Who gets what and why? Committee assignments in the German Bundestag

Although committee assignments have been researched in various parliaments, findings are inconclusive. This article contributes to the debate by analysing the allocations to specialised committees in the Bundestag, a legislature that establishes strong committees despite having strong parliamentary party groups. Studying assignments in this legislature can, therefore, help us to solve the present disjunction between ‘European’ and ‘American’ experiences regarding committee research. The study uses the congressional theories of legislative organisation as heuristic devices but explicitly highlights the strong involvement of parliamentary party groups. The hypotheses are tested with a multiple membership multilevel model across several legislative periods (1990?2013) and backed up with evidence from 51 interviews with German legislators. The results show that next to constituency demands and the influence of regional factions, there is strong evidence for a reassignment pattern and that a legislator’s occupational background and connections to interest groups matter in the assignment process.     

Committee bias in legislatures with a high degree of party cohesion: Evidence from Danish municipalities

The institution of committees in democratic legislatures has for years been said to bias policy making because the preferences of committee members differ from, and are more alike than, those of other legislators due to self‐selection to the committees. Based on an analysis of United States Senate committees, Hall and Grofman suggested in 1990 that the preferences of committee members primarily diverge from, and are more alike than, those of non‐committee members on policy issues that are salient to constituencies or at least to an easily definable segment of constituencies. This article argues that the logic of Hall and Grofman should in fact be reversed in legislatures characterised by highly cohesive parties. Accordingly, the main hypothesis is that in such legislatures the preferences of committee members are more likely to be alike than those of non‐committee members in the committees that work with policy issues of less salience to constituencies. Using a large‐scale comparative design comprising data collected in 2008 on the spending preferences of 1,348 Danish local politicians, evidence is found supporting this hypothesis. This finding points to the importance of considering the role of parties when assessing committee bias.     

The analysis of Scottish Parliament committee influence: Beyond capacity and structure in comparing West European legislatures

Abstract.  The Scottish Parliament was set up in the hope that strong committees would foster consensus, with an emphasis on reducing partisanship and adopting a pragmatic approach to the detailed study of draft legislation. However, few empirical studies exist that assess the value of the committee process. This flaw is common within the West European literature. The comparative literature on legislative influence is lacking in detailed empirical studies (in part because of the dominant assumption within the literature that parliaments are peripheral to the policy process). Most studies provide impressionistic discussions of the capacities of committees and the constraints to their effectiveness. They do not follow this through with an analysis of committee 'outputs'. This study of the amendments process in the Scottish Parliament addresses the gap. It uses data from a four-year study of legislative amendments to develop indicators of parliamentary outputs. While the results confirm that the committee system operates at the heart of the 'new politics' in Scotland, further such individual country studies are necessary to supplement much broader comparative analyses.     

Cardinals or Clerics? Congressional Committees and the Distribution of Pork

Journalistic and academic accounts of Congress suggest that important committee positions allow members to procure more federal funds for their constituents, but existing evidence on this topic is limited in scope and has failed to distinguish the effects of committee membership from selection onto committees. We bring together decades of data on federal outlays and congressional committee and subcommittee assignments to provide a comprehensive analysis of committee positions and distributive politics across all policy domains. Using a within‐member research design, we find that seats on key committees produce little additional spending. The chairs of the Appropriations subcommittees—the so called “cardinals” of Congress—are an exception to the rule. These leadership positions do generate more funding for constituents, but only from programs under the jurisdiction of their subcommittee. Our results paint a new picture of distributive politics and call for a reexamination of its canonical theories.     

Politics and the rescue of insolvent savings and loans before 1989

The results presented in this paper are consistent with those predicted by public choice economists who believe that regulatory agencies represent the interests of their controlling congressional committees. Membership on committees is not random; congressmen seek committee assignments where they can represent the interests of their constituency. Congressmen from states where financial institutions are significant will seek membership on their respective banking committees. Once on those committees, congressmen will seek to protect and promote their own constituency. In the case of the savings and loan industry, insolvent savings and loans received benefits from staying in operation. These savings and loans gained another chance to gamble for resurrection. Being shut-down or placed in a management consignment program did not give this option. The results presented in our paper indicate that participation in one of the rescue programs is not random. Savings and loans in states with political power (representation on the Senate banking committee) are less likely to be resolved.A previous version of this paper was presented at the Southern Economic Association Meetings, November 18–21 1990, New Orleans, Louisiana. The authors thank James R. Barth, Henry N. Butler, Gordon Tullock, Lawrence J. White, and an anonymous referee, for helpful comments. Financial support from the Summer Research Program of the College of Business, Boise State University, is gratefully acknowledged. We accept responsibility for any remaining errors.     

Women on the Sidelines: Women's Representation on Committees in Latin American Legislatures

This article explores how new groups can be marginalized after they gain representation in the legislature. We use data from six Latin American legislatures to examine the effect of institutional and political factors on how traditionally dominant male political leaders distribute scarce political resources—committee assignments—to female newcomers. In general, we find that women tend to be isolated on women's issues and social issues committees and kept off of power and economics/foreign affairs committees as the percentage of legislators who are women increases, when party leaders or chamber presidents control committee assignments, and when the structure of the committee system provides a specific committee to deal with women's issues. Thus, to achieve full incorporation into the legislative arena, newcomers must do more than just win seats. They must change the institutions that allow the traditionally dominant group to hoard scarce political resources .     

Committees in legislatures: A property rights perspective

Without the imposition of some institutional structure, a legislature is a non-exclusive resource, and legislators will have a tendency to overuse the resource and reduce its productivity. The committee system is a method for granting property rights over the legislature's agenda by subdividing the agenda and assigning each committee rights over a portion of the agenda. Just as common grazing ground could be more productive if it were subdivided and assigned to individual owners, the legislature is more productive if access to the agenda is subdivided and assigned to committees.Ownership rights to committee assignments are allocated based on seniority because this makes the rights more secure and therefore more valuable to their owners. In the United States Congress, the seniority rule replaced a system in which assignments were made at the discretion of party leaders. In the former system, legislators needed to expend effort to retain their assignments, which diminished their ability to use their assignments productively. Because individuals can use resources more productively if they do not have to be concerned about protecting their ownership interest, the seniority system enables the legislature to be more productive in producing legislation.     

The many faces of EU committee governance

Committees linking national administrations and the EU level play a crucial role at all stages of the EU policy process. The literature tends to portray this group system as a coherent mass, characterised by expert-oriented ‘deliberative supranationalism’, a term developed through studies of comitology (implementation) committees. This article builds on survey data of 218 national officials in 14 member states who have attended EU committee meetings. These groups exhibit important common features: expert knowledge rather than country size plays a pivotal role in the decision making process; across types of committee, participants evoke multiple allegiances and identities. In spite of loyalty to national institutions, there is also a sense of belonging to the committees as such, though with significant variation among types of committee. Council and comitology groups are strongly intergovernmental, while Commission committees seem more multi-faceted. The primary aim here is to give an empirical account, but the main observations are interpreted from an institutional and organisational perspective.     

Legislative committees as loyalty-generating institutions

The current debate over models of self-selection in Congress — whether Congressmen by-and-large find themselves on committees which most closely correspond to their constituents' interests — has implications for theories of Congressional organization. Building on recent findings which question a categorical self-selection process, in this paper we present a theory of committee function based on loyalty to party leaders. As a rationale for leadership privilege, and to provide context for our argument, we first present a theoretical framework based on a modified model of cooperation. We then focus on certain specifics of our leadership theory; that rank-and-file members vote leadership interests in exchange for leader support in gaining choice committee assignments and aid in passing legislation. This leads to predictions about voting patterns across committees. Static tests of these relations are performed, as well as those incorporating changes in voting patterns with seniority.     

How to Measure the Europeanisation of a National Legislature?

While there is no shortage of research on national parliaments and European integration, empirical studies on the impact of EU on domestic legislatures are lacking. This article contributes to the literature by discussing the challenges involved in measuring the Europeanisation of national parliaments and through suggesting several hypotheses and indicators – EU-related national laws, the use of control instruments (confidence votes and parliamentary questions) in EU matters, and the share of committee, plenary and party group meeting time spent on European matters – that can be used in subsequent comparative research. Evidence from Finland shows the differentiated impact of Europe: while the share of domestic laws related to EU is smaller than often argued, particularly committees are burdened to a much larger extent by European matters.     

Committee structure and political preferences: The case of Norwegian local government

Abstract.  In Norway, as in the other Nordic countries, sector-based policy making in local government is considered a problem as it is alleged to take place at the expense of a more integrated approach. Inspired by American rational choice theories on committee power, this article first sets out to establish whether the distributive rationale of the present committee system actually does promote sector-orientation among local politicians. This approach is challenged by alternative theories on committee power, focusing on the informational rationale in specialisation and the relevance of partisanship . The findings suggest that all the three theories explain in part committee member' preferences, but partisanship is most important for explaining both spending preferences and preferences on organisational forms. The article goes on to explore whether recent local council reforms, intended to replace the sector-oriented system with strong committees by a new de-specialised system with weaker committees, are likely to curb the effect of sector on committee members' preferences. The conclusion here is not easy to draw, but it is clear that sector-orientation is not encouraged by the reforms; in fact, the opposite seems to be the case. What local councils may have overlooked, however, is the influence of the informational rationale on committees and their members. The analyses are based on data obtained from a random sample of 119 of Norway's 435 municipalities.     

The Democratic Legitimacy of the European Union Committee System

This article investigates both the operation and the democratic legitimacy of the European Union committee system. This vast but rarely studied system is an important site of European governance, exercising an increasing amount of policy responsibility while also providing the essential arenas necessary for supranational problem solving. Despite their contribution to the success of the “European project,” committees are increasingly coming under attack, notably for their lack of democratic credentials. The article employs original empirical research based on interviews and internal documentary evidence to answer a timely question: does the EU committee system strike an appropriate balance between the values of system effectiveness and democratic legitimacy? Following the application of a set of democratic principles to EU committees, the article finds that a poor balance has been struck between effectiveness and democracy. The article concludes with some operational suggestions for improving this balance in the short‐to‐medium term.     

Coalition Government and Committee Power

Recent research suggests that committees in parliamentary democracies may, at least partly, be endogenous to the prevalence of coalition government. In this article, I examine the conditions under which parliamentary majorities reform legislative rules to expand or reduce committee power. I expect that, ceteris paribus, the greater the conflict inside the governing coalition, the higher the probability that parties in government will adopt reforms expanding committee power and the lower the chance that they will implement changes reducing such power. These expectations are tested using original new data on the reforms of committee agenda powers undertaken in eight European states within 20 years from democratic transition. I find some evidence to support the endogeneity of committee power to the ideological heterogeneity of parliamentary government.     

Multiple Institutional Embeddedness in Europe: The Case of Danish, Norwegian, and Swedish Government Officials

The questions posed in the current study are (1) whether, and (2) how, participation within Commission expert committees and Council working parties of the European Union (EU) affects the coordination behaviour of the participants. Based on organizational theory arguments, the coordination role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is arguably weakened by institutional dynamics existing within Commission expert committees. The opposite is argued to be the case within Council working parties. Empirically, this study is based on 160 questionnaires and 47 face-to-face interviews with Danish, Norwegian, and Swedish domestic government officials attending EU committees. Secondly, this study also includes answers from 49 officials at the permanent representation to the EU of these three Scandinavian countries. Being excluded from attending Council working parties, Norwegian civil servants participating within Commission expert committees are shown to coordinate considerably less with the foreign ministry than their Danish and Swedish counterparts. Notwithstanding these observations, this study also reveals how the coordination behaviour evoked by national civil servants reflects their domestic institutional affiliations. In addition to showing how EU committees affect coordination behaviour among the participants, the current analysis also shows how responses to integration requirements are filtered – and even conditioned – by a prior state of affairs at the domestic level of governance.     

The industrial structure of the California Assembly: Committee assignments,economic interests,and campaign contributions

This paper examines the provision of campaign contributions made by economic interests to incumbents seeking reelection in the 1984, 1986, and 1988 California Assembly elections. The study tests whether the distribution of campaign contributions by specific industrial sectors corresponds to legislator possession of the policy property rights associated with membership on relevant Assembly standing committees. A non-parametric statistical model compares the distribution of campaign contributions from groups within a given industrial sector to members of relevant policy committees with the distribution of contributions from all other contributor classes. The empirical analysis confirms that committee assignments significantly affect the allocation of special interest resources in Assembly elections, substantiating the importance of institutional considerations in influencing special interest activity.     

Partisan dealignment and committee power in five Westminster parliaments

What explains the power of parliamentary committees? A large literature on the United States Congress sees strong legislative committees as a consequence of legislators’ incentives to cultivate a personal vote. These incentives are typically understood to be determined by formal electoral rules. How legislatures are elected thus shapes how they are organised. This article argues that explanations of legislative organisation should also consider a non-institutional source of personal vote-seeking incentives: voters’ partisanship. Where partisan dealignment is more extensive, legislators have stronger incentives to develop a personal vote. Where committee systems are more powerful, legislators have better opportunities to do so. Partisan dealignment should thus lead to stronger committee systems. This argument is supported by analysis of original data on the postwar evolution of committee systems in five ‘Westminster’ parliaments. Partisan dealignment is associated with larger committee systems, and with larger expansions of committee systems.     

Participation and voting in committees: Evidence from the ILO

Although many international organisations are formally built on the principle of ‘one country–one vote’, the lack of representativeness in decision-making may give a subgroup of members disproportionate influence. Using data on participation and voting in 51 decision-making committees of the International Labour Organization (ILO), we do find a bias in voting outcomes due to committee composition. Recent theoretical research has argued that voters with extreme preferences may self-select into committees. A procedure is proposed to test for this prediction. There is no indication that governments with extreme preferences are drawn disproportionately into ILO committees.     

Exclusive Committee Assignments and Party Pressure in the U.S. House of Representatives

Most studies of committee agency in theU.S. House of Representatives consider theideological location of the committee’smedian with respect to some agent. Littlestudied, however, is the effect committeeagency may have on legislators seekingcommittee assignments. I show that whencommittees are agents to the party,legislators feel pressure to selectideological positions more proximate to theparty. They respond to this pressure byexhibiting voting behavior more similar tothe preferences of the party median. Committee assignments, then, are a means bywhich parties can influence the votingbehavior of their members.     

Blurring the International-Domestic Politics Distinction: Danish Representation at EC Negotiations

This article explores the extent to which Danish membership of the European communities has blurred the traditional distinction between international and domestic politics. Based on data concerning the pattern of representation of Danish ministries at EC negotiations, the article finds a strong decentralization of negotiation competences among ministries and a spread of negotiation responsibilities across hierarchical levels, types of organization, and types of civil servants. The conclusion is that this blurring tends to maximize the influence of domestic interests and that it accounts for much of the immobility of EC decision-making.     

Committee choice and the core under supramajority rule: Results from simulation of majority choice in 2-dimensional space

While simple-majority choice by committees is generally unstable, supramajority rule has been demonstrated to yield nonempty sets of stable outcomes: outcomes in the core. This paper reports results of a computer simulation of majority choice by committees under supramajority rule. The object is to explore the transition from unstable to stable committee choice with increasing supramajority rules. The findings are that supramajority rule limits the instability of committee choice; that stable committee choice is no more predictable than unstable committee choice; and that an optimal supramajority rule can be specified which minimizes instability and maximizes the predictability of committee choice. In all of the results, simple-majority rule plays virtually no role.