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Ramkrishna Bhattacharya 《Journal of Indian Philosophy》1999,27(5):485-497
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This article consists of a tentative exploration regarding the Buddhist portrayal and critique of Sāṃkhya epistemology and the theory of reflection (pratibimbavāda) as expressed in the Sāṃkhyatattvāvatāraḥ chapter of Bhāviveka’s 6th century Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā, and its auto-commentary the Tarkajvālā; and the Jain portrayal and critique of Sāṃkhya epistemology and the theory of reflection as expressed in Haribhadrasūri’s 8th century Śātravārtāsamuccaya (ŚVS) and Yogabindu. The article includes a translation of the Yogabindu, verses 444–457. 相似文献
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In spite of the fact that the mūla-text of the Cārvākasūtra is lost, we have some 30 fragments of the commentaries written by no fewer than four commentators, namely, Kambalāśvatara,
Purandara, Aviddhakarṇa, and Udbhaṭa. The existence of other commentators too has been suggested, of whom only one name is
mentioned: Bhāvivikta. Unfortunately no extract from his work is quoted anywhere. The position of the Cārvākas was nearer
the Buddhists (who admitted both perception and inference) than any other philosophical system. But in order to brand the
Cārvākas as pramāṇaikavādins they were made to appear as one with Bhartṛhari. Even though the commentators of the Cārvākasūtra had some differences among themselves concerning the interpretation of some aphorisms, they seem to have been unanimous in
regard to the number of pramāṇas to be admitted. It was perception and inference based on perception. Only in this sense they were pramāṇaikavādins. Unlike other systems of philosophy, the Cārvāka/Lokāyata did not accord equal value to perception and inference. Inference,
they said, must be grounded on perception first, so it was of secondary kind (gauṇa). From the available evidence it is clear that the commentators were unanimous in one point, namely, primacy of perception
which includes admittance of such laukika inference as is preceded and hence can be tested by repeated observations. In this respect both Aviddkarṇa and Udbhaṭa were
in agreement with Purandara. Bhaṭṭodbhaṭa or Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa was known as a commentator who differed from the traditional Cārvākas
and broke new grounds in explaining some of the aphorisms. His commentary is creative in its own way but at the same time
unreliable in reconstructing the original Cārvāka position. Udbhaṭa seems to have digressed from the original, monist materialist position by taking a dualist position
concerning the body-consciousness relation. Moreover, he seems to verge on the idealist side in his explication of an aphorism.
In this sense he was a reformist or revisionist. Aviddhakarṇa, like Udbhaṭa, attempted to interpret the Cārvāka aphorisms
from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika point of view, perhaps without being converted to the Cārvāka. Since it is not possible at the present
state of our knowledge to determine whether they were Cārvākas converted to Nyāya or Naiyāyikas converted to Lokāyata, the
suggestion that they simply adopted the Cārvāka position while writing their commentaries without being converted to the Cārvāka,
may be taken as a third alternative. In spite of the meagre material available, it is evident that (1) not unlike the other
systems, there is a lack of uniformity in the commentary tradition of the Cārvākasūtra, (2) not all commentators were committed monistic materialists; at least one, namely, Udbhaṭa, was a dualist, and (3) in
course of time Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika terminology, such as gamya, gamaka, etc., quite foreign to the traditional Cārvāka, has been introduced into the Cārvāka system. 相似文献
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The concept of avidyā or ignorance is central to the Advaita Vedāntic position of Śȧnkara. The post-Śaṅkara Advaitins wrote sub-commentaries
on the original texts of Śaṅkara with the intention of strengthening his views. Over the passage of time the views of these
sub-commentators of Śaṅkara came to be regarded as representing the doctrine of Advaita particularly with regard to the concept
of avidyā. Swami Satchidanandendra Saraswati, a scholar-monk of Holenarsipur, challenged the accepted tradition through the publication
of his work Mūlāvidyānirāsaḥ, particularly with regard to the avidyādoctrine. It was his contention that the post-Śaṅkara commentators brought their own innovations particularly on the nature
of avidyā. This was the idea of mūlāvidyā or ‘root ignorance’, a positive entity which is the material cause of the phenomenal world. Saraswati argues that such an
idea of mūlāvidyā is not to be found in the bhāṣyas (commentaries) of Śaṅkara and is foisted upon Śaṅkara. This paper attempts to show that although Śaṅkara may not have
explicitly favoured such a view of mūlāvidyā, his lack of clarity on the nature of avidyā left enough scope for the post-Śaṅkara commentators to take such a position on avidyā. 相似文献
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Ayon Maharaj 《Journal of Indian Philosophy》2013,41(1):57-78
This paper examines Swami Hariharānanda āra?ya’s unique interpretation of sm?ti as “mindfulness” (samanaskatā) in Patañjali’s Yogasūtra I.20. Focusing on his extended commentary on Yogasūtra I.20 in his Bengali magnum opus, the Pātañjaljogdar?an (1911), I argue that his interpretation of sm?ti is quasi-Buddhistic. On the one hand, Hariharānanda’s conception of sm?ti as mindfulness resonates strongly with some of the views on sm?ti advanced in classic Buddhist texts such as the Satipa??hānasutta and Buddagho?a’s Papañcasūdanī. On the other hand, he also builds into his complex account of the practice of sm?ti certain fundamental doctrines of Sā?khyayoga—such as mindfulness of the Lord (“ī?vara”) and mental identification with the Puru?a, the transcendental “Self” that is wholly independent of nature—which are incompatible with Buddhist metaphysics. I will then bring Hariharānanda’s quasi-Buddhistic interpretation of sm?ti of Yogasūtra I.20 into dialogue with some of the interpretations of sm?ti advanced by traditional commentators. Whereas many traditional commentators such as Vācaspati Mi?ra and Vijñānabhik?u straightforwardly identify sm?ti of I.20 with “dhyāna” (“concentration”)—the seventh limb of the a??ā?gayoga outlined in Yogasūtra II.28-III.7—Hariharānanda argues that sm?ti is the mental precondition for the establishment of dhyāna of the a??ā?gayoga. 相似文献
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Alberto Todeschini 《Journal of Indian Philosophy》2010,38(1):49-74
This paper is a study of debate practices as seen in the Nyāyasūtra and a number of commentaries. It concentrates on the ‘Points of Defeat’ (nigrahasthāna), i.e., those occasions that if met in debate would entail defeat. The conditions under which a debater would meet with defeat
were discussed widely in India and have also attracted considerable attention from modern scholars. In order to better understand
this subject, use is made of some of the intuitions about language and conversation that we owe to the philosopher H. P. Grice
(1913–1988) as well as of some recent theoretical advances in argumentation theory and informal logic, particularly of those
most influenced by Grice’s thought. The Points of Defeat are studied both individually and as a group and it is shown that
they point towards the practice of debating as being a rational, cooperative and goal-directed activity. 相似文献
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Walter Menezes 《Journal of Indian Philosophy》2016,44(1):155-177
This is an enquiry based on the Vivekacū?āma?i (VC), the primary focus of which is to present viveka (discrimination) along with its three catalysts, namely, ?ruti, tarka, and anubhava as the unique pramā?a of Ultimate Knowledge. This paper discusses the significance of the six popular pramā?as of Advaita Vedānta (AV) and reiterates that as far as AV is concerned epistemologically those pramā?as have merely a provisional value (vyāvahārika). In accordance with the purport of VC this paper argues that ?ruti and tarka, culminating in anubhava (trans-empirical insight sans experience) are blind in themselves and are enthusiastically carried forward by viveka (discrimination) for the attainment of the final realisation. This paper concludes that viveka, along with its three catalysts namely, ?ruti, tarka, and anubhava is the sole pramā?a of the trans-empirical experiential knowledge of Brahman. 相似文献
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Hiromi Habata 《Journal of Indian Philosophy》2018,46(2):241-261
The word sautrāntika is known to designate one of the philosophical schools in later documents, but its earlier phase remains uncertain. The discovery of this term in the Mahāparinirvā?a-mahāsūtra thus brings forward new evidence essential for solving the problem of sautrāntika. In this paper, I will attempt to establish the interpretation of the context, in which the phrase vinayadhara? sautrāntika? appears. 相似文献