To have a voice in the matter: A comparative study of the Swedish and Danish European committees

This article deals with the issue of how the national parliaments might be strengthened in order to decrease the democratic deficit within the EU. It examines the parliamentary European committees in the Danish and Swedish Parliaments and concludes that their potential to influence and control their respective governments’ EU policies mainly depends on the Government's parliamentary base and opportunities for legislative influence open to parliamentary oppositions. Moreover, it examines various organisational aspects of the European committees, including distribution of tasks and internal co‐ordination within the Parliament, at what stage in the decision‐making process the European Committee and the Parliament are involved and information management. With some conspicuous exceptions, Denmark and Sweden have chosen the same organisational arrangements for dealing with EU affairs both in the Parliament as a whole and, specifically, in the European committees. The principal conclusion is that the European committees in Sweden and Denmark are effective means for giving the national parliaments a voice in EU matters, but the article also addresses some reforms to strengthen their positions.     

The reluctant activist: the Italian parliament and the scrutiny of EU affairs between institutional opportunities and political legacies

ABSTRACT

The article analyses the participation of the Italian Parliament in the scrutiny of EU affairs after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon and its implementation through the national Law 234/2012. The empirical analysis highlights that notwithstanding the presence of favourable institutional and political conditions, the involvement of the Italian Parliament in EU affairs moderately increased. The Treaty of Lisbon and Italian legislation improved Parliament’s rights to participate in the ascending phase but without altering significantly the balance of powers between the European Commission and NPs, and between the Italian Parliament and the Government. Moreover, MPs perceive the EWS and the PD as not impactful on decision-making at the EU and the national level.     

Strong parliament of a small eu member state: The Finnish parliament's adaptation to the EU

If even the minister participating in the meeting of the Council of Ministers does not know the agenda of the day, not to say anything of whether the minister has all relevant documents available, how can anyone imagine that the Parliament could influence the decisions?

The Finnish Ex‐EU minister Mr Pertti Salolainen (Cons).¹

The article gives a presentation of the Finnish Parliament's early adaptation to EU membership. Our main argument is that the Finnish Eduskunta is stronger that the other national parliaments with respect to dealing with EU issues, because the Eduskunta is pro‐active and because the whole Parliament, all standing committees included, is involved in the preparation of Finnish national EU policies before decisions are taken in the Council of Ministers. The Finnish Parliament is thus in a strong position to influence in advance, on an established routine basis, the position of the Finnish representative in the Council of Ministers. We also point out some practical and informational problems, and analyse the main procedural and organisational reforms inside the Eduskunta. Utilising interviews with the party functionaries in the Eduskunta, the article ends with a discussion on the main problems facing the Finnish parliamentarians, a way forward and some conclusions.     

Parliamentary questions in the European parliament: Representation,information and control

Parliamentary questions and the membership of the European Parliament have both remained under‐researched. This article redresses the deficit by using a content analysis of written questions to analyse the behaviour of MEPs. Since tabling a question is one of the last formal rights of the backbencher, the study of parliamentary questions may be regarded as a particularly useful tool for increasing our knowledge of the way that MEPs understand their role as representatives. First the formal rules, function, and importance of parliamentary questions are explained. The following dimensions of questions are analysed: the questioning activity of MEPs, party groups, and national delegations; the issues MEPs raise in their questions, and the territorial dimension of the questions.     

European integration and the french parliament: From ineffectual watchdog to constitutional rehabilitation and an enhanced political role

The development of the European Union is as much an opportunity as a threat to national parliaments. Our case study of the French Parliament suggests that as the process of integration has quickened in pace and broadened in scope, parliament has on successive occasions used the opportunity to strengthen its constitutional position with the introduction of Article 88‐4 and improve its capacity to scrutinise government through the adoption of a series of laws. Parliament now has the power to delay if not block the adoption of measures at European Union level by refusing to lift its scrutiny reserve. It is difficult to determine if parliament has significantly increased its influence over the government on European affairs, but it is now able to adopt potentially politically significant resolutions on all European Union issues which the government takes into account when negotiating in Union institutions. European integration has been a significant factor in the rehabilitation of the French Parliament.     

Westminster as a Three-in-One Legislature for the United Kingdom and its Devolved Territories1

This article considers the emergence of a cohesive political elite within the European Parliament. Moving from a short review of the literature and drawing on some preliminary data, the paper discusses alternative hypotheses to explain the recruitment and career pattern of MEPs and introduces a typology of members. Afterwards, the paper compares representatives of the new EU member states with the ‘pioneer parliamentarians’ elected in 1979 and with their colleagues elected in the 15 countries of the ‘old’ European Union. Signs of a new pattern of European political career appear to be emerging, thus providing a new possible set of explanatory hypotheses about the evolution of European Union representatives.     

Laying the foundation for institutionalisation of democratic parliaments in the newly independent states: The case of Ukraine

This article examines the institutionalisation of the Ukrainian Parliament, the Verkhovna Rada, since the fall of the Soviet Union. The emergence of a popularly elected legislature in post‐Soviet Ukraine stands as a cornerstone in the development of a democratic regime. While the Verkhovna Rada is by no means a mature parliament, the foundation for future institutionalisation has been laid through the establishment of a representative political process, nascent political parties, a separation of powers between the executive and the legislature, and the policy‐making capacity of the Parliament.     

Regional parliaments in the EU multilevel parliamentary system

ABSTRACT

European integration has created a multilevel political system that is dominated by executive actors. Despite the increasing competences of the European Parliament, a growing EU-awareness of national assemblies and an emerging attention of regional parliaments for EU affairs, the EU polity still lacks a sound parliamentary representation. As the EU presents itself as a representative democracy, the current set-up raises questions from the perspective of democratic legitimacy. The establishment of multilevel parliamentarianism may be part of the remedy. This introduction focuses on the position that regional parliaments take in such a European multilevel parliamentary system. The authors address three relevant questions: what roles do regional parliaments take up in terms of legislation, scrutiny and networking? To what extent are they empowered by the Lisbon Treaty? And what explains the variation in their activities? The authors develop hypotheses that are, to varying degree, addressed by the contributions in this special issue.     

An Electoral Connection in European Parliament Voting

Concerns about endogeneity often complicate attempts to estimate a causal link between public opinion and the voting records of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). In this article, I overcome this problem by exploiting a rare natural experiment—the surprising and exogenous revelation of Irish public opinion that resulted from Ireland's ratification of the Nice treaty. I find that the Irish electorate's rejection of Nice caused Ireland's European Parliament delegation to vote in a more conservative manner, while its subsequent ratification caused a partial reversal of this shift. My finding of an electoral connection on the Nice treaty casts doubt on the claim that MEPs are largely unconstrained by voter preferences on European issues, despite claims of a democratic deficit in European institutions.     

Keeping national parliaments informed: The problem of European legislation

Since Maastricht there has been a growing realisation in the institutions of the European Union, that the unfettered flow of information is vital to the health of the whole European project. Some moves have been made towards more transparent decision‐making, but progress has been slow and is limited by a culture which values confidentiality, particularly in intergovernmental negotiations. The free flow of information is especially important to national parliaments if they are to exercise any influence in the EU. The House of Commons Select Committee on European Legislation has recently pronounced the scrutiny system to be ‘in deep crisis’ because of chaotic decision‐making and a disregard for the rights of national parliaments. Many Westminster MPs feel frustrated by the difficulty of keeping track of EU legislation. The paper suggests that the ingredients of an improved information system already exist. A wealth of current information can be derived from EU‐related electronic databases and through direct links between the European Parliament and national parliaments. It proposes that a new current awareness service for the House of Commons, distributed via the parliamentary network and as hard copy, could focus information for MPs in a much more accessible way.     

Codecision procedure biais: the European legislation game

The European Union’s codecision procedure is analyzed as a bargaining game between the Council and the European Parliament. The model shows that the policy outcome is biased towards the ideal point of the institution that is closest to the status quo, when the negotiation leads to an agreement. If the Council’s ideal policy is closer to the status quo, as is the case for example concerning the duration of maternity leave, the resulting policy will remain closer to the Council’s than to the European Parliament’s position. Furthermore, the result of the codecision procedure is Kaldor–Hicks inefficient. The developments of common policies concerning asylum, fishery and maternity leave illustrate both the possibility of the failure of negotiations and the influence of the Council on the outcome.     

Granting the Right to Vote for the European Parliament to Resident Third‐Country Nationals: Civic Citizenship Revisited

The EU grants rights to third‐country nationals (TCNs) and strives to approximate their rights to those of Union citizens. Up to now, the approximation has extended to social and economic matters. This article investigates whether political rights, notably voting rights for the European Parliament (EP), should also be approximated. To this end, the analysis applies Dahl's democratic principles of ‘coercion’ and ‘all affected interests’ as well as Bauböck's principle of ‘stakeholding’ to the position of TCNs in the EU. Against that background, it explores the relevance of arguments for and against granting TCNs the right to vote in European elections and submits that voting rights should be granted to long‐term resident TCNs. The author then proposes including TCN voting rights in the legal framework for EP elections and concludes by suggesting the use of the concept of civic citizenship to express political approximation of TCNs to EU citizens.     

Lord Cooke of Thorndon (1926–2006): 51 Years in the Law

This article provides an in‐depth analysis of the landmark ‘cash for query’ judgment of the Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court of India. The scope of parliamentary privileges in India, as well as in England and America, is examined, particularly with respect to the jurisdiction of the courts. The present position in the law of parliamentary privileges in India was laid down in the case of Raja Ram Pal v The Hon’ble Speaker, Lok Sabha, &; Ors. The Supreme Court of India has extensively dwelled on the matter and has delivered a judgment, which is by far the most comprehensive decision in this field of law. The author notes in the analysis that the difference between the English and Indian constitutional systems is of crucial significance. The conflicts between the judiciary and parliament in England arose because of the sovereignty of parliament, and the judiciary had to fight for every inch of its jurisdiction in England. The judiciary had to contend with Parliament not only as a legislative body, but also by virtue of being the ‘High Court of Parliament’, as a superior court. Because of these reasons, the case law from British constitutional history does not have strict applicability in India. The decision of the Supreme Court of India in Raja Ram Pal v The Hon’ble Speaker, Lok Sabha, &; Ors, is a clear expression of a very basic feature of the Indian constitutional mechanism: where the Constitution is the supreme law of the land, and all governmental organs, which owe their origin to the Constitution and derive their powers from its provisions, must function within its framework.     

Pinpointing the Powerful: Covoting Network Centrality as a Measure of Political Influence

This article introduces centrality in covoting networks as a measure of influence. Based on a simple cueing dynamic, it conceptualizes those lawmakers as most central—and thus as having the greatest signaling influence—who impact the greatest number of colleagues' voting decisions. A formal proof and an agent‐based simulation show that cue‐providers are always more central than followers; hence, we can use real‐world voting data to identify the most influential legislators. To confirm the measure's construct validity, we predict covoting centrality in the European Parliament and find those factors that are expected to impact legislators' influence to predict their centrality.     

Interests,Instruments and Institutional Preferences in the EU Comitology System: The 2006 Comitology Reform

This paper seeks to reveal the institutional interests of the Council of Ministers, the European Parliament and the Commission in the comitology system. This is done by an investigation of the 2006 comitology reform, which introduced the regulatory procedure with scrutiny. This reform was the result of developments in four areas: the Lamfalussy reform in the area of financial regulation; the controversial use of comitology in the area of GMOs, food safety and the environment; the failed Constitutional Treaty; and the amending of the 1999 comitology decision. The analysis shows that the reform was the result of a two‐dimensional constitutional struggle. The first dimension concerns the relative supervisory position of the two legislative actors, the Council and the European Parliament. The second dimension concerns the relationship between the legislative and the executive branch of the EU system. In theoretical terms, the analysis demonstrates an example of T.M. Moe's ‘politics of structural choice’. The paper ends by drawing lessons for the negotiations on the new comitology system following the Lisbon Treaty.     

After Enlargement: Voting Patterns in the Sixth European Parliament

We examined how voting behavior in the European Parliament changed after the European Union added ten new member‐states in 2004. Using roll‐call votes, we compared voting behavior in the first half of the Sixth European Parliament (July 2004‐December 2006) with voting behavior in the previous Parliament (1999–2004). We looked at party cohesion, coalition formation, and the spatial map of voting by members of the European Parliament. We found stable levels of party cohesion and interparty coalitions that formed mainly around the left‐right dimension. Ideological distance between parties was the strongest predictor of coalition preferences. Overall, the enlargement of the European Union in 2004 did not change the way politics works inside the European Parliament. We also looked at the specific case of the controversial Services Directive and found that ideology remained the main predictor of voting behavior, although nationality also played a role.     

The Cocoon of Power: Democratic Implications of Interinstitutional Agreements

Abstract:  This article assesses Interinstitutional Agreements (IIAs) in terms of democratic theory. It starts from the premise that democratic rules as developed in the national context may be used as a yardstick for supranational governance as well. Thus, parliamentarisation of the Union is defined as an increase in democracy, although relating problems such as weak European party systems, low turnouts, and remoteness are not to be neglected. The article evaluates several case studies on IIAs in this vein and asks whether they strengthen the European Parliament or not, and why. It arrives at conclusions that allow for differentiation: empowerment of the European Parliament occurs in particular when authorisation to conclude an IIA stems from the Treaty or from the power that the European Parliament has in crucial fields such as the budget and is willing to use for this purpose. Success is, however, not guaranteed in every case, and is sometimes more symbolic than real. However, a democratic critique must also stress negative consequences of IIAs in terms of responsivity, accountability, and transparency.     

Mixed Messages in Bottles: the European Union,Devolution, and the Future of the Constitution

An unprecedented eleven‐member UK Supreme Court decided R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union on 24 January 2017. The Government's argument, that it could start the process of withdrawing from the EU using a prerogative power instead of an Act of Parliament, was comprehensively defeated by an 8:3 majority. However, the Government also secured a unanimous verdict that it did not need the consent from the devolved legislatures in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland before invoking Article 50 of the TEU. I explore the judicial argumentation in light of Philip Bobbitt's six modalities of constitutional argument, five of which feature, and one of which ought to have featured, in this seminal case.     

R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union: Three Competing Syllogisms

The Miller case concerned the constitutional requirements for the UK to give notice of its intention to withdraw from the EU pursuant to Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union. The parties made submissions in terms of two competing syllogisms. The Government argued that ministers, exercising Crown prerogative, had the power to give notice without statutory authorisation. The Applicants argued that the process required authorisation by Act of Parliament because the UK's withdrawal would deprive people of rights arising under EU law. However, a majority of the Supreme Court decided in favour of the Applicants based on a third and significantly different syllogism, based on the proposition that the European Communities Act had established EU law‐making and law‐interpreting institutions as new ‘sources of law’. This note assesses the three competing syllogisms and examines the constitutional significance of the majority's proposition that these new EU sources of law were integrated into UK domestic law without disrupting the principle of parliamentary sovereignty.     

Open parliament policy applied to the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies

ABSTRACT

This article will analyse the implementation of an open parliament policy that is taking place at the Chamber of Deputies, in accordance with the guidelines of the Open Government Partnership international programme (OGP), regarding the action plan of the Opening Parliament Work Group in particular, one of the subgroups of OGP. The authors will evaluate two blocks of initiatives for open parliaments executed by the Chamber in the last few years, that is, digital participation in the legislative process and Transparency 2.0, in order to observe their impasses and results obtained until now. In the first part the authors will study the e-Democracy portal and in the second part the authors will focus on open data, collaborative activities to use those data (hackathons) and the creation of the Hacker Lab, a permanent space dedicated to open parliament practices. The analysis considers the initiatives that the authors evaluated as part of the transformative and arena profiles of the Brazilian Parliament, according to Polsby's classification, with exclusive characteristics.