E‐communication: Strengthening the Ties between Councillors and Citizens in Norwegian Local Government?

This article examines the extent to which local politicians use digital channels in their contact with citizens and stakeholders, in comparison with traditional forms of communication (i.e. face-to-face and telephone contact) and which politicians are using digital channels the most. By analyzing a national survey of municipal politicians and mayors in Norway, findings show that e-mail has become an important channel of communication between local politicians and citizens, while e-debates have not. More surprisingly, the digital divides related to age and levels of education, which are reported in other studies, are less obvious in this study. Variations, however, in e-mail usage do exist in municipal hierarchies; Mayors, more than other politicians, use e-mail in work-related communication. The article also discusses whether digital channels are able to transfer the all important 'local' tacit knowledge from citizens to local politicians, and concludes that most politicians do not consider e-mail to be as capable at doing so as the traditional channels. The article indicates that the informality of e-mail lowers the threshold for contact, increasing the politicians' knowledge about the experiences, problems and preferences of the citizens, thus broadening their pattern of communication and reaching new interest groups. E-mail, therefore, seems to increase contact and strengthen the ties between politicians and citizens. Politicians are aware, though, of the relationship between the electorate's lack of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) competence and usage of e-communication channels, and they stress that their use of digital channels is a supplement to traditional channels – not a replacement.     

The causes of legal rents extraction: evidence from Spanish municipalities

This paper analyzes the causes of legal political rent extraction by using a direct measure of it, namely, local top politicians’ wages. In particular, we investigate whether local politicians’ incentives to extract rents by setting their own wages are influenced by the degree of political competition and voter information. We use a sample of the largest Spanish municipalities over the years 2008–2010. The results indicate that weaker political competition and lesser voter information are related to more rent extraction. In an additional analysis, we show that higher wages do not ensure better financial management. These findings confirm that when politicians can set their own salaries, higher wages do not mean better management, but they are just political rents.     

Elite perceptions of mass preferences in The Netherlands; biases in cognitive responsiveness

Abstract. Several studies have shown dissimilarities between political leaders and voters in terms of political attitudes and policy preferences. Though many explanations have been offered for this phenomenon, the knowledge factor has been overlooked. The basic question of this paper is how knowledgeable politicians are of the political opinions of their voters as well as of the general public. Forty-six national Dutch politicians were asked to estimate the percentage of the public at large and of their own voters who agree with specific political statements. These estimates were then compared with the actual distribution of opinions. Though using a rather strict criterion it has been found that politicians tend to give inaccurate estimates of the public's support for various political issues. The inaccuracy does not differ between members of the government and members of parliament, but politicians of parties in office appear to perform worse than members of opposition parties. The data do not support the hypothesis about politicians' ability to correctly estimate majority and minority opinions, or to accurately localize their own voters relative to the public at large. Furthermore it is observed that politicians overestimate rather than underestimate differences in opinion between the electorate and their own voters. No difference is found in politicians'estimates of political issues which can or cannot be classified in terms of 'left' or 'right'. In addition, politicians do not judge their voters to be more right-wing than they actually are. Contrary to our hypothesis, Social-Democratic politicians are not more likely to show a 'conservative bias' in estimating their voters' preferences compared to politicians from the Christian-Democratic and Liberal parties. Finally, the relevance of our findings for political sciences as well as some normative consequences are briefly discussed.     

Do politicians’ preferences correspond to those of the voters? An investigation of political representation

This paper investigates political representation by exploring the relationship between citizens' preferences and the preferences of their elected representatives. Using Swedish survey data, the empirical analysis shows that voters and politicians have significantly different preferences for local welfare services, implying that voters do not elect representatives with the same preferences as their own. The results show that when comparing a politician of a certain age, gender, educational level and marital status, with a voter with identical characteristics, the politician still has preferences for a significantly higher level of spending on the locally provided services. Hence, our results indicate that the representation of different socio-economic groups does not necessarily lead to a larger degree of representation of these groups' agendas. Moreover, we find the observed difference to be largest for the least salient expenditure item. We do, however, not find any evidence for differences in preferences between the two groups being associated with a decline in trust for politicians among voters.     

Cheap talk or incredible commitment? (Mis)calculating transparency and anti‐corruption

Why do “tainted” politicians in high‐corruption countries adopt transparency and anti‐corruption policies that risk exposing their wrongdoing? Using the cases of freedom of information and public asset disclosure in Romania, we assess three explanations: that these policies are meant to be mere window dressing, facilitate bottom‐up monitoring, or ensure access to information for the ruling party if it loses power. We find that decision makers adopt transparency and anti‐corruption policies because they want to signal their integrity and because they underestimate their consequences. Because they assume they will be able to control implementation, decision makers discount the potential costs of damaging information being released. Sustained political competition can keep corruption and lack of transparency on the public and political agenda, shifting attention from policy adoption to implementation and leading to increased compliance. Since politicians miscalculate the consequences of their actions, signals that are intended to be cheap can end up being quite costly.     

Municipal Size and Democracy: A Critical Analysis of the Argument of Proximity Based on the Case of Denmark

The Nordic welfare states are based on a unique system of highly decentralized municipalities. However, in Denmark a discussion about merging municipalities has emerged. The discussion has kept within the framework of the classic dichotomy between capacity and proximity, or been limited to considerations of effectiveness versus democracy. The assumptions behind both arguments can be nuanced and problematized, and a new study, based on an extensive set of data, analyses the basic assumptions behind the argument of proximity. In accordance with earlier studies, it finds that participation is higher in small municipalities. However, municipal size does not affect citizens' interest in and knowledge of local politics. Nor does it affect citizens' perception of local politicians and their trust in local political decisions. This is surprising, given previous research in this area.     

Evaluating Administrative Modernization in German Local Governments: Success or Failure of the “New Steering Model”?

This article evaluates the results and impacts of administrative modernization in Germany after more than 10 years of New Public Management experience, concentrating on the most advanced level of public sector reform: local authorities. Drawing on a broad empirical basis, the authors pursue the following questions: Do “Weber‐ ian” administrative structures and processes continue to characterize the German public sector, or have the reforms left behind lasting traces of a managerial administration? Are local authorities performing better today, and if so, can this be attributed to the New Public Management modernization? The presented results show that no paradigm shift from the “Weberian” bureaucracy to New Public Management has occurred so far. Performance improvements notwithstanding, the new mix of steering instruments causes numerous unintended consequences, causing “Weberian” administration to reemerge.     

Whistleblowing in Local Government: An Empirical Study of Contact Patterns and Whistleblowing in 20 Norwegian Municipalities

Whistleblowing by administrative employees in local governments can bring critical knowledge about misconduct and failed policy outcomes and priorities to the attention of politicians. This article examines whether (1) whistleblowing to politicians is considered acceptable among politicians and administrative employees, (2) politicians receive whistleblowing cases and how those who do so handle the case, and (3) contact patterns between politicians and administrative employees influence the whistleblowing activity and the action taken by the politicians to address wrongdoing. The article departs from the theory of pillars of institutions and the tensions between and within institutional pillars to analyse unique data from a survey based on the vignette method and actual whistleblowing among politicians (N = 400) and employees (N = 373) from 20 Norwegian municipalities. The analysis shows that the degree of contact between politicians and administrative employees is correlated with positive perceptions of whistleblowing and constructive handling of wrongdoing reports by the politicians.     

Greater Expectations: A Field Experiment to Improve Accountability in Mali

I argue that if citizens systematically underestimate what their government can and should do for them, then they will hold politicians to a lower standard and sanction poor performers less often. A field experiment across 95 localities in Mali in which randomly assigned localities receive a civics course identifies the effect of raising voter expectations of government on their willingness to hold leaders accountable. The course provides information about local government capacity and responsibility as well as how local politicians perform relative to others, effectively raising voter expectations of what local governments can and should do. Survey experiments among individuals in treated and control communities (N = 5,560) suggest that people in treated villages are indeed more likely to sanction poor performers and vote based on performance more often. A behavioral outcome—the likelihood that villagers challenge local leaders at a town hall meeting—adds external validity to survey findings.     

Expert knowledge use and deliberation in local policy making

This article analyzes the extent to which public administrators make use of expert knowledge (i.e., research or evaluation reports) when they prepare policy advice, and the extent to which politicians deliberate on the information provided to them by the administrators. The study is based on original, quantitative data from local politics in Sweden. We find that expert-informed policy advice from the administrators and critical reflection by the politicians are more pronounced when there is a lot of public attention. Furthermore, administrators use expert information more when they operate in a context in which there are large political disagreements. However, politicians deliberate less on the administrators’ policy advices in such environments. Thus, conflict seems to generate a pressure on the administrators to search for expert knowledge. But at the same time, within a context of political disputes, politicians make less effort to understand and critically reflect over the information provided to them by the administration, and are less inclined to change their opinions even if good arguments are presented to them. Thus, the empirical analysis indicates that what role expertise gets in policy making is very much a consequence of the local political environment.     

Comment on BØrre Nylehn's "Strategy in Local Government".

Børre Nylehn's article "Strategy in Local Government" is an exciting and thought provoking discussion of strategic management in local government. However, his observations can be discussed, both theoretically and empirically. It has been documented that politicians resist attempts to introduce strategic management systems in the form of Management by Objective, especially in small municipalities, but Nylehn's conclusion that strategic management is not used in local government organizations, that it is inappropriate, inadequate and even harmful is too hasty. I will argue that there may be good reasons to use strategic thinking in local government, but more research is needed to document the costs and benefits.     

Do politicians anticipate voter control? A comparative study of representatives’ accountability beliefs

Representation literature is rife with the assumption that politicians are responsive to voter preferences because their re-election is contingent upon the approval of those voters, approval that can be won by furthering their desires or, similarly, that can be threatened by ignoring their wishes. Hence, scholars argue that the anticipation of electoral accountability by politicians constitutes a crucial guarantor of (policy) responsiveness; as long as politicians believe that voters are aware of what they do and will take it into account on election day, they are expected to work hard at keeping these voters satisfied. If, on the other hand, politicians were to think what they say and do is inconsequential for citizens’ voting behaviour, they may see leeway to ignore their preferences. In this study, we therefore examine whether politicians anticipate electoral accountability in the first place. In particular, we ask 782 Members of Parliament in Belgium, Germany, Canada and Switzerland in a face-to-face survey about the anticipation of voter control; whether they believe that voters are aware of their behaviour in parliament and their personal policy positions, are able to evaluate the outcomes of their political work, and, finally, whether this knowledge affects their vote choice. We find that a sizable number of MPs believe that voters are aware of what they do and say and take that into account at the ballot box. Still, this general image of rather strong anticipation of voter control hides considerable variation; politicians in party-centred systems (in Belgium and some politicians in Germany that are elected on closed party lists), anticipate less voter control compared to politicians in more candidate-centred systems (Canada and Switzerland). Within these countries, we find that populist politicians are more convinced that voters know about their political actions and take this knowledge into account in elections; it seems that politicians who take pride in being close to voters (and their preferences), also feel more monitored by these voters. Finally, we show that politicians’ views of voter control do not reflect the likelihood that they might be held to account; politicians whose behaviour is more visible and whose policy profile should therefore be better known to voters do not feel the weight of voter control more strongly.     

‘No‐one likes us; we don't care’: ‘Dissident’ Irish Republicans and Mandates

The episodic dissident republican activity evident in Northern Ireland since the Good Friday Agreement has been accompanied by regular assertions from the police, politicians and commentators that dissidents have no backing. This article examines the historic importance of mandates and support for previous and contemporary republican armed campaigns. It explores whether violent republicans have ever enjoyed widespread support in Ireland and assesses the extent to which a lack of backing has precluded violent campaigns. The piece analyses the evidence regarding the lack of sympathy for current dissident violence, assessing the degree to which armed republicanism has reached a new level of isolation.     

Journeys to the limits of first-hand knowledge: politicians’ on-site visits in zones of conflict and intervention

ABSTRACT

This article explores the practice and political significance of politicians’ journeys to conflict zones. It focuses on the German example, looking at field trips to theatres of international intervention as a way of first-hand knowledge in policymaking. Paying tribute to Lisa Smirl and her work on humanitarian spaces, objects and imaginaries and on liminality in aid worker biographies, two connected arguments are developed. First, through the exploration of the routinized practices of politicians’ field trips the article shows how these journeys not only remain confined to the ‘auxiliary space’ of aid/intervention, but that it is furthermore a staged reality of this auxiliary space that most politicians experience on their journeys. The question is then asked, second, what politicians actually experience on their journeys and how their experiences relate to their policy knowledge about conflict and intervention. It is shown that political field trips enable sensory/affectual, liminoid and liminal experiences, which have functions such as authority accumulation, agenda setting, community building, and civilizing domestic politics, while at the same time reinforcing, in most cases, pre-existing conflict and intervention imaginaries.     

Before There Was Enron,There Was Orange County: A Study of Local Government Financial‐Oversight Committees

Recent financial scandals in some of America's largest corporations have prompted popular speculation that a similar crisis may occur within the public sector and, therefore, that government and nonprofit organizations should be required to adopt financial oversight practices similar to those that are mandated of publicly‐traded corporations in the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002. One of those mandated practices—the use of financial‐oversight committees—is already a common practice in public organizations, though little is known about its effectiveness. This study uses a national sample of local governments to examine whether financial‐oversight committees improve financial control and strengthen stakeholder confidence in financial reporting. The findings provide preliminary support for the use of financial‐oversight committees as an effective tool to improve financial accountability in local government.     

Competition of Politicians for Incentive Contracts and Elections

When politicians are short-term oriented or future elections do not sufficiently reflect the success of past policies, democratic elections cannot motivate politicians to undertake long-term socially beneficial projects. When politicians can offer incentive contracts which become effective upon reelection, the hierarchy of contracts and elections can alleviate such inefficient decision-making in politics. This mechanism still works if the public cannot commit itself to a reelection scheme or if the public is unsure about the politicians’ time preferences. In the non-commitment case, incentive contracts may need to include a golden parachute clause.     

Strategy in Local Government

One aspect of the study of local government organization is the role of consultants and the models they have introduced in order to help the local government reorganize. One of these models is "strategy", and this article sets out to consider the implication for these organizations if "the logic of strategy" were to be implemented. A common denominator of all the local governments studied is that "strategy" does not function, and the question is why this is so. Two distinctly different explanations can be considered. One states that "strategy" is difficult and that the politicians and administrators will need time to adjust to new ways of working. The other explanation, which is applied here, focuses on whether local government as an institution can be reconciled with the demands and premises inherent in "strategic thinking". My conclusions arc negative. "Strategy" is a model from the private sector and more specifically from the competitive sector of society and it is not appropriate for wider use. In this article the arguments are restricted to local government, and do not necessarily apply to other types of public organization.     

‘There will be burning and a‐looting tonight’: The Social and Political Correlates of Law‐breaking

In the aftermath of the August 2011 riots, politicians and commentators offered a range of explanations for the social unrest and wanton violence. Drawing on survey and focus‐group data, this paper investigates those explanations by analysing how socio‐economic, normative and political factors shape contemporary attitudes towards law breaking in Britain. The paper finds that both economic deprivation and personal moral values help to explain attitudes toward illegal behaviour, but citizens’ mistrust of political leaders and their disengagement from public affairs are also an important factor. The findings suggest that politicians who want to provide moral leadership need to do so through their actions as well as their words.     

Electric Shock: The 2012 India Blackout and Public Confidence in Politicians

How do disruptions in basic public service delivery shape people’s perceptions of politicians? We offer evidence from the July 2012 blackout in India, the largest in human history. Using data from the India Human Development Survey, we compare confidence in politicians between households that were surveyed during the outage and affected by it (treatment) and only days before it (control). Balance statistics show that the treatment and control groups are statistically indistinguishable, and further tests indicate that there was no disturbance to the pattern of surveying. Far from undermining public confidence in politicians, the outage increased it, as citizens reacted to the anxiety created by the crisis. The implications are normatively troubling, as politicians seem to have reaped benefits from disruptions in public service delivery.     

‘He's snooty ‘im’: exploring ‘white working class’ political disengagement

Using a small pilot qualitative study conducted in the North of England prior to the 2010 general election, we seek to understand why our respondents might feel actively disengaged from mainstream politics. It is argued that one major reason is because politicians are seen as lacking understanding of the local contexts in which these low-wage workers live. The gulf between represented and representative is widened if politicians fail to communicate in a ‘down to earth’ way. This indicates that social inequality between represented and representative is a factor in disengagement, but that such disengagement is not the result of apathy on the part of citizens. Further research is required, but our study suggests that if politicians fail to recognise their privilege and politics fails to address economic disadvantage across ethnic groups then disengagement from mainstream politics is likely to worsen.