The Democratic Peace is Not Democratic: On Behalf of Rawls' Decent Societies

In The Law of Peoples , John Rawls defends the claim that 'decent' societies (non-liberal, non-democratic constitutional republics) deserve full and good standing in the international community. His defense of decent societies consists of two main arguments. First, he argues that the basic human right to political participation does not imply a right to democratic political institutions. This argument has been thoroughly discussed by commentators. Second, he argues that decent societies, if admitted to the international community, would pose no special threat to the stability of that community. This argument has largely been ignored. My aim in this article is to analyze this second argument, which I call the 'peace argument'.     

Human Rights Without Political Participation?

John Rawls claims that “benevolent absolutisms” honor human rights without honoring political participation rights. Critics argue that he is mistaken. One objection appeals to the instrumental value of political participation rights. This objection holds that without political participation rights, individuals cannot secure the content of their rights against encroachment. Given this, individuals without political participation rights cannot be said to have rights at all. Here, I evaluate this instrumental objection. I identify three ways of relating political participation rights to human rights and show that one makes sense of Rawls’s claim. I then defend this view from instrumental objections. This has implications beyond the realm of Rawls scholarship. Many societies are not democratic and are not democratizing. We must determine whether any of these societies can secure at least the content of human rights and, if so, what shape their social and political institutions must take to do so.     

William Talbott’s Which Rights Should be Universal?

In this review essay, I first set out and then subject to criticism the main claims advanced by William Talbott in his excellent recent book, “Which Rights Should be Universal?”. Talbott offers a conception of basic universal human rights as the minimally necessary and sufficient conditions to political legitimacy. I argue that his conception is at once too robustly liberal and democratic and too inattentive to key features of the rule of law to play this role. I suggest that John Rawls’s conception of human rights comes closer to hitting the mark Talbott sets for himself and that Talbott incorrectly rejects Rawls’s view. I conclude that what likely divides Talbott and Rawls is that Rawls, but not Talbott, explicitly frames the inquiry into the minimally necessary and sufficient conditions to political legitimacy in terms of a liberal democratic people attempting to determine, as a matter of its just foreign policy, whether or not to recognize other organized polities as independent and self-determining within the international order.     

From primary goods to capabilities to well-being

Amartya Sen’s The Idea of Justice (2009 Sen, A. 2009. The idea of justice, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]) mistakenly characterizes transcendental accounts of justice as being unable to compare non-ideal alternatives, and thus misfires as a criticism of Robert Nozick and John Rawls. In fact, Nozick’s disinterest in when rights may be overridden does not bespeak indifference to specific questions of comparative assessment, and Lockean rights do give determinate advice in everyday circumstances. Sen correctly reports that Rawls’s theory is defective at giving practical normative advice, but the basic problem is the over-rigidity of Rawls’s absolute priority relations, not transcendentalism. Sen’s search for a complete moral theory requires that he produce one. Act consequentialism is one promising complete theory of justice, having both transcendental grounding and clear methods for comparative assessment. I also propose moving from Sen’s capabilities standard of social justice to one based on functioning. The latter facilitates distinguishing between trivial and worthless capabilities and important and worthwhile ones, and focuses social justice more squarely on the end of well-being.     

Cultural Diversity and Education: the Dilemma of Political Stability

In their recent work both John Rawls and Joseph Raz have shown a keen awareness of the need to address the challenges associated with the cultural diversity so characteristic of many liberal democracies. However, a number of the issues raised by non-liberal minorities in Britain in relation to educational policy suggest that these prominent liberal responses ultimately fail to address the complexities of the problems posed by cultural pluralism. Nonetheless, these two approaches identify important considerations which will have to be taken into account by any adequate response to cultural diversity. Viewed together, Rawls' emphasis on political stability and Raz's recognition of the pervasiveness of cultural membership imply that a genuine accommodation of cultural membership can only be achieved within the context of a dynamic political community.     

Love is a Battlefield: Post-Political Control in an Era of Financial Crisis

This paper criticizes the ideology of deontological liberalism from the perspective of Marxist thought and employs the idea of temporality as an example of this critique. Deontological liberals like John Rawls argue that the liberal political order should be indifferent to ultimate ends. Consequently, Rawls constructs an "abstract" self that is defined apart from the concrete totality of a real human life. This paper argues, through Marx's essay "On the Jewish Question" that the liberal, bourgeois self is not "abstract" but exists in an instrumentalized society in which individuals treat themselves and others as means, not ends. Following this line of thought, the paper shows that the purportedly "abstract" or "empty" linear temporality of modern thought is actually commodified or instrumentalized time. The paper concludes with suggestions how "leisure" understood as non-instrumental or self-sufficient time could be an alternative to the commodified temporality of bourgeois culture.     

A Response to Jeremy Waldron's Law and Disagreement

This article offers a critical response to arguments developed by Jeremy Waldron on the subject of democracy and constitutional rights. In particular it responds to three claims made by Waldron: first, he claims contemporary Western societies are characterised by deep and intractable disagreement; second, collectively binding decisions should be reached by democratic means alone; and third constitutional devices, such as bills of rights, should be rejected because they act as constraints on democracy. I argue that Waldron is unable to argue for the primacy of democracy from the baseline of intractable disagreement that he posit. He implicitly relies upon a position of moral consensus to confirm the priority of democracy over alternative decision-making procedures. Further, the moral stance that Waldron takes towards democracy is based upon a Kantian theory of justice which is shared by liberal-constitutional theorists, such as Rawls and Dworkin, who advocate bills of rights. Finally, Waldron does not provide the arguments necessary to justify the rejection of bills of rights. Good reasons exist for tempering democratic procedures with constitutional devices. However, this conclusion is qualified. It depends upon counterfactual claims that can be resolved only by taking into account the specific institutional and cultural practices of particular political systems.     

Does justice stand alone?

A common feature of leading liberal-egalitarian political theories is the sharp priority they attribute to justice, and to distributive justice in particular. In this article, I argue that liberal egalitarians have yet to offer a persuasive argument for prioritizing justice, and distributive justice in particular, in this way. I focus on assessing arguments advanced in the seminal work of John Rawls and employ the pluralist liberalism of Isaiah Berlin to illustrate that Rawls’ arguments are not even persuasive for reasonable liberals like Berlin, let alone for non-liberals. The upshot of my argument is not that liberals should abandon the pursuit of greater equality of wealth and income, but only that such goals should still be balanced against the claims of other fundamental values, such as individual liberty and the common good (contrary to those who want to give sharp priority to distributive justice).     

Do We Need a Liberal Theory of Minority Rights? Reply to Carens,Young, Parekh and Forst

In their perceptive critiques of my recent book on Multicultural Citizenship , Iris Young, Joseph Carens, Bhikhu Parekh and Rainer Forst raise a number of interesting and important issues. In this short response to their critiques, I focus on two of them. First, whereas I tried to draw a sharp distinction between immigrants and national minorities, my critics argue that we should think of ethnocultural groups on a more fluid continuum. Second, whereas I tried to ground a theory of minority rights on specifically liberal principles, my critics argue that such an approach is unduly intolerant of non-liberal ethnocultural groups. In response to these challenging questions, I try to both clarify and strengthen the positions I outlined in my book.     

Patriotic Virtue

Some philosophers argue that the state and its citizens stand in a morally privileged position vis-à-vis one another, but not towards other states or citizens. However, many of those people, particularly philosophical liberals, also hold that morally insignificant differences, such as place of birth, sex or ethnicity, should not affect rights, liberties and life prospects. On the face of it, these two sets of ideas appear incompatible and point to a conflict in some liberal thought. Liberal philosophers, like John Rawls, have attempted to reconcile these conflicting ideas. His attempt has attracted a great deal of criticism, especially from those liberals attracted to a more cosmopolitan point of view. In this article, we use Aristotelian virtue ethics as the basis upon which to reconcile liberalism and patriotism. We argue that the state should be understood as an agent that stands in a special relationship to its citizens (of philia ). The state's virtue depends, in part, on it giving those citizens preferential treatment with regard to justice compared to citizens of other countries. Similarly, if citizens are to be just in their relations with their own state, they must behave in special ways towards that state as compared to other states. Certain forms of justice only arise in relationships of particular kinds.     

Capabilities Theory and the Limits of Liberal Justice: On Nussbaum’s Frontiers of Justice

In Frontiers of Justice, Martha Nussbaum applies the “Capabilities Approach,” which she calls “one species of a human rights approach,” to justice issues that have in her view been inadequately addressed in liberal political theory. These issues include rights of the disabled, rights that transcend national borders, and animal rights issues. She demonstrates the weakness of Rawlsianism, contractualism in general, and much of the Kantian tradition in moral philosophy and shows the need to move beyond the limitations of narrow rationalism, nationalism, and speciesism. Nevertheless, Nussbaum fails to elaborate adequately the grounds for her own capabilities position or to face fundamental theoretical questions about the nature and implications of that position.     

On Sen on comparative justice

Against scepticism from thinkers including John Rawls and Thomas Nagel about the appropriateness of justice as the concept through which global ethical concerns should be approached, Amartya Sen argues that the problem lies not with the idea of justice, but with a particular approach to thinking of justice, namely a transcendental approach. In its stead Sen is determined to offer an alternative systematic theory of justice, namely a comparative approach, as a more promising foundation for a theory of ‘global justice.’ But in the end Sen offers no such thing. He does not develop a theory of justice and this is all to the good; for if values are plural in the way Sen suggests, then justice is not a master idea but one value among many, and it should be neither the first virtue of social institutions, nor the notion that frames all our reflections on ethical and political life.     

Reconciliation Arguments in John Rawls’s Political Philosophy

Abstract

Recently debates about the worth of “ideal theory” have directed attention to the functions that an account of a perfectly just society can serve. One function is that of “reconciliation”: learning that a seemingly undesirable feature of the social world would exist even in the perfectly just society can show us the value that it has in the present as well. John Rawls has emphasized reconciliation as among the roles of political philosophy. For instance, Rawls claims that his theory of justice can reconcile us to the pluralism of liberal democracies. In this essay, I argue that Rawls’s political theory also can reconcile the inhabitants of liberal democratic societies to the fact that such societies may be cognitively confusing on account of their complexity. Then I contend that Rawls’s work offers valuable theoretical resources for analysing a society’s transparency or lack thereof.     

Ecomodernist citizenship: rethinking political obligations in a climate-changed world

Green accounts of environmental citizenship typically seek to promote environmental sustainability and justice. However, some green theorists have argued that liberal freedoms are incompatible with preserving a planetary environment capable of meeting basic human needs and must be wound back. More recently, ‘ecomodernists’ have proposed that liberalism might be reconciled with environmental challenges through state-directed innovation focused on the provision of global public goods. Yet, they have not articulated an account of ecomodernist citizenship. This article seeks to advance the normative theory of ecomodernism by specifying an account of ecomodernist citizenship and subjecting the theory’s core claims to sympathetic critique. We argue that state-directed innovation has the potential to reconcile ambitious mitigation with liberal freedoms. However, full implementation of ecomodernist ideals would require widespread embrace of ecophilic values, high-trust societies and acceptance of thick political obligations within both national and global communities. Ecomodernism’s wider commitments to cosmopolitan egalitarianism and separation from nature thus amount to a non-liberal comprehensive public conception of the good. Furthermore, ecomodernism currently lacks an adequate account of how a society that successfully ‘separates’ from nature can nurture green values, or how vulnerable people’s substantive freedoms will be protected during an era of worsening climate harms.     

Recognition as Redistribution

Abstract

This paper aims to explore and examine the implied commitment to the premises of recognition in Rawls’s account of redistributive justice. It attempts to find out whether or not recognition relations that produce humiliation and cultural injustice can be followed to their logical conclusion in his theory of redistribution. This paper makes two claims. Firstly, although Rawls does not disregard the harms of misrecognition as demonstrated in his notion of self-respect being the most important primary good, he cannot liberally accommodate the idea of humiliation as a case of injustice without compromising the basic premises of his theory. Secondly, while resource distribution produces indirect side effects that can impact upon cultural injustice, addressing recognition issues through the prism of redistribution can inadvertently result in further misrecognition. The paper concludes that in the final analysis Rawls wrongly takes redistribution as the overarching principle of justice to which recognition is but a subservient principle.     

Palpable insecurity and Sen’s comparative view of justice: anthropological considerations

Amartya Sen’s comparative approach to justice makes clear that notions of justice are shaped by human agency and experience, and both his focus on the ‘internal view’ of well-being that emphasizes suffering as a central feature of illness and his recognition that social and cultural factors shape perceived injustice are critical to this approach. However, Sen questionably depicts the contributions of anthropological research to this project as limited to ‘the sensory dimension of ill-health.’ Focusing on mental health in the context of global justice, I argue that Sen’s treatise on justice can be refined through an ethnographic method that synchronizes attention to (1) cultural knowledge and social relations in ecological settings; (2) fundamental human needs; and (3) levels of analytic specificity involving situations, categories, and events. This method integrates analysis of internal phenomenology and external constraints of political economy and ideology. To demonstrate I discuss three cases involving students and violence in Rio de Janeiro, women and witchcraft in Ghana, and historical migration and war trauma among Vietnamese immigrants in which external conditions of insecurity and inequality contributed to deteriorating mental health conditions including depression, trauma, and debilitating anxiety.     

Power,Profit and Prestige: The History of American Imperialist Expansion

ABSTRACT

This article provides a critical reading of the idea of ‘the reasonable’ in contemporary politics, as reflected in the work of John Rawls. I argue that this concept is best understood as a practice of political identification, which provides the template for mutual accommodation without concurrent agreement on any substantive commitments. However, by constructing a teleological story in which the reasonable leads naturally back to the liberal principles of justice, Rawls reveals the limits of the concept. Rather than ending political disagreement by establishing a shared foundation, prioritizing reasonableness only repurposes conflicts by transforming disagreement into a series of debates over the meaning of reasonableness itself, battles which are every bit as partisan and vicious as those Rawls sought to exclude. Revitalizing the idea of the reasonable requires abandoning the effort to deploy it as a technique of exclusion. Instead, reasonable politics should be oriented toward engagement with unreasonable critics.     

Trust Your Compatriots, but Count Your Change: The Roles of Trust, Mistrust and Distrust in Democracy

Although trust is clearly central to human relations of all kinds, it is less clear whether there is a role for trust in democratic politics. In this article, I argue that trust is central to democratic institutions as well as to democratic political participation, and that arguments which make distrust the central element of democracy fail. First, I argue for the centrality of trust to the democratic process. The voluntary compliance that is central to democracies relies on trust, along two dimensions: citizens must trust their legislators to have the national interest in mind and citizens must trust each other to abide by democratically established laws. Second, I refute arguments that place distrust at the centre of democratic institutions. I argue, instead, that citizens must be vigilant with respect to their legislators and fellow citizens; that is, they must be willing to ensure that the institutions are working fairly and that people continue to abide by shared regulations. This vigilance – which is reflected both in a set of institutions as well as an active citizenry – is motivated by an attitude termed 'mistrust'. Mistrust is a cautious attitude that propels citizens to maintain a watchful eye on the political and social happenings within their communities. Moreover, mistrust depends on trust: we trust fellow citizens to monitor for abuses of our own rights and privileges just as we monitor for abuses of their rights and privileges. Finally, I argue that distrust is inimical to democracy. We are, consequently, right to worry about widespread reports of trust's decline. Just as distrust is harmful to human relations of all kinds, and just as trust is central to positive human relations of all kinds, so is distrust inimical to democracy and trust central to its flourishing.     

Justice in Ideal Theory: A Refutation

In this article I argue that theorizing about justice at the level of ideal theory is inherently flawed and thus has impoverished liberal egalitarianism. Ideal theorists (falsely) assume that a political philosopher can easily determine (or has privileged access to) what constitutes the 'best foreseeable conditions'. Furthermore, by assuming full compliance, ideal theorists violate the constraints of a realistic utopia. More specifically I argue that liberal egalitarians who function at the level of ideal theory adopt a cost-blind approach to rights and a narrow view of possible human misfortune. The former issue leads liberal egalitarians to give priority to a serially ordered principle of equal basic liberties or to treat rights as 'trumps'; and the latter to a stringent prioritarian principle (Rawls' difference principle) or luck egalitarianism. Taken together, the cost-blind approach to rights, coupled with the narrow view of human misfortune, mean the liberal egalitarian theories of justice cannot address the issue of trade-offs that inevitably arises in real non-ideal societies that face the fact of scarcity. This makes liberal egalitarianism an ineffective theory of social justice.     

Philosophers,Activists, and Radicals: A Story of Human Rights and Other Scandals

Paradoxically, the political success of human rights is often taken to be its philosophical failing. From US interventions to International NGOs to indigenous movements, human rights have found a place in diverse political spaces, while being applied to disparate goals and expressed in a range of practices. This heteronomy is vital to the global appeal of human rights, but for traditional moral and political philosophy it is something of a scandal. This paper is an attempt to understand and theorize human rights on the terrain of the social actors who put them to use, particularly radical activists that have a more critical relationship to human rights. Attempting to avoid the philosophical pathology of demanding that the world reflect our conception of it, we base our reflection on the ambiguous, and potentially un-patterned, texture of human rights practice—taking seriously the idea that human rights express a relationship of power, importantly concerned with its legitimate arrangement and limitation. In both the philosophical literature and human rights activism, there seems to be a consensus on basic rights as undeniable moral principles of political legitimacy. This use of human rights is contrasted with radical social movements that reject this conception of rights as ideological and illegitimate, making specific reference to the Zapatista movement (Chiapas, Mexico) and the Landless Peasant Movement of Brazil (MST, from the Portuguese Movimento dos trabalhadores rurais Sem Terra), which are critical of the human rights discourse, but also make strategic use of the idea and offer alternative articulations of political legitimacy.