Goal Conflict in Juror Assessments of Compensatory and Punitive Damages

Recent tort reform debates have been hindered by a lack of knowledge of how jurors assess damages. Two studies investigated whether jurors are able to appropriately compartmentalize compensatory and punitive damages. In Study 1, mock jurors read a trial summary and were asked to assess compensatory and punitive damages in one of three conditions: (a) compensatory damages only, (b) punitive damages for the plaintiff, or (c) punitive damages for the state treasury. Results suggest that jurors who did not have the option to award punitive damages inflated compensatory damages via pain and suffering awards. Jurors were marginally more likely to award punitive damages when the plaintiff was the recipient. Mock jurors in Study 2 read a similar case summary and were asked to assess compensatory and punitive damages. Two factors were varied in Study 2: (a) egregiousness of the defendant's conduct, and (b) the recipient of any punitive damages (the plaintiff vs. a consortium of state funds). Jurors were more likely to award punitive damages when the defendant's conduct was more egregious and when the plaintiff was the recipient. The results suggest leakage between compensatory and punitive damage judgments, contrary to the law's mandate.     

Expert Testimony Regarding Child Witnesses: Does It Sensitize Jurors to Forensic Interview Quality?

Does expert testimony on forensic interviews with children help adults distinguish between poorly conducted and well-conducted interviews? This study evaluates the effects of social framework expert testimony regarding child witnesses in a case involving allegations of child sexual abuse. A 2 (Expert Testimony: present or absent) × 3 (Child Forensic Interview Quality: poor, typical, or good) × 2 (Child’s Age: 4- or 10-year-old) factorial design was used to examine whether expert testimony is prejudicial or beneficial to jurors (N = 463). The results revealed that, without expert testimony, mock jurors did not consider the forensic interview quality when reaching a verdict. However, with expert testimony, mock jurors were more likely to render guilty verdicts if the interview quality was good versus poor. Further expert testimony increased mock jurors’ knowledge about child witnesses. These findings suggest that expert testimony related to the impact of interview techniques on the reliability of children’s reports may assist fact-finders in evaluating child abuse cases.     

Complex scientific testimony: How do jurors make decisions?

Critics of the civil jury system question whether jurors can adequately evaluate complex expert testimony. Based on current models of research in persuasion, we hypothesized that when expert testimony is complex, factors other than content will influence persuasion. Participants, serving as mock jurors, watched a videotaped trial in which two scientists provided evidence on whether PCBs could have caused a plaintiff's illness. The complexity of the expert's testimony and the strength of the expert's credentials were varied in a 2×2 factorial design. After watching the videotape, mock jurors rendered a verdict and completed a number of attitude measures related to the trial. Overall, consistent with our prediction, we found that jurors were more persuaded by a highly expert witness than by a less expert witness, but only when the testimony was highly complex. When the testimony was less complex, jurors relied primarily on the content of that testimony, and witness credentials had little impact on the persuasiveness of the message.     

Jurors'Evaluations of Expert Testimony: Judging the Messenger and the Message

Jurors are laypersons with no specific expert knowledge, yet they are routinely placed in situations in which they need to critically evaluate complex expert testimony. This paper examines jurors'reactions to experts who testify in civil trials and the factors jurors identify as important to expert credibility. Based on in-depth qualitative analyses of interviews with 55 jurors in 7 civil trials, we develop a comprehensive model of the key factors jurors incorporate into the process of evaluating expert witnesses and their testimony. Contrary to the frequent criticism that jurors primarily evaluate expert evidence in terms of its subjective characteristics, the results of our study indicate that jurors consider both the messenger and the message in the course of evaluating the expert's credibility.     

Expert Testimony of the Battered Person Syndrome, Defendant Gender, and Sexual Orientation in a Case of Duress: Evaluating Legal Decisions

The current study examined the utility of expert testimony of the battered person syndrome (BPS) in a case of duress and the extent to which defendant gender, defendant sexual orientation, and participant gender influence mock jury decisions in a case of duress. Participants (N?=?413) read a scenario based on U.S. v. Dixon (2006) and answered questions assessing verdict, guilt, sentence length, duress legal elements, and attributes typically ascribed to victims of abuse. Results showed heterosexual female defendants were assigned the lowest sentences and met more of the legal elements of duress (i.e., were coerced, more likely to be believed, and purchased a gun to prevent harm) and attributes (i.e., experienced severe abuse, learned helplessness) compared to other defendants. When mock jurors received expert testimony, they provided lower rates of guilt and sentencing for defendants. Results also showed the inclusion of BPS expert testimony increased ratings for many of the legal elements of duress and attributes typically associated with intimate partner violence. In addition, results suggested that while heterosexual female defendants are more likely to be believed in a case of duress, expert testimony of BPS is helpful to all defendants. Limitations and future directions for research and practice are discussed.     

The Impact of Psychological Injury Evidence and Jurors’ Schemas on Civil Case Decisions

Psychological injury evidence is at the heart of many civil claims. Due to the recent burgeoning of sexual harassment and assault claims which predominantly involve psychological distress, it is especially important to understand how jurors process this evidence at the most basic (or schema) level, and how these preconceived notions influence processing of trial evidence and subsequent legal judgments. As a result, the present paper explores rarely addressed—but fundamental—issues regarding how jurors perceive psychological injury evidence. Specifically, do jurors have psychological injury schemas? And if so, what injuries do these schemas contain, how stable are they, how are they evaluated, and how do they affect jurors’ case perceptions and legal decisions? A review of relevant theory and empirical research reveals that jurors have psychological injury schemas, but they are often poorly developed and susceptible to the influence of prompts used to retrieve these schemas (e.g., questions posed by attorneys during voir dire, the actual injuries adduced by the plaintiff). Also interesting is that despite the relative importance of psychological injury evidence, tremendous gaps remain regarding what actual types of psychological injuries jurors believe typically result in civil cases, how stable these injury schemas are, and precisely how they affect jurors’ decisions. This paper addresses these important issues to help organize and direct future research on the subject, including proposing a model for how psychological injury schemas interact with jurors’ perceptions of the plaintiff’s alleged injuries to affect their legal decisions.     

The effects of complainant age and expert psychological testimony in a simulated child sexual abuse trial

Mock jurors viewed a videotape of a simulated child sexual abuse trial and then deliberated to a unanimous verdict. The complainant was described as either a 13- or 17-year-old female child. Jurors voted to convict more often when the younger complainant was seen, and the younger complainant was rated as more credible than the older complainant. Female jurors voted the defendant guilty more often and rated the complainant as being more credible than male jurors. Jurors voted to convict more often and rated the defendant as less credible when expert psychological testimony was specific to the case than when they were presented with either general expert testimony or no expert testimony. Jurors who saw a psychological expert testify became less accepting of child sexual abuse misconceptions than those in the no expert control condition. The implications of these findings are discussed.Millbrook Correctional Centre     

Expert Testimony Pertaining to Battered Woman Syndrome: Its Impact on Jurors' Decisions

Participants (N = 200) were presented with a criminal homicide trial involving a battered woman who had killed her abuser. Within the trial, both the response history (passive, active) and presence of expert testimony pertaining to battered woman syndrome (present, absent) were systematically varied. As well, half of the participants in each of these conditions were provided with a nullification instruction informing them that they were free to disregard the law and acquit should a strict application of the law result in an unjust verdict. Results indicated that, compared to the passive response condition, the mock jurors were no less receptive to the expert testimony in the active response condition. The impact of the testimony on participants' verdicts, however, was moderated by the nullification instruction. That is, although the presence of the testimony did result in greater verdict leniency, this only occurred when the mock jurors had been released from a strict application of the law. The implications of these findings are discussed.     

The Bottom Line: The Effect of Written Expert Witness Statements on Juror Verdicts and Information Processing

Mock jurors recruited from jury rolls were either not given written statements of expert witnesses' direct testimony or were provided with such statements before or after the presentation of that testimony. Presentation of the statements before the testimony and cross-examination provided jurors with a schema that allowed them to distinguish more effectively among the claims of four differentially worthy plaintiffs because they processed more probative evidence than other jurors. Jurors in receipt of written statements before the testimony found the evidence to be more comprehensible than other jurors. Jurors provided with written statements following testimony and cross-examination were able to differentiate between the most and least severely injured plaintiffs, whereas jurors not in receipt of any written statements were unable to differentiate among any of the differentially worthy claimants. The limitations of this case management technique and of the study are discussed.     

The impact of general versus specific expert testimonyand eyewitness confidence upon mock juror judgment

Subjects (n=128) initially viewed an eyewitness of high or low confidence. Subsequently, participants viewed a psychologist who gave either espert testimony on the unreliability of eyewitness identification, specific expert testimony, or no expert (control) testimony. Subjects viewing expert testimony believed the eyewitness identified the gunman significantly less often, gave the defendant lower guilt ratings, estimated a lower general percentage of correct identifications under similar circumstances, estimated a lower percentage of general accurate eyewitness testimony, and gave significantly lower ratings to the belief that one can generally tell from eyewitness confidence whether an eyewitness is accurate than subjects in control conditions. Significant differences were also obtained between general and specific expert testimony. Participants viewing specific expert testimony estimated lower general percentages of correct identifications under the circumstances of the crime and reported relying more upon the psychologist's testimony than subjects viewing general expert testimony. Additionally, subjects viewing general expert testimony had significantly less confidence in their gunman vs. innocent person decision than subjects in specific testimony or control conditions. Subjects who viewed the high confidence eyewitness decided that the eyewitness correctly identified the gunman more often, gave the defendant higher guilt ratings, and estimated the general percentage of accurate eyewitness testimony to be significantly higher than jurors in low eyewitness confidence groups. The finding that jurors may continue to rely on eyewitness confidence to gauge the accuracy of the witness even after viewing expert testimony is discussed.     

Educating Jurors about Forensic Evidence: Using an Expert Witness and Judicial Instructions to Mitigate the Impact of Invalid Forensic Science Testimony

Invalid expert witness testimony that overstated the precision and accuracy of forensic science procedures has been highlighted as a common factor in many wrongful conviction cases. This study assessed the ability of an opposing expert witness and judicial instructions to mitigate the impact of invalid forensic science testimony. Participants (N = 155) acted as mock jurors in a sexual assault trial that contained both invalid forensic testimony regarding hair comparison evidence, and countering testimony from either a defense expert witness or judicial instructions. Results showed that the defense expert witness was successful in educating jurors regarding limitations in the initial expert's conclusions, leading to a greater number of not-guilty verdicts. The judicial instructions were shown to have no impact on verdict decisions. These findings suggest that providing opposing expert witnesses may be an effective safeguard against invalid forensic testimony in criminal trials.     

Comparing the effectiveness of <Emphasis Type="Italic">Henderson</Emphasis> instructions and expert testimony: Which safeguard improves jurors’ evaluations of eyewitness evidence?

Objectives

The New Jersey Supreme Court recently determined that jurors may not be able to effectively evaluate eyewitness evidence on their own. As a result, the Court proposed the use of judicial instructions to assist jurors (called Henderson instructions) and suggested the implementation of these instructions would reduce the need for expert testimony. We tested the efficacy of these instructions compared to alternative instructions and expert testimony.

Methods

We utilized a mock trial paradigm, randomly assigning 452 participants to 1 of 20 videotaped trial conditions that varied the quality of eyewitness evidence (both witnessing and identification conditions) and the type of safeguard presented during the mock trial.

Results

Jurors were sensitive to the quality of identification conditions on their own. Jurors were more likely to convict when identification conditions were good and less likely when identification conditions were poor. This relationship was mediated by eyewitness credibility ratings. Expert testimony resulted in skepticism by reducing the likelihood that jurors would convict regardless of the quality of witnessing and identification conditions. No variation of the instructions influenced verdicts.

Conclusions

While jurors were sensitive to the quality of identification conditions on their own, we observed no such effect for the quality of witnessing conditions, even with the aid of instructions and/or expert testimony. Both Henderson instructions and expert testimony may be insufficient for assisting jurors to effectively evaluate problematic witnessing conditions. Future research should examine the use of alternative safeguards.

     

Barring ultimate issue testimony

This research focuses on one of the major changes wrought by the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984: the exclusion of expert mental health testimony on the “ultimate issue,” that is, testimony specifically addressing the expert's opinion that the defendant is sane or insane. Subjects in this research were presented with 1 of 10 variants of an insanity case in which experts testified for the defense, prosecution, both, or neither. The testimony was at one of three levels: diagnostic only, penultimate issue, or ultimate issue. Results showed that level of testimony had no effect on the verdict pattern. There was evidence to suggest that this effect may occur because jurors infer, and/or mistakenly recall, higher levels of expert testimony than was actually presented to them. In addition, general and specific constructs (Finkel & Handel, 1989) that predict verdict yieldedR ² values from .500 to .668 and were not significantly affected by the level of expert testimony. Implications of these findings are discussed.     

Expert psychological testimony

Experimental psychologists increasingly are asked to give expert testimony in court, especially with regard to issues of eyewitness reliability. Whether or not experimental psychologists should give expert testimony on these matters is a controversial issue. The empirical literature suggests that potential jurors do not have a good understanding of the variables influencing eyewitness accuracy and that they cannot discriminate adequately between accurate and false eyewitness identification testimony. Experiments using expert testimony as a treatment variable, however, have not made a definitive case that expert testimony can benefit trial outcomes. The question of whether or not to give expert testimony must be broadened to consider not only the effects on verdicts but also the effects of expert testimony on the process by which verdicts are reached, the practices of police in subsequent investigations, the public's view of psychology, the practices of judges in subsequent cases, and the interaction between expert testimony and research activities.     

Computer-Animated Displays and the Jury: Facilitative and Prejudicial Effects

Two experiments assessed the effects of computer-animated displays on mock jurors. In both, participants watched a trial involving a dispute over whether a man who fell to his death had accidentally slipped or jumped in a suicide. They watched a proplaintiff or prodefendant version in which the body landed 5–10 feet or 20–25 feet from the building. Within each condition, the distance testimony was presented orally or with an animated display. When the tape depicted the event in a neutral manner, judgments were more consistent with the physical evidence. But when the plaintiff and defense used the tape to depict their own partisan theories, participants increasingly made judgments that contradicted the physical evidence. Results suggest that computer-animated displays have greater impact than oral testimony. Whether that impact is to facilitate or mislead a jury, however, depends on the nature of the display.     

Jurors' knowledge of battered women

An increasing number of psychologists with expertise in the area of battered women are participating in the legal system as expert witnesses and occasionally testify on behalf of a battered woman who has injured or killed her partner. Testimony about the battered woman syndrome has been offered to help the jury understand why the defendant reasonably perceived that she was in danger of harm. One of the requirements of expert testimony is that it be beyond the common understanding of the jury. Many commentators assume that jurors are uninformed or misinformed about battered women and, thus, that expert testimony is necessary to educate them. This study evaluated what jurors know about violent relationships. Approximately 300 jurors read scenarios about spousal violence and answered a questionnaire dealing with circumstances surrounding such abuse. Results suggest that on certain dimensions of spousal violence, jurors are aware of empirical research findings. On other dimensions, jurors are less well-informed and could potentially benefit from the testimony of an expert.