Without Regret: The Comprehensive Nature of Non-domination

In this article I examine Rawls's claim that there is no fundamental opposition between political liberalism and republicanism. I contend that Rawls's position is untenable in light of the necessary values and virtues that must accompany republican liberty as non-domination. Furthermore, I examine the 'regret' Rawls has toward some of the 'political virtues' of his approach and argue that if republicans were to have the same attitude, republican liberty as non-domination would be undermined. I conclude that republicanism is likely to be accompanied by values and virtues that affect the whole of an individual's life and therefore can be said to be a comprehensive doctrine.     

Does Rawls Support the Procedural Republic? A Critical Response to Sandel's Democracy's Discontent

In Michael Sandel's latest book entitled Democracy's Discontent (1996), he argues that the prevailing public philosophy (what he calls the procedural republic) that informs America's institutions undermines self-government and a sense of community. Does John Rawls support the procedural republic? Contrary to what Sandel contends, I argue that it is not fair to label Rawls as a leading proponent of the procedural republic. Rawls's egalitarian liberalism does not endorse the public philosophy that has informed American Constitutional Law and the political economy for the past half a century.     

Universals and Particulars: the Case of Liberal Cultural Nationalism

Recent work in liberal political theory has rejected cosmopolitanism to incorporate the empirical agenda of nationalism and multiculturalism. In this article three issues facing cultural national liberalism are first extracted from Rawls's Political Liberalism : the range of reasonable cultural identities under liberalism; the substantive ethical bases of the state; and the possibility of principles of cultural self-respect. I then examine three works which address these problems, Will Kymlicka's Multicultural Citizenship , David Miller's On Nationality , and Charles Taylor's 'The Politics of Recognition'. Kymlicka provides principles of cultural self-respect but is caught between conceptualising culture in universalist and particularist terms. Miller's liberal national state rests on shared meanings, but this serves to complicate the introduction of universal moral ideas. Taylor presents authenticity as an alternative self-understanding to liberal autonomy, but I argue against the notion of cultural authenticity.     

How can Political Liberals be Environmentalists?

It is often assumed that neutralist liberalism and environmentalism are incompatible because promoting environmentally friendly policies involves endorsing a particular conception of the good life. This paper questions that assumption by showing that one important version of neutralist liberalism, John Rawls's 'justice as fairness', can allow two kinds of justification for environmental policies. First, public reason arguments can be used to justify conceptions of sustainability and environmental justice. Second, comprehensive ideals (including non-anthropocentric ideals) can be used to justify more ambitious environmental policies when two conditions are met, namely, the issue under discussion does not concern constitutional essentials or matters of basic justice; and the policy is endorsed by a majority of citizens. Rawls's willingness to allow this second kind of justification for environmental (and other) policies is defended against two objections, which claim that Rawls's 'democratic liberalism' is incoherent. The first objection – the 'justice' objection – is that to spend public money promoting comprehensive (environmental) ideals is inconsistent with the 'difference principle'. The 'justice' objection depends on a common misunderstanding of the difference principle. The second objection – the 'neutrality' objection – claims that 'democratic liberalism' is inconsistent with Rawls's commitment to neutrality. The 'neutrality' objection is unconvincing because 'democratic liberalism' is 'fundamentally neutral' whereas the leading alternative is not.     

Can my religion influence my conception of justice? Political liberalism and the role of comprehensive doctrines

In his last works, John Rawls explicitly argued for an overlapping consensus on a family of reasonable liberal political conceptions of justice, rather than just one. This ‘Deep Version’ of political liberalism opens up new questions about the relationship between citizens’ political conceptions, from which they must draw and offer public reasons in their political advocacy, and their comprehensive doctrines. These questions centre on whether a reasonable citizen’s choice of political conception can be influenced by her comprehensive doctrine. In this paper I present two models of the relationship, which give contrasting answers to these questions, and defend the model that is more permissive with regard to the influence of comprehensive doctrines. This has important implications for our understanding of Rawlsian political liberalism, and reduces the force of objections that have been offered by theorists sympathetic to religion.     

On monarchy

Monarchy is liberalism’s little secret. Given the number of articles and books appearing every year dealing with liberal democracy as the hallmark of contemporary Western societies, it is astonishing that monarchy is rarely ever mentioned despite the fact that monarchy, and not a republic, is the constitutional form of quite a number of Western liberal states. I argue that considering the political reality of the established monarchies in Europe leads into a dilemma: either contemporary liberalism is not the kind of theory it claims to be or it has to reconsider its central tenets. In conclusion, I show that the dilemma cannot be solved or avoided but needs to be embraced by conceiving liberalism not as a applied moral theory but as a political theory that leaves room for various symbolic self-understandings and acknowledges the crooked timber of historical realities.     

John Rawls and Policy Formation

Liberalism has bay far been the most appealing ideology in modern political thought, and considered by many as one of human kind's greatest inventions, product of our development as a race. However, new theories have threatened the philosophical foundations upon which liberalism itself stands. One of the most strongly criticized theories is that of the Original Position, developed by the political philosopher John Rawls, and which is itself a fundamental cornerstone in Rawls's Theory of Justice. In this article, I will focus on discussing the problems and questions that arise for policy formation when analyzing the Orginal Position.     

Why Work Harder? Equality, Social Duty and the Market

The paper responds to Cohen's critical claim that for agents who sincerely accept Rawls's difference principle it is not consistent to seek material incentives towards productivity. The central argument of the paper is that productive agents in a market economy would not be as productive without material incentives unless held to be under a (controversial) duty to increase productivity. This duty is distinct from merely having a duty to contribute up to a reasonable minimum, and then equalise material benefits. The controversial duty is not derivable from the difference principle itself, nor from the background motivations for it. Therefore, if Cohen's critique is internal to Rawlsian distributive justice, it is based on a controversial version of that view of distributive justice when applied to a market system. It is the reach, and not the core insight of Cohen's critique that is attacked here. If in any way sound, that insight does not un-controversially apply to all material incentive-seeking in a market economy.     

Postliberalism: The New Centre Ground of British Politics

Brexit and support for anti‐establishment insurgencies suggest that British politics is moving away from the old left–right opposition towards a new divide between the defenders and detractors of progressive liberalism. As this article suggests, progressive liberalism differs significantly from both classical and new liberalism. It fuses free‐market economics with social egalitarianism and identity politics. Both the hard left and the radical right reject this combination and want to undo a number of liberal achievements. British politics is also moving in a postliberal direction. In the economy, postliberalism signals a shift from rampant market capitalism to economic justice and reciprocity. In society, it signals a shift from individualism and egalitarianism to social solidarity and fraternal relations. And politically, it signals a shift from the minority politics of vested interests and balkanised group identity to a majority politics based on a balance of interests, shared identity and the embedding of state and market in the intermediary institutions of civil society. This article argues that postliberalism is redefining Britain's political centre ground in an age where neither progressive liberalism nor reactionary anti‐liberalism commands majority support. First, it charts the ascendancy of progressive liberalism over the past quarter‐century. Second, it contrasts anti‐liberal reactions with postliberal alternatives, before exploring why earlier iterations of postliberalism failed to gain traction with the political mainstream. Third, it provides a discussion and critique of Theresa May's postliberal conservatism, notably the tension between free‐market globalisation and free trade, on the one hand, and the support for national industry and the indigenous working class, on the other.     

Mexico Under Salinas: Towards a New Record for One Party's Domination?

Nowadays, the Mexican political regime is one of the oldest regimes in the world. Established in 1929, in a few years it could break the USSR record for a party in power. After an important crisis in 1988, president Salinas managed to get the ship out of the storm with an effective set of macroeconomic policies. In fact, he has been seen internationally as a very effective leader, who achieved what Gorbachev could not: a deep economic reform without a political crisis. He proposed and succeeded in starting a North American Free Trade Agreement and reformed the state structure along the lines of what he calls "social liberalism." The prospects for the regime and the party in power look good for the presidential elections of 2994. Nothing however assures that the current policies will really help to solve Mexico's unemployment and inequality problems. The vertical political and administrative structures are not well suited for that purpose and are a source of political instability. It may be the case that the social-liberal model brings economic growth but does not help in bringing about a better distribution of income and more democracy. In this case, either in 2994 or later, the regime may face dificulties and it may not allow for a pacific political transition. To avoid this, the country will need active social, small business, regional and educational policies, handled by a professional administrative apparatus. It will also need more democratic electoral and policymaking systems plus a working division of powers and federalism. In a country with long authoritarian traditions these are difficult to attain, yet possible objectives.     

Liberalism,socialism and democracy: variations on a governmental theme

Liberalism is commonly understood as a political doctrine or ideology concerned with the maximization of individual liberty. However, following Foucault's work on governmentality, a different usage has been suggested, based on the idea of a liberal mode of government. I argue that the differences between these accounts of liberalism derive from a fundamental ambiguity in the liberal project, as a result of which the figure of a community of autonomous individuals appears on the one hand as given reality, serving to identify the character and the limits of legitimate government, while on the other it appears as yet to be realized positivity, serving to define the objective for a variety of governmental projects.

This paper examines the implications of that ambiguity for the understanding first of liberalism as doctrine and second of its relationship to other contemporary doctrines - democracy, socialism and the neo-liberalism in particular. Since the figure of the community of autonomous persons considered as given reality tends to dominate standard characterizations of liberalism as doctrine of government, it also plays an important part in the contrasting characterizations of democracy and socialism. We should expect the view of such a community as artefact to produce a rather different picture.     

Three cheers for liberal modesty

ABSTRACT

Many liberals have been immodest in postulating that their own progressive, secular liberalism is the only one that can be justified in public reason. In Liberalism’s Religion, I articulate a more modest theory of liberalism and religion. While I personally endorse progressive secular liberalism, I argue that it is only one of the reasonable conceptions of liberal justice. This liberal modesty has profound, hitherto unnoticed implications for (i) the role of religious arguments in the public sphere, (ii) the legitimacy of religious establishment, and (iii) the justifiability of religious exemptions. In this article, I defend these three claims by providing replies to my critics.     

Yellow versus Orange—Never a Fair Fight: An Assessment of Two Contributions to Liberal Politics Separated by Three-quarters of a Century

British Liberals have a thing about colours, especially yellow and orange. Two publications, separated by over seventy years and known by the colour of their respective covers, mark special periods in the history of British liberalism, times when liberals have appeared to be on the comeback trail. The article sets out to make the case that the authors of The Orange Book (published in 2004) have a great deal to learn from their liberal predecessors. Yellow Book liberalism was more radical, better informed and better matched to the most pressing political concerns of its day. It was also more open to arguments and ideas from those who had no particular allegiance to either the Liberal Party or to its political philosophy. Liberals, it is argued, need to be far more concerned about refashioning and revitalising liberalism than about reclaiming or reasserting their exclusive ownership of the fundament of liberal thought.     

The New Feudalism: Globalization,the Market,and the Great Chain of Consumption*

Drawing on a substantive connection between liberalism and feudalism, I argue that in spite of a nominal commitment to democracy, the American political system is not substantively democratic. On the contrary, the increasing commitment to neoliberal ideology over the past 30 years is having the effect of establishing a private government, one that is strikingly similar to feudalism, where the few rule the many in the interests of the few and status arrives via consumption and market connections. Furthermore, the internationalization of the American politico-economic model, largely via transnational corporations, promises the extension of this New Feudalism throughout the world. Despite the claims that "liberal democracy" promises the end to history, in other words, the future of democracy looks particularly bleak.     

Migrant Information Packs and the Colonisation of Civility in the UK

In response to the immigration of migrant workers, especially from the European Union accession states, the UK government has engaged in a particular form of civilising project within a wider attempt to inculcate civility and respect amongst citizens and non-citizens realigned to ‘British’ values. Drawing on the work of Elias, this article explores the role of information packs provided to recent migrants as a means of codifying required values. The article argues that elements of these information packs are based on the spatial imagining of national communities and the cultural assumptions underpinning them and that civility in public space is used as a mechanism for constructing increasingly conditional forms of citizenship.     

Giving Up (on) Rights? The Future of Rights and the Project of Radical Democracy

Debate over the theory of rights has recently reemerged, with a confrontation between postfoundational writings that challenge the very discourse of rights and Habermasians (and others) who insist on the foundational centrality of rights. This article will not enter such a debate directly, but rather will try to take seriously that challenge itself. The article asks what, exactly, is at stake in an argument for or against rights and queries whether this challenge to rights discourse entails giving up on rights as a tool of political leverage. In responding to such questions I indicate a future for rights and rights discourse, one found within the project of radical democracy. I not only insist that we cannot abandon the discourse of rights in contemporary theory and politics, but also go on to suggest that sustaining and reinvigorating the discourse of rights requires a significant displacement of that discourse from the dominant terms of liberalism and toward those of radical democracy.     

The ‘I’ and the ‘we’ of citizenship in the age of waning democracy: Wolin and Balibar on citizenship,the political and dedemocratization

Despite drawing on different historical traditions and philosophical sources, Sheldon Wolin and Étienne Balibar have come to see citizenship and democracy in fundamentally similar ways. However, the work of one has not been considered alongside that of the other. In this paper, I examine some of their key texts and draw out three areas of common concern: the historical specificity of the political, citizenship as a dialectical process and dedemocratization. The significance of Wolin and Balibar’s writing on citizenship and democracy lies in a set of proposals for the eternal rebirth of the citizen as democratic agent between action and institution, hierarchy and equality, individual and community, difference and the universal. Their open-ended frameworks can be seen as an antidote to contemporary pessimism about the fate of democracy as either political order or normative ideal. I conclude by suggesting that contemporary Ecuadorean and Bolivian debates about how to combine relational ontologies and liberalism has opened a fertile domain for re-imagining the I and We of citizenship.     

The Freedom of Expression in Global Perspective

This paper presents recent events including the Danish cartoon crisis occasion—a re-examination of John Stuart Mill’s argument for freedom of expression. Despite the appeal of liberalism, Mill’s philosophy had from the start been subject to intense criticism. The rise of political Islam opens a new phase in the debate; the difficulties pointed out by Mill’s critics are indicative of the obstacles that liberalism still faces.

The political economy of the Kachin revolutionary household

Applying a feminist political economy analysis of the Kachin military movement, this article will be mapping women's involvement in the armed uprising since the outbreak of the conflict in 1961, demonstrating the centrality of gender relations for the war. Using primary data, this article will show how the household provides essential support to the Kachin war effort in the shape of emotional, physical and material labour, thus underscoring the critical role played by women in maintaining the conflict. Examining the relationship between narratives of gendered insecurity in the community and notions of militarized duty, this article will argue that the Kachin armed forces have employed gendered notions of security and duty to legitimize and sustain the conflict. The importance of normative gender relations for providing labour and emotional and material support for the conflict will then be examined, showing how the household is situated as the nucleus of the armed revolution. The findings in this article thus reveal a need to take into account the relationship between the household and the armed conflict, arguing that the household is a site inseparably linked to nationalistic objectives, underpinning the economic and ideological structures of military movements. Interventions aiming at resolving the conflict in Kachin must therefore consider the importance of gender relations in upholding the political-economy infrastructure of the military movement.     

The Origins &; Meaning of Liberal/Conservative Self-Identifications Revisited

This paper examines the permanence of differences in the psychological underpinnings of ideological self-identifications. Previous research has suggested that conservatives differ from liberals insofar as their self-identifications as such are best explained as the product of a negative reaction (both to liberalism generally and to the groups associated with it in particular) rather than a positive embrace. However, this paper demonstrates that the dynamics underlying the formation of ideological self-identifications are not static reflections of inherent differences in liberal and conservative psychologies but rather evolve in response to changes in the political environment. Whereas feelings (positive or negative) toward liberalism played a decisive role in shaping individuals’ ideological self-identifications during the New Deal/Great Society era of liberal and Democratic political hegemony, the subsequent resurgence of political conservatism produced a decisive shift in the bases of liberal and conservative self-identifications. In particular, just as conservative self-identifications once primarily represented a reaction against liberalism and its associated symbols, hostility toward conservatism and its associated symbols has in recent years become an increasingly important source of liberal self-identifications.