Negotiating Military Alliances: Legal Systems and Alliance Formation

Do domestic legal systems affect states' propensity to form military alliances? This article, building upon the existing research in international relations, adopts a socio-legal approach to understanding international treaty making. By focusing on the essence of international negotiations—communication between states' representatives—I argue that negotiating parties who share a common legal language have a common a priori understanding concerning concepts under discussion. Domestic laws operating within states impact the process of creation of international law embodied in treaties. Empirical analyses show that states with similar legal systems are more likely to form military alliances with one another. Additionally, domestic legal systems influence the way that states design their alliance commitments. In general, my findings suggest that the influence of domestic laws does not stop at “the water's edge.” It permeates the interstate borders and impacts the relations between states, especially the treaty negotiating and drafting process. International negotiators bring their legal backgrounds to the negotiating table, which influences both their willingness to sign treaties and the design of the resulting agreements.     

The Reputational Impact of Investor-State Disputes

To what extent do alleged violations of international commitments damage state reputation? This article explore this question with specific reference to investor-state disputes arising under the protection of international investment agreements. Its main contributions are threefold. First, building on the political institutions literature, the study places the theoretical importance of information about the rules of the game, and the actions of the participants at the center of analysis. Second, in contrast to prior empirical research, the study systematically analyzes the costs of state involvement in investment treaty arbitration by examining all known disputes. Third, the study addresses the impact of investment disputes on both foreign investment flows and state reputational rankings. We show that the consequences of investment disputes vary with the transparency of the investor-state dispute settlement process. The central implication of these findings for the broader body of literature on international institutions is that reputational mechanisms for effective treaty enforcement cannot be taken as given but instead need to be explored on the basis of a nuanced approach that addresses the pivotal issues of institutional design and information costs.     

Domestic Institutions,Trade Disputes,and the Monitoring and Enforcement of International Law

Why do some governments participate more actively in the enforcement of international law than others? In the context of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/World Trade Organization (WTO), I argue that domestic institutions – and, specifically, the electoral rule – can account for these differences. Interest groups are frequently harmed when foreign governments violate international law and have compliance information, but they lack access to formal enforcement mechanisms, such as dispute settlement bodies. I identify two complementary effects of domestic institutions. Where domestic institutions increase the government’s responsiveness to interest groups, the government is more likely to enforce international law on their behalf. In turn, because they expect that rule violations are more likely to be enforced, interest groups are more willing to contribute to the monitoring of international law. Hence, interest groups are more likely to provide the information necessary for enforcement, and governments are more likely to be aware of rule violations and to provide enforcement. Empirical evidence from the GATT/WTO is consistent with these propositions.     

Attitudes toward Consent-Based and Non-Consent-Based International Law in a Regional Power Context

International legal scholars have identified and argued for and against new forms of non-consent-based international law. We study variation in Brazilian public opinion about adherence to international law created in three different ways: through a consent-based multilateral treaty, by the U.N. Security Council with the participation of Brazil, and by the U.N. Security Council without the participation of Brazil. Information that Brazil has participated in creating the international legal obligation through a multilateral treaty or membership on the Security Council yields levels of support for adherence to the legal obligation that are similar to those found when the origins of the legal obligation are generic. Information that the international legal obligation was created without Brazil’s participation, on the other hand, results in reduced support for compliance. This difference, which is particularly concentrated among highly educated respondents, is not driven by reduced concerns about reputational consequences or sanctions. Our results suggest that the increased use of non-consent-based forms of international law might be challenged by a lack of public support for compliance.     

Analysing Voting Inconsistency in the United Nations General Assembly

In many international institutions, contested norms pass via voting. Although votes express national positions, dynamic vote shifts are a widespread phenomenon. Why do states sometimes change their voting stances concerning re-occurring international rules and norms? To explain observed variation, this analysis theorises the role of domestic and external windows of opportunity as well as the role of lobbying in the United Nations General Assembly. It shows that changes in government composition and changes in the text of re-occurring international rules and norms matter. Yet, whilst resourceful actors more likely change their voting stance after having successfully negotiated text changes, less powerful states are more likely to shift voting stances in response to third party lobbying.     

Organization without delegation: Informal intergovernmental organizations (IIGOs) and the spectrum of intergovernmental arrangements

The renaissance in the theoretical analysis of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) has focused on formal IGOs (FIGOs), but many IGOs are subject to no formal treaty and/or have no permanent secretariat. Important examples of informal IGOs (IIGOs) include the G-groups that are the locus of much high-level interaction among states. We develop the spectrum of intergovernmental arrangements to show the wide variation in the formalization of international institutions and theorize when states will choose informal arrangements such as an IIGO over (or in combination with) a FIGO. A paired case comparison illustrates our claims that states use IIGOs when they need flexibility, to protect their sovereignty, to maintain close control of information, to lower short term transaction costs for speed, to minimize bureaucracy and to manage uncertainty during times of crisis. Finally, we examine how institutional choice is influenced by power.     

Explaining Costly International Institutions: Persuasion and Enforceable Human Rights Norms

Why do states create enforceable international human rights norms that empower third parties to prevent and sanction domestic human rights abuses? Recent theories suggest that international institutions are shaped not only by power and interests but also by the content of arguments during intensive communication and argumentation processes. Moving beyond the simple notion that "communication matters," I argue that states are likely to be persuaded by arguments that draw on widespread taken-for-granted norms, in particular, prohibitions on bodily harm, the importance of precedent in decision making, and the link between cooperation and progress. This model extends previous theories by specifying mechanisms and scope conditions for international change through persuasion. I illustrate the argument by examining the convention against torture, a costly international institution that allows domestic courts to prosecute crimes that occur in the territory of other states (universal jurisdiction). Because of its enforcement mechanisms, the torture convention poses a difficult case for theories explaining international institutions. If persuasion models can explain even costly institutions, they should be more widely considered as explanations for all kinds of international institutions.     

Justifying Inequality as Equality: Germany and the Reform of Voting Weights in the Council of the European Union

ABSTRACT

Weighted voting institutionalises inequality in international organisations. How is it possible that states accept rules that formally privilege some over others even though this contradicts the sovereign equality of states and norms of democratic decision-making? This contribution to a special issue about global stratification shows that arguments about equality can actually serve to justify inequality in international institutions. This can be seen in moves by the German government to justify its proposals for a reform of voting in the Council of the European Union (1995–2008). Successive German governments focused on arguments about democracy based on the equality of states and of citizens to justify their push for a more privileged position for Germany in the Council. Efficiency also figured as a justification but was clearly less prominent.     

Norway,Spitsbergen, and America, 1905-1920

In the Spitsbergen treaty of 1920, Norway acquired sovereignty over the Spitsbergen Islands. Rather than Woodrow Wilson, the American president, the architects behind the treaty were Robert Lansing, Wilson’s secretary of state, and, behind the diplomatic scene, the mining investor, John M. Longyear. In 1906, Longyear established a mining company to exploit the coal deposits at Spitsbergen. He induced Congress, the State Department, and the White House to forge an American policy for the European Arctic, including the appointment of Lansing, an international lawyer, as a counsel in the State Department. Lansing was a leading expert on both international law and the lack of state authority at the terra nullius, Spitsbergen. In 1915, he became secretary of State and, at the Paris Peace Conference, decided American policy regarding the Spitsbergen question. This analysis shows how the outcome of the Spitsbergen question was a result of American mining interests, supplemented by Norwegian-American shared interests in conflict resolution based on international law.     

Self-Defense and the Use of Force: Breaking the Rules, Making the Rules, or Both?

This article examines shifts in international law regarding the use of force—the jus ad bellum —that emerged in the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and subsequently were invoked in part by the United States and United Kingdom to justify military intervention in Iraq. These shifts import some elasticity—in time, space, and place—into the preexisting legal understanding of self-defense. To be sure, the general consensus that supported the use of force in Afghanistan as a legitimate exercise of self-defense has diluted as the use of that force expanded into other theaters of operation. It is therefore unsurprising that considerable controversy envelops claims by some states that international law entitles them to use force in self-defense in a preemptory manner. This article explores the articulation of this and other justifications for the military intervention in Iraq. It also unpacks the difficult question whether these entitlements are constitutive of inchoate legal rules or simply deviations from the still operational old rules. Moreover, this article encourages scholars and students of international law and relations to consider why a movement is afoot to change the rules and how this affects the architecture of collective security. To facilitate this process of reflection, this article explores the policy implications of retaining the old rules or adopting the newly alleged rules.     

Domestic Institutions,Capacity Limitations,and Compliance Costs: Host Country Determinants of Investment Treaty Arbitrations, 1987–2007

The number of investment treaty arbitrations has exploded in recent years. However, the distribution of known arbitral claims varies among states. Some states have had multiple claims brought against them, while others appear not to have experienced any. This article represents the first study to seek causal explanations for this variation. My principal hypothesis is that a country's institutional capacity for protecting investor rights should be negatively correlated with the number of treaty-based arbitral claims brought against it. A panel analysis suggests that, after controlling for other determinants, countries with greater institutional capacity experience fewer disputes than those with lower capacity. This finding reveals an important truth about investment treaties: while they may be designed to help developing countries compensate for domestic-level institutional deficiencies in order to attract more foreign investment, it is precisely those countries with the weakest institutions for which the costs of treaty compliance are likely to be the highest.     

印度现代化进程中的社会风险问题及其治理研究

在世界风险社会形成的今天,任何一个国家都被迫直面现代性或第二次现代性所带来的巨大压力。与其他国家相比,印度所面临的风险环境带有更为复杂的多重特征。作为国情类似的后发国家,将印度与中国的社会风险状况进行比较,无疑会对印度的社会现实获得更为清晰的认识和判断。在此基础上,本文建议从法制、信息化管理、人口就业政策、社会机制、国际安全合作等方面对印度现行制度框架进行调整,为印度这样一个社会结构特殊的国家早日迈入现代化提供一个风险治理的视角。     

Not letting ‘bad apples’ spoil the bunch: Democratization and strict international organization accession rules

To solve their domestic and international problems, democratizing states often form new international organizations. In doing so, they face the question of institutional design: what types of rules and provisions should be included in the charter of the new international organization? We analyze this question through the lens of accession rules, with an emphasis on voting rules. We argue that democratizing states have strong incentives to design organizations with strict accession rules. Organizations with strict accession rules allow the founding members to regulate entry. This is particularly useful for transitional democracies, as democratizing states are initially unable to gain entry into the lucrative existing international organizations operated by the established democracies. Using original data on accession voting rules in 324 international organizations, we find strong evidence in support of our claims.     

Reaching Inside the State: International Law and Superior Liability

With the creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the International Criminal Court (ICC), the international community has taken the most decisive steps yet to reach inside the state to protect individuals from and prosecute individuals for violations of international humanitarian law. After outlining the key developments in international law on this subject, I turn to the heart of the paper—an analysis of how these developments in international law should affect theory and research in international relations and comparative politics. To what extent should we expect that the international community would hold individuals accountable? Will individual leaders comply with international law? Most importantly, what factors will influence the level of enforcement of and compliance with international law? I conclude with suggestions as to how research on international law on individual liability should advance.     

Derogating from International Human Rights Obligations in the ‘War Against Terrorism'? — A British–Australian Perspective

ABSTRACT

This article examines the United Kingdom's Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 and the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2002 (Cth) from an international human rights law perspective. It argues that both pieces of legislation raise serious concerns in relation to international legal obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Both international treaties allow for ‘derogation’ from certain provisions in times of ‘public emergency’. While the United Kingdom has officially derogated from some of its treaty obligations, Australia has yet to submit a similar notification. This article argues, however, that the United Kingdom's derogation is unlawful. Likewise, current circumstances in Australia would not permit lawful derogation from the ICCPR.     

The rise of “diminished multilateralism”: East Asian and European forum shopping in global governance

The article argues that the “principled multilateralism” of the immediate post-Cold War period is increasingly giving way to what may be called a “diminished multilateralism.” Newly emerging global and regional powers such as the BRICS states (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and other rising powers in the Global South are increasingly questioning the legitimacy of the existing international architecture which they regard as a vehicle of the USA and Western countries to conserve their international influence in an era of rapid change. In the process, international institutions have increasingly become arenas of power rivalries which take the form of contests over access and membership, decision-making rules and normative order. The result is an increasing paralysis of these institutions and their inability to solve global problems. One aspect of these institutional power struggles is “forum shopping.” The article shows that East Asia and Europe have both become active players in forum shopping. Three conditions facilitated forum shopping: major crises and external shocks; sentiments of frustrated entitlement in connection with exclusive and discriminatory international institutions, and extra- and intra-regional power shifts.     

加强中国与东盟能源安全合作的国际法思考

中国与东盟的能源安全合作已从现实和制度层面展开,但是仍然存在能源产品出口受到限制、能源运输通道安全受到威胁、南海问题向国际化方向发展等问题,应当注重国际法规范在保障中国与东盟能源安全合作中的作用,利用联合国条约体系、WTO协议和CAFTA协议,充分认识ECT和NAFTA协定的借鉴意义。     

Framing the EU’s policy towards the neighbourhood: the strategic approach of the Seventh European Parliament (2009–2014)*

The Lisbon treaty afforded the European Parliament (EP) increased powers in foreign policy. These have included new legislative competences in the area of international agreements or the European Union’s (EU) relations with third party states. This article analyses the way the last mandate of the EP, which was the first to benefit from the changes introduced by the Lisbon treaty, framed EU foreign policy. More specifically, it explores the way in which the EP strategically framed the EU’s approach towards the neighbourhood countries. The focus on the neighbourhood is justified by the fact that it is the most salient area of the EU’s foreign policy. The article shows that the EP pushed for the EU to have a stronger presence in the neighbourhood. The EP also strategically aimed that it should have a more central role in shaping the EU’s approach towards the neighbourhood.     

Reforming the equilibrium? Veto players and policy change in the European constitution-building process

The EU currently experiences a reform dilemma which is common to many international organizations composed of a large number of veto players who must adopt a change of the status quo. After the accession of ten countries in May 2004, the 25 governmental veto players adopted a modest reform text that proposes as many changes as it retains provisions of the Nice treaty. This ambivalent outcome raised much criticism and has been rejected by the French and Dutch voters who had to ratify the reform. This raises questions on the reasons for change and stability in organizations which attempt to reform their obsolete provisions under the constraint of many (types of) veto players. This study examines under which conditions the positions of the different types of veto players—governments, parliamentary ratification pivots, median voters and the supranational actors—are important to explain the outcome of the draft treaty. Our results suggest that the probability for reform is only determined by governmental gains when we control for parliamentary ratification pivots and median voters from status quo-prone member states. We also find that governments favoring the status quo retain their veto in case either parliaments or voters favor reform. This responsiveness is supported by the fact that median voters also matter when member states did not announce a referendum.