Change—and Scepticism—as a Constant: Anthony King on Parties and Party Systems

Tony King had a healthy disrespect for conventional wisdom but a deep appreciation for common sense. Drawing on an eclectic mix of sources, both qualitative and quantitative, he wore his learning lightly, the better to highlight and explain to academic and non‐academic audiences how shifts in society and public opinion drove change inside parties and in the party systems in which they operated. King asked great questions and provided answers that simultaneously captured complexity and the big picture. His provocative interpretations and analysis were always stimulating—and many of them proved highly prescient.     

Budget reform—the Malaysian experience

Budget reform had been on the Malaysian government agenda for over two decades. The first major effort at budget reform was the introduction of the Malaysian version of Programme and Performance Budgeting System (MPPB) in 1969. Another major restructuring of the budget process took place in 1989 to modify MPPB. The package of modifications was titled the Modified Budgeting System (MBS). This article reviews the development of budget reform over the past decades. It documents the modest progress of MPPB and examines the rationale of the recent reform. The article then surveys the objectives and elements of the latest initiative in greater depth to assess the extent of its improvement over the previous effort. The article also illustrates, based on the lessons learnt from the implementation of MPPB, that an appropriate administrative structure, culture and implementation strategy are all-important for reform success.     

Governance and Complexity—Emerging Issues for Governance Theory

Unexpected epidemics, abrupt catastrophic shifts in biophysical systems, and economic crises that cascade across national borders and regions are events that challenge the steering capacity of governance at all political levels. This article seeks to extend the applicability of governance theory by developing hypotheses about how different governance types can be expected to handle processes of change characterized by nonlinear dynamics, threshold effects, cascades, and limited predictability. The first part of the article argues the relevance of a complex adaptive system approach and goes on to review how well governance theory acknowledges the intriguing behavior of complex adaptive systems. In the second part, we develop a typology of governance systems based on their adaptive capacities. Finally, we investigate how combinations of governance systems on different levels buffer or weaken the capacity to govern complex adaptive systems.     

Presidential address— Seeing through the fog

All public policies have two things in common. They deal with the future and, as a result, they are based on forecasts or projections. The forecasts or projections may be implicit or based on naive extrapolation or ad hoc assumptions. They may be explicit and based on elaborate extrapolations or on behavioral models. In either case, unfortunately, they are notoriously unreliable. In fact, they almost always are wrong—sometimes just a bit wrong, but often massively wrong. Nonetheless, forecasts are what distinguishes reasoned planning from blind action. Without forecasts, we would be totally at sea. That we have to use forecasts or projections, that we know they will be wrong, and that they usually are wrong raise some difficult questions for policy analysis and policymaking. Regrettably, in my view, they receive too little attention.2 My purpose today is to urge that they receive more. My comments are intended to make four points. First, it is important for policymakers to appreciate how errorprone forecasts and projections actually are. Second, it is important not to permit the availability of projections or forecasts to obscure fundamental policy questions that are important in any plausible scenario. Third, uncertainty means that, where possible, it is prudent to design policies with builtin flexibility that respond automatically to diverse possible outcomes. Fourth, where builtin flexibility is impossible, complete analyses should take into account the consequences if forecasts prove wrong, and weigh those consequences against the results of postponing action until information improves or against other policies under the plausible range of possible outcomes. © 2000 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.