Indigenous rights discourse in Australia

The ability of Australia's indigenous people to create their own cultural identity and social reality is shaped profoundly by the Australian legal system in various ways. The 1992Mabo decision of the Australian High Court ‘created’ a right to land tenure for Australia's indigenous people. This ‘right’ has been further explicated by federal legislation in the post-Mabo era, in and around law. This essay analyzes the 1992Mabo decision in the context of governmental, judicial and wider social responses to indigenous issues. At several sites, it examines ‘indigenous rights’ discourse to illustrate the shifting meaning of ‘rights’ in legal currency in the indigenous debate. The essay suggests that the ‘rights’ discourse of legal liberalism has not yet provided meaningful plurality in the recognition of indigenous rights.     

‘I Would Prefer Not To’: Giorgio Agamben, Bartleby and the Potentiality of the Law

In Homo Sacer, Giorgio Agamben suggests that Herman’s Melville’s ‘Bartleby the Scrivener’ offers the ‘strongest objection against the principle of sovereignty’. Bartleby, a legal scribe who does not write, is best known for the formula with which he responds to all his employer’s requests, ‘I would prefer not to.’ This paper examines this formula, asking what it would mean to ‘prefer not to’ when the law is in question. By reading Melville’s story alongside Aristotle’s theory of potentiality and Walter Benjamin’s theses on history, it suggests that Bartleby’s interest, for Agamben, lies in his challenge to dominant conceptions of the relation between potentiality and actuality, which, he believes, are rendered indistinct in sovereignty. By reflecting critically on Agamben’s depiction of Bartleby as a ‘new Messiah’, this paper examines Agamben’s understanding of what it would mean to fulfil the law, and what form of political task this would entail.     

On the unification of legal rules in the European Union

Unification of legal rules in Europe is not a new phenomenon. However, nowadays, Europe is still an area with many different jurisdictions. This paper studies the process of unification of legal rules in the European Union within a non-cooperative game-theoretical framework. This paper contributes to the understanding of the process by concentrating on the role of the European Commission. In the law-and-economics literature, it is argued that national legal rules will converge more or less spontaneously through the works of legislators and judges. But legal convergence in the European Union is not inevitable: preferences toward legal rules differ across nation-states; substituting a legal system for another one is costly; a coordination problem may arise. We first study the interactions of two nation-states who choose non-cooperatively their legal rules. We shall argue that the action of the Commission is, at first sight, likely to eliminate the coordination problem (under certain conditions). Two factors are at work. First, the Commission has a certain expertise which enables it to propose new and perhaps more efficient rules (so that the choice of unification does not reduce to select a particular nation-state legal system). Second, the Commission may use a system of fines that induces nation-states to abide by its rules (once these rules are adopted by nation-states). Next, we refine our first model: the process of legal unification is viewed as a game where nation-states choose the game that they will play. They choose if they will try to reach an agreement without resorting to the actions of the Commission, or if they will play the game implicitely proposed by the Commission. This captures more precisely the action of the Commission, its ‘right of initiative’’, the publication of proposals in ‘green’’ or ‘white papers’’. In this second model, a coordination problem may arise. JEL Classification C72 · K00     

Becoming-Animal,Becoming-Detainee: Encountering Human Rights Discourse in Guantanamo

The Guantanamo detention facility, from its early days an emblem for human rights abuses, is a space where legal subjectivity of detainees is contested or even permanently suspended. This essay argues that we should look for the underlying rationale for this treatment not in the politicians who pursue intelligence, security, and strategic interest, or indeed even revenge for 9/11, but rather in the logic—or the ontology—that drives the present political and legal system. This is not to say, of course, that politicians play no role, or that they are mere ‘victims’ of social and political power relations—far from it; yet, it has to be acknowledged that the foundational assumptions on which the existing system operates create conditions of possibility for such degrading actions and exclusionary politics. This paper will first explore these philosophical foundations that enable such an understanding of exclusionary legal subjectivity as we see practiced in Guantanamo, amongst other places; secondly, it will search for an alternative logic of legal subjectivity as a ‘foundation’ for rights. Gilles Deleuze’s notion of ‘becoming’ as a potentially facilitative practice for an ‘open’ notion of legal subjectivity, as well as Alain Badiou’s account of ethics and evil, which points to a more ‘inclusive’ yet ‘situational’ understanding of human rights, will prove particularly useful here.     

His master’s voice: H.L.A. Hart and Lacanian discourse theory

H.L.A. Hart’s jurisprudence seems antithetical to Jacques Lacan’s psychoanalysis. Professor Schroeder argues that, in fact, Hart’s concept of law has surprising similarities to Lacan’s ‘discourse of the Master’. Both reject a command theory of law: subjects do not obey law out of fear. Moreover, both insist that the authority of law is completely independent from its content. Anyone seeking to develop a psychoanalytically sophisticated critical legal theory should reconsider Hart. As insightful as his concept of the symbolic is, Lacan has no expertise in legal systems and does not discuss positive law per se. Although he posited a theory of ethics in his Seventh Seminar and the seeds of a jurisprudence are implicit within his theory, he offers no account of legal right, justice or what Hart misleadingly calls ‘morality’. A Lacanian jurisprudence must, therefore, be supplemented by other sources. Moreover, legal positivists should not dismiss psychoanalysis. As insightful as Hart’s jurisprudence is, his theories of legal subjectivity and linguistics are simplistic and his concept of law too narrow. He describes only one aspect of legal experience: obedience to law. He ignores what most legal actors do: Hart’s concept of law excludes the practice of law. Although Lacan’s ‘master’s discourse’ surprisingly parallels Hart’s jurisprudence, Lacan does not restrict the symbolic to the master’s discourse. It requires three other ‘discourses’. Lacan, therefore, supplements Hart. Specifically, Lacan’s fourth discourse describes the excluded practice of law and provides the mechanism by which ‘morality’ can critique law.

Finding cover: Legal trauma and how to take care of it

As law originates in violence, it is always haunted by its constitutive trauma. Recourse to law's origin, which is implicitly or explicitly sought in (constitutional) adjudication, thus requires a way to deal with law's trauma. What is needed is a cover, to be provided through (legal) interpretation. Four such interpretive ‘cover up’ operations, all necessarily somewhat duplicitous, are discussed. The first three represent main currents in legal theory. First, the standard legal view, which denies the trauma but relies on traditional authority to cover it. Second, a ‘neurotic’ solution, in which trauma is also denied but nevertheless cover is produced through collective interpretation. In the third, ‘perverse’ solution, trauma is admitted, and even enjoyed; on the other hand, it is denied that cover can be produced by any interpretive authority. The fourth option provides an alternative: recognition of law's trauma, covering it through the collectively shared practice of interpretation. It is shown that an example of such a collective effort can be found in the Dutch practice of gedogen, the deliberate under-enforcement of law, which is capable of creating an ‘informal rule of law’ that deals with intractable social problems more successfully than attempts formally to enforce applicable law. This revised version was published online in November 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Legal ethnography: Exploring the gendered nature of legal method

Beginning with the idea of law as discourse, this essay examines the ways in which legal method is gendered. Texts, such as affidavits and court forms, and local ‘mundane’ practices are part of the production and affirmation of the law as a producer of truth. A possible methodology for exploring legal method, ‘legal ethnography,’ is introduced as a means by which wemight explicate how legal method works to support and reify legal discourse, in the process silencing the voices of women. The essay also explores how legal method comes to be accepted as a ‘tool of the trade’ by lawyers, who then use it to translate the primary narrative of the client into a cause of action that is comprehensible to lawyers, judges, and other actors in the legal system. Finally, the limitations of the proposed methodology are considered.     

Ideas of Transgression and Buddhist Monks

It is implicit in a western understanding of law that law is a series of generalisations, which are universal and which aim to promote social community. At the same time ‘law’ is expected to operate in a territory (rather than for specific people or castes) where it applies, and to apply to a community of rights-bearing subjects. Such a view of law may have reflected part of the values of the European Enlightenment where law was seen as a rational science and where religion has been seen as excluded from law. An alternative route in the study of law is to study ‘transgressions’. The literature on ‘transgression’ suggests transgressions form an amorphous category and a proper examination of them is not closed by the normal taxonomy between the studies of ‘law as obedience’ versus ‘laws as violation’. In one sense transgressions are part of the rule, yet a separate category in their own right. I use the concept of ‘transgression’ to attempt to describe the legal significance of ‘violations’ in the rules of the Buddhist monks (Vinaya). I conclude that a proper consideration of the role of sexual desire in the Vinaya allows me to show that ‘violations were accepted within an institutional framework, that ‘violators’ were not excluded from the order of monks and that sexual experience could be seen as an alternative, if controversial, path of spiritual development.     

The Role of Narratives in Legal Education

The significance of narrative as the primary form of human communication forms the basis of this paper. Following a brief consideration of the natural inter-relationship between law and narrative, the author goes on to discuss the more specific application of a narrative approach to legal scholarship and legal education. The paper sets out the findings of a practical research project that took as its inspiration James Boyd White’s portrayal of the law student as a creative and imaginative thinker, and Martha Nussbaum’s claim that it is through the power of ‘narrative imagination’ that we gain a broader appreciation and understanding of humanity. It explains how a group of law students participated in ‘the Narrative Research Project’ at the University of Leicester; participating in story-telling seminars and creating their own fictional narratives from appellate case reports. It describes the students’ reaction to the project as heartening in the sense that they became more aware of the significant role that human actors play in legal proceedings, but it also expresses doubts over the extent to which such an approach can, by itself, cultivate humanity in the law school.     

Feminism and the siren call of law

Feminists have so often declared and celebrated the fecundity of the relationship between feminism and legal reform that critique of legal doctrine and norms, together with proposals for their reconstruction, have become the hallmarks of the modern feminist engagement with law. Yet today the long-cherished ‘truth’ about law’s potentially beneficial impact on women’s lives has started to fade and the quest for legal change has become fraught with problems. In responding to the aporetic state in which feminist legal scholarship now finds itself, this paper offers a recounting of the relationship between feminism and the politics of legal reform. However, in so doing, it seeks neither to support nor to oppose these politics. Instead, it explores the historical contingencies that made this discourse possible. Utilizing Foucault’s concept of episteme, it demarcates the nineteenth century as the historical moment in which this discourse arose, and tracing the epistemic shifts underpinning the production of knowledge, locates its positivities at the interface of the time’s episteme and the discourse of transcendental subjectivity that it engendered.

Legal Environment,Firm-level Corporate Governance and Expropriation of Minority Shareholders in Asia

Claessens et al. (2000, Journal of Financial Economics 58(1–2), 81–112) show that corporate control is substantially enhanced by using pyramid structures and cross-holdings by firms in nine East Asian countries. Claessens et al. (1999, SSRN Working Paper; 2002, Journal of Finance 57(2), 2741–2771) provide empirical evidence regarding expropriation arising from the separation of cash flow from voting rights in Asian firms. Their analysis suggests a high degree of expropriation in Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. We re-examine the problem of expropriation in Asian firms reported by earlier research. We explore firm-level governance-control structure interactions, and control-legal environment interaction for a set of Asian firms for which we are able to obtain relevant data for all the required variables. The major contribution of this paper is that it jointly examines ownership-control structure, firm-level governance and country-level legal protection available to external suppliers of capital. Using post-crisis data, we find a strong country effect in governance. In general, high control firms in countries with weak legal protection have lower firm-level governance scores in general. On the other hand, high control firms, in countries which have a stronger legal protection environment, signal their intention to not expropriate minority shareholders’ wealth by voluntarily adopting measures to strengthen their discipline and responsibility scores. Contrary to earlier findings, we do not find a relationship between control-ownership wedge and firm value. Furthermore, we do not find any relation between firm-level governance and firm value as measured by Tobin’s Q.     

The Lawyer, the Judge, the Historian: Shaping the Meaning of the Boston Massacre, American Revolution, and Popular Opinion from 1770 to the Present Day

Both the Kevelson Seminar topic, ‘Lawyers as Makers of Meaning,’ and the appearance of a highly-publicized television series in the United States dedicated to the life of President John Adams (1735–1826) invite inquiry into Adams’ role as a lawyer who shaped the meaning of the American Revolution (and his role in bringing it about). Three trials from Adams’ early legal career illustrate that he presented both himself and fellow resistance leader James Otis, Jr., as heroic loners struggling for the rights of Americans against British injustice. Although he did not call it that, in 1970 lawyer and future Massachusetts Superior Court Justice Hiller Zobel, in his book The Boston Massacre, undertook what we would consider a semiotic approach that investigated the relevant codes and contexts—both the legal complexities and the audiences, other lawyers, judges, and posterity about which Adams spoke, simplifying and minimizing their roles as he maximized his own (and Otis’s). Zobel’s own relationship with Adams’ legal career appeared in his own tenure on the bench, especially in the famous ‘Nanny’ (discussed by Denis Brion, in this issue) case in which he explicitly presented the Boston Massacre Trials as a relevant precedent. Despite Adams’ willingness to subordinate his clients’ welfare to the patriot cause early in his career, it can be argued that HBO television and historian David McCullough, by presenting him to the public only flawed by his outspoken, stubborn honesty, have nevertheless performed a public service. Their version of Adams offers Americans in the twenty-first century an alternative role model to the dishonest, ill-informed politicians who use public opinion polls rather than political theory, moral philosophy, and historical knowledge as the basis of their decisions.     

The Structure of Conflicts of Fundamental Legal Rights

In recent years, the most widespread doctrine about the conflicts between fundamental (usually constitutional) legal rights could be summarized in the following three main theses: (1) The elements in conflict are legal principles, as opposed to legal rules; (2) Those conflicts are not consequences of the existence of inconsistencies or antinomies between the norms involved, but rather depend on the empirical circumstances of the case. In other words, the norms are logically consistent and the conflicts are not determinable a priori or in abstracto, but only in concreto; and (3) The classical criteria for solving conflicts between norms, such as lex superior, lex posterior and lex specialis, are not suitable to solve conflicts among fundamental legal rights. Indeed, they require a specific method known as ‘weighing and balancing’. Although all three theses could be (and indeed have been) regarded as problematic, in this paper I address mainly the second one. I try to show that there is room for a tertium genus between antinomies (deontic inconsistencies) and conflicts caused by strict empirical circumstances that I call ‘contextual antinomies’. There are situations in which the norms involved are not inconsistent but the conflict arises for logical reasons. My thesis is that many conflicts between fundamental legal rights fall in this category. I offer, in an appendix, a proposal of formalization of this kind of conflict and the elements involved in it.     

Strategies of Rupture

The paper is an exploration in critical legal theory, and argues for a return to thinking of critical legal intervention in political-strategic terms. If the insistence is on strategies of rupture it is because the attention is on what registers as resistant, neither reducible to—nor co-optable by—the order it seeks to resist. It is argued that if law is to offer redress to injustice it has to offer terms that can break incongruently, irreducibly so, with the order of capital, and its economy of representation, not couching critique within its terms, taking flight into the mysticism and escapism of the ‘ethical turn’, or entrusting critique unconditionally to the deconstructive energies of the law. The paper explores how difficult the task facing critical legal theory is in view of law’s power of ‘homology’ and its ‘mechanisms of deadlock’. Both within the courtroom (the focus here is on the tactics of rupture of the lawyer Vergès) and outside it, a return to a strategic understanding of law underlies its deployment as means of critique (‘simple’ or ‘immanent’) or object of confrontation rather than horizon of communicative exchange.     

Reflections on Waldron’s Archetypes

Jeremy Waldron argued that the government lawyers responsible for the ‘torture memos’ acted unprofessionally by undermining the prohibition on torture. He did so partly on the basis that that the torture prohibition represents a ‘legal archetype’ which cannot be undermined without doing considerable harm to large bodies of law. This paper argues that, however much intuitive appeal Waldron’s archetype-based analysis may have, its force is inherently limited. This is so for two reasons. First, the claim that the torture prohibition is an archetype for non-brutality can only make a meaningful difference to the integrity of the legal order insofar as ‘brutality’ is understood widely. Waldron, though, reads ‘brutality’ in a narrow fashion. Second, and more importantly, the claim that archetypes are uniquely important to legal reasoning and the legal order is deeply problematic.     

Politics of Law and the Lacanian Real

The paper explores the role of Jacques Lacan’s Ethics of Psychoanalysis in debates in law and legal philosophy. It proceeds by considering a debate between Slavoj Žižek and Judith Butler over Lacan’s concept of the real, which forms part of a larger discussion over the future of democracy and the rule of law (Butler et al. 2000). Through reference to discussions of the relationship between law and ethics based on the Antigone tragedy, I argue that the difference between Žižek and Butler’s positions should not be understood in terms of the correctness of their reading of Lacan, but in terms of the political commitments that inform their respective interpretations. I explain the implications of this debate over one of Lacan’s most enigmatic concepts, thereby showing how Lacan’s theory can be used to rethink the politics of law in light of the increased emphasis on ethics in contemporary legal debates.     

Kant, Copyright and Communicative Freedom

The rapid recent expansion of copyright law worldwide has sparked efforts to defend the ‘public domain’ of non-propertized information, often on the ground that an expansive public domain is a condition of a ‘free culture’. Yet questions remain about why the public domain is worth defending, what exactly a free culture is, and what role (if any) authors’ rights might play in relation to it. From the standard liberal perspective shared by many critics of copyright expansionism, the protection of individual expression by means of marketable property rights in authors’ works serves as an engine of progress towards a fully competitive ‘marketplace of ideas’ – though only if balanced by an extensive public domain from which users may draw in the exercise of their own expressivity. This article shows that a significantly different, and arguably richer, conception of what a free culture is and how authors’ rights underpin it emerges from a direct engagement with the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. For Kant, progress towards a fully emancipated (i.e. a ‘mature’ or ‘enlightened’) culture can only be achieved through the critical intellectual activity that public communication demands: individual expressive freedom is only a condition, not constitutive, of this ‘freedom to make public use of one’s reason in all matters’. The main thesis defended in this article is that when Kant’s writings on publicity (critical public debate) are read in relation to his writings on the legal organization of publishing, a necessary connection emerges between authors’ rights – as distinct from copyrights – and what Jürgen Habermas and others have named the public sphere. I conclude that it is the public sphere, and not the public domain as such, that should serve as the key reference point in any evaluation of copyright law’s role in relation to the possibility of a free culture.     

Legal Aid,Self-Representation,And The Crisis At The Hague Tribunal

The unfolding of the case of Prosecutor v. Vojislav ŠeŠelj at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has been dramatic and more than a little chaotic. The author argues that it is diagnostic of a broader crisis at the Tribunal. As an experiment in international justice, the ad hoc tribunal model has proved to be expensive and slow, but on several points also procedurally arbitrary, intellectually unconvincing, and vulnerable to improper political considerations. These problems have attained a critical mass in ŠeŠelj’s case, as illustrated here. The accused ŠeŠelj, an ultranationalist politician and former paramilitary leader, has vowed to bring the Tribunal to its knees. He is self- represented at trial. This privilege was twice reaffirmed in 2006 by the ICTY Appeals Chamber, having been twice revoked by a bench of trial judges. In 2007, the new pre-trial judge in the case (now presiding judge), Jean-Claude Antonetti, declared that a self-represented accused who can prove indigence is entitled to legal aid. He ordered the Registrar of the Tribunal to pay ŠeŠelj’s defence expenses from the Tribunal’s legal aid budget if ŠeŠelj could prove his indigence. The author argues that while there is good reason to disburse legal aid funds to an indigent accused who has been granted privileges of self-representation, this entitlement was not convincingly explained by Antonetti. Moreover, ŠeŠelj’s destructive aims were improperly set aside by Antonetti in reaching his decision on the public financing of his defence. The current situation, which represents the combined effort of the Appeals Chamber and Antonetti, allows ŠeŠelj to bully participants in the proceedings, issue thinly veiled threats to prospective witnesses and the public at large, and bend the trial procedure to the requirements of his political populism. The poor handling of this case by the Tribunal as a whole calls into question the ad hoc tribunal model of international criminal justice. In the period 2003–2007, the author was a legal advisor to ICTY trial judges, working for a short time on the Vojislav ŠeŠelj case prior to its transfer to Judge Antonetti.     

The Critic’s Love of The Law: Intimate Observations on an Insular Jurisdiction

This article, which should not in any sense be taken to reflect the views of the Editorial Board of Law and Critique, argues that the political project of critical legal studies in England remains overwhelmingly in the future. Lacking academic identity, political purpose and ethical conviction, critical legal scholarship in England has been too insecure in its institutional place and too unconscious of its individual and collective desires to resist absorption into the institution. Critical legal studies – as distinct from feminist legal studies, gay and lesbian studies or critical race theory –has tended to teach and so reproduce the core curriculum in a passive and negative mode. Resistant, ostensibly for historical and political reasons, to self-criticism and indeed to self-reflection upon their institutional practices, critical scholars have ended up repeating the law that they came to critique and overcome. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.