A New Paradigm? Peter Berger’s “The Two Pluralisms”

The article discusses Peter Berger’s suggestion to replace the secularization theory by a “new paradigm” of a double plurality: the plurality of religions and the plurality (rather: polarity) of the religious and the secular sphere. Whether this constitutes a new paradigm seems just as questionable as whether it is a paradigm at all. After having discussed these two questions the article engages with the basic tenets of Berger’s concept by asking whether the paradigm is convincing. The discussion focusses on Berger’s concept of religion, which puts the secular and the religious sphere in opposition to each other – not only in the society but also in the consciousness of the religious subject.     

Peter Berger’s “Many Altars” and the Theology of Religions

My notes on Peter Berger’s recent publication (Berger 2014) come in two parts. In part one, I will address a couple of conceptual ambiguities surrounding the so-called “secularization theory”. In part two, I will deal with Berger’s argument that religious diversity undermines religious certainties and in that sense fosters secularization. As I will point out, theologians are not only well aware of this situation, they are discussing it as part of the so-called “theology of religions,” and they have identified a solution that avoids what Berger rightly characterizes as the two impasses of fundamentalism and relativism.     

Pluralism in the Mind and the Structure of Cognitive Minorities

In his book The Many Altars of Modernity Peter L. Berger (2014) called for the replacement of secularization theory, which in his view no longer has much relevance today, with a theory of (religious) pluralism. Such a theory must encompass two levels, the level of the mind and the level of society. In this paper I will focus on the level of mind and explain some of the conceptual linkages with the level of society which Berger only touches upon in his book. The paper’s main purpose, however, is to sketch out a framework in which Berger’s ideas on “pluralism in the mind” could be investigated empirically. I will argue to focus on “cognitive minorities”, that is, on groups of people whose understanding of the world differs significantly from that of their social environment. As concrete cases I suggest a comparative study of a religious group (Evangelical Protestants) in a strongly secularized city (Leipzig, Germany) and a group of skeptics and seekers (Unitarians) in a city characterized by evangelical religiosity (Dallas, Texas). With the help of these settings – that is my thesis – it will be possible to investigate what Berger formulated as the central issue in his pluralism theory: How is it possible for people to integrate religious and secular worldviews in their minds, more or less simultaneously?     

The Plurality of Peter Berger's “Two Pluralisms” in Germany

The aim of this paper is to unfold Peter L. Berger’s new paradigm of the “Two Pluralisms” for the German context, concretizing and localizing the management of religious plurality with regard to central societal fields. It is argued that, besides the bird’s-eye view of the global and national developments, more differentiated analyses of smaller-scale units (like federal states, municipalities, and cities) are needed which zoom into the concrete local negotiation processes, opening them up with regard to their topics, actor constellations, dynamics, and effects. While Berger builds up his new paradigm in the connection of the social macro-level and the individual micro-level, this paper deals primarily with the meso-level and the consequences of the “Two Pluralisms” in the institutional contexts of politics/law, education, symbolic representation, and communication that are currently undergoing a significant change through secularization and religious pluralization while, however, have so far hardly been examined with regard to their dynamics and the intended integrative effects.     

The secular contract: sovereignty,secularism and law in Australia

What does it mean to say that a nation-state is secular? Secular law typically begins when a state has no religious competitor for authority. For this reason, it can be said that the Australian state is secular because its authority is derived from its own laws. What makes Australian law sovereign, the highest authority within the state, is its secularity. However, given Australia's colonial heritage, it is not just the absence of religious authority, such as a state religion, that gives the state its secularity. The law's foundations in colonial violence and the extinguishment of Indigenous sovereignty as a competing authority are also a crucial way in which secular Australian law can continue to operate as the sovereign authority within the state. Using the work of Charles W. Mills, I will critically interrogate how legal and political characterisations of the law as secular work to disavow the state's racialised foundations in colonial violence in the form of a “secular contract”. In developing this notion of a “secular contract” I hope to show that secularism be must re-thought of as not simply the operation of law without religion, but also, as complicit with the ways indigenous sovereignties in (post)colonial states are negated.     

Islamism,secularization, secularity: the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt as a phenomenon of a secular age

The paper outlines parallels between the processes of secularization and secularity in the West, as interpreted by José Casanova and Charles Taylor, and Islamism as a modern social and political phenomenon. It focuses on the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s history and ideas and specifically on a number of public documents detailing its social and political vision. I argue that if we define ‘secularization’ not only as the weakening of religious belief, but as the institutional differentiation of modern state structures and the marginalization of religion, and ‘secularity’ as the process whereby faith becomes one option among others and religion becomes an identifiable set of beliefs seen as guidelines for reform, the Brotherhood, similarly to other Islamist entities, is a phenomenon of a ‘secular age’.     

Conceptualizing lived religious citizenship: a case-study of Christian and Muslim women in Norway and the United Kingdom

The concept of ‘religious citizenship’ is increasingly being used by scholars, but there are few attempts at defining it. This article argues that rights-based definitions giving primacy to status and rights are too narrow, and that feminist approaches to citizenship foregrounding identity, belonging and participation, as well as an ethic of care, provide a more comprehensive understanding of how religious women understand and experience their own ‘religious citizenship’. Findings from interviews with Christian and Muslim women in Oslo and Leicester suggest a close relationship between religious women's faith and practice (‘lived religion’) and their ‘lived citizenship’. However, gender inequalities and status differences between majority and minority religions produce challenges to rights-based approaches to religious citizenship.     

Intersectional dialogue – Analyzing power in reaching a Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 on conflicting grounds

The concept of “intersectional dialogue” is developed in the article to analyze intersections of power in dialogue, specifically in analyzing the relations between the particular and the universal in the negotiations surrounding the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). The drafting of the UDHR is reread to explore how power conflicts over values intersected when unique individuals met in dialogue characterized by conflicting consensuses rather than hegemonic Western domination. The concept of intersectional dialogue helps illustrate how people relate to different social affiliations, as power relations central to dialogue are not static but change with context, setting, and group dynamics.     

Islam and Religion in the EU Political System

This article examines the increasing relevance of Islam and religion in the institutional arrangement of the EU post-Maastricht and the future policy implications for the complex political system of the EU. By adopting a combination of qualitative methodologies that are theoretically rooted in historical institutionalism and in a systemic view of the EU, the paper studies the emergence of Islam and religion as policy issues in two institutional settings, the European Commission and the European Parliament, during the 1990s and up to the first decade of the twenty-first century. The analysis shows a growing attention to faith communities on the part of the Commission, in the post-Maastricht context, culminating in the elaboration of semi-official avenues for encounter and dialogue with religious groups. It also indicates how, in turn, these semi-official practices and the ideas behind them have gradually imposed themselves upon multiple levels of the EU political system, thus opening up an institutional space in the EU for consultations with and ‘informal policies’ towards faith communities, both within and outside the EU borders.     

A funny thing happened on the way to the mosque: promoting civil society and religious pluralism through local conflict

Understood primarily as a meta-narrative reflecting citizens' reluctance to accept migration and Islam as permanent components of their society, grass-roots protests against mosque construction also highlight a democratic paradox regarding multi-level governance: while national governments bear chief responsibility for ensuring fundamental religious freedoms, local authorization procedures affecting mosque construction (e.g. zoning, building permits) have rendered communal spaces a Ground Zero for the regulation of Islamic faith communities. While similar protests have taken place across Europe, German officials face special problems in responding to challenges by neighbourhood groups, rooted in the complicated nature of federalism, the legacy of National Socialism and a new, if misunderstood, element of ‘militant democracy’ at local levels. The Pankow-Heinersdorf case, staged on the outskirts of eastern Berlin, shows that multifaceted interventions can help contesting parties come to terms with religious differences, develop their networking and dialogue skills and actually contribute to more effective democratic participation at the local level.     

Listening and Hearing

In today’s polarized milieu doublethink is refined to “sayisms,” talking points, soundbites, bullet points, and bumper stickers, announcing a stance but not necessarily seeking a response beyond approval (like) or disparagement (unfriend). Conversations become stilted, guarded, or polemical. Often they simply cease. News media seek followers rather than listeners, and content in the educational sphere is increasingly displaced by the modeling of attitudes to be mimicked. Free speech is often transmogrified into silencing -- and violence that can be fatal. The rhetoric of ever expanding rights-claims, hallmarks of a progressive faith? displaces efforts toward the kind of mutual accommodation needed in any healthy community. This article is a plea for less grandstanding and more listening, even to the voices of religious traditions, which have long served, and continue to serve, as a kind of communal conscience, being repositories of the highest values and deepest concerns of the majority of mankind.     

Toleration,Skepticism, and Blasphemy: John Locke,Jonas Proast,and Charlie Hebdo

As the recent Charlie Hebdo, Copenhagen café, and Garland, Texas, shootings show, religion has recently reemerged as a source of violence within liberal democracies, particularly in those instances where cases of alleged blasphemy are involved. Although toleration arose, within the liberal tradition, as a means of dealing with such conflict, some individuals, possessed of devout religious belief, when confronted with beliefs or practices profoundly at odds with their faith, cannot conceive of toleration as a possibility. In such situations, the demand that these individuals tolerate that to which their faith is at odds is likely to run up against a more personal and, for its adherents, eternal agenda. This article considers a way in which those with devout religious beliefs might tolerate that which is profoundly at odds with their faith, thereby providing a means to avoid violent outcomes such as those in the “extreme cases” above.     

Myth-Free Space Advocacy Part II: The Myth of the Space Frontier

Space advocates commonly compare the settling of the “space frontier” to the settling of the “western frontier” in the United States, arguing that space settlement will realize the same benefits purportedly realized by the western expansion of the United States: the generation of new cultures; the development of new technologies; and the empowerment of democratic governance. However, much of the reasoning here is based on a faulty understanding of history and on an overly optimistic view of what it will be like to live in a space settlement. Thus, I argue that ardent faith in the promises of settling the space frontier is a mythological belief, rather than a well-confirmed one.     

Escaping Earth: Human Spaceflight as Religion

What if we viewed the history of human spaceflight somewhat less through the lens of Cold War politics, which admittedly was central to the race to the Moon, but more as an expression of what might be called a religion of spaceflight? There seems to be a deeply religious quality to advocacy for the investment in and support for human space exploration, lending to the endeavor of a “higher purpose” that helps to explain both the generous nature of the actual investment and the ultimate unwillingness of Americans to eviscerate space budgets despite less than full support for space exploration. This article examines religious conceptions as a means of analyzing what might be termed a “space gospel.” I lay out here the proposition that human spaceflight may be viewed as a religion with similar attributes to those present in mainstream religious denominations. This approach to exploring the history of human spaceflight offers a different and useful frame of understanding that broadens basic conceptions about this aspect of the human past.     

The Danish ‘Competition State’: Still Along the Third Way?

This brief review article addresses the question of whether the so-called “competition state” was “abandoned” during the recent Danish election of 2019, which brought the Social Democrats back in government under the leadership of Mette Frederiksen. During the prior Social Democratic government of 2011-2015, led by Helle Thorning-Schmitt, this concept was introduced as a highly controversial policy concept and came to summarize the government’s program of economic reforms and recovery. The concept was subsequently strongly criticized in broader public political discourse as well as by the Social Democratic party and Mette Frederiksen herself. It is thus worth considering, whether the competition state reform program has been “buried” with the recent election, as this might imply a more radical break or discontinuity away from the “third way” competition state reform program embarked upon by most western European Social democrats since the 1990’s. This article will, first, briefly review the public discussion about the competition state in Denmark, before it, second, will recapitulate the academic debate about the competition state and clarify the concept. Third, it will review central tenets of the economic policy of the Thorning-Schmitt government of 2011-2015, as well as, fourth, the announced reform program of the new Social Democratic government. Finally the article will contrast and compare the two programs, and conclude that the “competition state” to a large extent endured the election of 2019, even if the Frederiksen government seems to lead the Danish competition state into reform trajectory towards increasing dis-universalization of social security and pensions.     

“Sexual Assault” and Other Buzz Phrases that Need to Die

Academics nowadays have invented many phrases for which they demand widespread acceptance that do not accurately represent reality, or which make no sense when we consider them closely. Prime among these is the concept of “sexual assault,” which has made its way into state laws and the UCMJ since its coinage in the 1960s and 1970s and is now a mainstay of training on college campuses. This concept is flawed because it includes all sexual actions under the rubric of the noun “assault,” as if we spoke of “driving aggression” rather than “aggressive driving,” to color all driving with the possibility of aggression. It is simply not true that sexuality is nothing but one more form aggression, and that all sex is potentially aggression if it is perceived by one partner as such. Another false coinage we are asked to accept is the notion that men “objectivize” women. In fact few men want to sleep with or get an erotic charge from objects; if anything the issue seems to be focus on physical details. Then there is the widely repeated assertion that “gender is assigned at birth.” Rather than debating whether or not this is so we should ask whether the concept itself makes sense. Assigned? By what entity? Just at birth? These are examples of linguistic over-reach, the attempt to change the world with words rather than letting a change in the way we see the world (Kuhn’s paradigm shift) produce corresponding words in a more gradual way that most of us can accept. Just because we hear these phrases all the time from professional wordsmith academics with axes to grind, we need not feel constrained to accept them if they are not accurate representations of the world.     

The “brand” of the Catholic Church in England and Wales: Challenges and opportunities for communications

This paper considers the concept of “brand” in relation to religious organisations and, in particular, the Catholic Church in England and Wales. It explores the application of marketing and branding concepts to the Church and reports on perceptions of the Church's brand and identity. The findings show that the Catholic Church in England and Wales has very strong brand equity and high levels of brand loyalty among its members, although conventional marketing language should be avoided due to the sensitivities involved. The findings suggest that the Church could usefully be regarded as a “brand community,” akin in many key respects to brand communities in the commercial sphere. It recommends that Church communications could be enhanced by leveraging the brand more effectively as within a true “brand community” for the purpose of encouraging brand loyalty and energising Church members.     

Agent-based modeling, public choice, and the legacy of Gordon Tullock

The future of modeling in public choice may be glimpsed by examining its evolution in economics. For problems that are influenced by heterogeneity of actors, social networks, or emergence—the arising of a complex system from simple phenomena, such as Adam Smith’s “invisible hand”—economists increasingly are turning to agent-based modeling. Agent-based modeling is a form of computational analysis that focuses on agents rather than on aggregates. In his long career as a founding scholar of public choice, Gordon Tullock repeatedly followed the agent-oriented approach of methodological individualism. Many of Tullock’s models are thus highly amenable to further exploration using that method. As agent-based modeling becomes more and more popular, the importance of Tullock’s work will continue to grow.     

Secularism vs. Post-Secularism: A Critical Examination of Cooke’s Post-Secular Alternative

In recent work, Maeve Cooke has criticised Jürgen Habermas’s post-metaphysical model in order to motivate an alternative “post-secular” conception of the state, which involves the replacement of the “institutional translation proviso” with the “nonauthoritarian reasoning requirement”. I provide a qualified defence of the Habermasian model by arguing that it does not lead to the kind of negative consequences regarding legitimacy and solidarity Cooke attributes to it. This, in turn, means that Cooke’s proposal for the secular foundation of political authority on a post-secular basis is insufficiently motivated. In the process, I argue that the point of departure for the debate about religion in the public sphere shared by both Habermas and Cooke – the picture of the “total” religious citizen – should be rejected because it presupposes an overly simplistic view of religions and religious identities.     

Does Wal-Mart reduce social capital?

Social capital has attracted increasing attention in recent years. We use county-level and individual survey data to study how Wal-Mart affects social capital. Estimates using several proxies for social capital—such as club membership, religious activity, time with friends, and other measures—do not support the thesis that “Wal-Mart destroys communities” by reducing social capital. We measure exposure to Wal-Mart two ways: Wal-Marts per 10,000 residents and Wal-Marts per 10,000 residents aggregated over the years since 1979 to capture a more cumulative “Wal-Mart Effect.” We find that the coefficients on Wal-Mart’s presence are statistically insignificant in most specifications.