Protecting Sovereignty,Protecting the Planet: State Delegation to International Organizations and Private Actors in Environmental Politics

As global interdependence grows, states often use international organizations to achieve both domestic and foreign policy goals. One way states respond to demands for cooperation is to delegate to international organizations and private actors. In this article, we use new data spanning a century of international environmental law to understand when and why states delegate to international organizations to manage environmental problems. We find that delegation is a persistent phenomenon that facilitates the implementation of states' preferences. However, they make this decision with care: States tend to delegate functions with lower sovereignty costs, such as implementation and monitoring, but rarely delegate rule making and enforcement. We also find that heterogeneous preferences among states increases the likelihood of delegation. Overall, our results suggest that states seek to delegate out of a motivation both to reduce transaction costs and to establish credible commitments.     

National parliamentary control and voting in the Council of the European Union

This article explores the different ways governments express dissent in the Council of the European Union (EU) through ‘No’ votes, abstentions and recorded negative statements. A game-theoretical model is presented that studies voting behaviour and analyses how the national parliaments’ levels of control over their governments’ EU policies affect it. It is concluded that governments that are strongly controlled by their parliaments are not more likely to express dissent. However, when they do express dissent, they vote ‘No’ more often. Parliamentary control depends on the presence of formal oversight institutions as well as the motivation of parliamentarians to hold their governments accountable. Empirical support is found in an analysis of votes on 1,387 legislative proposals that represent more than a decade of Council decision making in the period 2004–2014. This article contributes to the discussion on the involvement of national parliaments in EU affairs, and clearly distinguishes the different forms of dissent in Council decision making.     

Setting the agenda: Social influence in the effects of the Human Rights Committee in Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe

Analyzing original data from Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe, this article explores the influence of the Human Rights Committee (HRC) of the United Nations (UN) in the configuration of states' normative agendas and the roles they seek to play. Focusing on the HRC's reporting procedure, the article investigates whether states adjust the substantive content of their periodic reports to mimic the human rights agenda explicitly set by the HRC through its concluding observations reports. The article finds that states take the HRC seriously and play the role of “good,” committed members of the human rights regime, following in their periodic reports the agenda of rights previously set by the HRC. The article, therefore, offers a specific theoretical argument and systematic, original evidence on the potential and the limits of the influence of the organs of the international human rights regime.     

The 2004 Greek Election: PASOK's Monopoly Ends

What determines a government's position inside the Council of the European Union? This article takes up recent arguments according to which Council decision-making is driven not only by ‘objective’ national interests but also by the ideological preferences of the member states' representatives. On the basis of a study of Germany, Austria and Sweden and their positions with regard to the Services Directive, it seeks to advance the debate by specifying the conditions under which ideological preferences are more likely to dominate. Applying a principal–agent model it is argued that the relative impact of ideological preferences crucially depends on the relationship between the ministers sitting in the Council and the governing parties at the national level: the less a minister is exposed to parliamentary and intra-governmental control, the more a country's position is susceptible to the ideological preferences of the minister.     

What Stops the Torture?

States whose agents engage in torture in a given year have a 93% chance of continuing to torture in the following year. What leads governments to stop the use of torture? We focus on the principal–agent relationship between the executive and the individuals responsible for supervising and interrogating state prisoners. We argue that some liberal democratic institutions change the probability that leaders support the creation of institutions that discourage jailers and interrogators from engaging in torture, thus increasing the probability of a state terminating its use of torture. These relationships are strongly conditioned by the presence of violent dissent; states rarely terminate the use of torture when they face a threat. Once campaigns of violent dissent stop, however, states with popular suffrage and a free press are considerably more likely to terminate their use of torture. Also given the end of violent dissent, the greater the number of veto points in government, the lower the likelihood that a state terminates its use of torture.     

Signaling and Counter‐Signaling in the Judicial Hierarchy: An Empirical Analysis of En Banc Review

We leverage the institutional features of American courts to evaluate the importance of whistleblowers in hierarchical oversight. Drawing on a formal theory of signaling in the judicial hierarchy, we examine the role of whistleblowing dissents in triggering en banc review of three‐judge panels by full circuits of the Courts of Appeals. The theory generates predictions about how dissent interacts with judicial preferences to influence circuits' review and reversal decisions, which we test using original and existing data. First, we show that judges who dissent counter to their preferences are more likely to see their dissents lead to review and reversal. Second, we show that dissents are most influential when the likelihood of non‐compliance by a three‐judge panel is highest. Our results underscore the importance of dissent in the judicial hierarchy and illustrate how judicial whistleblowers can help appellate courts target the most important cases for review.     

Bargaining Power of Smaller States in Germany's Länderfinanzausgleich 1979–90

In this paper we explore the impact of politicalfactors on redistribution across the states in theGerman Länderfinanzausgleich. From a public choiceperspective the smaller states are supposed to have ahigher influence on decisions in the secondlegislative chamber due to a lower shadow price oftheir votes, which implies a higher bargaining power.As the federal government's policy depends on amajority in the second chamber there is an incentiveto buy smaller states' votes. Controlling for GDP percapita, we find statistically significant support forour hypotheses.     

A New Phase of European Integration: Organised Capitalisms in Post-Ricardian Europe

In the past, economic integration in Europe was largely compatible with the preservation of different national varieties of capitalism. While product market integration intensified competition, member states could build on and foster their respective comparative advantage. Today, this no longer unequivocally holds true. This article contends that a new, ‘post-Ricardian’ phase of European integration has emerged in which the Commission's and the European Court of Justice's (ECJ's) attempts to promote economic integration systematically challenge the institutions of organised capitalism. It demonstrates this by discussing recent disputes over the Services Directive, the Takeover Directive, and company law. In the current phase of European integration, the Commission's and the ECJ's liberalisation attempts either transform the institutional foundations on which some of the member states' economic systems rely or they create political resistance to an extent that challenges the viability of the European project.     

The Disclosure Dilemma: Nuclear Intelligence and International Organizations

Scholars have long argued that international organizations solve information problems through increased transparency. This article introduces a distinct problem that instead requires such institutions to keep information secret. We argue that states often seek to reveal intelligence about other states' violations of international rules and laws but are deterred by concerns about revealing the sources and methods used to collect it. Properly equipped international organizations, however, can mitigate these dilemmas by analyzing and acting on sensitive information while protecting it from wide dissemination. Using new data on intelligence disclosures to the International Atomic Energy Agency and an analysis of the full universe of nuclear proliferation cases, we demonstrate that strengthening the agency's intelligence protection capabilities led to greater intelligence sharing and fewer suspected nuclear facilities. However, our theory suggests that this solution gives informed states a subtle form of influence and is in tension with the normative goal of international transparency.     

Retrenchment as a Screening Mechanism: Power Shifts,Strategic Withdrawal,and Credible Signals

Both advocates and opponents of retrenchment have treated it as an undesirable, last‐ditch strategy for states that have already experienced severe decline. This article presents a formal model that identifies an unrecognized benefit of retrenchment: It can provide declining states with valuable information about rising states' future intentions. By removing constraints over the behavior of rising states in a particular region, a declining state can induce hostile risers to attempt revision of the regional order. This, in turn, makes a riser's cooperative behavior more credible as a signal of benign intentions, allowing the decliner to oppose hostile types while accommodating benign ones. In contrast to the existing focus on retrenchment as a desperate strategy taken from a position of weakness, this article suggests that the informational benefits of retrenchment are greatest when it is undertaken early, from a position of strength.     

Securing cyberspace: How states design governance arrangements

The functioning of modern societies increasingly depends on secure cyberspace. Given states' lacking capacities to protect this novel domain, governments draw on a variety of third parties for support. Yet, they face a challenge. While imposed control may limit third parties' competence, the abandonment of hierarchical control contradicts the widespread notion of national security. How do states navigate between these functional and national security imperatives to design governance arrangements? We develop a typology that combines cybersecurity problems (risks vs. threats) with governance modes (delegation vs. orchestration). This helps us to explore more than 100 cybersecurity policies across 15 different states. We find one predominant pattern. Governments delegate authority but maintain elements of hierarchical control, when they respond to threatening attacks. In contrast, governments orchestrate intermediaries by soft inducements to address risks and diffuse vulnerabilities in cyberspace. This contributes to both indirect governance scholarship and the debate on cybersecurity.     

Friends of the Court? Why EU governments file observations before the Court of Justice

The preliminary reference procedure under which the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) responds to questions from national courts regarding the interpretation of EU law is a key mechanism in many accounts of the development of European integration and law. While the significance of the procedure has been broadly acknowledged, one aspect has been largely omitted: The opportunity for member state governments to submit their views (‘observations’) to the Court in ongoing cases. Previous research has shown that these observations matter for the Court's decisions, and thus that they are likely to have a significant impact on the course of European integration. Still, little is known about when and why member states decide to engage in the preliminary reference procedure by submitting observations. This article shows that there is significant variation, both between cases and between member states, in the number of observations filed. A theoretical argument is developed to explain this variation. Most importantly, a distinction is made between legal and political reasons for governments to get involved in the preliminary reference cases, and it is argued that both types of factors should be relevant. By matching empirical data from inter‐governmental negotiations on legislative acts in the Council of the EU with member states’ subsequent participation in the Court procedures, a research design is developed to test these arguments. It is found that the decision to submit observations can be tied both to concerns with the doctrinal development of EU law and to more immediate political preferences. The conclusion is that the legal (the CJEU) and political (the Council) arenas of the EU system are more interconnected than some of the previous literature would lead us to believe.     

Road to Ruin? A Spatial Analysis of State Highway Spending

Do states engage in infrastructure expenditure competition to attract new economic activity? Economic theory is inconclusive on the matter. States might respond to increased infrastructure spending in competitor states by increasing their own infrastructure spending. Conversely, states may decrease spending in the presence of positive spillovers from competitor states' infrastructure investment. Using spatial econometric techniques and focusing specifically on highway spending, we demonstrate that states expend less on highways when spending in neighboring states increases. We explore this possibility further by modeling state personal income growth as a function of own‐state and neighbor‐state highway spending. Our findings suggest positive spillovers influence interstate relationships for highway spending rather than race‐to‐the‐top competition for economic activity.     

States' interests as limits to the power of finance: Regulatory reforms in early local government financialization in the US and UK

Through a comparison of typical and deviant cases, this study probes and refines the augmented power model which argues that the structural power of the financial industry fosters its instrumental power in influencing regulatory reforms under certain scope conditions. It shows the industry's success in influencing policymakers to authorize municipalities to use derivatives and thereby to financialize their debt management in the US (typical case). The failure of banks to acquire such a law in the UK (deviant case) reveals a hitherto little-noticed condition under which this power explanation collapses: states' fiscal and monetary constitution. We demonstrate that analyzing the operation of finance power requires a precise consideration of how states' fiscal and monetary constitution structures governments' responses to financial industry's regulatory preferences. Moreover, we conclude that synthesizing business power research with literature on the mutual dependence between states and finance helps to explain patterns of state financialization.     

State health reform: Effects on labor markets and economic activity

Individual states are actively weighing health care reform proposals and their potential impacts on many levels, including states' own economies. This article considers the effects on state economies of two instruments of health reform: employer mandates and cost containment. The literature suggests that an employer mandate will reduce employees' wages in the long run. In the short run, however, to compensate for the costs associated with mandated health care insurance for their employees, firms may raise their prices to consumers, reduce the number of employees or allow a drop in profit margins. By increasing health care spending and the number of insured persons, mandates would also increase states' levels of economic activity. Though cost containment may dampen the stimulative effects of expanded coverage, resources not spent on health care as a result of effective cost containment might be redistributed to other sectors in a state's economy.     

Securing the Globe: Intelligence and the Post-9/11 Shift from 'Liddism' to 'Drainism'

Significant shifts have been underway in security intelligence agencies and processes since the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States. Whereas the previous quarter of a century had seen a considerable democratization of intelligence, the article examines whether UK and US government responses risk the re-creation of 'security states'. Changes since 9/11 in law, doctrine, the intelligence process - targeting, collection, analysis, dissemination and action - and oversight are considered and it is concluded that there is a danger of the rebirth of independent security states.     

Democratic Dilemmas of Multilevel Governance: Legitimacy,Representation and Accountability in the European Union

How is sovereignty managed in the EU? This article investigates the relationship between sovereignty and European integration through the prism of national opt-outs from EU treaties, addressing an apparent contradiction in contemporary European governance: the contrasting processes of integration and differentiation. On the one hand, European integration is increasing as states transfer sovereign competencies to the EU. On the other hand, we see a multitude of differentiation processes through which member states choose to disengage from the EU polity by negotiating exemptions or derogations. Drawing on Pierre Bourdieu's political sociology, the article argues that to understand how sovereignty is interpreted and exercised in the EU, it is necessary to focus not only on the constitutive and regulative dimensions of sovereignty, but equally on the practice dimension. This entails an exploration of how sovereignty claims are managed in a particular social setting. Rather than seeing opt-outs as classic instruments of international law, accentuating the member states' unchanged sovereignty, the article argues that the management of the British and Danish opt-outs quite paradoxically expresses the strength of the doxa of European integration, i.e. the notion of ‘an ever closer union’.     

Expenditures on children and child support guidelines

This article examines the literature that estimates parental expenditures on children; describes the types of child support guidelines that are being used by the states; and compares how the child support awards that emerge from each state's guidelines compare to the empirical estimates of expenditure patterns on children. The findings indicate that the states' guidelines appear to be more or less consistent with the estimates of expenditures on children. In a few cases, however, the guidelines require less in support from the noncustodial parent than the parent would have spent on the child(ren) in an average intact family. In many other cases, the guidelines require child support payments that are very close to the lower bound of the estimates of expenditures. This article concludes with a discussion of the difficult value judgments that ultimately must be made in setting child support awards.     

The varieties of banking regulation in the EU: An empirical analysis

The EU strives to harmonize banking regulation, while its member states continue to insist on a degree of differentiation to accommodate national specifics. A new data set of national options and discretions (O&Ds) embedded in EU banking legislation facilitates systematic analysis of member states' policy preferences across multiple policy cycles. Its results suggest that states' O&D choices are related to their respective variety of banking capitalism. Coordinated and liberal market economies choose O&Ds to protect distinct subsets of regulatory parameters delaying full harmonization. Dependent market economies on the Eastern periphery use O&Ds to prevent the outflow of capital from foreign‐owned subsidiaries under their jurisdiction. These deep institutional roots suggest that many O&Ds will be carried over to the upcoming generation of EU banking legislation, despite the increased harmonization pressures in the banking union.     

Soft Competition: Finland,Sweden and the Northern Dimension of the European Union

In the context of European integration, Sweden and Finland are frequently seen as natural allies. Based on a number of perceived similarities, their shared Nordic heritage, established historical ties and their concurrent accession to the European Union (EU), they are rarely seen as competitors or proponents of diverging points of view. Their alignment within the EU, over sub‐regional issues surrounding Northern Europe in particular, is often rather taken as a given. By focusing on the specific conduct of Sweden and Finland as regional stakeholders in the Baltic Sea Region (BSR) and the way they have played this role within the EU, this article seeks to challenge these common assumptions. It shows that Sweden and Finland do not converge in their positions, also in matters concerning the EU's Northern Dimension – that is, a policy that distinctly furthers regional core issues whose promotion within the EU could be in both states' interest. Instead of pooling forces to attain greater leverage within the EU, Sweden and Finland rather compete with each other in this regard. Using the example of the Finnish Northern Dimension initiative, this article shows how Sweden and Finland have promoted sub‐regional matters through different political and organizational channels, keeping bilateral cooperation to a minimum and leaving potential avenues of pooled action at the EU level aside. The article thus concludes that the concept of a Swedish‐Finnish tandem within the EU needs to be looked at more critically when it comes to explaining or predicting their conduct as Member States.