The Exceptional Case of the British Military Bases on Cyprus

As is widely known, Cyprus was the place used as springboard for all the US–British air operations in the region surrounding it, in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya and so on. However, neither the Republic of Cyprus, nor the breakaway regime in the north of the island had anything to do with that. The logistical hub for those activities were the so-called Sovereign British Military Bases conceded to Britain in the 1960 Zurich Agreement in return for the independence Cyprus gained in the same year. Cyprus is the only place on the planet where the United Kingdom maintains as a legacy of British colonial rule sovereign military bases and a military presence secured as a result of a multilateral treaty of guarantee far surpassing those rights that the United Kingdom had managed to have recognized in the installation of military bases in Burma, Malta and Ceylon. Nevertheless, two things are very remarkable: why has the United States, despite its numerous other facilities in the Near East, preferred those bases for its activities? Why have the British clung on to their bases in Cyprus – in spite of the retreat of British forces from so many bases originally built by the United Kingdom in so many places around the world since 1960, although in comparison with other overseas garrisons still left of the British Empire, the one in Cyprus is the biggest and the most expensive to maintain? The article tries to illuminate the background of this paradox. It examines, based on primary and secondary sources from several countries, the historical evolution and regime of the UK Sovereign Military Bases on Cyprus, which constitute an exceptional case in both international relations and international law. It argues that the operation of the British bases in Cyprus has been exceeding the legal framework determined by the Treaty of Establishment and hardly complies with the British obligation to decolonize the entire territory of the island of Cyprus as well as the right of the Cypriot people to self-determination.     

Britain and the abdication of Reza Shah

On the eve of the Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran in the Second World War, Sir Reader Bullard, the British minister in Tehran, urged on his government the desirability of removing the Iranian ruler, Reza Shah, from office. Association with the ‘universally detested’ shah, whom he described as a ‘greedy ignorant savage’, was detrimental to Britain's interests and its war effort. In the weeks that followed the Anglo-Soviet occupation of Iran, Bullard continued to press for and to shape the ultimate British decision to force Reza Shah to abdicate and go into exile. Yet, this was not always Bullard's view of Britain's relationship with the Iranian ruler. When he presented his credentials 20 months earlier, Bullard described it as his ‘urgent duty’ to win Reza Shah's favour. Nor did Bullard's insistence that Britain depose the Shah initially find favour with the Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, his Middle East staff at the Foreign Office, or with Churchill. This article traces the evolution of Bullard's own view of Reza Shah and the developments that led the Foreign Office, initially eager to win Reza Shah's favour and even ready to offer Reza Shah a ‘substantial bribe’ for his cooperation, to take steps to topple Reza Shah from the throne.     

The Political Economy of Saudi Arabia

The Regional Co-operation for Development (RCD) was set up by the regional members of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), Iran, Turkey and Pakistan, in July 1964 to strengthen their socio-economic development. However, a number of financial, political and administrative difficulties made progress under RCD slow. Despite assurances to the contrary, the probable impetus behind the formation of RCD was the unease with the politico-military aspects of CENTO. However, RCD's political significance grew steadily, and that of CENTO declined correspondingly. Nevertheless, recognizing that RCD could not provide an effective military substitute, Iran and Turkey still attached value to CENTO. After twelve unsatisfactory years, the three regional Heads of State held a summit in Izmir on 22 April 1976, making amendments to the 1964 declaration. The Treaty of Izmir was signed in 1977 as the legal framework for RCD. Yet, RCD was unsuccessful. In January 1985, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan established a new organisation called the Economic Co-operation Organization (ECO).     

Muhammad Reza Pahlavi and the Bahrain Question, 1968–1970

This paper examines the role of Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, the late Shah of Iran, in the secret Anglo-Iranian negotiations over Bahrain from January 1968 to March 1970. Despite a clear strategic imperative for abandoning Iran's claim to Bahrain in the wake of the British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf, the Shah feared that such an act would be seen by the Iranian public as collusion with the British to surrender Iranian territory, thereby further eroding the Pahlavi monarchy's precarious legitimacy. Drawing on British official papers and Iranian oral histories and memoirs, this paper explores for the first time the story of these secret negotiations and the extent to which the Shah's diplomacy was constrained by domestic considerations.     

‘This is a Prison…A Death in Life’: Reza Shah’s troubled exile on the Island of Mauritius

Reza Shah, the feared and powerful master of Iran for nearly two decades, spent the last years of his life in lonely exile, on the island of Mauritius, then in South Africa. His life in exile was hardly a happy one. The place and conditions of his exile were dictated not by himself but by the British, and the relationship between the two remained uneasy. Britain’s handling of Reza Shah – the degree and freedom and choice they were prepared to allow him and his family – were determined by the exigencies of war. Reza Shah sought to loosen the bonds of British control. In Tehran, his son and successor, Mohammad Reza Shah, also played a role. He used what leverage he had with the British to help ease the conditions of his father’s exile, while he endeavored to protect Iran’s interests under a difficult foreign occupation. The push-and-pull of cross-purposes entailed by this triangular relationship defined Reza Shah’s life in exile in both Mauritius and Johannesburg. This article examines the Mauritian period of his exile.     

De Gaulle and the question of Syria and Lebanon during the Second World War: Part I

This study examines political, economic, and strategic relations between Libya and Britain from the Second World War to the 2011 ‘Arab Spring’ conflict in Libya. Analysing primary and secondary sources, this study attempts to determine if a connection exists between the British fighting in Libya during the Second World War and the British-led military intervention in the Libyan ‘Arab Spring’ revolt against Muammar Qaddafi's regime. Britain retained a strategic and economic presence in Libya in the period following the country's independence in 1951. The rise to power of Qaddafi in 1969, however, changed the course of bilateral ties. Qaddafi nationalized British assets in Libya, and implemented anti-Western policies. Ties with Britain were strained, reaching a low point during the 1980s and 1990s with Libya's persecution of political dissidents in Britain. A brief rapprochement between Tripoli and London from 2001 to 2011 brought normalization of ties and renewed British investment in the Libyan oil sector. However, in February 2011, Britain and its western partners aided Libyan rebels in their fight against Qaddafi, successfully toppling his regime. Today, as the struggle for power continues in Libya – with Islamist groups representing a serious force vying for power – many questions remain concerning the future direction of the Libyan state and society.     

Political Violence in Late Colonial Cyprus: The Balance of Risk

Based on reflections on his 1998 book Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 1954–59, the author now offers the view that more attention should be given to Greek-Cypriot missteps as well as British ones. The article looks at the roles of Archbishop Makarios and Governors Harding and Foot. The outcome of the 1950s struggle, it argues, cannot be understood in narrowly Cypriot terms but only in its regional context. The author is of the view that a window of opportunity for enosis was lost in miscalculations and confusion between the aims of ousting the British and securing a union with Greece.     

‘A matter of political expediency’: Iran,Britain, South Africa and the settlement of Reza Shah's estate

When Reza Shah, the former ruler of Iran, died in exile in Johannesburg, South Africa, in 1944, he left some £110,000 in cash in his bank account and valuables and other items worth another £20,000. But he left no will; and the Union government proceeded to impose a tax amounting to over £43,000 (one-third of the total value) and to distribute the remainder among heirs as specified in Union law for persons who had died intestate. Reza Shah's son, Mohammad Reza Shah, the ruling Iranian monarch, hard up for money, fought these requirements. He claimed everything in his late father's possession was his, and that neither estate taxes nor distribution to heirs applied. A four-year battle over the estate ensued. It was eventually resolved, but only after vigorous efforts by two British ambassadors to Tehran, endeavours at the highest levels of the British government; the involvement of the South African prime minister and, finally, an act of the South African parliament. This article examines the intricate tug-of-war surrounding the settlement of the estate of Reza Shah and what it tells us about the principal parties involved.     

战后日本“重返”东南亚与英国的应对

二战后,英国政府不希望日本经济复苏过快,并且不愿看到日本经济过多地染指东南亚。1954年英国促成日本加入由它倡导的科伦坡计划,以便把日本在东南亚的活动尽量纳入其可控范围之内。除此以外,在50年代和60年代前期,英国对日本在东南亚的企图进行了重重阻挠。但是进入60年代中后期,随着日本的经济飞速发展,国力日渐增强,英国已无力阻止日本进入东南亚。英国在日英首脑会晤的场合,不断敦促日本加强对东南亚国家的援助,而日本却一再敦促英国维持在东南亚的军事存在。     

Great Britain and the Norwegian constitution of 1814

SUMMARY

By the 1814 Treaty of Kiel, Norway was detached from Denmark and was to be given to Sweden. Prince Christian Frederik, heir to the Danish throne, was the Viceroy of Norway in 1814. He refused to accept the Treaty, and decided instead to establish Norway as an independent kingdom under his rule. To legitimize his claim, he called for elections to a constitutional assembly. This assembly began on 10 April 1814. The constitution which it approved was inspired by numerous sources. This article investigates the British influences upon it. It also considers how Britain's stance in the international diplomacy of the day affected the outcome. Norway did indeed enter a forced union with Sweden, but with its constitution almost intact. This constitution was underpinned by the separation of powers, which its originators associated with Britain, and was known to them from books by Charles-Louis de Secondat, Baron de la Brède et de Montesquieu (1689–1755) and Jean-Louis de Lolme (1740–1806). Many members of the assembly had knowledge of British politics, especially the vocal Count Wedel-Jarlsberg and Captain Peter Motzfeldt. Three draft constitutions manifested important British influences. The approved constitution also contained crucial borrowings from Britain, particularly on civil rights. The Norwegian political system scarcely resembled Britain's at that time, especially since the separation of powers was interpreted differently. Nevertheless, some aspects of parliamentary procedure derived from the British model.     

From the Eastern Question to the Death of General Gordon: Representations of the Middle East in the Victorian Periodical Press, 1876–1885

After a tribute to the late Professor J. D. Pearson, this lecture advances the view that the Victorian periodical press was an extremely important medium for the exchange of ideas by the political and intellectual elite in Britain. Among the many topics covered in the press was British foreign policy and the author analyses almost 400 articles on the Middle East which appeared in 10 of the most influential periodicals during the years 1876-1885. Almost all the articles examined approach their subject with Britain's strategic position in the world as their prime, if sometimes unspoken, concern. Although some articles attempt to be fair in their view of Middle Eastern peoples and of Islam, the concept of racial superiority is very common, and reflects the contemporary writers' view of Britain as a civilizing influence in the Middle East.     

Japan in the coming century: Looking East or West?

The modernization of Japan's trade policies and social structure, argues Professor Ronald Dore of the London School of Economics, will increase Japan's social instability. The continuation of the outdated Japan‐US alliance, he states, only inhibits the growth of the international order; he warns that the day may come when Japan's interests lie with China rather than the US. Dore advocates that Japan adopt a proactive foreign policy, using military force not for reasons of national interest, but only to contribute to the peaceful settlement of international conflicts.     

Reza Shah’s journey into exile

On September 16, 1941, three weeks after British and Soviet troops invaded Iran in the Second World War and occupied the country, Reza Shah abdicated the throne in favor of his son, quit Iranian soil and boarded a British ship to go into exile. The British refused to allow Reza Shah to choose his own place of exile (South America) and sent him to the island of Mauritius. This article examines British thinking that resulted in the choice of Mauritius as the place of exile. It traces Reza Shah’s journey across Iran as he prepared to leave the country; details the composition of the large party of family and staff that accompanied him; provides an account of Reza’s Shah’s reminiscences and reflections at this difficult and emotion-laden moment when he was forced to surrender power, and describes the ‘stooped and aged man’ he had become. It ends with the arrival of the ship carrying Reza Shah and the royal party in Mauritius.     

The Special Operations Executive and Cyprus in the Second World War

Cyprus, together with Gibraltar and Malta, constituted the ‘crown jewels’ of British sea power in the Mediterranean during the Second World War. Being deployed on Cyprus the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force could fight the Germans and Italians in the Southeast Mediterranean, thus inhibiting the continuous supply with troops and war material of the Africa Corps of Field Marshall Ervin Rommel. This article aims to shed light on the activities of the Special Operations Executive on the island. Citing recently declassified files we assess the espionage and propaganda as well as the guerrilla warfare contingencies in case of an Axis invasion of Cyprus. We provide a critical assessment of the British guerrilla warfare strategy, arguing that the SOE and the 25th Army Corps based on Cyprus had not been well prepared to counter aggression due to inter-service rivalries, bad planning and lack of manpower. Besides, the SOE distrusted the Greek-Cypriots and the Turkish-Cypriots to the extent that the training of guerrillas was planned to commence only after a successful invasion and the occupation of the island. Finally, SOE officers considered the Cypriot communists with their anti-colonialist declarations as another threat to be confronted with special operations.     

From Mare Nostrum to Insula Nostra: British Colonial Cyprus and the Italian Imperial Threat

As part of its growing imperial aspirations that were part of the so-called Mare Nostrum attempt, the Italian Empire sought to build up nationalist propaganda on Cyprus. The irredentist activities and propaganda coordinated by the Italian Embassy in Cyprus alarmed the British governors and the Foreign Office. By drawing upon archival documents, this article analyses the evolution of the strategic importance of Cyprus for the British Empire, which began in response to the perceived threat posed by the Italian Empire during the interwar period. The main argument put forward here is that under these new circumstances Cyprus became a significant geostrategic possession for the British Empire. The Italian Empire, having colonised the Dodecanese islands of the Aegean Sea, was gradually making its presence felt in Cyprus in the 1920s and went on to do so more vigorously in the 1930s. The Italian ambassador was perceived as persona non grata by the British government in Cyprus. It was therefore difficult for the British Empire under the actual, or at least the perceived, threat of Italian influence to permit Cypriots to exercise their right of self-determination.     

The ‘Missing Dimension’: Britain's Secret War against France in Syria and Lebanon, 1942–45 – Part II

The article provides the ‘missing dimension’ in the historiography of Syria and Lebanon in the Second World War. It is based on secret British and Syrian documents obtained by the French intelligence from their agents in the British Legation in Beirut and the Syrian government in Damascus, never published before. These documents, recently discovered by the author, shed new light on the activities of the British intelligence agencies in the Middle East during and after the war. They reveal that these agencies played an important role in shaping Britain's policy in the region by securing the tacit collaboration of prominent Arab nationalists in Syria and Lebanon and other Arab countries. In Syria (and Palestine), Britain conducted a ‘dual policy’: one purported to mediate between the French and the Syrians, details of which are found in British archives, and a tacit policy aimed to evict France, of which few traces remain in official documentation. Hence de Gaulle's accusations that Britain secretly engineered the expulsion of France from the Levant were indeed justified, and that the Syrians' claim that their country was the first Arab state to secure complete independence is questionable. The article also discloses that Britain was behind the Hashemite schemes to integrate Syria in a Greater Syria or an Iraqi-led Hashemite confederation. Copies of more than one hundred of the documents are annexed to the article, including a secret agreement from 29 May 1945 revealing that President Quwatli was coerced into granting Britain a dominant position in Syria.     

Willard Straight, The First World War, and "Internationalism of all Sorts": The Inconsistencies of An American Liberal Interventionist

Willard D. Straight was a banker-diplomat and one of the most prominent early twentieth-century advocates of a greater international role for the USA. From the beginning of the war he argued the Mahanist line that American security depended upon the British fleet and in its own interest the United States should therefore intervene. At the same time he perceived the war as offering a golden opportunity for American bankers and businessmen to make international commercial gains at the expense of Britain. In 1915 this outlook led him to leave the insistently pro-Allied banking firm of J. P. Morgan & Company for the National City-affiliated American International Corporation, which was consciously designed to expand American overseas investments. Throughout the war Straight, who died in late November 1918, consistently argued that an Anglo-American alliance must be the essential foundation of any postwar international order — a position also taken by Theodore Roosevelt — but Straight also demonstrated significant and growing suspicion of and hostility to Great Britain. The numerous inconsistencies in his thinking seem to have sprung from the fact that, rather than being a well thought-out position, his internationalism arose primarily from an indiscriminating psychological need to have his country play a great but poorly defined role on the world stage.     

Equal partners? The Information Research Department,SAVAK and the dissemination of anti-communist propaganda in Iran, 1956–68

This article examines how the Foreign Office’s Information Research Department (I.R.D.) worked with SAVAK, the Iranian intelligence service, between 1956 and 1968. It explores how a mutual fear of the Soviet Union compelled both departments to work together to produce and disseminate anti-communist propaganda. As well as the publication of books, prominent Iranian journalists would be given stories that praised the Shah’s regime and discredited the Soviet Union. SAVAK figures were also invited to Britain by the I.R.D. to attend training sessions on producing propaganda. The ties between both agencies, however, meant SAVAK was able to persuade the I.R.D. to assist in the conception of anti-Arab Nationalist propaganda, something that contravened wider British foreign policy. Moreover, such an agency-led approach was rendered short-lived. By 1968, many of the SAVAK figures friendly to the I.R.D. were promoted and replaced by individuals less keen on working with the British.     

LIMITED WAR,UNLIMITED TARGETS

In the early days of the Korean War, the U.S. Air Force (USAF) had a policy of precision bombing military targets only. Policy-makers in Washington, D.C., formulated this policy to ensure the protection of Korean civilians and to increase the effectiveness of their air operations. Senior USAF officers in Korea, however, were unhappy about the limitations placed on them by Washington. In their strategic air operations against targets in North Korea USAF officers followed Washington's precision bombing policy, but they insisted that USAF bombers be permitted to use incendiary bombs against population centers in North Korea. China's entry into the war in November 1950 led to a drastic change in the precision bombing policy. On 5 November 1950, when the UN forces began suffering defeat after defeat in battles with the new enemy, General Douglas MacArthur designated cities and villages in North Korea as “main bombing targets” and permitted the use of incendiary bombs, which had been used in attacks against Japanese cities during World War II. From that point until the end of the war, the USAF regarded North Korean cities and villages as their crucial targets as political and military occasion demanded.     

US security strategy in Asia and the prospects for an Asian regional security regime

The US–Japan alliance serves as the cornerstone of US security strategy in East Asia. The Bush administration remains supportive of efforts by Japan to become a more “normal” nation and is expected, during its second term, to continue to encourage Tokyo to play a more active role in regional security (while refraining from open pressure or from meddling in the debate over constitutional revision). The Pentagon's ongoing Global Force Review will likely result in some modest adjustments in the US military footprint in Japan, but with no lessening of Washington's overall commitment or ability to respond to regional crises. Meanwhile, Washington will continue to support institutionalized multilateral mechanisms (including sub-regional efforts that do not include the US) as useful means to promote regional security and coordinate counter-terrorism efforts, while relying on ad hoc coalitions (or unilateral actions if necessary) to address specific threats to its own security or to the security of its allies.