Congressional Use of the Program Assessment Rating Tool

This paper seeks to advance knowledge about congressional use of the program assessment rating tool (PART) in the 109th Congress. The research suggest that both congressional chambers use PART on a limited basis; affirms that congressional committees are exposed to PART scores through congressional budget justification score inclusion and in federal agency testimony; and that use was primarily driven by non‐congressional actors.     

Playing the Wrong PART: The Program Assessment Rating Tool and the Functions of the President's Budget

The extensive literature about the George W. Bush administration's Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) has not emphasized an issue that appears quite clearly in interviews with senior Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and congressional staff. Budget analysis can pursue efficiency in two ways. One, the object of traditional analysis, involves assessing programs to understand the ratio of inputs to outputs within an agency, and thus the effects of more or less funding. Another approach, termed “budgeting for results,” measures program performance so as to allocate funding among programs in a way that increases total welfare. The second approach is much more difficult because it necessitates comparison of measures of unlike phenomena, requires expertise that often does not exist, and is more easily contested as invoking values rather than facts. Both congressional and OMB sources report concerns that PART weakened budget analysis by diverting resources from traditional analysis. If one goal of reformers is for the OMB to provide analysis that will influence Congress, the focus should be on strengthening the capacity to do traditional budget analysis.     

Rent-seeking and pesticide legislation

This paper provides a test of the Appelbaum and Katz (1987) rent-seeking model, in which rents are endogenous. The Appelbaum-Katz model is theoretically modified to correspond to our empirical application, in which rent-seeking and rent-avoiding coalitions are attempting to influence legislators' votes on pesticide regulations. Probit estimations are used to analyze the legislators' votes on two bills to amend pesticide legislation (a proxy for rent). Empirical results generally support the rent-seeking determinants identified in the model. Tobit estimation is used to investigate campaign contributions by the coalitions to the legislators. These contributions are a proxy for rent-seeking activities. Again, the model is supported.     

The economic organization of legislatures and how it affects congressional voting

Congress confronts two major organizational problems that affect the behavior of legislators, party leaders, and groups doing business with congressional committees: The costly nature of monitoring and the absence of explicit mechanisms for upholding agreements. The problem of monitoring implies that party leaders will have a difficult time influencing decisions made in decision-making arenas where the actions of legislators are less visible, as in congressional committees. While legislators can evade leadership monitoring of their actions within committees, once an issue leaves a committee, the costs of monitoring decline, and leadership influence increases. The absence of mechanisms for assuring that legislators keep their bargains means that groups will place an emphasis on dealing with reliable legislators — those who can be counted upon to uphold their end of a bargain. Thus, party leaders are more effective in influencing floor voting because of their better ability to monitor legislator behavior; however, obligations to important interest groups will be more immune to leadership influence because of the incentives for committee members to adhere to their bargains.     

Effectiveness of Connected Legislators

Important work has been done to measure legislative effectiveness in the U.S. Congress and to explain the individual characteristics that drive it. Much less attention, however, has been devoted to study the extent to which legislative effectiveness depends on the legislators' social connections. We address this issue with a new model of legislative effectiveness that formalizes the role of social connections, and we test its predictions using the network of cosponsorship links in the 109th–113th Congresses. We propose a new empirical strategy that addresses network endogeneity by implementing a two-step Heckman correction based on an original instrument: the legislators' alumni connections. We find that social connections are a significant determinant of legislative effectiveness. We also study the influence of legislators' characteristics in shaping the network effects. In doing so, we provide new insights into how social connectedness interacts with factors such as seniority, partisanship, and legislative leadership in determining legislators' effectiveness.     

The Structure of Utility in Spatial Models of Voting

Empirical models of spatial voting allow legislators' locations in a policy or ideological space to be inferred from their roll‐call votes. These are typically random utility models where the features of the utility functions other than the ideal points are assumed rather than estimated. In this article, we first consider a model in which legislators' utility functions are allowed to be a mixture of the two most commonly assumed utility functions: the quadratic function and the Gaussian function assumed by NOMINATE. Across many roll‐call data sets, we find that legislators' utility functions are estimated to be very nearly Gaussian. We then relax the usual assumption that each legislator is equally sensitive to policy change and find that extreme legislators are generally more sensitive to policy change than their more centrally located counterparts. This result suggests that extremists are more ideologically rigid while moderates are more likely to consider influences that arise outside liberal‐conservative conflict.     

I Get By with a Little Help from My Friends: Leveraging Campaign Resources to Maximize Congressional Power

Central to the study of Congress is the study of relationships among members. Electoral collaboration is a function of a member's position in the broader congressional power network. It allows members to leverage their campaign resources to achieve the four classic goals of members of Congress: reelection, making good public policy, obtaining power within the institution, and having one's party in the majority. Using nearly 3.2 million FEC records from 2010 to 2016, we explore the dynamics that influence electoral collaboration. We find members are most likely to collaborate electorally with other members from the same state, party, and committee, and the most electorally vulnerable. Further, party leaders share most frequently with the rank and file. These findings build upon our expanding understanding of congressional collaboration, the networks members of Congress form, and the congressional power structure members operate within.     

Performance‐Based Budgeting: The Contribution of the Program Assessment Rating Tool

Under the President's Management Agenda for performance and budget integration, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) designed the Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) to breath new life into performance‐based budgeting as envisioned by the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA). This article discusses what PART is designed to do and how the PART process works. Based on recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports addressing implementation of PART in the last four fiscal years, the article answers such questions as: Has PART made a difference in program operations? What is the relationship between PART and GPRA? Has progress been made in improving the evidence base for PART assessments? How well does PART assess programs related to a common goal? What has been congressional reaction to the PART process? Are PART and performance budgeting making a difference in government?     

Rethinking Representation from a Communal Perspective

Most foundational theories of congressional representation were developed during an era of less polarized and less partisan politics. These theories viewed the incumbency advantage as buttressed by the fact that some constituents were willing to support legislators from the opposite party because of their “home styles.” But in an era of policy immoderation in Congress, this perspective leads to an assumption that citizens evaluate their members of Congress based on what those legislators do for them individually, rather than what they do for their districts more broadly. In this paper, we ask whether citizens take the interests of their fellow constituents into account when evaluating their members of Congress. Using both survey data and an experiment, we uncover support for the notion that citizens take a more communal view of representation as at least part of their evaluations of their representatives. This suggests individuals may have a more nuanced understanding of representation than purely self-interested approaches tend to assume.     

X-efficiency and technical efficiency

This paper examines the relationship between campaign contributions from savings and loan and finance industry PACs and membership on the House Banking Committee. The distinguishing features of this paper are that we focus on campaign contributions at an industry level, and we use regression analysis to determine whether membership on the House Banking Committee, the committee with oversight responsibility for the savings and loan industry, influences the level of contributions received by an individual legislator. We find that members of the House Banking Committee do receive significantly greater contributions from the savings and loan and finance PACs than do other members of Congress and that being chairman of the House Banking Committee also pays a dividend.     

The Electoral Costs of Party Loyalty in Congress

To what extent is party loyalty a liability for incumbent legislators? Past research on legislative voting and elections suggests that voters punish members who are ideologically “out of step” with their districts. In seeking to move beyond the emphasis in the literature on the effects of ideological extremity on legislative vote share, we examine how partisan loyalty can adversely affect legislators' electoral fortunes. Specifically, we estimate the effects of each legislator's party unity—the tendency of a member to vote with his or her party on salient issues that divide the two major parties—on vote margin when running for reelection. Our results suggest that party loyalty on divisive votes can indeed be a liability for incumbent House members. In fact, we find that voters are not punishing elected representatives for being too ideological; they are punishing them for being too partisan.     

Searching for Symptoms of Political Shirking: Congressional Foreign Travel

Despite the hypothesized propensity for shirking to marklegislative institutions, the evidence is rather equivocal;moreover, most of the research has focused exclusively onlegislator voting, thereby constraining whatevergeneralizations might emerge. The purpose of this paper is tocontribute to the debate over the question of politicalshirking by extending the range of phenomena examined toinclude congressional foreign travel. Our analysis providesevidence that opportunism is a problem in Congress. We findthat last-period problems have arisen in the area of foreigntravel, and that increased scrutiny to the problem on the partof Congress only shifted consumption patterns, i.e.,legislators began taking foreign junkets near, but not at theend of, their legislative careers. Not all foreign travelshould be construed as worthless junketing since there isstrong evidence that some foreign travel is related tomembers' responsibilities on congressional committees.     

Dealing in Discipline: Party Switching and Legislative Voting in the Italian Chamber of Deputies, 1988–2000

Compared to U.S. political parties, parties in Italy (and Europe generally) are quite cohesive. Rarely do members of parliament vote against their copartisans in legislative divisions. Yet in Italy in recent years, legislators switch parties with seeming abandon. Between 1996 and spring 2000, one out of four deputies in the Chamber of Deputies switched parties at least once, compared to only 20 switches in the U.S. Congress from 1947 to 1997 ( Nokken 2000 ). We examine the relationship between switching and observed party unity in Italy by focusing on individual legislators' switching decisions and voting behavior. Overall, switchers move out of highly disciplined parties, suggesting that they switch partly in order to escape strong discipline.     

Scale economies and rent-seeking in legislative parties

This paper examines equilibrium legislative party size, based upon scale economies in producing political outcomes. Political production — finding policies legislators desire and vote-trading to pass them — has strong scale economies up to, but not far beyond, a majority of the voters. Either one or two parties is efficient, but a larger number is not. A single party's optimal long-run strategy is to benefit a dominant majority by avoiding the creation of an effective second party. But short-term rent-seeking is in legislators' and leaders' interests, which eventually causes a second effective party and a stable two-party equilibrium. Estimates of party size for the U.S. Congress suggest considerable short-term rent-seeking.     

Is Trade Policy for Sale? Congressional Voting on Recent Trade Bills

This paper examines voting by U.S. Representatives onthe North American Free Trade Agreement, the UruguayRound Agreement, and most-favored nation status forChina. Using recent political economy models of tradepolicy to formulate an empirical specification ofcongressional voting behavior, we find evidence thatcampaign contributions influenced legislators' voteson the NAFTA and Uruguay Round bills. Labor groupcontributions were associated with votes against freertrade while business contributions were associatedwith votes in favor of freer trade. Economicconditions in each member's district as well as thebroad policy views of the legislators also affectedrepresentatives' voting decisions.     

Party Sub-Brands and American Party Factions

Scholars and pundits have long noted the dominance of the American two-party system, but we know relatively little about new, endogenous institutions that have emerged within the two major parties. I argue that ideological factions provide party sub-brands, which allow legislators to more precisely define their partisan type and capture faction-specific resources. To support this claim, I analyze new data on nine ideological factions in the House of Representatives (1995–2018). I find that (1) faction voting is distinct, suggesting a product ripe for party sub-branding, and (2) joining a faction changes the ideological composition of a candidate's donor base—conditional on the strength of the faction's institutions. Party sub-branding is effective only when factions possess organizational features that induce coordinated and disciplined position taking (e.g., whips, PACs, membership restrictions). These results suggest that, even within highly polarized parties, American political ideology is more than a dichotomous choice, and factions target niche markets of political donors as a means of blunting financial instruments of party power.     

Seniority and anti-competitive restrictions on the legislative common pool: tenure’s impact on the overall production of legislation and the concentration of political benefits

It is well established that geographic areas benefit, in terms of the share of government spending they capture, from having a legislator with longer tenure, holding constant the tenure of other legislators. However, the implications of this literature for how the total production of legislation changes if all members gained seniority is less clear. Increased levels and dispersion of seniority within Congress generate a cartel-like effect, whereby legislators restrict the quantity of legislation enacted and increase the average price of each passed bill. The analysis provides a natural experiment to gauge the impacts of the emergence of the congressional committee system.     

Bailout for sale? The vote to save Wall Street

This paper provides a public choice analysis of the 2008 banking bailout in the United States. The paper introduces heterogeneity of congressional districts into the common agency problem in special interest politics. District heterogeneity implies district-specific electoral constraints on legislators’ ability to collect rents from, and cast dissonant votes in support of, special interests. An empirical analysis examines legislative voting on the initial bailout proposal, using campaign contributions to legislators from special interest groups and the importance of financial services for employment within congressional districts as the main explanatory variables. The empirical analysis corrects for possible endogeneity bias, using valid instruments, and considers several intuitive sub-sample estimations as alternative methods for addressing the endogeneity issue. The paper provides empirical evidence that campaign contributions from the financial services sector influenced legislative voting on the banking bailout.     

Superfund expenditures and cleanup priorities: Distributive politics or the public interest?

Using data on all final National Priorities List (NPL) sites, this study employs an integrated model of distributive and public interest politics to determine whether the overall pace of cleanup efforts and funding of the 8.5 billion Superfund program over the past eight years reflects self-interested congressional influence or public interest objectives. Despite the fact that both EPA and Congress have substantial incentives to promote the Superfund program, the results indicate that once a site is on the final NPL, there is little committee-based congressional influence over the distribution of site cleanup or funding, although evidence exists that legislators can hasten a site's transition from proposed to final status on the NPL. The chief determinants of cleanup pace and level of funding are the site's Hazard Ranking System (HRS) scores, whether federal funds are financing the cleanup, and whether the site is designated as a state priority.     

The effectiveness of savings and loan political action committees

In recent years, political action committees (PACs) have played an increasingly important role, both in contributing to candidates and in influencing voting patterns. Savings and loan PACs are numerous throughout the country and consist of PACs affiliated with individual institutions and trade associations. The question which is addressed in this research paper is the effectiveness which savings and loan related PACs have had on influencing voting patterns. Because of savings and loan allegiance to the real estate industry, voting patterns on a selected set of nine cogressional bills pertaining to various facets of real estate are used to test PAC effectiveness. These bills were voted on by the House of Representatives during the 1978–80 congressional term. A twenty-one simultaneous equation model which employs probit transformations, maximum likelihood estimation procedures, and two stage least squares, is built to test relationships among the endogenous variables of congressional votes, electoral margin, PAC contributions, and constituent and congressional ideology. In addition to testing the effectiveness of savings and loan PAC contributions, the results of the study shed light on savings and loan PAC performance relative to that of real estate PACs, labor PACs, home builder PACs, business PACs, and other PAC groupings. The model is also used to identify some determinants of PAC contribution patterns. As a related issue, the role of ideology as a predictor of voting patterns is re-examined. Findings indicate that savings and loan PACs have only been marginally successful in influencing real estate voting patterns when compared to the other PAC groups. Results also indicate that few variables could be identified as determinants of savings and loan contributions, whereas other more established PACs had determinants which were consistently significant. Overall, findings imply that PAC contribution procedures of the savings and loan industry could benefit by imitating or purchasing the expertise of more experienced PAC groups.