which a nullification defense was successful, juries used the outcome of the case, as well as the intent of the defendant, to evaluate the worth and weight of the evidence. Pronullification conditions devalued the currency of the evidence and permitted juries to utilize nonevidentiary factors in deciding the cases used in this study.This research was supported by a grant from The University of Toledo Graduate School.     

A Study of Juror and Jury Judgments in Civil Cases: Deciding Liability for Punitive Damages

A study was conducted to investigate civil juries' decisions concerning defendants' liability for punitive damages in tort cases. A total of 121 six-member mock juries composed of jury-service-eligible citizens were presented summaries of previously decided cases and given a comprehensive instruction on the defendant's liability for punitive damages. Most of the mock juries decided that the consideration of punitive damages was warranted, although appellate and trial judges had concluded that they were not warranted. The tendency to find the defendant liable was partly due to jurors' failure systematically to consider the full set of legally necessary conditions for the verdicts they rendered. Individual differences in the jurors' backgrounds were not strongly related to their verdicts; income and ethnicity were weakly related to judgments. The social processes in deliberation on civil juries were similar to the dynamics of deliberation that have been observed in criminal juries.     

The importance of forensic evidence for decisions on criminal guilt

Recent studies have found that the general public perceives forensic evidence to be relatively inaccurate and to involve high levels of human judgement. This study examines how important the general public finds forensic evidence by comparing decisions on guilt and punishment in criminal cases that involve forensic versus eyewitness testimony evidence and examining whether a CSI effect exists. Specifically, this experimental survey study utilized a 2 (crime type: murder or rape) × 4 (evidence type: DNA, fingerprint, victim eyewitness testimony, or bystander eyewitness testimony) ? 1 (no victim testimony for murder scenario) design, yielding seven vignettes scenarios to which participants were randomly assigned. Results indicate that forensic evidence was associated with more guilty verdicts and higher confidence in a guilty verdict. Forensic evidence did not change the expected sentence length and did not generally affect the ideal sentence length. However, for rape, respondents believed that the defendant should receive a longer sentence when forensic evidence was presented but forensic evidence did not alter likely sentence that respondents expected the defendant to receive. The results of this study did not support a CSI effect. Overall, this study suggests that forensic evidence – particularly DNA – has a stronger influence during the verdict stage than the sentencing stage.     

Permitting Jury Discussions During Trial: Impact of the Arizona Reform

A field experiment tested the effect of an Arizona civil jury reform that allows jurors to discuss evidence among themselves during the trial. Judges, jurors, attorneys, and litigants completed questionnaires in trials randomly assigned to either a Trial Discussions condition, in which jurors were permitted to discuss the evidence during trial, or a No Discussions condition, in which jurors were prohibited from discussing the evidence during trial according to traditional admonitions. Judicial agreement with jury verdicts did not differ between conditions. Permitting jurors to discuss the evidence did affect the degree of certainty that jurors reported about their preferences at the start of jury deliberations, the level of conflict on the jury, and the likelihood of reaching unanimity.     

Admitting evidence of a defendant's previous conviction (PCE) and its impact on juror deliberation in relation to both juror‐processing style and juror concerns over the fairness of introducing PCE

Purpose. To examine the impact of admitting previous conviction evidence (PCE) on juror and jury deliberation. Major questions are: (1) Is there is an association between the inclusion of PCE and confidence in a defendant's guilt using a relatively rich trial simulation? (2) Does PCE invoke jurors’ considerations of fairness to the defendant? (3) Is heuristic processing (HP) associated with a prejudicial interpretation of evidence? Methods. In experiment 1 (n= 82), individual jurors were asked to recall evidence, express opinion, and justify verdicts on the two counts of Affray and Grievous Bodily Harm (GBH). In experiment 2 (new n= 121), PCE information was emphasized and a jury deliberation condition was included. Results. There was no simple association between admitting PCE and judgements of guilt. However, both interviews and jury deliberations indicated careful consideration of evidence. In particular, juror arguments showed that some were troubled by PCE, which they saw as unwarranted and therefore unfair to the defendant. Finally, HP was associated with both a prejudicial focus on the defendant's character and a higher confidence in guilt. Conclusions. A simple link between PCE and judgements of guilt may only hold in relatively circumscribed experimental simulations. Results also indicate that the introduction of PCE is unlikely to aid evidence‐based deliberation without careful testing of different forms of judges’ explanation concerning PCE.     

The basis of citizen's perceptions of the criminal jury

Two studies examined citizens' perceptions of the criminal jury and their evaluations of 6- or 12-person juries operating under unanimous or majority decision rules. Study 1 was a telephone survey of 130 adult citizens in which respondents evaluated alternative jury structures in the abstract. In Study 2, students were asked to evaluate jury structures for a hypothetical trial in which they were either the defendant or the victim in a crime with a mild or serious outcome. In both studies, jury size and decision rule were related to ratings of procedural cost, and the severity of the crime moderated procedural evaluations. In Study 1, juries were preferred to judges and the 12-person unanimous jury was preferred over other jury structures when the crime involved was serious. In Study 2, there were no direct effects due to variations in jury structure, but subjects appeared to trade off procedural cost and thoroughness of deliberation as a function of the seriousness of the crime. Procedural fairness emerged as the strongest independent predictor of desirability for jury procedures, and fairness was related to representativeness and accuracy. The role manipulation did not influence subjects' responses. In both studies, respondents were very supportive of the jury as an institution, despite a perception that erroneous jury verdicts do occur.     

Estimating Juror Accuracy,Juror Ability,and the Relationship Between Them

This article advances a method based on standard test theories and measurement models to determine correct verdicts for jury trials, and to estimate juror accuracy, juror ability, and trial difficulty (and the relationships among them). With five vignette cases and 1,318 juror eligible adults as the subjects, the model consistently identified verdicts that accorded with the judge’s instructions on the law as correct. With the correct verdicts, the strength of the relationship between juror accuracy and juror ability was found to be substantial. These findings suggest that the assumption of equivalent accuracy of jurors underlying the Condorcet’s jury theorem (Condorcet, Essai sur l’Application de l’Analyse a la Probabilite des Decisions Rendues a la Pluralite des Voix, Paris, 1785) may be untenable for general cases where jurors of diverse dispositions and abilities serve together; and that the role of juror ability in determining the accuracy of legal decisions could be more significant than that of attitudes and values because, unlike attitudes and values, ability could affect juror’s legal decisions regardless of the type of the case.     

Defendant-juror similarity and mock joror judgments

It was hypothesized that joror-defendant similarity would lead to greater leniency toward a criminal defendant when the evidence against that defendant was weak or inconclusive; but when evidence was strong, it was expected that this relationship would be reversed. In Study 1, religious similarity was found to be simply and positively related to evaluation of the defendant and leniency, a relationship unaffected by the strength of evidence. This pattern of results was attributed to (a) insufficiently strong evidence against the defendant and (b) the lack of anticipated jury deliberation, problems addressed in Study 2. In that study, when evidence was strong against the defendant, juror-defendant racial similarity did increase the likelihood of conviction, but only when jurors anticipated being in the racial minority in their jury. Implications of the findings for psychological theory and for voir dire were discussed.The authors wish to thank Howard Klein and Jane Stanfel for their assistance in data collection and analysis in Experiment 2, and the Editor and two anonymous reviewers for their suggestions on an earlier draft.     

Factors affecting testimony about mitigating circumstances and the fixing of punishment

Although trial attorneys typically choose to have defendants testify on their own behalf, there are data from studies using simulated juries which suggest that the presentation of favorable testimony by defendants might be harmful. Data from these studies are suspect, however, because subjects' verdicts had no realworld consequences. In the present study the real-world consequentiality of subjects' verdicts (some vs. none), the presence of mitigating testimony (some vs. none), the source of the mitigating testimony (defendant vs. third party), and the credibility of mitigating testimony (high vs. low) were all manipulated in order to test their effects on the severity of penalities subjects assigned. The results showed that among subjects whose decisions were of no consequence, none of the other manipulated variables produced any reliable differences. On the other hand, among those who thought their decisions were of real consequence, less severe penalties were given when mitigating testimony was presented as opposed to when it was not, and more interestingly, this was true regardless of the testimony's source. The results are seen as underlining the importance of inducing a sense of consequence in simulated jury studies.     

The effect of jury nullification instruction on verdicts and jury functioning in criminal trials

Jury nullification is a mechanism, and a defense, which allows the jury, as representatives of the community, to disregard both the law and the evidence and acquit defendants who have violated the letter, but not the spirit of the law. Should juries simply follow the law as articulated by the trial judge, or should they act as “conscience of the community,” and neglect the strict requirements of the law when it would lead to unjust or inequitable verdicts? The present study was aimed at providing empirical data for the following question: will the jury operate in a manner which is different than its normal functioning if given explicit nullification instructions? Three nullification instructins varying in explicitness as to nullification were combined with three criminal cases to yield a 3×3 factorial design. Forty-five six-person juries (270 subjects), were randomly assigned to the nine experimental groups. The results showed that juries given explicit nullification instructtions were more likely to vote guilty in a drunk driving case, but less likely to do so in a euthanasia case. The third case, which dealt with murder, did not show any differences due to instructions. Juries in receipt of nullification instructions spent less deliberation time on the evidence and more on defendant characteristics, attributions, and personal experiences.     

Battered women who kill

This study assesses acquital rates using mock jurors in cases involving a battered woman charged with killing her husband. The simulated trial format was based on actual courtroom proceedings including witness cross-examination and jury deliberation proceedings. The type of plea entered was varied and reflected either self-defense, automatism, or a hypothetical plea of psychological self-defense. The severity of abuse incurred by the defendant was also varied along with expert testimony. Jurors more frequently found the defendant not guilty when a plea of automatism was entered compared to a plea of self-defense. The frequency of acquittals following a plea of psychological self-defense resulted in more acquittals than the self-defense plea but significantly fewer than the automatism plea. The likelihood of acquittal increased under conditions of severe abuse as opposed to moderate abuse. Expert witness testimony was observed to influence verdicts during juror deliberations.     

Juror Sensitivity to the Cross-Race Effect

Black and White mock jurors' sensitivity to the cross-race effect was investigated by varying the race of the eyewitness in a simulated murder trial of a Black defendant. Participants heard an audiotape of a trial after which they rendered a verdict and rated the credibility of the witnesses. White participants found the prosecution witnesses (including the eyewitness) more credible, and the defense witness less credible, than did Black participants; they were also more likely to find the defendant guilty. The Black eyewitness was perceived as more credible than was the White eyewitness, but eyewitness race had no effect on verdict. These results are consistent with the literature indicating that jurors of different races reach different verdicts, and also that jurors are relatively insensitive to factors that affect eyewitness testimony, such as the cross-race effect.     

Korean citizen participation in criminal trials: The present situation and problems

As citizen participation in criminal trials was first introduced in 2008, it is advisable to keep the present form of an all-citizen jury system rather than introduce or adopt aspects of the Continental mixed tribunal system because the former system makes the best use of the meaning of Article 1 of the Act of Citizen Participation in Criminal Trials in Korea. Though previously professional judges participated in the deliberation process, under the current system, the new procedure should allow only jurors to engage in deliberations and render verdicts, with sentencing still left to professional judges. The new law should also eliminate a consent agreement required for a defendant in jury trial, thereby making jury trial mandatory for certain classes of heinous crimes like murder or even political crimes; juvenile cases, however, may still be excluded from jury trial. In addition, the exclusion right of the court should also be recognized, but the current comprehensive rule (Article 9 (1) (3)) should be eliminated. It is necessary for the jury verdict to have legal binding force such that the prosecutor cannot appeal the acquittal if the verdict was decided unanimously. Lastly, as for the use of victim participation programs, it is enough to simply allow victims to make statements as witness. This year, on March 6, 2013, the revised system of civil participation in criminal trials has been ready based on the evaluation of the current system by the Committee on Civil Judicial Participation, which was comprised of members from the judiciary, the academia, and civil organizations. The new amendment will be submitted to the National Assembly within this year.