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1.
This paper analyzes the attitudes of the Roman Catholic Church in Poland towards the Jews and anti-Semitism during the first decade since the political transformation of 1989–1990. After discussing briefly the main patterns of the development of the Roman Catholic Church in Poland in the modern era I examine two opposing positions within the institutionalized Roman Catholic Church — the ‘Open Church’ and the ‘Closed Church’ — that emerged in the aftermath of Poland's regaining full sovereignty in 1989. The ‘Open Church’ and the ‘Closed Church’ represent opposite views on the role of the church in society and on the dialogue with Jews and Judaism and on anti-Semitism.The ‘Open Church’ is a relatively recent phenomenon that originated in the circles of the layman progressive Catholic intelligentsia in the post-1945 period. It is the first visible formation within Roman Catholic Church in Poland, which advocates dialogue with Jews and Judaism and is engaged in the eradication of anti-Semitic attitudes. The ‘Closed Church,’ which represents the formation of the ‘besieged fortress’ was historically strongly intertwined with the exclusivist ethno-nationalistic political movement of the National Democracy. The remnants of this fusion were still visible in the statements of high rank clergy in the 1990s and early 2000. This formation ignores the concept of the dialogue with Jews and Judaism advocated by Pope John Paul II and among its supporters there are still many holders of anti-Semitic views. The paper provides various examples of anti-Semitic occurrences and pronouncements of the 1990s and it discusses various initiatives aimed at the facilitating dialogue between Christians and Jews introduced by the members of the ‘Open Church’ in the 1990s. It assess the importance of the ‘Open Church’ in the eradication of anti-Semitic views and the extent of the influence of the ‘Closed Church’ on both the clergy and Catholic community at large. 相似文献
2.
Radoslaw Zubek 《Communist and Post》2008,41(2):147-161
A distinguishing feature of Central European polities is a strong policy-shaping role of parliaments. This article demonstrates how party political and procedural factors set the scene for the executive's loss of legislative control in Poland. Parties undermine the governmental grip because of their limited internal cohesion and competitive coalitional strategies. Parliamentary rules reinforce such party effects. The executive can shield its bills from amendments by relying mainly on partisan controls, not formal privileges. But, as an analysis of over 300 bills shows, when party discipline and coalition cooperation are in short supply, partisan controls are ineffective as instruments of legislative control. 相似文献
3.
Olga Semukhina 《Communist and Post》2018,51(3):215-229
This paper examines two interrelated issues: the role of police as an institution of Russian society and their role during the past 25 years. This research is based on a series of in-depth interviews conducted by the author in 2014–2016 with former and current police officers in three Russian cities. The paper traces changes in the perceived institutional roles of the Russian police by comparing police officers' views during three periods: early through mid-1990s, late-1990s through mid-2000s, and mid-2000s through 2010s. The study reports that, during the early period, Russian police were disfranchised from the state and this abandonment was a source of institutional identity crisis for law enforcement officers who remained on the job. This process was coupled with high levels of job dissatisfaction and the overall feeling of “abandonment” of police by the state.At the same time, it was during this post-Soviet period, when ideas of policing as a service to the society were introduced and sometimes entertained among the professional circles of police officers and other government officials. Furthermore, this period was marked by continuous, though often sporadic, institutional reforms and anti-corruption measures.In the second period, the Russian police were slowly engaging back into the state-building process, which caused increased job satisfaction and better retention rates. At the same time, the second period signified a decline of the “police as service” ideology and the comeback of paternalistic views on policing. During this time, the government's efforts to reform police and anti-corruption measures became systemic and better organized. Also, in the second period, members of the civil society became more active in demanding public accountability and transparency from the Russian police.Finally, the modern period of police development presents a case in which the institutional identity of the Russian police has been clearly connected to the state's capacity. This process is coupled with increased paternalistic views among police officers and a failure of “police as a service” doctrine. In such an environment, the efforts by a maturing civil society to demand public transparency and accountability of the police are often met with hostility and anger. The paper concludes that further development of the Russian police depends on the role that they will play within the modern Russian state. 相似文献
4.
From the moment when wide spread of large scale assessments in sociology and economics began, the most commonly used indicators of peoples’ qualifications are the number of years spent in education and the possession of a high school/college/university diploma. But what if these formal indicators are unreliable under certain conditions and do not reflect actual literacy and competency of people? This article, drawing on data from the Programme for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC), questions accuracy of the basic educational indicators in Russia. There is a linear relationship between the possession of a formal graduation diploma and the measurement of PIAAC literacy of the able-bodied population in OECD countries, including the Eastern European ones. However, the analysis shows that in Russia there is an inconsistency between literacy and formal educational status. This fact in itself casts doubt on the effectiveness of formal education indicators in Russia. The social implications resulting from this inconsistency become apparent through an international comparison of research results. These ill effects have been documented in the areas of employment, education and social reproduction and in the social self-awareness of the Russian people. 相似文献
5.
We discuss the political economic development of Romania since 1989, with a focus on the evolution of higher education (HE). First, we place this evolution in the context of demand for HE by prospective students and employers, focusing on the low demand for skills in the MNC-dominated Romanian economy. Second, we provide empirical insight on indicators of quality, enrolment, and funding as key features of the HE system. We argue that Romania has evolved into a dependent market economy entrenched in a low-skills equilibrium, and that the weakness of the HE system is a key element in this process. 相似文献
6.
2008年民进党下台以来,持续透过访美、恢复驻美代表处、在两岸政策和对美政策上积极迎合美国等做法,修补与美国的互信关系,为其重返执政创造条件。民进党对美示好的做好虽得到美方善意回应,但因民进党拒绝放弃“台独”立场,无法提出令美放心的两岸政策新主张,因此双方互信提升程度有限,美始终对民进党重新执政充满疑虑。因受美国对台战略考虑、民进党两岸政策转型的复杂性等因素制约,未来双方关系的发展前景充满变数。 相似文献