Command Responsibility: Mode of Liability for the Crimes of Subordinates or Separate Offence of the Superior?

The nature of command responsibility is still open to debatein international criminal law: is a superior to be held criminallyresponsible for the crimes committed by his subordinates ‘asan accomplice’, for having participated in the commissionof the crime by omission, or as a perpetrator of a separateoffence of dereliction of duty? This article surveys the post-WW2case law and the first international instruments on this point,and then analyses the jurisprudence of the International CriminalTribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The judges appearto have recently adopted a new approach to Article 7(3) ICTYSt.in that the superior is held responsible ‘for failureto prevent or punish with regard to the crimes of the subordinate’and no longer ‘for the crimes of his subordinates’.It is a responsibility ‘sui generis’ indeed, wherethe crime of the subordinate plays a central role in the attributionof responsibility to the superior. It is, therefore, necessaryto carefully consider the relationship between the superior'sfailure to act and the subordinate's crime, both with regardto objective and subjective elements. The same question finallyarises in relation to Article 28 of the Rome Statute, the literalinterpretation of which implies that a superior shall be punishedfor the same crime committed by his subordinates. In order toavoid the risk of holding a person guilty of an offence committedby others in violation of the principle of personal and culpablecriminal responsibility, it is crucial to consider separatelythe different cases of command responsibility, which are basedon distinct objective and subjective requirements.     

Interactions between National and International Criminal Law in the Preliminary Phase of Trial at the ICC

The author discusses the interaction between international andnational law in determining whether a case is admissible fromthe viewpoint of complementarity (Article 17 of the Statuteof the International Criminal Court) and with regard to theconcept of ‘interests of justice’ (Article 53 ofthe same Statute). Complementarity does not separate nationalfrom international criminal jurisdiction; nor does it put themin conflict with each other — rather, it favours the aforementionedinteraction. In addition, the concepts of ‘ability’and ‘willingness’ tend to ensure an indirect harmonizationof national criminal systems around common international criteria.As for reliance on the notion of ‘interests of justice’when determining whether to initiate proceedings, accordingto the author, Article 53 envisages a compromise between prosecutorialdiscretion and strict legality, thereby enshrining a hybridizationbetween various national traditions. The author notes that thedecision to open investigations should be objective and foreseeable;to this end, she suggests some general criteria, which are intendedto serve as guidelines for establishing whether, in a specificcase, the interests of justice warrant the initiation of proceedings.     

Remarks on the General Part of International Criminal Law

After decades of little reflection on the General Part of InternationalCriminal Law (‘ICL’), the practice of the Ad HocTribunals and Part III of the ICC Statute both offer a uniqueopportunity and create a necessity to give more thought to therules of attribution for international crimes. Indeed, the aimof further research must be to develop a more refined systemof attribution. This is especially important in ICL, since itis primarily concerned with high level perpetrators who rarelycommit the crimes themselves but use mid- or low-level perpetratorsto execute their criminal plans. While ICL ‘in action’is recognized today as primarily criminal law, the rules ofattribution are still underdeveloped. Some rules developed bythe case law even violate, when applied in their extreme form,fundamental principles of criminal law. Identifying and applyingthese principles, specifically the principles of legality andculpability, will be the first step in constructing a more legitimatesystem of attribution.     

The Proper Limits of Individual Responsibility under the Doctrine of Joint Criminal Enterprise

Joint criminal enterprise (JCE) as a mode of liability in internationalcriminal law is a concept widely upheld by international caselaw. It has, however, been harshly attacked by commentators,particularly with regard to what has come to be known as the‘third category’ of the notion, that of liabilitybased on foreseeability and the voluntary taking of the riskthat a crime outside the common plan or enterprise be perpetrated.This author considers that while most criticisms are off themark, at least two are pertinent: (i) that the InternationalCriminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) Appeals Chamberin Tadi (1999) was wrong in indiscriminately using terminologytypical of both the civil law and common law tradition, and(ii) that the foreseeability standard, being somewhat looseas a penal law category of culpability and causation, needssome qualification or precision. Generally speaking, the notionof JCE needs some tightening up. For instance, in Kvoka, anICTY Trial Chamber rightly stressed that the contribution ofa participant in a common criminal plan must be ‘substantial’(the Appeals Chamber, however, disagreed to some extent in thesame case). Furthermore, with specific regard to the third categoryof JCE, the author, after setting out the social and legal foundationsof the foreseeability standard and the motivations behind itsacceptance in international criminal law, suggests various waysof qualifying and straightening it out. One of them could liein assigning to the ‘primary offender’ (i.e. theperson who, in addition to committing the concerted crimes,also perpetrates a crime not part of the common plan or purpose)liability for all the crimes involved, while charging the ‘secondaryoffender’ with liability for a lesser crime, wheneverthis is legally possible. The author then suggests, contraryto a 2004 decision of the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Branin, thatthe third category of JCE may not be admissible when the crimeother than that agreed upon requires special intent (this appliesto genocide, persecution as a crime against humanity, and aggression).In such cases, the other participants in JCE could only be chargedwith aiding and abetting the crimes committed by the ‘primaryoffender’ if the requisite conditions for aiding and abettingdo exist. The author then suggests that the view propoundedin 2004 by an ICTY Trial Chamber in Branin is sound, namelythat the general notion of JCE may not be resorted to when thephysical perpetrators of the crimes charged were not part ofthe criminal plan or agreement, but rather committed the crimesunaware that a plan or agreement had been entered into by anothergroup of persons. In conclusion, he contends that this qualifiednotion of JCE, in addition to being provided for in customaryinternational law, does not appear to be inconsistent with abroad interpretation of the provision of the ICC Statute governingindividual criminal responsibility, that is, Article 25, inparticular 25(3)(d).     

Violence and Massacres -- Towards a Criminal Law of Inhumanity?

The law's responses to massacres seem to vacillate between twomodels: (i) the model of the ‘criminal law of the enemy’inspired by the national criminal law and rendered topical againby the attacks of September 11; (ii) the model of the ‘criminallaw of inhumanity’ symbolized by the paradigm of crimesagainst humanity. The latter model is better suited to takeaccount of the qualitative dimension of massacres, i.e. thefact that they, besides being mass offences (quantitative criterion),also offend against humanity. To establish a ‘criminallaw of inhumanity’ as a model with a universal, or universalizable,dimension, three conditions are necessary, which concern (i)the definition of the crimes, (ii) the assignment of responsibilityand (iii) the nature of the punishment. As for the definitionof the crime, one could implicitly deduce from the list of actsconstituting crimes against humanity (Article 7 of the InternationalCriminal Court Statute) that humanity so protected has two inseparablecomponents: the individuality of each human being, not reducibleto membership in a group, and the equal membership of each inthe human community as a whole. With regard to the second condition,it is not sufficient to hold responsible the de jure or de factoleaders; intermediaries and perpetrators, at all levels of hierarchy,must also be held accountable. As for the third condition, itis not sufficient to content oneself with the watchword of thefight against impunity without bringing up the nature and functionsof the punishment; hence the necessity not only to rethink therole ‘criminal’ law can play in a policy of punishment,but also to focus on prevention, reparation and reconciliation.Finally, the author suggests that the proposed model of a ‘criminallaw of inhumanity’ must be built through the interplaybetween municipal law and international law. On the one hand,the wealth of national legal systems — also with regardto penalties and responsibility — should be better integratedinto international criminal justice; on the other, nationalcriminal systems should be better adapted to conditions of internationallaw, through the introduction into domestic law of the definitionsof the crimes and also the rules for assigning criminal responsibility.     

An Odd Couple: Domestic Crimes and International Responsibility in the Special Tribunal for Lebanon

This article examines one of the most serious flaws of the Statuteof the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (‘STL’): whileit provides that Lebanese domestic law is the sole source ofcrimes over which the STL will have jurisdiction, it at thesame time applies to these domestic crimes uniquely internationalforms of criminal responsibility, namely joint criminal enterpriseand command responsibility. By doing so, the Statute is in violationof the nullum crime sine lege principle, since it would allowfor the conviction of persons who could not be held responsibleunder Lebanese law. The purpose of this article is to highlightsome ways out of this problem.     

Corporate Liability for International Crimes under Canada's Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act

Given that the Rome Statute does not provide jurisdiction totry corporations for breaches of international criminal law,it has been suggested that national jurisdictions might be usedto fill this impunity gap. The author presents several arguments.First, the international criminal law system, including theRome Statute — and particularly the principles of universaljurisdiction and complementarity — provides the theoreticalgrounding for states to assert jurisdiction over internationalcrimes wider than the International Criminal Court (ICC). Second,Canada, owing to interactions between its domestic legislationimplementing the ICC Statute and existing national criminallaw, is now able to prosecute corporations for breaches of internationalcriminal law. Finally, this increased jurisdiction of Canadiancourts is consistent with the current status of corporationsunder international criminal law. What is really interestingabout Canada's approach, however, is not so much that it hascreated a new legal principle, but rather that it is one ofthe first countries to establish jurisdiction over internationalcrimes committed by corporate entities which were previouslycommitted with impunity.

By stating that I could not guaranteethat the army is not using forced labour, I certainly implythat they might, (and they might) but I am saying that we donot have to monitor the army's behaviour: we have our responsibilities;they have their responsibilities; and we refuse to be pushedin to assuming more than what we can really guarantee. Aboutforced labour used by troops assigned to provide security onour pipeline project, let us admit between Unocal and Totalthat we might be in a grey zone.¹

     

Joint Criminal Enterprise and Command Responsibility

The joint criminal enterprise doctrine appears more and moreas the ‘magic weapon’ in the prosecution of internationalcrimes. Yet, the doctrine not only gives rise to conceptualconfusion and conflicts with some fundamental principles of(international) criminal law but also invades the traditionalambit of command responsibility liability. This becomes obviousif both doctrines are applied simultaneously in cases againstaccused with some kind of superior position. After a short introductionon both doctrines, as interpreted in modern case law, the articlegives some examples of their simultaneous application and triesto develop distinguishing criteria in light of the case lawand a ‘dogmatic’ analysis of both the doctrines.A reference to the theory of ‘Organisationsherrschaft’shows that there is yet another option to impute internationalcrimes to top perpetrators.     

Rethinking Guantanamo: Unlawful Confinement as Applied in International Criminal Law

Although criticism of US-led detention at GuantánamoBay has been extensive, little attention has been placed onevaluating the implications of international humanitarian lawstandards as applied in international criminal law. This paperconcludes that there is a striking resemblance between allegationsmade of Guantánamo and many of the scenarios that havegiven rise to individual criminal responsibility for unlawfulconfinement as a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions in othercontexts. In this regard, arguments that individuals who donot enjoy prisoner-of-war status fall into a legal vacuum orthat international humanitarian law has somehow been renderedobsolete by the ‘War on Terror’ ignore the factthat international criminal precedents unambiguously disagree.If nothing else, an analysis of international criminal law'streatment of unlawful confinement highlights the urgent needto rethink the legal basis for detention at Guantánamoand the risks of individual criminal responsibility for purportingto develop international humanitarian law through unilateralchanges in policy rather than formal international law-makingprocesses.     

On the Use of Criminal Law Notions in Determining State Responsibility for Genocide

On the face of it the 1948 Convention on Genocide appears tobe a treaty that on the one hand obliges contracting statesto criminalize and punish genocide in their domestic legal systemsand, on the other, arranges for interstate judicial cooperationfor the repression of genocide. The International Court of Justice(ICJ), in the Bosnia v. Serbia judgment, has instead held thatthe Convention, in addition to providing for the criminal liabilityof individuals, also imposes on contracting states as internationalsubjects a set of obligations (to refrain from engaging in genocide,to prevent and punish the crime, and also to refrain for allthose categories of conduct enumerated in Article III: conspiracy,incitement, attempt, complicity). This approach raises two questions:(i) is it warranted so to broaden states' responsibility? (ii)when applying such Article III categories to state responsibility,should an international court such as the ICJ that pronounceson interstate disputes rely upon criminal law categories toestablish whether a state incurs responsibility for conspiracy,complicity, and so on? Or should it instead forge autonomouslegal categories better suited to state responsibility? Theauthor sets forth doubts about whether it is appropriate totranspose criminal law categories to the corpus of internationallaw of state responsibility. In particular, his misgivings relateto the category of ‘state complicity in genocide’as set out by the Court: once the Court decided to transplantthis criminal law category to state responsibility, arguablyit should have relied upon the rigorous concept of complicity,as derived by international criminal courts from case law andthe relevant practice of states, rather than apply a notionthat finds no basis in international criminal law, in comparativecriminal law or in state practice.     

The Alien Tort Statute: Blackstone and Criminal/Tort Law Hybridities

The importation of criminal law concepts into the area of civillaw is attracting increasing interest. The United States’Alien Tort Statute (ATS), though principally known for enablinginternational human rights suits to be filed in the domesticcourts of the United States, also imports criminal law notionsinto civil litigation. This article explores the hybrid natureof the ATS in the context of the development of internationallaw, and raises the question of whether ‘grandeur’is a principal reason for the ATS’ existence.     

International Law and Detention of US Asylum Seekers: Contrasting Matter of D-J- with the United Nations Refugee Convention

US refugee law reflects an ever-increasing conception that theapplication of international standards would constitute an unacceptablerisk to national security. CSR Article 31(2)’s requirementthat refugees ‘shall not’ be detained unless ‘necessary’appears among the chief casualties of such suspicions. US jurisprudenceremains strikingly devoid of reference to Article 31, and 2003’sMatter of D-J- is a prime example. D-J- was an administrativedecision in which the US Attorney General held that nationalsecurity required all US asylum seekers who successfully arrivevia boat must be subject to mandatory detention throughout thecourse of removal proceedings. Despite US accession to the Protocol,Article 31(2) was not mentioned. This article explores what might have happened to D-J- if theRefugee Convention had indeed been applied to his case. Utilizingthe international methodology for treaty interpretation, itapplies Article 31(2) to various aspects of the Attorney General'sdecision. Part 2 argues that under the Supreme Court's CharmingBetsy rule, statutory discretion to detain must be interpretedconsistently with US international obligations. Part 3 concludesthat Article 31(2) of the Refugee Convention grants asylum seekersa right to release whenever their detention is not ‘necessary’.Part 4 proposes a three-part ‘pyramid’ approachto explain the elemental phases of the decision to detain anasylum seeker and examines necessity at each stage. Finally,Part 5 discusses Article 31(2)’s implications regardingevidence and proportion. The premise throughout is that, hadit been applied, the Refugee Convention could have protectedthe interests of both D-J- and ‘national security’.     

The Nuremberg Trial and its Impact on Germany

The impact of the Nuremberg trial on Germany has changed overtime. It is not only a question of evolving legal debate, butalso a correlation of historical, political and moral developments.The author considers the reception of the International MilitaryTribunal (IMT) trial during the Cold War. West Germany rejectedNuremberg's historic precedent, principally on the grounds thatthe Allies had enforced victors’ justice, and that theTribunal had applied ex post facto law by violating the nullumcrimen principle. Meanwhile, East Germany seemingly took upthe cause of Nuremberg by prosecuting minor Nazi perpetrators.However, this affirmation was politically motivated, and itled to inhumane abuses of power, exemplified by the Waldheimtrials. The reunification of Germany marked the beginning ofa positive approach to the Nuremberg legacy: the new generationof judges, politicians and academics was increasingly sympatheticto international criminal justice, and adopted the Nurembergprecedent by dealing judicially with crimes committed in theEast during the Cold War. The study goes on to deal with therelevance of West German legal critique for modern internationalcriminal law. The author suggests that a distinction shouldbe made between true victims of international crimes and thosewho wish to revise history by portraying themselves as such,as many West Germans did after World War II. Moreover, the ‘victors’justice’ argument must not be used to conceal the factthat justice has indeed been administered. However, the criticismof the IMT's violation of the nullum crimen principle is firmlygrounded in the German, as opposed to Anglo-American, legaltradition.     

The Enforcement of Arrest Warrants by International Forces: From the ICTY to the ICC

The conflict in the former Yugoslavia set a precedent in modernhistory for having a multinational military force being empoweredand directed to execute arrest warrants issued by an internationalcriminal tribunal. On legal grounds, the International CriminalTribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) attained this resultby relying on the broad wording of its governing Statute coupledwith the ICTY's own rule-making powers. In contrast, the draftersof the International Criminal Court (ICC) Statute elaboratedon the nature of the cooperation from international forces insignificantly more details but at the same time opted for reducingthe ICC's powers vis-à-vis these forces. Therefore, theICC Statute now runs contrary to the ICTY's case law recognizinga judicial power to order an international force to executean ICTY arrest warrant. This deferential stance towards collectiveenterprises of states not only infringes upon the States Parties’general obligation to cooperate with the ICC, but, in the end,weakens the ICC's ability to enforce international criminaljustice.     

Asylum Claims and Drug Offences: the Seriousness Threshold of Article 1F(b) of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the UN Drug Conventions

Asylum claims lodged by individuals who were involved in drugactivities prior to their entry into the country of asylum raisecomplex questions as to whether they have committed a seriousnon-political crime under Article 1F(b) of the 1951 Conventionand thus shall be excluded from refugee protection. The 1988 UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugsand Psychotropic Substances (Trafficking Convention) —which is the relevant international framework for drugs in thefield of international criminal law — indiscriminatelyconsiders all forms of supply related drug offences as ‘seriouscriminal offences’, irrespective of individual criminalresponsibility. This conflicts with the complex nature of thedrug industry particularly in countries affected by armed conflictand proportionality considerations inherent to Article 1F(b). Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treatiesprovide a possibility to reconcile the ambiguous wording ofthe Trafficking convention with Article 1F(b) by means of interpretation.Offences for personal consumption as the least serious drugoffences do not reach the seriousness threshold of Article 1F(b).Trafficking offences in turn attain the seriousness thresholdonly if aggravating circumstances prevail over mitigating circumstances,and if there are no grounds for rejecting individual responsibilityor defenses to criminal liability. International, large-scaleactivities carried out by transnational organized criminal groupsare factors that make drug offences most serious.     

An Inquiry into the Turkish 'School' of International Law

This paper seeks to examine major Turkish textbooks of publicinternational law, focusing particularly on a small number ofcore areas in this discipline: historical origins and basicfeatures; formal sources; main subjects; the law of territory;international law and development. These textbooks show a stronginclination towards Eurocentrism and positivism due to theirdenial of the vigour of ‘soft law’, as manifestedfor instance in UN General Assembly resolutions, and of theirmarginal treatment of ‘international law and development’.What is more, substantive issues of international law are notdiscussed in a critical way; rather the procedures of the disciplineare given priority. This is almost to suggest that Turkish internationallaw scholars hold the view that their raison d’êtreis confined to ‘technical expertise’, and that therelationship between law, other disciplines and society liesoutside their domain. In the final analysis, therefore, thehard core of issues integral to international law and havinga deep impact on international politics, such as the searchfor a New International Economic Order (NIEO), the principleof self-determination and human rights are either entirely bypassedor treated only very narrowly in Turkish international law textbooks.     

Finding a Proper Role for Command Responsibility

This article examines the role that command responsibility currentlyplays in the case law of the International Criminal Tribunalfor the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International CriminalTribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). The ad hoc tribunals rely in principleon a broad concept of command responsibility – which canbe applied to all superiors, including political and civilianones. However, in practice, accused persons have only rarelybeen successfully charged under this form of liability. Indeed,recent case law has gradually adopted a rigorous approach withrespect to the legal requirements of command responsibility.This has made it more difficult to establish criminal liabilityof superiors who have not directly participated in the commissionof international offences. The ad hoc tribunals have expressedan explicit preference for forms of ‘direct’ liabilitywhere the accused can be convicted both under ‘direct’and command responsibility. While the ICTY and ICTR have progressivelyinterpreted other international legal concepts to deal effectivelywith collective crimes committed by leaders of organized groups,they seem to have confined command responsibility to internationalcrimes perpetrated in typical military-like contexts.     

Individual Criminal Responsibility in Article 25 ICC Statute

The collective nature of crimes under international law doesnot absolve us of the need to determine individual responsibility.Article 25 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court(ICC) now contains a detailed regulation of individual criminalresponsibility. While discussing the elements of various modesof individual criminal responsibility, this essay shows thatthe most important difference between prior legal frameworksand Article 25(3) ICC Statute lies not in the redefinition ofthe scope of individual responsibility in international criminallaw, but in the systematization of modes of participation. Thecase is made that Article 25(3) is best construed as a differentiationmodel with four levels of participation. In this model, modesof participation should be understood as indicative of the degreeof individual guilt, and thus as helpful guidelines in sentencingmatters. With particular reference to joint commission, theauthor shows that this concept also leads to a coherent interpretationof the various modes of participation.     

Any Other Contribution? Ascribing Liability for Cover-Ups of International Crimes

As the International Criminal Court (the Court or ICC) continues to develop the parameters of the various modes of liability set out in Article 25(3) of the Rome Statute, recent developments raise questions as to whether the Court can consider participation in cover-ups or concealment of crimes as giving rise to individual criminal responsibility. It is only recently that international tribunals, and notably the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), have turned to consider how international criminal law approaches responsibility for cover-ups or concealment of crimes. In reviewing how and why the ICTY has addressed individual criminal liability for engaging in cover-ups, and in light of the ICC’s Mbarushimana decision, the aim of this paper is to suggest how the ICC might consider such issues in future cases. Having demonstrated the necessity of international criminal law accounting for cover-ups, the paper will discuss how the jurisprudence, in toto, excludes the possibility of holding to account individuals who contribute to the cover up of international crimes, by whatever means, or however grave, unless they were acting on the premise of a prior agreement with the principals. By way of conclusion the paper will suggest that an expansive interpretation of Article 25(3)(d) of the Rome Statute may provide a means of addressing this gap.     

Bad Torture -- Good Torture?: What International Criminal Lawyers May Learn from the Recent Trial of Police Officers in Germany

The author discusses whether a state agent who applies tortureagainst a suspect in order to prevent the death of one or moreinnocent persons can successfully plead a ground for excludinghis or her criminal responsibility under national (in particular,German) law as well as international law. The author examinesthe judgment of a German court, which recently found two policeofficers guilty of threatening to use violence against a suspectedkidnapper, but refrained from punishing them on account of theirmotivation to save the life of the hostage. The author maintainsthat the court's ‘guilty, but not to be punished’verdict could provide guidance for the resolution of comparablecases under international criminal law. He submits that thetension between the absolute ban on torture under internationalhuman rights law and the availability of defences even to crimesof torture under international criminal law should be resolvedthrough a human rights-oriented interpretation of the latter.The author concludes that criminal responsibility for tortureunder international criminal law cannot be excluded by the factthat the torturer acts to save innocent life; however, his orher altruistic motivation may be taken into account in determiningthe sentence.