Is Bigger Better? Activity and Success in Negotiations in the United Nations General Assembly

Theorists often claim that being bigger than one's counterparts offers advantages in multilateral negotiations. In this article, I examine that argument using data from negotiations in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). The article analyzes and compares the activity levels of smaller and larger states in international negotiations, and sheds light on the conditions under which the latter “punch below their weight.” My analysis indicates that size directly affects participation, but not success rates. Bigger states can better formulate national positions on a broad range of issues, enabling their diplomats to more actively participate in negotiations, while smaller states are absent more often. Activity is conducive to success, which helps bigger states. But not every negotiation strategy is equally effective. In the UNGA's one‐state, one‐vote context, bigger states are not able to systematically exert disproportionate influence despite their often superior financial resources and bargaining strategies.     

Dwarfs in international negotiations: how small states make their voices heard

Students of international relations interested in cooperation through international regimes and organizations very often devote their attention to the role of a few big states rather than the numerous small ones. Small states tend to possess fewer administrative and financial resources back home as well as smaller and less well-equipped delegations at the international negotiation table than big states. This can easily translate into difficulties in preparing positions for all items on the negotiation agenda and in developing negotiation strategies in great detail, which might inhibit small states from successfully influencing negotiation outcomes. Yet, since international negotiation often rest on a one-state, one-vote principle and since small states can adjust priorities and redirect their limited capacities, there is a window of opportunity for small states to turn into important international actors and achieve significant outcomes in international affairs. In order to systematically shed light on the role of small states in international negotiations, this article outlines the conceptual framework to answer the following question: How, and under which conditions, can small states successfully punch above their weight in international negotiations?     

Beyond contestation: conceptualizing negotiation in democracy promotion

ABSTRACT

This article presents an analytical framework that guides the contributions to this special issue and, in general terms, aims at enabling a systematic investigation of processes of negotiation in the international promotion of democracy. It first briefly introduces the rationale for studying democracy promotion negotiation, offers a definition, and locates the general approach within the academic literature, bringing together different strands of research, namely studies of negotiation in international relations as well as research on democratization and democracy promotion. The larger part of the article then discusses key concepts, analytical distinctions and theoretical propositions along the lines of the three research questions that are identified in the introduction to this special issue. More specifically, the article (1) offers a typology that facilitates a systematic empirical analysis of the issues that are discussed in democracy promotion negotiations; (2) takes initial steps towards a causal theory of democracy promotion negotiation by identifying and discussing a set of parameters that can be expected to shape such negotiations; and (3) introduces key distinctions and dimensions that help guide empirical research on the output and outcome of negotiations in democracy promotion.     

Diplomatic Interactions and Negotiations

This article examines the role of state actors, organization agencies, and individual agents in diplomatic interactions and negotiations. States as diplomatic actors, organizations as diplomatic agencies, and individuals as diplomatic agents enter into complex and interdependent relationships. Proposing a three‐level analysis of interstate interactions and diplomatic negotiations, I argue that no diplomatic negotiation happens without interactions between parties at the state, organizational, and individual levels. The agency–structure paradigm provides a conceptual framework for understanding behavioral and structural properties of international interactions and their influence on diplomatic negotiations. Diplomatic negotiation employs specific forms of interaction, using a distinct language, protocol norms, symbols, ceremonies, and rituals. The state's “self” (as a social conception of its identity, values, and interests) affects the process of diplomatic negotiation. By managing, organizing, and improving international interactions at the actor, agency, and agent levels, negotiating parties can advance the process and effectiveness of diplomatic negotiation.     

A small state’s anticipation of institutional change: effects of the looming Brexit in the areas of the CSDP and internal market

ABSTRACT

Brexit will profoundly change politics in the European Union, and all countries will have to adjust to the new situation. But the issue is more pressing for small member states that are more dependent on international organisations than big states. This article studies how the institutional setting affects a small state’s preparations for Brexit in the areas of the common security and defence policy and internal market. Contrary to the expectations, it shows that the Czech Republic, the small state under scrutiny, has invested more effort into a preventive adjustment in the internal market policy than to the CSDP. This result is explained by the existence of alternative institutional frameworks that are expected to mitigate the impact of Brexit on EU’s security and defence policy. It also suggests that while small states profit from the existence of strong institutions, they also face the risk of unmitigated impact when these institutions change.     

Introduction: negotiating the promotion of democracy

ABSTRACT

This article makes the case for why we should turn to studying democracy promotion negotiation, outlines the research questions guiding this special issue, identifies overarching findings and summarizes the individual contributions. After outlining the rationale for more attention to the issue of negotiation, which we understand as a specific form of interaction between external and local actors in democracy promotion, we outline three basic assumptions informing our research: (1) Democracy promotion is an international practice that is necessarily accompanied by processes of negotiation. (2) These negotiation processes, in turn, have an impact upon the practice and outcome of democracy promotion. (3) For external democracy promotion to be mutually owned and effective, genuine negotiations between ‘promoters’ and ‘local actors’ are indispensable; the term ‘genuine’ here being understood as including a substantial exchange on diverging values and interests. The article, then, introduces the three research questions for this agenda, concerning the issues on the negotiation table, the parameters shaping negotiation processes, and the results of democracy promotion negotiation. We conclude by presenting an overview of the overarching findings of the special issue as well as with brief summaries of the individual contributions.     

Immovable Positions: Public Acknowledgment and Bargaining in Military Basing Negotiations

Why might public acknowledgment of cooperative security negotiations generate bargaining constraints that provoke stalemate? Previous scholarship points to aroused public opinion. Yet in many cases where hard-line bargaining stances develop and talks collapse following public acknowledgment, it is not domestic political pressures that tie leaders’ hands. This article examines instead an international constraint attendant to publicity: opposition by third-party states. I argue that international power position shapes the balance of vulnerability between the negotiating parties to abandonment and entanglement. The act of official acknowledgment can constrain the more vulnerable partner by enabling third-party states to credibly scrutinize its intentions. By threatening strained relations, such scrutiny can create a security dilemma that reduces the weaker partner's bargaining range to a choice between cooperation on its terms and noncooperation. I evaluate this argument by studying foreign military basing negotiations. Statistical analyses and a comparative case study produce strong support for my argument.     

The domestic politics of international negotiations: The effects of state structures and policy making processes

Putnam's metaphor of a two‐level game that state representatives play when they face the dual constraints of international bargaining and domestic pressures has been applied across different political systems. This paper argues that it is important to take into account differences in state structures and political processes in the study of international negotiations. That state structures and processes are important has become a common theme in current research on foreign policy, decision making, and international conflict. Building on this literature, this study involves a meta‐analysis of existing case studies of two‐level games. The previously completed cases provide evidence of variation in the characteristics of two‐level games. Independent measures of the institutional structures of the states involved in the set of case studies are collected from the POLITY III dataset. Hypotheses on how differences in state structures might influence the characteristics of two‐level bargaining are then examined. The study finds that differences in state structures do influence the dynamics of two‐level games. Some of the results support the conventional wisdom on this relationship, while other results suggest counter‐intuitive insights. A framework conceptualizing state characteristics at three levels is proposed for future research.     

The Rhetoric of Appeasement: Hitler's Legitimation and British Foreign Policy, 1938–39

Few grand strategies have been more scrutinized than Britain's decision to appease Nazi Germany. From 1933 to 1938, Britain eschewed confrontation and attempted to settle German demands. However in the five months following the negotiations at Munich, the British abandoned appeasement and embraced a policy of confronting the German state. The roots of both appeasement and confrontation can be found in Germany's legitimation strategies. Until the Munich crisis, Adolf Hitler justified Germany's aims with appeals to collective security, equality, and self-determination—norms central to the European system established by the Treaty of Versailles. After Munich, in contrast, German politicians abandoned these legitimation strategies, arguing instead that expansion was justified as a matter of German might, and not international rights. As Britain came to see German demands as illegitimate, so too did they decide this revisionist state was insatiable, impervious to negotiation, and responsive only to the language of force.     

Defensive development,combative contradictions: towards an international political sociology of global militarism in Africa

ABSTRACT

Drawing on international political sociology, this article shows how the merger of development and security has become part of the ideational architecture that facilitates a new ‘feel-good’ militarism in Africa. Contemporary international reform efforts are designed to restrain military power in the name of development, democracy and civilian oversight, but also to strengthen the coercive capacities of African security institutions and make them more efficient in the global fight against violent extremism. Such defensive development efforts have implications for the historically problematic relationship of the African state with modern forms of organised force, reconfiguring and recalibrating relations and dynamics between the state, military forces and external actors. The article concludes that defensive development is fraught with combative contradictions and risks becoming the handmaiden not only of increased militaristic violence, but also of oppression and the restriction of freedom and democracy.     

The negotiation burden of institutional interactions: non-state organizations and the international negotiations on forests

The participation of non-state actors in international politics has been investigated since the creation of international institutions. Yet, the rules, principles and norms of global governance are no longer discussed in single isolated institutions. Rather, with the proliferation of international regimes and organizations, international issues are now negotiated in a context of institutional interactions known as ‘regime complexes’. This poses new questions, in particular on the negotiation burden that these new processes place on international actors. To answer this question, this contribution compares non-state participation in both contexts (single regimes and regime complexes), using the international forest negotiations as a case study. It uses quantitative methods to measure the negotiation burden of single regimes and compare it with the negotiation burden of regime complexes. The negotiation burden of single regimes is found to be insignificant, political interest being the major motivation for participation, while the negotiation burden of regime complexes is found to be real, demanding a certain type of material and organizational resources in order for non-state actors to participate. Yet a certain diversity of non-state representation is maintained within regime complexes, non-governmental organizations being dominant with respect to business groups.     

Back-Channel Negotiation: International Bargaining in the Shadows

Back‐channel negotiations (BCNs) are officially sanctioned negotiations conducted in secret between the parties to a dispute. These extraordinary negotiations operate in parallel with, or replace, acknowledged front channels of negotiation. Back channels are like the black markets of negotiation; they are separate tables where bargaining takes place in the shadows. When front‐channel negotiations fail, they are sometimes eclipsed by successful BCNs even though the same principals, conflicts, and sociopolitical contexts are involved. This article asks: Why do decision makers deploy back channels? What is the impact of BCN on international peace processes? The Palestinian–Israeli peace process, in which both back and front channels have been used consistently, provides the basis for comparing channels and offering initial answers to these questions. The author concludes that while BCN can facilitate breakthrough agreements, it can also damage a peace process by helping to reinforce some of the uncertainties that gave rise to the use of back channels in the first place.     

The Power of the Chair: Formal Leadership in International Cooperation

This article addresses the influence wielded by the formal leaders of international cooperation—those state or supranational representatives that chair and direct negotiations in the major decision bodies of multilateral organizations and conferences. This is a topic that so far has received limited systematic attention by IR theorists, who have tended to treat bargaining parties as functionally and formally equivalent, leaving little theoretical space for formal leadership. Drawing on rational choice institutionalism, I introduce a theory that develops a coherent argument for the delegation of authority to the chairmanship, the power resources of negotiation chairs, and the influence of formal leaders over outcomes. I assess the explanatory power of this theory through evidence on formal leadership in three alternative organizational settings: the European Union, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/the World Trade Organization, and the United Nations environmental conferences. I find in favor of the chairmanship as a source of independent influence in international cooperation. Formal leaders perform functions of agenda management, brokerage, and representation that make it more likely for negotiations to succeed, and possess privileged resources that may enable them to steer negotiations toward the agreements they most prefer.     

Public Opinion as a Domestic Constraint in International Negotiations: Two-Level Games in the Anglo-Irish Peace Process

This article aims to broaden the theoretical foundations of the two-level games approach to understanding international negotiations by considering the conditions under which public opinion can act as a domestic constraint on the ability of international negotiators to reach agreement. In determining the role that public opinion plays, three factors are of central importance: (1) the preferences of the public relative to those of decision makers and other domestic constituents; (2) the intensity of the issue under negotiation; and (3) the power of the public to ratify a potential agreement. Evidence from the last decade of Anglo-Irish negotiations over the future and status of Northern Ireland shows that public opinion acts as a constraint on negotiators when the public has the power to directly ratify an international agreement. When the public's power to ratify an agreement is indirect, the intensity of the issue under negotiation will play a critical role in determining whether public preferences serve as a constraint on decision makers.     

Negotiating in a Complex World

Drawing on the literatures on negotiation and conflict resolution as well as research on international diplomacy, the author proposes a framework for understanding complexity in real-world negotiations. Rejecting models of the process that are simplistic, sterile, or static, he argues that complexity is inherent in negotiation. In ten propositions, he lays out key dimensions of complexity and ways that skilled negotiators can manage it. The propositions focus attention on the ways negotiators create and claim value, shape perceptions and learn, work within structure and shape the structure, negotiate and mediate, link and de-link negotiations, create momentum and engineer impasses, and work outside and inside. The author also highlights the importance of organizational learning in negotiation, noting that most negotiators manage multiple negotiations in parallel, and most organizations have many negotiators doing similar things.     

生物多样性议题安全建构的碎片化

1992年,《生物多样性公约》与《联合国气候变化框架公约》《联合国防治荒漠化公约》一并成为全球环境治理与合作的重要制度性框架文件。目前,生物多样性的国际合作程度、社会认知深度、治理行动速度等都明显逊色。生物多样性治理的迫切程度不亚于其他的全球性环境议题,但其议题安全化的分散性却不利于建构整体性的安全认知。生物多样性议题安全建构的碎片化体现在生态、治理目标、谈判、国家及其他行为体四个层面。生态层面是指生物多样性的安全认知;治理目标层面是指全球生物多样性治理的"爱知目标"与安全的联系;谈判层面包括资金机制、资源动员、遗传资源获取和惠益分享、保护区以及主流化等议题;各缔约方及其他行为体层面不仅在各项议题上表达各自关切,同时也将生物多样性问题建构为粮食安全、水安全、公共卫生安全、经济安全等多元安全关注。生物多样性议题安全建构的碎片化导致了该问题虽然在话语上进入了安全领域,但是缺乏共同的安全认知,难以提供简明和清晰的治理目标和路径,不利于推动全球有效治理。     

From Lab Experiments to Real Negotiations: An Investigation of International Iron Ore Negotiations

Negotiation researchers have conducted a large number of experimental lab studies to identify the factors that affect negotiation outcomes, but it remains unclear whether those results can be generalized to real‐world negotiations. To explore this question, we analyzed the dynamic international iron ore annual negotiations that took place from 2005 to 2009. We found evidence that supports two important findings from previous experiments. Specifically, we focused on the impact of negotiators’ best alternatives and first offers on negotiation prices using multiple case study analysis. We found that iron ore prices increased more when the gap between the previous year's negotiated price and the price on the alternative spot market, a public market in which commodities are traded for immediate delivery, was larger, which suggested that buyers were sensitive to the strength of this alternative, supporting the literature on the role of alternatives. We also found that the first offer price significantly influenced the final price. Our findings extend two important experimental findings from the negotiation literature to large‐scale business negotiations in the real world.     

An Exploration of a Model of Social Networks and Multilateral Negotiations

Multilateral (many-party) negotiations are much more complex than traditional two-party negotiations. In this article, we explore a model of social network activity, especially clique formation, among parties engaged in multilateral negotiation and the implications that such networks might have on the negotiation process and outcome. Using data collected from 375 subjects participating in a negotiation simulation, our results reveal that, primarily, the negotiator's perspectives of clique formation (coalition building) — both his or her own and the other party's — have unique effects on the integrative, problem-solving approaches used in the process and on the negotiator's satisfaction with outcomes. Secondarily, centrality (manifest as emergent power) has a positive effect on both problem solving and satisfaction. Interestingly, we found that those players who emerged as the most dominant and powerful were not as satisfied (in relative levels) as those who were less powerful.     

Parliamentary assertion and deep integration: the European parliament in the CETA and TTIP negotiations1

Abstract

Scholars have long viewed parliamentarians as parochial actors having little interest, or incentive to engage, in international diplomacy. Yet, parliaments have recently taken on a very active role in various international negotiations. This article explores the role of the European Parliament (EP) in the European Union (EU)–Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) and the EU–United States Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations. Drawing on classic institutionalist insights, it develops the concept of parliamentary assertion and explores its usefulness through a combination of comparative and process-tracing analyses. The conclusions are threefold: (1) the EP has asserted its power in international trade matters beyond the simple power of consent; (2) the EP’s search for legitimacy in the EU polity is driving this phenomenon; and (3) this phenomenon is significant beyond the current CETA and TTIP negotiations.