An explanation for camera perspective bias in voluntariness judgment for video-recorded confession: Suggestion of cognitive frame

Three experiments were conducted to test the hypothesis that difference in voluntariness judgment for a custodial confession filmed in different camera focuses ("camera perspective bias") could occur because a particular camera focus conveys a suggestion of a particular cognitive frame. In Experiment 1, 146 juror eligible adults in Korea showed a camera perspective bias in voluntariness judgment with a simulated confession filmed with two cameras of different focuses, one on the suspect and the other on the detective. In Experiment 2, the same bias in voluntariness judgment emerged without cameras when the participants were cognitively framed, prior to listening to the audio track of the videos used in Experiment 1, by instructions to make either a voluntariness judgment for a confession or a coerciveness judgment for an interrogation. In Experiment 3, the camera perspective bias in voluntariness judgment disappeared when the participants viewing the video focused on the suspect were initially framed to make coerciveness judgment for the interrogation and the participants viewing the video focused on the detective were initially framed to make voluntariness judgment for the confession. The results in combination indicated that a particular camera focus may convey a suggestion of a particular cognitive frame in which a video-recorded confession/interrogation is initially represented. Some forensic and policy implications were discussed.     

Perceptions of children during a police interrogation: Guilt,confessions, and interview fairness

Abstract

Jurors are often provided with confession evidence and must determine whether the confession was true, false, coerced, or voluntary. As more juveniles are tried in adult criminal court, jurors must increasingly make these determinations about minors’ statements. In this study, mock jurors read an actual interrogation of a child suspect that included confession evidence, and then provided judgments regarding the coerciveness of the interrogation, the child's and police's knowledge and behaviors, and guilt. Child age (11 versus 14 years) and gender were manipulated and examined in relation to participant gender and pre-existing sympathy levels for juvenile offenders. Factors external to the suspect – participant gender and sympathy for juvenile offenders – interacted with child suspect factors to influence perceptions of the child, the interrogation, and guilt. When multiple factors were considered, perceptions of suspect credibility and police fairness were the strongest predictors of guilt and perceived culpability. The findings have implications for decision-making in cases involving juvenile defendants and confession evidence.     

The effects of judicial admonitions on hearsay evidence

Using a simulated civil case, this experiment investigated whether mock jurors: (a) are able to disregard hearsay evidence when admonished to do so, (b) experience psychological reactance and "backfire effects" in proportion to the strength of judicial admonition instructing them to disregard hearsay evidence, and (c) are able to recognize and disregard hearsay evidence without judicial instructions. Results indicate that jurors were unable to disregard inadmissible hearsay testimony in some legal decisions regardless of whether there were judicial instructions to do so. Jurors exhibited backfire effects paying more attention to inadmissible hearsay evidence when they were strongly instructed to disregard it. More specifically, juror backfire effects were evident in both their confidence in their liability verdicts and in their punitive damage awards. The legal and policy implications of these findings are discussed.     

Defendant and juror race in a necessity case: An ultimate attribution error

This study investigated whether Black and White mock jurors would commit the ultimate attribution error (i.e., over-rely on dispositional explanations to understand the negative actions of out-group members) in a necessity defense case. Participants (N = 97) read a fictional looting case, in which the race of the defendant varied. Mock jurors were expected to show out-group severity through more guilty verdicts and blame attributions. Mock juror and defendant race were not significantly related to verdicts, but for the Black defendant, White mock jurors attributed more control to him, and believed he was likely to reoffend more so than did Black mock jurors. This study adds to the literature on the mechanism by which racial bias interferes with juror decisions.     

Effects of Judicial Instructions and Case Characteristics in a Mock Jury Trial of Battered Women Who Kill

This study examined the effects of judicial instructions on the outcome of a mock jury trial that involved a woman who pleaded self-defense after killing her abusive spouse. Jurors were instructed to adopt either an objective or a subjective standard of reasonableness when reaching a verdict. Within objective/subjective instruction conditions, half of the juries viewed a case in which the woman killed her abuser while he was attacking her (confrontational) and the remaining half viewed a case in which she killed him while he was asleep (no confrontation). Juries in the subjective conditions returned significantly more not guilty verdicts than jurors in the objective conditions. At the individual juror level, participants hearing subjective instructions were significantly more likely to rate the defendant as not guilty than jurors given objective instructions when the abuse was nonconfrontational.     

Effects of pretrial juror bias,strength of evidence and deliberation process on juror decisions: new validity evidence of the Juror Bias Scale scores

This study examines the validity of the Juror Bias Scale scores in relation to the mock juror decisions reached in two real life homicide cases before and after the deliberation process. The judicial cases used varied in terms of the ambiguity of the evidence presented at both trials. The WLS methodology for statistical modelling of categorical data was used to analyse data. The findings indicated that the Juror Bias Scale scores successfully predict the verdicts and other related questions before and after deliberations in the case with ambiguous evidence. Furthermore, deliberations caused a generalisation effect on the pretrial juror bias in such a case, and enhanced the differences between defense-biased and prosecution-biased jurors in the verdicts delivered after deliberations. The implications of these findings are discussed in relation to the use of pretrial juror bias questionnaires in jury selection.     

Effects of defendant age and juror bias on judgment of culpability: What happens when a juvenile is tried as an adult?

The current study examined the possibility that trying juveniles as adults was prejudicial. One hundred and fifty three undergraduate mock jurors, classified as either prosecution-biased (PB) or defense-biased (DB), participated in the experiment. The jurors were randomly assigned to read a murder trial summary depicting a 19-year-old adult defendant (AD-19), a 16-year-old juvenile tried as an adult (JA-16), or a 13-year-old juvenile tried as an adult (JA-13). Defendant age interacted with juror bias. In the JA-16 condition, compared with defense-biased jurors, prosecution-biased jurors found the defendant guilty more often, had higher confidence in the defendant’s guilt, and set a lower standard of proof. By all appearances, some jurors might lose neutrality when judging juveniles tried as adults.     

Attitudes,anger, and nullification instructions influence jurors’ verdicts in euthanasia cases

Courts have historically avoided informing jurors about their nullification power (i.e. the power to return a not-guilty verdict when their conscience demands it but the law directs otherwise), fearing that such knowledge would prompt disregard for the law and reliance on attitudes and emotions rather than evidence. We investigated jurors’ inclination to nullify the law in a morally ambiguous case of physician-assisted suicide, testing the impact of euthanasia attitudes on case judgments as well as moderators and mediators of that effect. Mock jurors with pro-euthanasia attitudes were overall less likely to vote guilty than anti-euthanasia jurors, especially when they were given jury instructions informing them of jurors’ power to nullify. Nullification instructions also exacerbated the effect of jurors’ attitudes on anger, disgust, and moral outrage toward the defendant – emotions that mediated the effect of attitudes on verdicts. We also tested the impact of incidentally induced anger on jurors’ reliance on their attitudes rather than the law, given anger’s propensity to increase certainty and heuristic processing. Anger enhanced mock jurors’ reliance on their attitudes under certain conditions. Theoretical and practical implications for understanding juror decision-making are discussed.     

Identifying and measuring juror pre-trial bias for forensic evidence: development and validation of the Forensic Evidence Evaluation Bias Scale

Abstract

Previous research has provided support for the impact of juror pre-trial bias on judicial decision making, particularly in cases where the evidence presented at trial is of weak or ambiguous probative value. In an effort to identify whether a pre-trial bias for forensic evidence exists, the Forensic Evidence Evaluation Bias Scale (FEEBS) was developed and tested. The results of a principal components analysis suggested that two distinct constructs were being measured, corresponding to a pro-prosecution and pro-defence bias toward forensic evidence. In a second validation study, scores on these two subscales were compared with other existing juror bias measures (Juror Bias Scale and Belief in a Just World) and in a mock juror decision making task only the pro-prosecution subscale of the FEEBS predicted the perceived strength of forensic evidence. A partial mediation model is presented which explains the relationship between this bias and verdict preferences. The implications of this potential juror bias are discussed in the context of real juries, the CSI Effect (which refers to anecdotal claims that jurors are biased by the popularity of fictional representations of forensic science on television) and peremptory challenges, as well as future research directions.     

Gruesome Evidence and Emotion: Anger, Blame, and Jury Decision-Making

Judges assume that gruesome evidence can influence juror verdicts, but little is known about the manner in which the influence is manifested. In a 2 × 3 study that varied the gruesome content of photographic and verbal evidence, gruesome verbal evidence did not influence mock juror emotional states, and had no impact on the conviction rate. Mock jurors who saw gruesome photographs, compared with those who saw no photographs, reported experiencing significantly more intense emotional responses, including greater anger at the defendant. The conviction rate when visual evidence in the form of gruesome or neutral photographs was included was significantly higher than the conviction rate without photographic evidence. Mean ratings of the inculpatory weight of prosecution evidence by mock jurors presented with gruesome photographs were significantly higher than those by mock jurors who did not view any photographs. Further analyses revealed that mock juror anger toward the defendant mediated the influence of the gruesome photographs in enhancing the weight of inculpatory evidence.     

Understanding juror perceptions of forensic evidence: investigating the impact of case context on perceptions of forensic evidence strength

The most widely accepted model of juror decision making acknowledges the importance of both the case-specific information presented in the courtroom, as well as the prior general knowledge and beliefs held by each juror. The studies presented in this paper investigated whether mock jurors could differentiate between evidence of varying strengths in the absence of case information and then followed on to determine the influence that case context (and therefore the story model) has on judgments made about the strength of forensic DNA evidence. The results illustrated that mock jurors correctly identified various strengths of evidence when it was not presented with case information; however, the perceived strength of evidence was significantly inflated when presented in the context of a criminal case, particularly when the evidence was of a weak or ambiguous standard. These findings are discussed in relation to the story model, and the potential implications for real juries.     

Effects of jurors’ gender and attitudes toward intellectual disability on judgments in cases involving disabled juvenile defendants

Because many juvenile offenders are intellectually disabled and have their cases tried by jurors in adult criminal court, it is important to understand factors that influence jurors’ judgments in such cases. Using a mock trial methodology, we explored the relations among jurors’ gender, attitudes toward intellectual disability, and judgments in a criminal case involving an intellectually disabled 15-year-old girl accused of murder. Men mock jurors’ judgments were not influenced by their preexisting biases, but women's were: the more women favored special treatment for disabled offenders, the less likely they were to suspect the disabled juvenile was guilty and the less likely they were to convict her. Implications for actual cases involving disabled juvenile defendants are discussed.     

The Effects of Rehabilitative Voir Dire on Juror Bias and Decision Making

During voir dire, judges frequently attempt to “rehabilitate” venirepersons who express an inability to be impartial. Venirepersons who agree to ignore their biases and base their verdict on the evidence and the law are eligible for jury service. In Experiment 1, biased and unbiased mock jurors participated in either a standard or rehabilitative voir dire conducted by a judge and watched a trial video. Rehabilitation influenced insanity defense attitudes and perceptions of the defendant’s mental state, and decreased scaled guilt judgments compared to standard questioning. Although rehabilitation is intended to correct for partiality among biased jurors, rehabilitation similarly influenced biased and unbiased jurors. Experiment 2 found that watching rehabilitation did not influence jurors’ perceptions of the judge’s personal beliefs about the case.     

Judging Bias: Juror Confidence and Judicial Rulings on Challenges for Cause

The judge in a jury trial is charged with excusing prospective jurors who will not be impartial. To assess impartiality, prospective jurors are typically asked whether they can be fair. Using an experimental paradigm, we found that small changes in jurors' self‐reported confidence in their ability to be fair affected judges' decisions about bias but did not affect the judgments of either attorneys or jurors. We suggest why a judge's role and unique relationship with jurors is likely to foster a decision strategy based on reported juror confidence, and we discuss the implications of our analysis for current legal debates over jury selection practices. Unexpected patterns in our results also highlight the ways in which perceptions of impartiality are affected, in part, by the social characteristics of the observer.     

Do pre‐admonition suggestions moderate the effect of unbiased lineup instructions?

We examined the additive and interactive effects of pre‐admonition suggestion and lineup instructions (biased or unbiased) on eyewitness identification rates. Participants watched a mock crime video, completed a target‐absent lineup identification, and completed a retrospective memory questionnaire. Prior to attempting an identification, participants were either exposed or not exposed to pre‐admonition suggestions and received biased or unbiased lineup instructions. The pre‐admonition suggestion indicated that it was likely that the perpetrator was in the lineup (surely, you can pick the perpetrator). The pre‐admonition suggestion increased false identification in the unbiased lineup condition. Furthermore, those who received the pre‐admonition suggestion were more certain in their identifications as well as other testimony‐relevant judgments than were those who did not receive the pre‐admonition suggestion. These results suggest that pre‐lineup suggestion can mitigate the beneficial effects of unbiased lineup instructions.     

Chaos in The Courtroom Reconsidered: Emotional Bias and Juror Nullification

A widespread presumption in the law is that giving jurors nullification instructions would result in "chaos"-jurors guided not by law but by their emotions and personal biases. We propose a model of juror nullification that posits an interaction between the nature of the trial (viz. whether the fairness of the law is at issue), nullification instructions, and emotional biases on juror decision-making. Mock jurors considered a trial online which varied the presence a nullification instructions, whether the trial raised issues of the law's fairness (murder for profit vs. euthanasia), and emotionally biasing information (that affected jurors' liking for the victim). Only when jurors were in receipt of nullification instructions in a nullification-relevant trial were they sensitive to emotionally biasing information. Emotional biases did not affect evidence processing but did affect emotional reactions and verdicts, providing the strongest support to date for the chaos theory.