Trouble Keeping Promises? An Analysis of Underfunding in State Retiree Benefits

This article examines the funding of two key components of state government total compensation: pensions and other postemployment benefits (OPEB), the latter consisting primarily of retiree health care. A brief overview of the economic, political, and legal environments of state pensions and OPEB is followed by an analysis of the unfunded liabilities for these respective benefits. Regression results suggest the importance of state management capacity, per capita income, and public employee density in understanding differences in the states' pension and OPEB funding performance. Additionally, employers' level of pension contributions, legislative professionalism, and fiscal constraint are significantly related to pension funding, while political ideology and levels of state pension funding are significantly related to OPEB funding. The article concludes by discussing the tensions that states face in attempting to balance the fiscal imperative of funding retiree benefits liabilities with the human capital challenge of attracting and retaining a professional workforce. Failure on either could be costly to state government.     

State and local pension plans' equity holdings and returns

This article explores recent trends in the size and performance of the equity investments of state and local pension plans. It also provides a context for the discussion about investing Social Security trust fund reserves in private equities. Equity holdings and returns for five of the largest private pension plans were compared with those of state and local pension plans. Key findings discussed in the article include: Equities were the largest investment in the aggregate portfolio of state and local pension plans in 1999 and represented 67 percent of the $3 trillion in aggregate state and local pension assets. Equity allocation of the five private plans resembled that of the aggregate. About 80 percent of state and local pension plan holdings were domestic equities in 1999. The five largest plans had about the same domestic/foreign allocation of equity investments during that same period. In 1999, state and local pension plans held about 11 percent of the U.S. equity market, which includes foreign equities held in the United States. State and local pension plans held about 10 percent of domestic equities in the U.S. equities market that same year. Returns on equity investments over a 10-year period were more than 17 percent for both private pensions and state and local pension plans. Although private plans tend to have slightly higher total returns, the difference stems from the higher equity asset allocation of the private pensions that were studied.     

The impact of surplus sharing on the portfolio mix of public sector defined benefit pension plans: a public choice approach

The riskiness of state employee pension plan portfolios varies across states. We investigate whether this variation is related to how public employees and taxpayers share actuarial surpluses of pension accounts. We focus on two determinants of a plan’s asset mix: the relative influence of public employees to taxpayers; and whether a surplus-sharing contract is specified. Our theoretical model demonstrates that the effect of public employee influence on the asset mix is ambiguous. Our empirical results corroborate this complex theoretical result. In our theoretical and empirical analyses, if a surplus sharing rule is specified, plans adopt a more aggressive investment allocation.     

Public Pension Funds and Operating Budgets: A Tale of Three States

This article provides a normative framework for understanding the important link between public pension fund management and government operating budgets. Three aspects of pension fund management are discussed that have a significant impact on the operating budget: pension contribution, investment strategy, and the funding of pension liabilities. Three cases concerning West Virginia, New Jersey, and New York City are discussed to illustrate these three important aspects. The normative framework and the case studies demonstrate two important principles in prudently managing public pension funds: ensuring intergenerational equity and protecting the long-term health of government budgets.     

Enron/Andersen: Crisis in U.S. Accounting and Lessons for Government

Accounting and auditing play a key role in the belief of ordinary taxpayers and investors in their institutions. This is equally true of the private and governmental sectors. The Enron/Andersen scandal, regrettably, is not an isolated case, but rather merely indicative of underlying, structural flaws in our financial systems. Moreover, there is evidence that some of these flaws may be present in governmental accounting and auditing. The Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002 is an attempt to address these problems in the private sector, but does not address concerns in the public sector. Public sector accounting issues that need to be addressed and monitored include substandard audit work and related liability issues, the appropriate funding of GASB so as to ensure its independence, auditor fees, and auditor independence questions including protection of elected and appointed state auditors.     

Public pension reform in Japan

The March 2000 pension reform in Japan focused on the long-term financial sustainability of the country's two-tiered public pension system. The government opted for incremental changes in order to maintain pension solvency through 2060. Those changes could reduce future pension funding liability by an estimated one-third. Further, the decision to avoid structural reforms of its pension programs was based on fiscal considerations. Expanding general revenue funding for the first tier from the current share of one-third to cover the entire cost would require increases in the consumption tax that proved to be politically unacceptable. Fully privatizing the second, earnings-related tier would entail transition costs too great to bear at a time of rising budget deficits. In addition, the Japanese public generally supported the sharing of financial burden for public pension programs through a combination of benefit cuts, a raise in the pensionable age, and contribution rate increases. If current cost projections prove to be inaccurate, future pension reviews (scheduled every 5 years) will give the government further opportunity to fine-tune program changes.     

The Future of Public Sector Pensions

The dramatic rise in life expectancy and longer retirement has created serious concerns about the long‐term affordability of public sector pensions. Drawing on insights from a recent inquiry into public sector pension reform, commissioned by the Conservative–Liberal Democrat Coalition and led by the author, this article outlines the challenge faced by policy makers and sets out how it should be addressed. It argues that, with 12 million people active in this part of the pensions system, and estimates that the gap between contributions and payments will grow from £3bn to £10bn in the next decade, the government has no choice but to enter the ‘lions’ den’ of pensions’ policy. It contends that any long‐term solution is to be crafted cannot be based solely on economics, but must also answer fundamental questions of ethics and equity.     

Federal tax reform and the financing of state and local governments

Although the Reagan Administration tax reform proposals would reduce federal income tax liabilities for most taxpayers, federal tax reform would also create strong pressures on state and local governments to cut taxes and public services. These pressures would arise primarily because itemizers would no longer be able to deduct state and local taxes in determining their federal income tax liabilities. In New York City and Boston, it is likely that the Administration's tax reform would induce cuts in spending that range from 2.5 to 7.5 percent. While the elimination of state and local tax deductibility may promote allocative efficiency in the provision of local public goods, the cost would be a decline in the degree of redistribution through the state and local public sector, and a reduction in local public services for the poor.     

Characteristics of individuals with integrated pensions

Employer pensions that integrate benefits with Social Security have been the focus of relatively little research. Since changes in Social Security benefit levels and other program characteristics can affect the benefit levels and other features of integrated pension plans, it is important to know who is covered by these plans. This article examines the characteristics of workers covered by integrated pension plans, compared to those with nonintegrated plans and those with no pension coverage. Integrated pension plans are those that explicitly adjust their benefit structure to help compensate for the employer's contributions to the Social Security program. There are two basic integration methods used by defined benefit (DB) plans. The offset method causes a reduction in employer pension benefits by up to half of the Social Security retirement benefit; the excess rate method is characterized by an accrual rate that is lower for earnings below the Social Security taxable maximum than above it. Defined contribution (DC) pension plans can be integrated along the lines of the excess rate method. To date, research on integrated pensions has focused on plan characteristics, as reported to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) through its Employee Benefits Survey (EBS). This research has examined the prevalence of integration among full-time, private sector workers by industry, firm size, and broad occupational categories. However, because the EBS provides virtually no data on worker characteristics, analyses of the effects of pension integration on retirement benefits have used hypothetical workers, varying according to assumed levels of earnings and job tenure. This kind of analysis is not particularly helpful in examining the potential effects of changes in the Social Security program on workers' pension benefits. However, data on pension integration at the individual level are available, most recently from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), a nationally representative survey of individuals aged 51-61 in 1992. This dataset provides the basis for the analysis presented here. The following are some of the major findings from this analysis. The incidence of pension integration in the HRS sample is 32 percent of all workers with a pension (14 percent of all workers). The HRS can also identify integrated DC plans, a statistic that is not available from BLS data. The rate of integration for workers with only DC plans is 8 percent. After controlling for other variables, several socio-demographic characteristics are significantly related to the incidence of integration. The probability of having an integrated pension is 4.6 percentage points less for men compared to women. Non-Hispanic blacks are 6.4 percentage points less likely than non-Hispanic whites to have integrated pensions. Union members are 14 percentage points less likely to have integrated pensions, while workers with less than a graduate level education are at least 15 percentage points more likely to have a pension that is integrated. Some earnings and pension characteristics are also significantly correlated with pension integration. Earnings are positively related, with the probability of having an integrated pension increasing by 2 percentage points for an increase of $1,000 in annual pay. An even larger effect comes from earning at or above the Social Security taxable maximum. Workers at or above this income level are 10 percentage points more likely to have an integrated plan, but for those with more than one plan the probability of pension integration goes up by 13 percentage points.     

The Political-Economic Dimension of Pensions: The Case of Japan

This article examines how pensions are interwoven with the public and private financial system in Japan and the consequences for pension reform. A growing literature focuses on the multifaceted ways in which pensions are interwoven with the larger political economy. This study builds on this literature and finds that (a) public and private pensions have been integrated deeply into Japan's system of developmental finance, (b) this integration has created new economic and political problems as governments have attempted to shift away from its developmental model through deregulation, liberalization, and administrative reform, and (c) because pension reform is intimately linked with these reforms, it involves addressing fundamental issues regarding the role of the state, finance, and firms. These findings collectively illustrate that pension reform is not only driven by issues of fiscal viability and benefit levels, but also by the nature of the way in which pensions are integrated into a country's system of finance.     

Politics,Fiscal Necessity,or Both? Factors Driving the Enactment of Defined Contribution Accounts for Public Employees

Recent conflicts over public sector defined benefit pension funding have inspired polarized debates about the need for reform, including the utility of replacing pensions with defined contribution accounts, which are popular throughout the private sector. Between 1996 and 2011, 15 American states enacted legislation to implement either mandatory or optional defined contribution accounts for certain public employees. What drove this process? This article investigates the role of political, budgetary, and contagion influences on the diffusion of defined contribution accounts for general state employees. Empirical results suggest that enactments were influenced by Republican legislative, but not executive, partisanship. Gains in state indebtedness also increased the likelihood of enactment independent of political and other factors. There is no evidence of policy learning based on neighboring state activity and no influence from two measures of organized labor power. Both quantitative and qualitative robustness checks largely reinforce these findings.     

Pension coverage among private wage and salary workers: preliminary findings from the 1988 survey of employee benefits

Based on data for private wage and salary workers in May 1988, this article examined pension coverage under two types of employer-sponsored pension plans. Some of the factors associated with employer-financed pension coverage were also examined, and comparisons were made to findings on pension coverage of full-time workers in 1972, 1979, and 1983. "Covered" workers were defined as those actually participating in a pension plan. Among all private sector employees studied, 34 percent were covered by a "basic" pension plan (most of which, presumably, were defined benefit plans), and 14 percent were covered by a pretax retirement savings plan--a subtype of defined contribution plan. With 7 percent of the respondents covered by both types of plans, the total coverage rate under employer-sponsored plans was 41 percent. Twelve percent of the respondents reported that they had contributed to an IRA in 1987. The reported IRA usage was somewhat higher among those already covered by a pension plan than among noncovered workers. Six percent of the respondents were not covered by an employer-sponsored plan but were contributing to an IRA, yielding a total of 47 percent who were participating in either an employer-sponsored or an individual retirement plan. While it was assumed--as in previous studies--that all "basic" coverage was being funded by employers, only four-fifths of those in pretax retirement savings plans reported that employers were also contributing to these plans. The remainder of the analysis was restricted to coverage under employer-financed plans, and it was further restricted to full-time workers. A total of 46 percent of these workers were covered under employer-financed pension plans--33 percent covered only by a basic plan, 7 percent covered only by a pretax plan, and 6 percent dually covered. Among men, the coverage rate was 49 percent, compared with 43 percent among women. Several individual and job-related characteristics were found to be associated with employer-financed pension coverage among full-time employees. Coverage rates were quite low among workers under age 25, but were substantially higher among those aged 35-59. Pension coverage was also low among those with less than 5 years of employment on the job, but relatively high among those with 5 years or more of job tenure. Coverage rate differences by race were not substantial. Whites reported a coverage rate of 47 percent, compared with 42 percent among blacks and 45 percent among other races.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 400 WORDS)     

The relationships between public and private pension schemes: an introductory overview

Only recently have social insurance and private pensions, collectively, come to be thought of in terms of a total social security benefit package. The economic problems brought on by the 1974 oil crisis initially triggered consideration of a common, integrated role for the two systems. The second oil crisis reinforced the relative expansion in private pension programs, as a supplement to social security. Before these events, private and public pension programs interacted in only a limited number of ways, confined to relatively few countries. These interactions were largely confined to collective bargaining, whereby private pensions were gradually extended to nearly all employees in France and Sweden; mandating, or legally requiring private supplementation of social security, debated in several countries in the early 1970's, but postponed by the 1974 oil crisis; and contracting out, or covering a part of the social security benefit under a private plan, as in the United Kingdom. Overall, the tradition of private pensions was not very strong or broadbased. The current debate centers on which public/private pension mix is desirable from the point of view of an old-age income-maintenance program. A new element is the rising support for a "third pillar"--individual tax-encouraged savings--not only as a supplement, but as an alternative to social insurance.     

The evolution of Japanese employer-sponsored retirement plans

This article examines the development of Japanese voluntary employer-sponsored retirement plans with an emphasis on recent trends. Until 2001, companies in Japan offered retirement benefits as lump-sum severance payments and/or benefits from one of two types of defined benefit (DB) pension plans. One type of DB plan was based on the occupational pension model used in the United States before the adoption of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), but lacked the funding, vesting, and other protective features contained in ERISA. The other type of DB plan allowed companies to opt out of the earnings-related portion of social security, commonly referred to as "contracting out." Landmark laws passed in 2001 introduced a new generation of occupational retirement plans to employers and employees. One law increased funding requirements and enhanced employee protections for employer-sponsored DB plans, while a second law introduced defined contribution (DC) plans for several reasons, chiefly to increase retirement savings and help boost Japanese financial markets. These laws complemented earlier changes in the tax code and financial accounting standards already affecting employer-sponsored retirement plans. As a result, new retirement plan designs will replace most prereform era company retirement plans by 2012. In 2001, the experience of 401(k) plans in the United States, where 42 million participants had accumulated more than $1.8 trillion in assets over 20 years, attracted considerable attention among Japanese lawmakers finalizing provisions of the DC pension law. Even with government support and encouragement from the financial services industry, Japanese companies have not adopted these new DC plans in large numbers. As a result, occupational retirement plans in Japan have remained predominantly DB-a surprising development in light of the shift in a number of countries from DB to DC plans observed in recent decades. However, recent proposals to make DC plans more attractive to employers in Japan are likely to be implemented in the near future. This article summarizes the Japanese retirement system, with an emphasis on private-sector employees, and the complementary role played by voluntary employer-sponsored retirement plans; describes the financial pressures that faced retirement plan sponsors in the late twentieth century and the factors motivating the reform of Japanese voluntary retirement plans; examines the 2001 legislative changes that have transformed company retirement plans; and concludes with a review of trends and recent developments in employer-sponsored retirement plans since the implementation of the 2001 pension laws.     

政府财务境况和财政风险：一个分析框架

评估财政风险应从政府拥有的公共资源及政府应承担的公共支出责任和义务2方面入手,从资产负债存量和财政收支流量两个角度来动态地考察。政府财务报告的目标之一是提供财务境况信息,以评估财政风险。利用政府综合年度财务报告所提供的信息来分析和评价财政风险,可提高评估的准确性,并使之制度化和规范化。从政府会计的角度出发,讨论了财务境况的定义和计量,提出了从环境因素、组织因素和财务因素3方面来综合评估财政风险的一个分析框架,并设计了一套财务指标体系用以评估和预警财政风险。     

Funding Levels and Gender in Public Pension Plans

Using a comprehensive sample of 2002 and 2005 U.S. public retirement systems, we found that public pension plan underfunding grew dramatically in these years despite a good economy, increasing state tax revenues, and strong stock market returns on average, plans were only 83% funded. Teacher plans and plans with the most retirees were more underfunded. We found no significant differences related to asset allocations or actuarial assumptions about inflation and rate of return. A primary factor associated with significantly lower underfunding was more female active participants in the plan, suggesting another risk to women's retirement income.     

Retirement-age women and pensions: findings from the New Beneficiary Survey

This article examines the extent of employer-sponsored pension receipt and the amounts of pension benefits among a cohort of retirement-age women interviewed in the New Beneficiary Survey. These women reported relatively low levels of pension protection. Only 27 percent were receiving a pension in late 1982, either from their own employment or as survivors. This was one-half the rate of current pension receipt among a comparable cohort of men. An additional 17 percent of the women were expecting pensions of their own or had potential survivor protection through their husbands' pensions. Among those receiving a pension, women reported median monthly benefits of $250, compared with $460 among men. Pension benefits were a fairly important source of income for these women, particularly those who were unmarried. Almost one-half of the unmarried recipients depended on their pensions for one-third or more of their total incomes, and without their pension income 11 percent would have been below poverty income levels.     

Why Governments Should Produce Balance Sheets

This contribution to a controversy argues that accrual reporting at the whole of government level is appropriate and necessary as it provides a full picture of a government's financial position, discloses the impact of policy over the longer term (and therefore the sharing of the burdens between current and future taxpayers), focuses the attention of governments and public sector managers on the management of total resources and obligations and introduces discipline in financial reporting and therefore ensuring the integrity of the reported information.
Yet, accrual reporting, whether at the whole of government level or individual agency level, will not bring about changes of behaviour necessary to realise the full benefits of financial and other management reforms unless it is complemented by an accrual planning and budgeting regime to ensure that financial performance is planned and assessed on the same basis.     

The Canada Pension Plan's experience with investing its portfolio in equities

For the past few years, the Canada Pension Plan (CPP) has been investing some of its assets in equities. Without changes, an imbalance between revenues and outlays would exhaust the CPP reserve fund by 2015. Creating an entity that was independent of government was one of several changes the federal and provincial governments enacted to achieve fuller funding. The governments created an independent Investment Board (the CPP Investment Board, or "CPPIB") to oversee the new investments. Because the plan already owned a large government bond portfolio, the CPPIB decided to invest new CPP funds in broad equity indices in March 1999. In 2000, the CPPIB began actively investing a portion of the CPP funds. Key features of that policy and some observations about its implementation include the following: In addition to investing CPP revenues in equities, reform also included contribution rate increases, benefit reductions, and a financing stabilizer. The new investment policy accounted for 25 percent of the total effect of all the reforms. It is premature to know if the investments will achieve their long-term performance objective. The new equity investments are projected by the Chief Actuary, in his most recent Actuarial Report, to earn a 4.5 percent real rate of return on Canadian equity and 5.0 percent real return on foreign equity for a blended real return of 4.65 percent based on an equity mix of 70 percent Canadian and 30 percent non-Canadian. However, it is too early to tell if the equity investments will achieve that goal over the long run. The Investment Board's mandate is to maximize returns. The Investment Board, which oversees the CPP's new investments, has broad discretion to pursue maximum returns on its assets without incurring undue risk of loss while keeping in mind the financial obligations and other assets of the CPP. Furthermore, it has developed into a professional investment organization staffed with private-sector experts in finance and investment. The board is designed to be independent of government. The federal and provincial governments designed the board to operate at arm's length from themselves. The process for selecting directors includes public- and private-sector participation, and the board is in compliance with several sets of governance guidelines for corporations. CPPIB management, with the support of its board of directors, has decided to implement a virtual corporation model involving a small team of senior executives setting strategies for implementation primarily by external professional firms. Consequently, as a virtual corporation, the board currently relies on external fund managers to make investments and vote proxies. Several measures are designed to ensure accountability to the public. The investment legislation subjects the board to overlapping layers of oversight to ensure accountability to the public. The features of this oversight include public meetings in each province as well as quarterly statements and annual reports to Parliament, the federal and provincial finance ministers, and the public. The 10 finance ministers review the CPPIB's mandate and regulations every 3 years, and the CPPIB is subject to a special examination every 6 years by an auditor appointed by the Federal Minister of Finance.     

The Rise of Public–Private Partnerships in China: An Effective Financing Approach for Infrastructure Investment?

The rise of public‐private partnerships (PPPs) in China has spurred heated debates about their purpose and effectiveness. This article traces the fluctuation of China's PPPs over several decades and finds that PPPs have played a supplementary role in China's infrastructure investment, as a response to the pressures of fiscal shortfalls and government debts. The resurgence of PPPs in recent years aims to bridge the infrastructure gap and alleviate ballooning local debts. These expectations, however, are hard to realize. China's PPPs mainly involve state‐owned enterprises and place increasing financial burdens on the government. The central government has taken measures to attract private sector investment to mitigate the financial risk, but the prospects for PPPs remain unclear.