Fundamental rights in the EU after Kadi and Al Barakaat

This article takes stock of the emerging scholarship on the European Court of Justice's 2008 Kadi decision and seeks to make sense of the court's apparent evasiveness towards international law. The article argues that Kadi is best understood as an act of civil disobedience prompted by the UN Security Council's misapplication of foundational principles of the international order. In turn, the court's forceful articulation of the stakes in this case signals a prioritisation of basic rights within the supranational constitutional architectonic. In this respect, the ‘domestic’ constitutional implications of Kadi are just as far reaching as its consequences for the EU's status as an actor under international law.     

Inhuman and Degrading Punishment,Dignity, and the Limits of Retribution

The recent judgment of the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Vinter and others v United Kingdom provides a much needed clarification of the parameters of the prohibition on inhuman and degrading punishment under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) as it applies to whole life orders of imprisonment under mandatory life sentences – essentially, life imprisonment without parole. The Grand Chamber's judgment refines Strasbourg doctrine on life imprisonment and the prospect of release and illuminates key principles concerning inhuman and degrading punishment under Article 3 of the ECHR. This article considers the judgment's profound significance in relation to both human rights and penology.     

New Battles and Battlegrounds for Mandatory Arbitration After Epic Systems,New Prime,and Lamps Plus

The Supreme Court's recent decisions interpreting the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) in the employment context generally prioritize arbitration over workers’ labor law rights. The majority in Epic Systems Corporation v. Lewis upheld mandatory individual employment arbitration agreements despite their conflict with the labor law right to act in concert. The same majority in Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela rejected a state law interpretation of a contract provision to find that parties to an employment contract intend individual arbitration absent reference to group arbitration. A unanimous Court in New Prime v. Oliveira interpreted the FAA to include independent contractors under the transportation worker exemption, reinvigorating the battle over what it means to be engaged in interstate commerce to qualify for the exemption. These decisions resolved some disputes about the breadth of the FAA, but other questions remain. In the wake of Epic Systems and Lamps Plus, state courts and legislatures are testing the boundaries of the FAA's saving clause, with limited success. Confidentiality provisions, frequently associated with arbitration agreements, may unlawfully interfere with employees’ federal labor law rights. This article recommends that Congress amend the FAA to address these issues by excluding all workers engaged in interstate commerce, not just transportation workers, because the Court has strayed far from the original intent of the Act—to enforce commercial agreements in which the parties had equal bargaining power. State legislation also should provide guidance on what makes arbitration voluntary and fair, and provide a choice to employees on collective action, forum, and confidentiality.     

The Rule in Wilkinson v Downton: Conduct,Intention, and Justifiability

The decision in OPO v MLA [2014] EWCA Civ 1277 causes confusion to the rule in Wilkinson v Downton. A strong line of authorities indicates that the defendant must either have an actual intention to cause physical injury or be reckless as to the causing of such harm, the latter being determined by the likelihood of harm being caused by the defendant's act. ‘Imputed intention’ does not form a separate category of mental state. There was also a missed opportunity to develop a ‘justifiability’ criterion, by which policy considerations can be taken into account to preclude an application of the tort. This criterion ought to be developed in a principled manner, in line with the existing jurisprudence concerning human rights and with the policy limitations as developed in the context of other torts.     

Taking Abortion Rights Seriously: Whole Woman's Health v Hellerstedt

In Whole Woman's Health v Hellerstedt the Supreme Court of the United States passed down its most important decision on abortion for just under a decade. By a majority of 5‐3, the Court ruled that two provisions in a Texas law regulating abortion on grounds of women's health were constitutionally invalid, placing a ‘substantial obstacle’ in the way of women seeking to exercise their right to abortion. This comment delineates the key ways in which the Court's application of the standard of constitutional review under Planned Parenthood v Casey (1992) to the Texas provisions marks a landmark development for the protection of the constitutional right to abortion established in Roe v Wade, not the least by making clear that state abortion regulations which cite ‘women's health’ justifications should not pass constitutional review where those justifications lack a credible factual basis.     

Confronting Religion: Veiled Witnesses,the Right to a Fair Trial and the Supreme Court of Canada's Judgment in R v N.S.

The Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R v N.S. is significant because the majority seems to endorse an understanding of confrontation that assumes a defendant's right to a fair trial is imperilled by a witness who seeks to give evidence while wearing the niqab. The case is of interest because it permits reflection upon the interrelationship between the right to a fair trial and the right to confront witnesses enshrined in Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Given that the European Court of Human Rights conceptualises confrontation in epistemic terms, it is argued that it would be unlikely to find that a conviction based upon evidence from a niqab‐wearing witness would infringe the right to a fair trial. This note examines the value of demeanour evidence and whether the majority in R v N.S. was correct that the abrogation of the ability to assess demeanour evidence necessarily undermines trial fairness.     

The ‘Heathrow’ Case: Polycentricity,Legislation, and the Standard of Review

The recent Court of Appeal decision in the ‘Heathrow’ case, Plan B Earth v Secretary of State for Transport is an illustration of the challenges of reviewing polycentric and expert decision-making. The issues raised in the case concerning the Planning Act 2008 are an illustration of a court's expository role in such contexts. The Court tackled directly a series of interpretive questions concerning the Planning Act 2008's obligations regarding the consideration of climate change. The Habitats and Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) Directive issues raised in the appeal, in contrast, were presented with the question of the intensity of review foregrounded in legal argument. The Court therefore sought to articulate the ‘standard of review’ and to apply it to the government's decisions. This way of framing the issue unfortunately sidelined the courts’ expository role in relation to intepreting the Habitats and SEA Directives, leaving key provisions under-analysed.     

The Troika: The Interlocking Roles of Commission v. Luxembourg and Belgium,Van Gend en Loos and Costa v. ENEL in the Creation of the European Legal Order

Through comparisons with dispute resolution procedures in the North American Free Trade Area's Side Agreements, and with the debate over the direct effect of World Trade Organization obligations in the European legal order, this paper demonstrates that three of the European Court of Justice's most important decisions—Commission v. Luxembourg and Belgium, Van Gend en Loos and Costa v. ENEL—should be understood as combining to reorganise general international law's relationship between the EU Member States by substituting national court application of European obligations for the use of interstate retaliation as an enforcement mechanism, and thus providing the foundations for the EU's distinctive legal order.     

Packer in Context: Formalism and Fairness in the Due Process Model

Herbert Packer's The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (1968) has spawned decades of commentary. This essay argues that Packer's two‐model conceptualization of the criminal process is best understood within his professional milieu of doctrinal legal scholarship and the political context of the Warren Court revolution. Within this context, the essay suggests a distinction between two due process visions: formalism and fairness. This distinction is useful for illuminating debates and decisions on criminal procedure matters in the Supreme Court such as Terry v. Ohio (1968) and Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) . I conclude by encouraging sensitivity to legal and historical context in future commentary on Packer's framework.     

Kogan v Martin: A New Framework for Joint Authorship in Copyright Law

The Court of Appeal has set out a new framework for the application of copyright law's joint authorship test in a recent landmark case. Kogan v Martin brings some welcome clarity to the complex joint authorship landscape, embedding an inclusive pro-collaboration default standard. This case note contrasts the appeal court's nuanced framing of the dispute with the first instance court's narrower approach. The note then examines the new joint authorship framework and explains how it allows the test to be applied with an eye to the reality of collaborative creative endeavours. Finally, the significance of Kogan v Martin is highlighted, as are some questions which remain unanswered.     

Legal Neutrality,Public Benefit and Religious Charitable Purposes: Making Sense of Thornton v Howe

Thornton v Howe (1862) concerned a trust to promote the works of Joanna Southcott, a millenarian prophetess. Sir John Romilly's assertion of legal neutrality towards religion sits uneasily with the outcome of the case, but a contextual study shows that Romilly was sincere and that in its heyday Southcott's sect was a significant group with particular attraction for women. By the time of this litigation, however, her dwindling following was ill-equipped to administer the inadequate trust fund and prolonged litigation. Although Romilly's neutrality approach was correct at the time, it was overtaken by the impetus for greater scrutiny of religious charitable purposes through a requirement of public benefit.     

Mixed Messages in Bottles: the European Union,Devolution, and the Future of the Constitution

An unprecedented eleven‐member UK Supreme Court decided R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union on 24 January 2017. The Government's argument, that it could start the process of withdrawing from the EU using a prerogative power instead of an Act of Parliament, was comprehensively defeated by an 8:3 majority. However, the Government also secured a unanimous verdict that it did not need the consent from the devolved legislatures in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland before invoking Article 50 of the TEU. I explore the judicial argumentation in light of Philip Bobbitt's six modalities of constitutional argument, five of which feature, and one of which ought to have featured, in this seminal case.     

Caution in the Classroom: K-12 Teacher In-Class Speech,The Federal Courts and Garcetti

The federal courts’ approach to regulating K-12 public school teacher speech in the classroom has been split during the past twenty years. Some circuit courts use Pickering v. Board of Education, in which speech is examined to see if it touches on a matter of public concern. Others prefer Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, which focuses on whether speech is school-sponsored and whether the school had a legitimate reason for restricting it. In 2007, Garcetti v. Ceballos offered a new perspective on public employee speech. In that case, speech was examined to determine whether it was related to an employee's professional duties. An examination of federal court treatment of in-class teacher speech before and after Garcetti shows the case has further complicated the issue because it is being embraced by some federal courts as an appropriate precedent when dealing with classroom speech.     

Bent into Security: Barrister Contribution to a Skewed Order in Two Terrorism Prosecutions in Australia

This article explores two terrorism prosecutions – R v. Benbrika and Ors and R v. Elomar and Ors – to probe how Australian lawyers approach the integration of national security interests into the heart of public law. A brief background is provided followed by an analysis of how the Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2002 (Cth), as amended, and the National Security Information (Criminal and Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 (Cth) deviate from the legal order to produce a ‘skewed blend’ between national security and criminal justice. We examine three ways in which barristers contribute to bending of process in counter‐terrorism trials: accommodation to the precautionary standard, the resetting of equality of arms expectations, and brokered agreements that depend on the deferential relationships within the court. Consequently, the moral asymmetry of terrorism is the backdrop for the ‘plausible legality’ of ‘just world’ derogations from liberal politics.     

What does it mean to suffer loss? Haxton v Philips Electronics

In Haxton v Philips Electronics the Court of Appeal considered whether a widow could recover the diminution in value of her dependency claim following the defendant's tortious reduction of her life expectancy. The note outlines the development of the common law, demonstrating that Haxton is novel but not unorthodox, and tests whether Haxton's principles can provide a sound foundation for future cases. Positing three hypothetical scenarios, it argues that the disparity in outcome, rather than indicating a lack of unifying principle, as was suggested in Jobling v Associated Dairies, may be explained by combining Austin's division between primary and secondary rights with Gardner and Stevens' contributions as to how they are protected. Restitutio in integrum requires consideration of the reasons and values underlying the right in question and these are discernible in the jurisprudence. The note also considers whether Haxton could have been decided on the basis that a defendant should not profit from its own wrongdoing.     

Legislative Intentions and Counterfactu-als: Or,What One Can Still Learn from Dworkin's Critique of Legal Positivism

Riggs v. Palmer has become famous since Dworkin used it to show that legal positivism is defective. The debate over the merits of Dworkin's claims is still very lively. Yet not enough attention has been paid to the fact that the content of the statute at issue in Riggs was given by the counterfactual intention of the legislature. According to arguments from legislative intent, a judicial decision is justified if it is based on the lawmaker's intention. But can legislative intentions be determined counterfactually? More generally, what are the discursive commitments undertaken by a lawyer or a judge, in an exchange of legal reasons, when using this interpretive methodology? This paper addresses these issues considering, in particular, David Lewis's “resemblance” condition and “relevant similarity” between possible worlds in the evaluation of counterfactual statements. The analysis sheds some new light on the debate on theoretical disagreements and shows that Dworkin's conception of law as an argumentative practice is not necessarily at odds with legal positivism. It rather allows us to look at it under a better light.     

The Digital Economy Act 2010: subscriber monitoring and the right to privacy under Article 8 of the ECHR

This paper critically assesses the compatibility of s3 Digital Economy Act 2010 (DEA) with Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (1950) (ECHR). The analysis draws on Ofcom’s Initial Obligations and two UK cases, namely: British Telecommunications Plc & Anor, R (on the application of) v The Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills,¹1 British Telecommunications Plc & Anor, R (on the application of) v The Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills [2011] EWHC 1021 (Admin).View all notes and R (British Telecommunications plc and TalkTalk Telecom Group plc) v Secretary of State for Culture, Olympics, Media and Sport and others.²2 R (British Telecommunications plc and TalkTalk Telecom Group plc) v Secretary of State for Culture, Olympics, Media and Sport and others [2012] EWCA Civ 232.View all notes It argues that the implementation of this obligation allows directed surveillance of subscribers’ activities without legal authorisation under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA). It also analyses compliance with the Strasbourg Court’s three-part, non-cumulative test, to determine whether s3 of the DEA is, firstly, ‘in accordance with the law’; secondly, pursues one or more legitimate aims contained within Article 8(2) of the Convention; and thirdly, is ‘necessary’ and ‘proportionate’. It concludes that unless the implementation of s3 of the DEA required the involvement of State authorities and was specifically targeted at serious, commercial scale online copyright infringement cases it could infringe part one and part three of the ECtHR’s test, thereby violating subscribers’ Article 8 ECHR rights.     

Auctioneers and Misdescription: Between Scylla and Charybdis

In Elidor Investments SA v Christie's, Manson Woods Ltd the court implied a term as to Wednesbury reasonableness into an auctioneer's agency contract which fettered its ‘sole and complete discretion’ to describe lots. It is contended that, in so doing, the court unjustifiably and unnecessarily extended the jurisdiction into areas where it was not required and, in granting an injunction to restrain the sale of the lots, failed properly to apply the appropriate criteria.     

Ameron International: Expanding Insurance Recovery for Administrative Environmental Proceedings

In Ameron Int'l Corp. v. Ins. Co. of Pennsylvania, the California Supreme Court issued its long-awaited reconsideration of Foster-Gardner v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. which adopted the minority position that administrative notice letters are not “suits” that trigger a CGL insurer's duty to defend. In an important development for insurers and policyholders alike, Ameron limited Foster-Gardner, holding that an administrative process that resembles a court proceeding is a “suit” insurers must defend. This article surveys the majority rule, Ameron, and Ameron's possible impact in minority rule jurisdictions with Foster-Gardner-like precedent.     

Male Violence,Marital Unity,and the History of the Interspousal Tort Immunity

The interspousal tort immunity has been understood as a common law rule that was codified in the English Married Women's Property Act, 1882. It was explained as a necessary consequence of the wife's coverture and was justified by the doctrine of marital unity. This conventional account mischaracterizes the complexities underlying the development of the immunity and the reasons for its reformulation in the nineteenth century. This article traces a different trajectory, showing that the interspousal tort immunity was not articulated until Phillips v Barnet in 1876, and examining the way it came into being as a result of the reforms to divorce law and to the property rules of coverture. Although already implicit in the governing principles of the pre-reform law, the nineteenth-century expression of the rule concerning interspousal tort immunity was a product of the contemporary reforms to coverture at least as much as it was a product of coverture itself.