Towards a common standard of protection of the right to housing in Europe through the charter of fundamental rights

The trend towards the financialisation of housing since the 1980s and the global financial crisis exposed a dramatic lacuna in the legal protection of the right to housing. Yet, the right to housing features not only in national and international human rights instruments, but also in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Charter rights are increasingly finding expression in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). In particular, drawing on the Charter, the CJEU's interpretation of EU consumer law is moving towards a recognition of housing rights as inherent components of consumer protection. On the basis of such developments, this article examines whether there is scope to extend this human rights approach to new areas – namely, to the Mortgage Credit Directive (2014) – a major EU harmonising measure – and to the work of EU institutions now responsible for banking supervision. The article concludes that, if guided by the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the case law of the CJEU and the practice of supranational banking supervision could significantly enhance the protection of the right to housing, both at EU and Member State level.     

Balancing Fundamental Rights and Common Market Freedoms in Union Law: Schmidberger and Omega in the Light of the European Constitution

Abstract:  This article deals with how the Court of Justice balances fundamental rights protection and Common Market freedoms. From the particular perspective of the Charter and the ECHR, whose legal status will be upgraded upon entry into force of the European Constitution, it studies the Court of Justice's approach to fundamental rights invocations by Member States in the context of Common Market freedoms. For this purpose the judgments in Schmidberger and Omega will be discussed both in the current setting and that envisioned by the European Constitution. It will emerge that the Court of Justice's reasoning in Schmidberger and Omega can be criticised on different levels, and alternative approaches are proposed. At a later stage some further elements for refining the methodology for assessing Member States' fundamental rights invocations are addressed with a view to facilitating the Court of Justice more satisfactorily to take account of the current and likely future setting of fundamental rights protection in Union law.     

Homosexuality and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: What Can Be Learned from the History of the European Convention on Human Rights?

Despite differences between the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR) in terms of the substantive rights guaranteed and machineries to enforce them, both instruments have been foundational in the establishment of organizations that share a common history of rejecting human rights complaints from homosexuals. Although the contemporary jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) on homosexuality may contrast sharply with that of the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACtHPR) and the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACmHPR) – because the ACtHPR and ACmHPR have never upheld a complaint relating to sexual orientation – the early history of the ECtHR and the former European Commission on Human Rights (ECmHR) mirrors the current African stance. This article explores what those seeking to develop gay and lesbian rights in Africa might usefully learn from the historical evolution of similar rights under the ECHR.     

The EU and Issues of Human Rights Protection: Same Solutions to More Acute Problems?

Academic literature repeatedly calls for the EU's accession to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 (hereinafter Convention 1 ). Similarly, the Lisbon Treaty provides that the EU must accede to the Convention. [Correction made here after initial online publication.] This might seem odd as the European Court of Justice (hereinafter ECJ 1 ) has over the years developed abundant case‐law on human rights protection in the EU, and the EU has not so long ago adopted a, albeit non‐binding, catalogue of human rights (the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (hereinafter Charter)). But after all these years, cases, and Treaty amendments, the EU is in fact going back to the ECJ's 1996 landmark opinion which recommended the EU's formal accession to the Convention, 1 already proposed in 1979 by the Commission. 1 One reason for this might be that, in the meantime, human rights issues have multiplied in the application of EU law, especially in areas such as the Second and Third Pillars where—at least initially—fewer human rights protection guarantees were foreseen.     

The Meaning of 'Natural Person' and the Impact of the Constitution for Europe on the Development of European Private Law

Abstract:  European codes of private law have traditionally commenced with a concept of the person. In the development of private law in the European Union, we require a modern concept of the person, one which goes beyond the idea of the bearer of economic rights, to one which embraces ideas of human rights and social solidarity, as found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Nice Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.     

Privacy,Data Retention and Domination: Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for Communications

In Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for Communications, the European Court of Justice found the EU Data Retention Directive, which required the retention of communications data for up to two years, to be incompatible with Articles 7 and 8 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights – the rights to privacy and to the protection of personal data. It is argued in this note that the decision ought to be taken as one that is concerned with the exercise of arbitrary power, a concern that is captured by the concept of domination.     

Of Austerity,Human Rights and International Institutions

Austerity measures have led to the denial of social rights and widespread socio‐economic malaise across Europe. In the case of countries subjected to conditionality imposed by international institutions, the resultant harms have highlighted a range of responsibility gaps. Two legal developments come together to expose these gaps: Greece's argument in a series of cases under the European Social Charter that it was not responsible for the impact on rights brought about by austerity measures as it was only giving effect to its other international obligations as agreed with the Troika; and the concern to emerge from the Pringle case before the European Court of Justice that European Union (EU) institutions could do outside of the EU what they could not do within the EU ‐‐disregard the Charter of Fundamental Rights. That the Commission and the European Central Bank were in time answerable to international organisations set up to provide financial support adds an additional layer of responsibility to consider. Taking Greece as a case study, this article addresses the imperative of having international institutions respect human rights.     

Taking fundamental rights seriously in the Digital Services Act's platform liability regime

This article highlights how the EU fundamental rights framework should inform the liability regime of platforms foreseen in secondary EU law, in particular with regard to the reform of the E-commerce directive by the Digital Services Act. In order to identify all possible tensions between the liability regime of platforms on the one hand, and fundamental rights on the other hand, and in order to contribute to a well-balanced and proportionate European legal instrument, this article addresses these potential conflicts from the standpoint of users (those who share content and those who access it), platforms, regulators and other stakeholders involved. Section 2 delves into the intricate landscape of online intermediary liability, interrogating how the E-Commerce Directive and the emerging Digital Services Act grapple with the delicate equilibrium between shielding intermediaries and upholding the competing rights of other stakeholders. The article then navigates in Section 3 the fraught terrain of fundamental rights as articulated by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) under the aegis of the European Convention on Human Rights and the EU Charter. This section poses an urgent inquiry: can the DSA's foundational principles reconcile these legal frameworks in a manner that fuels democracy rather than stifles it through inadvertent censorship? Section 4 then delves into the intricate relationship between fundamental rights and the DSA reform. This section conducts a comprehensive analysis of the key provisions of the DSA, emphasising how they underscore the importance of fundamental rights. In addition to mapping out the strengths of the framework the section also identifies existing limitations within the DSA and suggests potential pathways for further refinement and improvement. This article concludes by outlining key avenues for achieving a balanced and fundamental rights-compliant regulatory framework for platform liability within the EU.     

论欧洲人权机构对人身自由与安全权的保护

人身自由与安全权是一项重要的基本人权,同时也是实现其他权利的基础.作为<世界人权宣言>发表后诞生的第一个区域性人权保护组织,欧洲人权机构通过其丰富的判例对"人身自由"与"人身安全"内涵作出界定,确立了人身自由与安全权保护的一系列标准,并注重对被依法剥夺人身自由者所享有的权利的保护,但是,欧洲人权机构在保护人身自由与安全权方面存在人权委员会与人权法院对个案的决定相互矛盾的问题,欧洲人权法院对个别案件作出的判决也存在对公约的规定适用不当和对该项权利保护乏力的问题.     

Vulnerability as a normative argument for accommodating “justice” within the AFSJ

Vulnerability is a concept that stems from ethics and legal theory. It has progressively gained momentum in international human rights law, in particular in the European contextof the European Court of Human Rights adjudications. Also, the European Union is sensitive to it.By the introduction of competences in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) we are witnessing a progressive “vulnerabilisation” of EU law. This article intends in the first place to outline such a problematic notion and then to highlight the normative effects of vulnerability. In particular, this article will put forward the argument that such notion could serve to revamp the profile of “justice” of the AFSJ, which has been neglected so far, calling for the development of a more sophisticated ethics of State duties.     

THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE REPUBLIC OF AUSTRIA

The aim of this article is to give an overview of the tasks and the function of the Supreme Court of Justice in interaction with the other two “Highest Courts” of the Republic of Austria on the one hand, and the European Court of Human Rights as well as the Court of Justice of the European Union on the other hand. For this purpose introductory remarks will examine the Austrian understanding of the judiciary as a state power and judicial independence. The closing part of the article will particularly look into the role of the Supreme Court as highest instance in criminal matters.     

The fundamental right of data protection in the European Union: in search of an uncharted right

The entry into force of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the ensuing introduction of the right to data protection as a new fundamental right in the legal order of the EU has raised some challenges. This article is an attempt to bring clarity on some of these questions. We will therefore try to address the issue of the place of the right to the protection of personal data within the global architecture of the Charter, but also the relationship between this new fundamental right and the already existing instruments. In doing so, we will analyse the most pertinent case law of the Court of Luxembourg, only to find out that it creates more confusion than clarity. The lesson we draw from this overview is that the reasoning of the Court is permeated by a ‘privacy thinking’, which consists not only in overly linking the rights to privacy and data protection, but also in applying the modus operandi of the former to the latter (which are different we contend). The same flawed reasoning seems to be at work in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Therefore, it is crucial that the different modi operandi be acknowledged, and that any upcoming data protection instrument is accurately framed in relation with Article 8 of the Charter.     

The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy and the Criminal Suspect

In In re JR38, the Supreme Court unanimously dismissed an appeal from a 14 year‐old boy who argued that the dissemination of his image, taken whilst he was participating in sectarian rioting, to local newspapers, violated his rights under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). However, the Court was divided on whether or not the measures taken by the police engaged the applicant's Article 8(1) rights at all. This case raises fundamental questions as to the scope of private life in the context of criminal investigations, and the place of the European Court of Human Rights’ ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ test in determining whether Article 8(1) of the ECHR is engaged. This case comment subjects the majority's interpretation of Article 8(1) to critical scrutiny, concluding that this interpretation may unduly restrict the scope of Article 8 protection for those subject to criminal investigations.     

Algorithmic surveillance: the collection conundrum

ABSTRACT

Supporters of increased surveillance see tremendous potential in the ever increasing creation, collection, and retention of personal data. Most acknowledge that the massive collection of information also creates challenges where the collection outpaces the ability to meaningfully process the data. Increased processing power and more finely tuned algorithms are often portrayed as the solution to this haystack conundrum. While a human may struggle to find the needle in an overflowing haystack of disordered information, powerful computers can take a logical and structured approach that will make the haystack eminently more searchable. This article evaluates this premise from a human rights perspective and considers whether algorithmic surveillance systems can be designed to be compatible with the right to privacy. In addition to assessing the incongruity between traditional safeguards (such as foreseeability and accountability) with algorithmic surveillance, this article also confronts the problem of initial collection and addresses the contention that well-defined algorithmic search can effectively limit the intrusiveness of surveillance. Evolution in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Union will be factored into this analysis.     

The rule of law as the lodestar of the European Convention on Human Rights: The Strasbourg Court and the independence of the judiciary

The rule of law is a constitutional principle under the European Convention on Human Rights. Throughout its history, the rule of law has been the lodestar guiding the development of the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights. In recent years, the normative impact of this principle has been increasing in the case-law of the Court, in particular in cases dealing with the independence of the judiciary. The article discusses the conceptual core of the rule of law under the Convention system as a fundamental component of “European public order”. Subsequently, the three-dimensional normative status of the rule of law is explored as well as the Court's statement that the principle is “inherent in all the Articles of the Convention”. On this basis, an in-depth analysis is undertaken of the application in recent Strasbourg case-law of the independence of the judiciary as a fundamental organic component of the rule of law. Finally, the author reflects on the “symbiotic” relationship in the field of judicial independence between the Strasbourg Court and the Court of Justice of the European Union.     

Opening up personal data protection: A conceptual controversy

The existence of a fundamental right to the protection of personal data in European Union (EU) law is nowadays undisputed. Established in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in 2000, it is increasingly permeating EU secondary law, and is expected to play a key role in the future EU personal data protection landscape. The right's reinforced visibility has rendered manifest the co-existence of two possible and contrasting interpretations as to what it come to mean. If some envision it as a primarily permissive right, enabling the processing of such data under certain conditions, others picture it as having a prohibitive nature, implying that any processing of data is a limitation of the right, be it legitimate or illegitimate. This paper investigates existing tensions between different understandings of the right to the protection of personal data, and explores the assumptions and conceptual legacies underlying both approaches. It traces their historical lineages, and, focusing on the right to personal data protection as established by the EU Charter, analyses the different arguments that can ground contrasted readings of its Article 8. It also reviews the conceptualisations of personal data protection as present in the literature, and finally contrasts all these perspectives with the construal of the right by the EU Court of Justice.     

Human Rights,Privacy and the Public Interest—Who Draws the Line and Where?

This lecture examines the protection of privacy in the United Kingdom (both at common law and after the incorporation of Human Rights Convention rights) as well as in other European countries and in the European Court of Human Rights. It considers the significance and extent of the margin of appreciation which that Court allows to individual states in respect of the protection of privacy and the balancing of privacy against other interests such as press freedom. It concludes that the margin allowed by the Strasbourg court may not be very large, that the balancing of interests apparently required by that Court is often delicate and difficult, that informal mechanisms of redress such as the Press Complaints Commissions have some benefits, but that further case-law development appears inevitably to be required if any certainty is to be achieved in at least some common situations.     

Union Citizenship—Metaphor or Source of Rights?

After nearly ten years of introducing Union Citizenship as a concept into Community law it seems time to draw a preliminary evaluation of its importance in reshaping the legal and social positions of citizens living in the EU, more precisely in its Member States. The balance sheet is however mixed: On the one hand, the prevalent position in legal doctrine seems to be that Union citizenship is merely a derived condition of nationality, while on the other side certain fundamental rights are based on criteria other than citizenship/nationality alone. The European Charter on Fundamental Rights will not overcome this dilemma. This can be shown in conflictual areas which are in the centre of discusion in the paper, namely the (limited!) use of the concept of citizenship to extend existing free movement rights in the new case law of the Court of Justice, the resistance towards granting 'quasi-citizenship' rights to third country nationals lawfully resident in the Union for a longer period of time, and the yet unsolved problem of imposing 'implied duties' based on a doctrine of ' abus de droit ' upon citizens paralleling the rights granted to them. As a conclusion the author is of the opinion that the question asked for in the title can be answered in the positive only to a limited extent. Citizenship appears to be a sleeping fairy princess still be be kissed awake by the direct effect of Community law.     

Balancing Between Human Rights Assumptions and Actual Fundamental Human Rights Safeguards in Building an Area of Freedom,Security and Justice: a Cosmopolitan Perspective

Rhetoric often claims that the European Union (EU), in issues related to Justice and Home Affairs, has to be united in its diversity. As such, the asylum and judicial systems of the Member States are initially perceived as equally good. By applying the cosmopolitan theory on two fields of interstate cooperation, asylum and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, the article explores how cosmopolitan the EU is in these fields, with a specific focus on material detention conditions. For cosmopolitanism to work, it has to be grounded in commonly shared norms, which enable the EU to regulate its dealings with the otherness of the Member States. The crucial role of the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Union in placing boundaries on the equal goodness of the Member States’ asylum and judicial systems is analysed. This judicial reality in which cosmopolitan norms are established and protected is discussed, together with the political realities dominating policy debates in order to build an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice.     

International Recognition of Victims' Rights

Since its inception, the United Nations has adopted two GeneralAssembly resolutions dealing with the rights of victims: the1985 Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victimsof Crime and Abuse of Power and the 2006 Basic Principles andGuidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victimsof Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and SeriousViolations of International Humanitarian Law. The focus of theformer was on victims of domestic crimes, while that of thelatter is on victims of international crimes; more particularly,gross violations of international human rights law and seriousviolations of international humanitarian law. The 2006 Principlesare, for all practical purposes, an international bill of rightsof victims. Their adoption has been hard-fought, but their implementationboth at the national and international levels is sure to stillface many obstacles. Parallel to this historic development havebeen decisions by the European Court of Human Rights and theInter-American Court of Human Rights, as well as provisionsin the statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), givingstanding to victims in ICC proceedings, but also certain rightsof compensation. These parallel developments, as well as otherswithin domestic legal systems, evidence a wide movement towardsthe recognition of the rights of victims of crime, whether domesticor international, or gross violations of human rights. Thisarticle re-traces the historic origin of victims' rights indomestic and international legal systems, focusing particularlyon the adoption of the two international instruments mentionedabove, and more particularly on the negotiating history of the2006 Principles. A detailed commentary of these Principles constitutesthe centerpiece of this article.