中央与地方事权划分的国别经验及其启示--基于六个国家经验的分析北大核心CSSCI

中央与地方的事权划分及其运行,是国家治理的重大命题。本文基于既有研究,构建以事性定权属、以事项配事权的分析进路,以此分析了美国等六个典型国家的经验,提炼了公共事务的政治、经济、社会、自然和发展战略等属性对于央地事权划分的意义,阐发了宪法和法律为主、其他为辅的划分途径。在此基础上,分析了相关国家央地事权划分的事务、权力类型和权力关系。最后,针对我国相关症结问题,阐述了相关国家的经验对于我国优化央地事权划分的启示。     

政治互动视角下政府间事权划分的研究——以食品安全监管事权改革为例

中央与地方事权、财力匹配首先是建立在对事权界定的基础之上的。关于事权划分的传统观点并不能很好地解释中国政府间事权划分的逻辑。在政治互动视角下,我国的政府间事权划分表现为,在单一制政府形式下,中央政府权衡"治理成本"与"治理风险"因素并在"高度关联治理结构"与"行政发包制"两种治理模式中做出选择,随之进行事权划分的动态调整。通过对改革开放以来我国食品安全监管事权在中央地方间进行的多次调整进行分析,可以发现中央地方事权划分的政治互动逻辑,并提出对政府间事权划分改革的建议。     

中央与地方事权划分的国别经验及其启示——基于六个国家经验的分析

中央与地方的事权划分及其运行,是国家治理的重大命题。本文基于既有研究,构建以事性定权属、以事项配事权的分析进路,以此分析了美国等六个典型国家的经验,提炼了公共事务的政治、经济、社会、自然和发展战略等属性对于央地事权划分的意义,阐发了宪法和法律为主、其他为辅的划分途径。在此基础上,分析了相关国家央地事权划分的事务、权力类型和权力关系。最后,针对我国相关症结问题,阐述了相关国家的经验对于我国优化央地事权划分的启示。     

发达国家如何保证食品安全（上）

美国：多层次“一揽子”监管 美国的食品安全监管体系分为联邦、州和地区3个层次，主要监管机构有20多个。在联邦层面上，负责食品安全的机构主要有：卫生与公众服务部下属的食品和药物管理局（FDA）以及疾病控制和预防中心（CDC），农业部下属的食品安全和检验局（FSIS）以及动植物卫生检验局，还有环境保护署（EPA）与全国海洋和大气管理局。州和地区机构的职责是配合联邦机构执行各种法规，检查辖区内的食品生产和销售点。     

美国政府事权划分及其对深圳改革的启示

美国政府治理体系一直是我国政府机构和学界关注和研究的热点。笔者通过在芝加哥大学有关美国政府管理体系、公共政策等课程的学习,以及实地考察访问伊利诺伊州政府、芝加哥市政府、库克郡、威尔郡的多个政府机构以及城市社区等,对美国各级政府的事权划分及运作机制有了更为具体和深入的了解,并结合深圳市下一步行政管理体制改革提出自己的看法。     

彩票市场政府监管体制的国际比较

世界各国的彩票市场都处于政府的严格监管之下,英国、美国和法国的彩票监管体制是最有代表性的三种监管模式.通过对三种代表性监管模式的比较分析,本文认为,一个国家的彩票市场结构必须符合彩票市场技术经济特征,但彩票监管机构的设置与监管权力的配置主要是政府选择的结果,与该国的行政管理体制密切相关;而彩票公益金的使用方向则直接取决于彩票发行的目的.     

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赵德勇/政府权力法治化的三个维度
　　政府权力法治化是实现政府治理法治化和国家治理体系现代化的关键所在。政府权力需要从三个维度完成其法治化。第一个维度,在改革与法治的关系中,应当以法治的方式限定政府权力,政府权力推进改革应当在法治的框架内进行,改革必须于法有据;第二个维度,在政府与市场的关系中,应正视政府权力在经济生活中的越位和缺位,进而以法治的方式厘清政府权力的边界,构建参与协作式的主体间性关系;第三个维度,在政府事权与政府财权的关系中,应当坚持财权与事权相一致的原则,以法治的方式合理划分政府的财权和事权。     

基于整体性治理的食品安全监管体系探究

目前中国食品安全监管模式主要是分段监管为主,品种监管为辅。这种模式细化了监管领域和监管环节,有利于提高专业化行政能力,但不可避免地导致了监管的"碎片化"。整体性治理着眼于政府内部机构的整体性运作,主张从分散走向集中,从破碎走向整合。以整体性治理的视角检视食品安全监管体系构成、运作逻辑以及存在的问题,有利于重塑中国食品安全监管体系。     

美国的食品安全保障体系及其经验启示

美国的食品安全保障体系具有以下特点:覆盖所有食品的法律体系构成了食品安全保护网,综合高效的监管体系保证了对食品安全的有力监管,科学的风险分析是食品安全的决策基础等。美国食品安全保障体系的经验有:立法、执法和司法决策以科学为依据,政府、相关行业和消费者形成严密的监管体系,食品安全责任主体明确、民众食品安全意识强等。借鉴美国的经验,我国在食品安全保障方面应做好以下工作:完善保障食品安全的法律法规体系,建立健全食品监管体系,建立和完善食品安全风险评估预防体系等。     

央地财政关系新论:基于权力清单的考察

权力清单的发布既是政府自我约束权力的体现,更是政府职能的整体梳理。而财税权力清单作为央地财政关系中的一种配权工具,通过对其进行纵横向度的比照,也有助于厘清各级财税部门的事权,实现中央与地方财政关系的规则之治。但是这种权力清单式的划分的效力和效果如何,是否足以完成纵向府际之间的事权划分任务,显然存在疑义。基于规范央地财政关系的考虑,极有必要从地方财政自主权、事权划分视角反思当下的财税权力清单制度,进而对其进行体系优化。也唯有优化财税权力清单内容,建立健全责任清单制度,规范清单的动态调整机制,才能促进财税权力清单的规范行使,助推权力清单的深入实践,实现央地财政关系的深度规范。     

碎裂型政府架构下的行政事务管理——以美国湿地管理机制为例

在政府管理过程中,跨部门、跨层级复杂行政关系的协调一直是难以解决的重大问题,多头管理往往导致具体事务管理上的困境.美国政府向来以权力分散、碎裂著称,在具体行政事务上也经常出现"九龙治水"的多头管理局面,但是美国行政机构的效率之高也是有目共睹的.因此,美国碎裂型政府架构如何运作、如何将不利条件转化为行政管理的驱动力就成为研究的热点.以美国湿地管理与保护机制为例,分析在具体行政事务管理中的政府行为;结合联邦主义理论、府际关系理论及府际管理理论,解释美国碎裂型政府方面的优势,构筑了分析模型.在这个分析模型中,环境保护署和陆军工程兵团等核心管理部门的清晰权限、相互之间的合作与制衡直接决定着湿地事务管理的绩效,而联邦的三权分立、各州及地方政府、权力及资源权属状况、社会利益团体等多方面因素构成了核心管理部门的外部环境;外部环境限定了核心管理部门的行动范围,也赋予它们必要的资源和权力.因此在湿地管理方面,美国围绕着若干重要的联邦机构,联合其它相关联邦机构及各州、地方政府,再吸收社会组织和个人的建设性参与,形成了一套法网严密、执法适度、资助得力、公民积极配合的高效管理机制.     

Presidential oversight: Controlling the regulators

In 1974, President Ford initiated a procedure by which the regulatory policies of federal agencies were subjected to systematic oversight. This activity continued with modest success through subsequent administrations. A substantial stiffening of oversight powers under President Reagan raises basic questions about the best means for performing effective oversight. Proposals for a so-called regulatory budget, within which each agency would be obliged to operate, could expand the oversight authority; but it is too exclusively cost-oriented. A more promising approach is to impose expiration dates on regulations, making them subject to renewal, and to reform the legislative mandates of the regulatory agencies.     

Patterns of Intergovernmental Relations in Environmental Cleanup at Federal Facilities

The authority of both federal and state environmental regulatorsis involved in decisions about regulating the cleanup of contaminatedsites at federal facilities. This study examines tripartiterelationships among EPA regional offices, state environmentalregulatory agencies, and U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) andU.S. Department of Energy (DOE) facilities during the processof cleaning up Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,and Liability Act (CERCLA) sites at two federal facilities.The analysis found regular patterns of conflict and cooperationin CERCLA cleanup programs at Weldon Spring, Missouri, and ReeseAir Force Base, Texas. DOD and DOE, as lead agencies, generallyfrustrated active participation by state environmental regulatoryagencies in the federal cleanup process. States used other environmentalregulations to obtain authority over federal CERCLA sites withvarying levels of success. States' success in gaining authorityover federal CERCLA sites depended on EPA regional offices'support of states' efforts.     

Agenda‐Setting at the Energy‐Water Nexus: Constructing and Maintaining a Policy Monopoly in U.S. Hydraulic Fracturing Regulation

Despite calls to increase federal oversight of hydraulic fracturing (HF), the U.S. Congress has maintained a regulatory system in which environmental regulatory authority is devolved to the states. We argue that this system is characterized by a long‐standing “policy monopoly”: a form of stability in policy agenda‐setting in which a specific manner of framing and regulating a policy issue becomes hegemonic. Integrating theories on agenda‐setting and environmental discourse analysis, we develop a nuanced conceptualization of policy monopoly that emphasizes the significance of regulatory history, public perceptions, industry–government relations, and environmental “storylines.” We evaluate how a policy monopoly in U.S. HF regulation has been constructed and maintained through a historical analysis of oil and gas regulation and a discourse analysis of eleven select congressional energy committee hearings. This research extends scholarship on agenda‐setting by better illuminating the importance of political economic and geographic factors shaping regulatory agendas and outcomes.     

How status-group power differentials shape age discrimination within U.S. federal agencies: Evidence from EEOC formal complaint filings, 2010–2019

Age discrimination is a systemic problem of the American administrative state that undermines both the caliber and performance of the U.S. federal government workforce. A theory is proposed, anchored on discrimination against age-eligible employees (age 40 and over) representing a social identity group, to explain how status-group power differentials between supervisors and non-supervisors within U.S. federal agencies explain the organizational incidence of formal discrimination complaints. The theory predicts that the incidence of age discrimination formal complaints is declining in the share of supervisory personnel who are discrimination age-eligible while increasing in the share of non-supervisory personnel members who belong to this group. Evidence is obtained for these hypotheses using objective data on Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's age discrimination formal complaints about an unbalanced panel of 130 U.S. federal agencies between 2010 and 2019. The empirical evidence underscores the structural challenges to combatting ageism within the U.S. federal government workforce during an era of an intergenerational personnel change.     

The State of U.S. Federalism, 2000-2001: Continuity in Crisis

Despite the 2000 presidential-election crisis, basic continuityprevailed in American federalism, including survival of theelectoral college and furtherance of the more recent shift offederal policymaking from places to persons during today's eraof coercive or regulatory federalism. The year revealed theenduring salience of political parties and the prominent roleof interest groups in the politics of federalism, as well asthe ways in which the federal system shapes, and is shaped by,policy debates. The U.S. Supreme Court continued its state-friendlydecision-making while Congress continued to preempt state authority,attach new conditions to federal aid, federalize criminal law,and nationalize power even while giving state and local governmentsmore administrative discretion. The year also illustrated thedeclining impact of federal aid on state-local revenues comparedto the increasing fiscal impact of the federal government'ssubstantive, monetary, and fiscal policies.     

Social and institutional challenges in species and ecosystem conservation: an appraisal of the U.S. Marine Mammal Commission

In the pantheon of U.S. environmental law, only one federal statute—the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972—has created an independent oversight agency with explicit authority to conduct appraisals of and make recommendations on all regulatory agency actions under the law. That agency, the U.S. Marine Mammal Commission, is the subject of our analysis. Using a semi-structured survey and participant observation, we assess the commission’s operations under its legislative mandate, using criteria from the literature on policy-oriented professionalism. Our findings indicate a dichotomy between the Commission’s oversight of other agencies’ marine mammal programs and the manner in which it self-evaluates, learns, and evolves on the basis of its experience, with strongly pragmatic approaches to its appraisal of other agencies’ programs, contrasted with weak appraisal of its own operations.     

Organizational design and its consequences for administrative reform: Historical lessons from the U.S. Budget and Accounting Act of 1921

The landmark U.S. Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 (BAA) instituted a series of administrative reforms that proponents claimed would improve budgetary control, stability, and coherence. We maintain that the compatibility of governance structures between agency and system levels is critical for understanding why these administrative centralization efforts were successful in achieving these aims for some federal agencies but not others. The BAA reforms impact on budgetary outcomes is evaluated using panel data on major U.S. federal agencies between 1894 and 1940. Applying semiparametric heterogeneous treatment estimation techniques, we find compelling support that administrative centralization of the federal budgetary process enhanced budget stability and coherence for executive departments while resulting in a lower caliber of budgetary performance for independent agencies. These findings imply that system‐level administrative centralization efforts may be effective only when public agencies are structurally amenable to such reforms.     

Environmental Federalism Revisited: Second‐Order Devolution in Air Quality Regulation

In this paper we examine states' use of local clean air agencies and provide a preliminary assessment of what causes states to devolve air quality policy authority to the local level. Data from a unique comparative state survey shows that states vary widely in the number of local clean air agencies they employ and the amount of authority these agencies have to set standards, monitor air quality, and enforce regulations. Multivariate analyses suggest that second‐order devolution is partly driven by a general propensity to decentralize policy authority, but that policy‐specific factors relating to the problem and interest group environment affect devolution as well. These findings indicate that local agencies play an important role in U.S. air quality regulation, and that the dynamics of state devolution to local agencies deserve further study.     

The State of American Federalism, 1994-1995

Federalism, as a concept and as a reality, received assistancefrom a variety of sources during 1994–1995. Opinion pollsrevealed a public strongly supportive of shifts in the balanceof power between federal and state governments. The new Republican-controlledCongress, bent on devolving authority to the states, busieditself with an ambitious legislative agenda. The DemocraticPresident pursued his principles of federalism and intergovernmentalrelations by supporting the unfunded mandates bill and by increasingthe use of the administrative waiver. The U.S. Supreme Courtbolstered federalism with its rulings in cases such as Lopez,a state challenge to the federal Gun-Free School Zones Act.The new mood in Washington, D.C. was complemented by state leadersanxious to take on the challenges of a rebalanced federal system