Australia's highest court raises the patent invalidity bar

In a long-awaited decision, the Australian High Court reviewedseveral key questions pertaining to patent validity and inventivestep in particular; in so doing, it has made it harder to invalidateAustralian patents.     

From Bilski back to Benson: preemption, inventing around, and the case of genetic diagnostics

The long-anticipated decision in Bilski v. Kappos was supposed to end uncertainty regarding the patentability of process claims (or, at the least, business method claims). Instead, the opinion featured a series of anomalies: The Court emphasized strict construction of the Patent Act, but acknowledged three judge-made exceptions to patentability. It disapproved State Street, the Federal Circuit case that had upheld business method patents, but could muster only four votes for the proposition that business methods are in fact unpatentable. But even though the Court upheld business method patents, it invalidated all of Bilski's hedging claims. And while the Justices agreed on one thing - a patent that "preempts" something (a mathematical formula, an approach, a commonly used idea, a wide swath of technological developments, the public's access) is bad - they failed to operationalize the concept. That problem had plagued the law prior to State Street; in the interest of preventing the same set of problems from recurring, this Article uses recent empirical studies on gene patents to tease out indicia ("clues") to supplement the machine-or-transformation test for determining when a claim is preemptive and therefore invalid. Chief among these clues is the inability to invent around claims that cover broad prospects.     

Computer-related inventions: from CFPH to Macrossan

Legal context: The recent joint decision of the Court of Appeal in AerotelLtd v Telco Holdings Ltd and othersand Patent Application byNeal William Macrossan concerns the proper application of theexclusions to patentability under Article 52 of the EuropeanPatent Convention (EPC) and in particular the exclusions concerningcomputer implemented inventions and methods of doing business. Key points: Before this decision, the proper approach to this area of thelaw had been thoroughly discussed and reformulated by DeputyJudge Prescott QC in CFPH followed by a string of first instancecases. There were also numerous decisions of the European PatentOffice, not all of which were consistent. Accordingly, thisis an area fraught with difficulty where it has been difficultto find an overreaching rationale to exclusions based on individualpolicy. The Court of Appeal has now set a new four stage test by whichcomputer implemented inventions should be approached, as wellas patents to which the other exclusions might apply. Practical significance: This new test may not reduce the difficulty of assessing inventionson a case by case basis, but it provides one source of authoritythat can now be followed. Furthermore, it may also prove helpfulthat each of the cases featured in this decision falls on eitherside of Article 52. As such the decision provides a useful,if sketchy, illustration of the dividing line between patentableand non-patentable subject matter.     

Non-obviousness standard under fire: flexible application of TSM test may result in validity challenges against many US patents

The US Supreme Court has reversed a judgment of the FederalCircuit, holding that a flexible application of the TSM testmay result in validity challenges against many US patents.     

US: appeals court dismisses employment discrimination suit by HIV-positive dental hygienist

Shortly before the decision in Toyota Motor Manufacturing, the US Court of Appeals (11th Circuit) issued another restrictive judgment, in a case dealing specifically with HIV-based discrimination. On 21 December 2001, in Waddell v Valley Forge Dental Associates Inc, it dismissed the case of a dental hygienist who sued his employer for suspending him from treating patients after he tested HIV-positive. The decision is a setback for efforts to ensure that the Americans with Disabilities Act translates into actual protection against discrimination for people with HIV/AIDS.     

Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.: Revisiting Pre-emption for Medical Devices

The recent United States Supreme Court decision in Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc. affirmed the doctrine of pre-emption protection only for those medical devices reaching U.S. markets via the PMA (premarketing approval) process and preserved the previous Lohr v. Medtronic decision's lack of preemption protection for those medical devices marketed via the generally more abbreviated 510(k) clearance mechanism. This paper reviews the logic and faults of the Riegel decision and discusses the implications of the Riegel decision for pre-emption protection for other classes of FDA-approved medical products.     

Saint Gobain patron of pharmaceutical patentees?

In recent years there has been much complaint from originatingpharmaceutical companies that the test of obviousness appliedin the UK, as evidenced by decisions of the Patent Court onpharmaceutical related patents, is set unfairly low. This isof particular impact where ‘formulation’ type patentsare concerned. That is, typically, those patents that claiman existing active ingredient mixed, formulated, or combinedwith other known components or in a different way. Pharmaceuticalcompanies complain that the vulnerability of such patents againstinvalidity proceedings in the UK fails to protect the considerableinvestment made in the development of these formulations againstgeneric competition. This article looks at whether the reasons for this concern canbe traced to particular sub-tests that have been used by thecourts to try to answer the statutory test for obviousness.In particular, the sub-tests of ‘lying in the road’and ‘obvious to try’ are examined and the questionof whether there has been an imbalance between these two sub-testsis explored. Further, it is argued that the decisions in therecent cases of Saint-Gobain and Angiotech suggest that therehas been a shift in how the Court of Appeal assesses obviousness.This is away from the ‘obvious to try with a reasonableexpectation of success’ standard to one of ‘obviousto try if success is self-evident’. If the Court of Appeal follows the line taken in these two casesthen pharmaceutical patents of the formulations kind shoulda face better prospect of surviving invalidity challenges basedon obviousness in future.     

Unincorporated software as idea: US Supreme Court limits extraterritorial effect of US patents for software inventions

The US Supreme Court has limited the extraterritorial effectof US patents for software inventions, reversing the previousexpansive interpretation of the Federal Circuit.     

Extraterritorial enforcement: US court refuses to enforce foreign patents

Upholding principles of territoriality, the US Court of Appealsfor the Federal Circuit has refused to extend its jurisdictionto enforce related foreign patents.     

Software patents in the United States: A balanced approach

This paper tracks the interesting journey of software patents in the United States from both a historic and current standpoint. The U.S patent system has drifted from being strict in the 1970s to being fairly lenient in 1990s and now again strict since 2007. The revolutionizing and famous Bilski case that is redefining the boundaries of software patents is described, and the impact of this Court case on software patents is discussed. The challenges in issuing software patents in terms of proving novelty and non-obviousness are presented in an attempt to bring forward some of the questions in the software patent debate. The uniqueness of software as an invention is analyzed to understand why software should be considered differently compared to other industries. The advantages and disadvantages of software patents are discussed. The paper concludes by providing recommendations and proposing a balanced approach to software patents.     

Misuse of private information as a tort: The implications of Google v Judith Vidal-Hall

The Court of Appeal in the recent decision of Google Inc v Judith Vidal Hall¹ has made a number of remarkable rulings in the area of privacy. An important aspect of this decision is that it clarified the legal foundation in which an action for unauthorised disclosure of private information is found. However, the decision itself is not without flaws. This paper seeks to analyse potential problems with the action being classified as a tort as well as the scope of misuse of private information being a form of privacy protection.     

The “process” of patenting: Why should we care about a potential U.S. Supreme Court decision in Bilski v. Doll?

In Bilski v. Doll, the U.S. Supreme Court is called to define one of the categories of patent-eligible subject matter, “process” patents. In 2008, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the category has a narrow meaning, and that to be eligible for a process patent under 35 U.S.C. § 101, the invention must involve a machine or apparatus or involve a transformation to a different state or thing, ultimately rejecting the patent application as unpatentable subject matter. The patent applicants have asked the U.S. Supreme Court to determine two issues: first, the meaning of “process” in 35 U.S.C. § 101 and whether the lower court properly relied on a “machine-or-transformation” test, and second, the test's potential conflict with 35 U.S.C. § 273, which provides protection for “method[s] of doing or conducting business.” The Court's decision could change the way that research and business are done, and patent protection for such investments. Parts 1 and 2 of this article address Bilski directly and what is and is not in dispute. Part 3 addresses the “machine-or-transformation” test, while Parts 4 and 5 address reasons not to adopt such a test.     

The Influence of Congressional Preferences on Legislative Overrides of Supreme Court Decisions

Studies of Court–Congress relations assume that Congress overrides Court decisions based on legislative preferences, but no empirical evidence supports this claim. Our first goal is to show that Congress is more likely to pass override legislation the further ideologically removed a decision is from pivotal legislative actors. Second, we seek to determine whether Congress rationally anticipates Court rejection of override legislation, avoiding legislation when the current Court is likely to strike it down. Third, most studies argue that Congress only overrides statutory decisions. We contend that Congress has an incentive to override all Court decisions with which it disagrees, regardless of their legal basis. Using data on congressional overrides of Supreme Court decisions between 1946 and 1990, we show that Congress overrides Court decisions with which it ideologically disagrees, is not less likely to override when it anticipates that the Court will reject override legislation, and acts on preferences regardless of the legal basis of a decision. We therefore empirically substantiate a core part of separation‐of‐powers models of Court–Congress relations, as well as speak to the relative power of Congress and the Court on the ultimate content of policy.     

Lawyers' Perceptions of the U.S. Supreme Court: Is the Court a “Political” Institution?

Do legal elites—lawyers admitted to federal appellate bars—perceive the Supreme Court as a “political” institution? Legal elites differentiate themselves from the mass public in the amount and sources of information about the Court. They also hold near‐universal perceptions of Court legitimacy, a result we use to derive competing theoretical expectations regarding the impact of ideological disagreement on various Court perceptions. Survey data show that many legal elites perceive the Court as political in its decision making, while a minority perceive the Court as activist and influenced by external political forces. Ideological disagreement with the Court's outputs significantly elevates political perceptions of decision making, while it exhibits a null and moderate impact on perceptions of activism and external political influence, respectively. To justify negative affect derived from ideological disagreement, elites highlight the political aspects of the Court's decision making rather than engage in “global delegitimization” of the institution itself.     

Dagher redux: searching for the missing pieces

The most relevant question for any joint venture is, when does the relationship become a jointventure and not simply a price-fixing cartel? With respect to this question, this Article juxtaposes Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher, 126 S. Ct. 1276 (2006), against years of contrary precedent. In Dagher, the Court altered the seemingly settled foundation of antitrust law by changing its view on past holdings and abandoning the ancillary effects doctrine. The Article provides an outline of key holdings prior to Dagher, as well as a discussion of the issues that can arise as joint ventures are formed. Additionally, the authors examine how the decision altered the foundation of joint venture law in the United States. In particular, the Article exposes several important antitrust concerns relating to joint ventures that the Supreme Court did not address in Dagher. Perhaps the most perplexing issue of Dagher is whether the venture at issue would have survived analysis under the Federal Trade Commission's "continuum" approach.     

A Strange Sort of Survival for Pinnel's Case: Collier v P & M J Wright (Holdings) Limited

This note discusses the decision of the Court of Appeal in Collier v P & M J Wright (Holdings) Limited , and notes that while the Court purports to uphold both the decision in Pinnel's Case and the effect of Re Selectmove , in fact, by an extension of promissory estoppel, it bypasses them.     

Violate, incur sanctions, and exhaust: the steep price of judicial review under Illinois Council

This Article analyzes the decision in Shalala v. Illinois Council on Long Term Care, Inc., in which the Supreme Court held that providers seeking to challenge Medicare regulations must first pursue those challenges through an administrative review process, except when application of this rule would result in "no review at all." In reaching this decision, the five-justice majority rejected the interpretation given to prior holdings by many commentators and circuits, and reasoned that it was appropriate to require providers to exhaust their administrative appeals even though the penalties for the challenged violations would not be stayed during the process. Given the nature of the administrative appeal process and the scope of penalties that may be assessed against Medicare providers, the author argues that the decision in Illinois Council evidences excessive deference towards the agency, or a disinclination on the part of the court towards entertaining Medicare lawsuits, either of which bodes ill for providers seeking judicial relief.     

Google liability for misleading or deceptive conduct: Australian perspective

On 6 of February 2013, the Australian High Court handed down an important decision in respect of the Google Inc's (Google) appeal against the decision of the Full Federal Court of Australia, holding that Google a search engine operator was not liable under s 52 of the Trade Practices Act (TPA) 1974 (Cth) for misleading or deceptive conduct (in respect of misleading advertisements published using Google's online ‘AdWords program’). The decision of the High Court is of great significance for jurisprudence on misleading and deceptive conduct with its broad implications for search engine providers such as Google, advertisers and trademark owners.     

Netherlands court grants copyright protection to perfume scent

In its decision the Supreme Court of the Netherlands has upheldthe decision of the Court of Appeals of 's-Hertogenbosch togrant copyright protection to the scent of the perfume trésorbelonging to Lancôme.     

Closing the Floodgates on Privacy Class Actions: Lloyd v Google LLC

In Lloyd v Google LLC [2021] UKSC 50, the Supreme Court overturned the Court of Appeal's decision, which had allowed a claim under the Data Protection Act 1998 to proceed as a representative action under CPR 19.6. This is significant because the Court of Appeal's decision arguably paved the way for further data protection/privacy claims to be brought as opt-out ‘class actions’ using this procedure. This case note summarises the Supreme Court decision and assesses its implications for both the procedural law of collective redress and the substantive law of privacy in England. It argues that the Supreme Court's reasoning in relation to both of these areas is sound as a matter of precedent and statutory construction. As a matter of public policy, the decision is likely to re-enliven debate about the availability of collective redress in English law and whether the existing collective proceedings regime should be broadened.