Reproductive choices and informed consent: fetal interests, women's identity, and relational autonomy

In this Article, I describe and examine the severe shortcomings in women's autonomy in the context of reproductive choices in the medical arena. The reproductive choices I explore are those choices that involve gestation: abortion, fertility treatments, and interventions during pregnancy. Due to state and medical interests in the fetus, I describe how information conveyed to patients making reproductive choices is biased towards fetal interests, relies on female stereotypes, and is still conveyed with the objective authority of the medical profession. Moreover, reproductive choices implicate women's values and identity interests that reach beyond medical concerns, which are not part of the informed consent doctrine at all. The narrow, individualistic informed consent torts doctrine intended to protect patient autonomy does not do enough in this context to balance bias nor does it mandate discussion of important identity interests and values. Accordingly, I argue that when faced with reproductive choices, women are not provided the balanced and comprehensive information needed to promote their autonomy. In response to the breakdown in patient autonomy I describe, instead of leaving women alone to make choices or regulating in order to protect them from their choices, a broader framework for supporting reproductive choices should be established. In light of the interdependence of woman and fetus, as well as the broader social context shaping these decisions, I argue that a more contextual, relational perspective of autonomy should be the goal of informed consent in the context of reproductive choices. I suggest a number of reforms that aim to optimize patient autonomy from a relational perspective. I suggest a broad, deliberative doctor-patient consultation and legal reforms that create more balance between the pull towards intervention and fetal protection on the one hand, and non-intervention and protection of women's personal identity interests on the other.     

MARRIAGE,IN‐LAWS,AND CRIME: THE CASE OF DELINQUENT BROTHERS‐IN‐LAW*

With marriage comes in‐laws, and if the in‐laws include delinquent males, their delinquency could affect the prosocial effects of the given marriage. In this article, I focus on the effect of having a convicted brother‐in‐law as a general indicator of this broader phenomenon of family‐formation processes impairing the positive impact of marriage on crime desistance. I use registry data on all men from birth cohorts 1965–1975 in Denmark (N = 69,066) to show that when a man marries, his new family ties to delinquent brother(s)‐in‐law do indeed hinder his criminal desistance. The results that take into account the characteristics of husbands, wives, their shared family‐formation process, and the criminality of male family members suggest that 1) family dynamics tend to keep criminality within family networks and 2) influences from one's broader social network through marriage are important for the protective effects of marriage. Analyses of previous conviction, co‐offending between a man and his brother‐in‐law, as well as analyses of in‐laws who reside in close proximity confirm the two mentioned main findings. In all, the findings reported in this article add to our understanding of the processes by which families are tied, and how these family‐formation processes influence men's behavior.     

Seeking Sperm: Accounts of Lesbian Couples' Reproductive Decision-Making and Understandings of the Needs of the Child

Same-sex couples and their children have been the subject ofsignificant international attention over recent years, includingdebates about planned parenthood in the context of same-sexrelationships (Donovan, 2000; Dempsey, 2004; Luttichau, 2004;Vonk, 2004; Ryan-Flood, 2005). Drawing on a qualitative studyof lesbian parent families in the UK, this article contributesfurther to these debates through a discussion of respondents’accounts of their reproductive decision-making. I discuss thesocio-legal discourses around the legitimacy of the lesbianparent family created by donor insemination and examine howrespondents react to these discourses. I identify an overarchingpreoccupation within these accounts which is concerned withaddressing the needs of children. The dominant notions of howbest to meet children’s needs established in contemporaryUK family policy pose considerable tensions for the lesbianparent family. In seeking to resolve these tensions, parentsin my study reinterpret and develop different understandingsof how best to meet these needs. Their accounts reveal the complexityof the considerable efforts of families raising children infamily forms that fall outside the normative order to addressthe needs of the child, and the disjunctions between everydayunderstandings of children’s needs and those constructedthrough policy and family law.     

Arbitration in financial dispute resolution: the final step to reconstructing the default(s) and exception(s)?

In this article, I argue for caution in embracing family arbitration as a new form of private ordering for resolving parties' financial disputes. I explain that family arbitration may be more successful than other forms of private ordering and final court hearings in enabling certain types of parties to resolve certain types of disputes. I consider why family arbitration may not become numerically significant despite its potential benefits, but may be much more important in normative terms. Lawyer-led negotiations remain the most common form of out-of-court resolution and constitute the de facto default form of bargaining in the shadow of the normative regime framed by ss 23–25 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. Together with the transformation in approach to nuptial agreements, family arbitration may mark a normative shift towards autonomy and private ordering. I question whether this is a desirable step for family law, at least before we have resolved the underlying policy debate.     

Reassessing the Feminist Theoretical Project in Law

This article seeks to address the current state of theoretical debate within feminist legal studies in the United Kingdom and beyond. It is part map, part critique of dominant theoretical trends – an attempt to identify and explore a range of questions about feminist scholarly engagement in law, including the relationship between academic feminism and political activism, the distinction (if any) between 'feminist' analyses and broader engagements with law and gender, and the normative underpinnings of feminist legal scholarship. The author makes no pretence to neutrality on these issues, questioning the perceived 'drift' between political and academic feminism, and arguing strongly for the recognition and realization of feminism's normative and transformative aspirations. Similarly, she challenges the emergence of an 'anti-essentialist' norm in feminist discourse, and reaffirms the value of 'women-centred' feminist approaches. Finally, this article is also a personal venture, a 'stock-taking' exercise which seeks to interrogate the author's own understanding of what feminist legal work entails.     

Beyond Inclusive Legal Positivism*

In this essay, I characterize the original intervention that became Inclusive Legal Positivism, defend it against a range of powerful objections, explain its contribution to jurisprudence, and display its limitations and its modest jurisprudential significance. I also show how in its original formulations ILP depends on three notions that are either mistaken or inessential to law: the separability thesis, the rule of recognition, and the idea of criteria of legality. The first is false and is in event inessential to legal positivism. The second is inessential to legal positivism. The third is likely inessential to law. I then characterize the central claim of ILP in a way that relies on none of these: ILP is the claim that necessarily social facts determine the determinants of legal content. I show that ILP so conceived leaves the central debates in law largely untouched. I suggest how the most fundamental of these—the question of the normativity of law—at least can be usefully addressed. The essay closes by suggesting that even though one can distinguish the social from the normative dimensions of law, a theory of the nature of law is necessarily an account of the relationship between the two: It is a theory either of the difference that certain distinctive social facts make in normative space, or it is an account of the distinctive normative difference that law makes, and the social and other facts that are necessary to explain that difference. One can distinguish between but one cannot separate the social from the normative aspects of legality.     

Some reflections on the legitimacy of international trial justice

This paper addresses a number of interrelated conceptual difficulties that impact adversely on the ability of international criminal trials to deliver outcomes perceived as legitimate by victims and communities in post-conflict states. It begins by exploring the extent to which those moral justifications for punishment espoused by international courts are instrumental in marginalizing the aspirations for justice of victims and victim communities, and suggests how a greater appreciation of the sociological context of punishing international crimes can contribute towards an improved understanding of normative practice. The paper then examines the relationship between perceptions of international crime and punishment, and the broader issue of whether international criminal law provides an appropriate normative structure for giving effect to those universal humanitarian values concerned with punishment in an increasingly pluralistic world. Finally, the paper considers how the theory and practice of punishing international crimes can more effectively satisfy both local and global aspirations for post-conflict justice through enhancing the transformative capacity of international criminal trials.     

Legal Positivism, Law's Normativity, and the Normative Force of Legal Justification

In this article, I distinguish between a moral and a strictly legal conception of legal normativity, and argue that legal positivists can account for law's normativity in the strictly legal but not in the moral sense, while pointing out that normativity in the former sense is of little interest, at least to lawyers. I add, however, that while the moral conception of law's normativity is to be preferred to the strictly legal conception from the rather narrow viewpoint of the study of law's normativity, it is less attractive than the latter from the broader viewpoint of the study of the nature of law. I then distinguish between a moral and a strictly legal conception of the normative force of legal justification, and argue that legal positivists may without contradiction embrace the moral conception, and that therefore the analysis of the normative force of legal justification need not be a problem for legal positivists. I conclude that, on the whole, we have reason to prefer legal positivism to natural law theory. I begin by introducing the subject of jurisprudence (section 1). I then introduce the natural law/legal positivism debate, suggesting that we ought to understand it as a debate about the proper way to explicate the concept of law (section 2). I proceed to argue that legal decision-making is a matter of applying legal norms to facts, and that syllogistic reasoning plays a prominent role in legal decision-making thus conceived (section 3). Having done that, I discuss law's normativity (section 4), the normative force of legal justification (section 5), and the relation between the former and the latter (section 6). I conclude with a critical comment on Joseph Raz' understanding of the question of law's normativity (appendix).     

The Presumption of Innocence and its Role in the Criminal Process

Many international instruments proclaim that those who face criminal prosecution ought to be afforded a ‘presumption of innocence’, and the importance and central role of this presumption is recognized by legal systems throughout the world. There is, however, little agreement about its meaning and extent of application. This article considers the purposes of legal presumptions in general and explores various, sometimes contradictory, conceptions of this most famous one. It is equated by many scholars to the requirement that the prosecution prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. As such, it is merely a rule of evidence (albeit an important one), with no application pre- or post-trial. The article advocates adoption of a broader, normative approach, namely that the presumption reflects the relationship which ought to exist between citizen and State when a citizen is suspected of breaching the criminal law. As such, it should be promoted as a practical attitude to be adopted by the key protagonists in the justice system, for the duration of the criminal process.     

Challenging normative constructions of parentage in Ireland

Legal conceptions of the family have evolved considerably in recent years. Many legal systems now offer recognition to what are commonly termed ‘non-traditional’ families, namely those that fall outside of the ‘sexual family’ ideal. Such reforms are certainly encouraging but they may nonetheless be criticised on the basis that they promote a heteronormative construction of the family rather than providing an innovative new perspective on modern family relationships. Using recent Irish reforms as the basis for the discussion, this article will examine the normative approach to family recognition which has been adopted in both Ireland and England and Wales and it will question whether those legal systems adequately accommodate families which fall outside the normative ideal. Where failings are identified, suggestions are presented as to how the law could be modified so as to fully accommodate ‘non-traditional’ families, in particular gay and lesbian families.     

Testing the limits of freedom of contract: the commercialization of reproductive materials and services

This article examines the cases for and against commercializing, or "commodifying," reproductive materials and services. Using a supply/demand third-party framework, three basic scenarios in which commercial-exchange relationships may be possible--exchange of gametes and zygotes, exchange of gestational services, and exchange of fetal material--and the major parties of interest, or stakeholders, are identified. The study sketches the liberal, essentialist, and radical contingency theories that shape the debate over the commercialization of reproductive materials and services. The article then attempts to derive some basic governing principles that reflect as much common ground as possible amongst these various normative perspectives, while recognizing that complete reconciliation is impossible. Taken together, these principles are designed to reflect a strategy of "constrained commodification," where commercialization or commodification, that is, financial remuneration, plays a relatively neutral role in the utilization of reproductive materials and services. In light of these principles, the article concludes by sketching legal and regulatory regimes with respect to the exchange of gametes and zygotes, gestational services, and fetal tissue.     

Constitutional Referendums: A Theoretical Enquiry

In recent decades the use of referendums to settle major constitutional questions has increased dramatically. Addressing this phenomenon as a case study in the relationship between democracy and constitutional sovereignty, this article has two aims. The first is to argue that these constitutional referendums are categorically different from ordinary, legislative referendums, and that this has important implications for theories of constitutional sovereignty. Secondly, the article suggests that the power of these constitutional referendums to re-order sovereign relations raises significant normative questions surrounding the appropriateness of their use. The article engages with these normative questions, enquiring whether the recent turn in republican political theory towards deliberative democracy may offer a model through which sufficiently democratic referendum processes can be constructed.     

The family planning service and the pill in Geneva (1965–1980): a step towards women's emancipation?

In 1965, a family planning service was created in Geneva which aimed at spreading information on contraception. This article focuses on the attitude of the centre vis-à-vis the new contraceptive methods, especially the pill, and puts it in perspective with other voices, such as those of feminists. In order to address the question of women's emancipation, it relies on the archives of the family planning centre and of the Women's Liberation Movement of Geneva. The centre's pedagogical discourse about contraception focuses on stable couples and a rational attitude towards reproduction and family planning. It reflects the dominance of medical theories in the field of sexuality in Geneva during this period. The author suggests that the centre's approach to contraception contributed to the diffusion of a new contraceptive norm by combining contraceptive information with messages concerning the proper type of relationship, the state of mind and even the feelings with which contraception should be associated. The sources, however, also suggest a gap between the messages delivered and actual uses made of the centre. While maintaining a conservative and normative discourse, the family planning service nevertheless gave women the possibility to increase their autonomy.     

Corrective Justice as A Principle of Criminal Law: A Prolegomenon

This article argues that corrective justice is an adequate principle of criminalization. On my interpretation, corrective justice holds that, in order for an action to count as a crime, there needs to be a plausible normative story about an offender having violated the interests of a victim in a way that disturbs their relationship as equal persons and a subsequent story about responding to crime in a way that corrects this disturbance. More specifically, I claim that corrective justice is concerned with the protection of interests that persons have in owning private goods throughout standard interactions with other persons. The argument proceeds in three steps. First, I specify the subject-matter that principles of criminal law need to ground and provide an outline of the idea of corrective justice. Second, I show that corrective justice can account for the main cases of crime and the salient modes of criminal responsibility. I also argue that corrective justice can make sense of two prima facie recalcitrant types of cases (rape and inchoate offenses). Third, and finally, I address two objections to my corrective justice theory of criminal law. The first concerns the implications corrective justice has for locating criminal law along the private/public law divide. The second objection raises the putatively problematic consequences corrective justice has for understanding the separation between criminal and civil law.     

The relationship of perceptions and emotions to behavior in the face of collective inequality

The present experiment investigated the role of emotions and perceptions in determining the overt behavior of disadvantaged group members. Three limitations to the existing psychological research are presented as a possible reason for the present inability to describe a consistent relationship between the emotions and perceptions of those faced with intergroup inequalities and their subsequent actions. The present experiment attempted to address these limitations by employing a laboratory paradigm in which subjects actually engage in overt behavior. As well, a broader array of emotions and perceptions were assessed and subjects were offered a variety of behaviors from which to choose. The findings point to a relatively strong relationship between emotions and perceptions on the one hand, and overt action on the other. Feelings of frustration and anger, the perception of one's personal treatment as satisfactory and just, and hope of future improvement of one's position combined to discriminate between subjects who accepted their disadvantaged position, those who took normative forms of action, those who reacted in an individual nonnormative way, and those who chose collective nonnormative behavior.     

Unveiling White logic in criminological research: an intertextual analysis

Critical race scholars have called into question the objective neutrality upon which much positivist social science rests, arguing that it discursively masks how whiteness underpins the normative purview of research design and findings. As the scholarly securing of whiteness takes shape through explicit and discursive mechanisms, this article examines how it is manifest in criminological research through an intertextual analysis of contemporary peer-reviewed scholarship. Examining 558 articles in five recognized journals, this paper documents how blind spots towards race and racial stratification surface in criminological research, arguing that most of the articles analyzed do not simply ignore White privilege; they actively uphold it. Findings suggest that they do so through two means: first by whitewashing race, that is, disregarding how race and racism can differentially affect acts and trends of crime and deviance, and secondly, by narrowly representing race as merely explanatory variable without querying the broader power relations it marks. After discussing how these patterns reveal and uphold whiteness as a normative value, we conclude with a discussion of preliminary steps aimed at exposing and unpacking how White logic informs the field.     

The EU's Private Law in the Regulated Sectors: Competitive Market Handmaiden or Institutional Platform?

The article contests the claim that EU private law is narrowly circumscribed by a market rationality. Such a claim tracks broader criticism of EU functional legal integration, although it tends to obscure the underlying transformative pressures on private law and regulation and the role EU law plays in coping with such pressures. To offer a number of counter‐narratives, the article draws on examples from the regulated sectors, including telecommunications and energy, to reveal their experimentalist features. These suggest that EU private law is constructed through a process of error‐corrections, which allows for mutual adjustment of instruments and hybridisation of EU and local policy goals. The process results in more finely grained assemblages of autonomy and regulation to respond to concrete problems or newly salient policy goals, so that markets are understood as social institutions that are always works‐in‐progress rather than convergence points. Thus, EU private law provides a platform for transnational market‐building through innovating institutions that promote various normative and policy commitments despite the interdependencies that could undermine them.     

Legal Emotions: An Ethnography of Distrust and Fear in the Arab Districts of an Israeli City

Recent sociolegal scholarship has explored the role of emotions in lawmaking and policymaking on security and crime issues. This article extends this approach to the relationship between law enforcement and affect by addressing the role of policing and security agencies in the (re)production of long‐term emotions, which bind a collective and fuel ethnonational division. An ethnography of the distinct emotional climate within the Arab districts of Lod, an Israeli city, shows that this climate is structured by two emotions: rampant distrust toward friends and neighbors, and intense fear of the Israeli authorities. This emotional climate is the product of the subterranean ties of Lod Palestinians with the Israeli security agencies as well as their experiences of the blurred line between state security and crime control enforcement. I embed the initial creation and relative stability of this emotional climate in the broader relationship between the Israeli state and its Palestinian citizens from 1948 to the present. The article concludes with a discussion of how the law enforcement's affective production has consequences for the salience and scope of citizenship and by arguing for a greater focus on the link between law enforcement, collective emotions, and processes of inclusion and exclusion.