公司表决权例外排除制度研究

公司表决权例外排除制度包括股东表决权例外排除制度和董事表决权例外排除制度,是指当股东(大)会(董事会)表决的决议事项与某一或某些股东(董事)存在特别利害关系时,这些股东(董事)或其代理人不能以其所持表决权参与表决的一种法律制度。作为矫正失衡的股东利益关系,防止控制股股东、公司“内部人”滥用资本多数决和控制权,完善公司法人治理结构,激活股东(大)会制度、董事会制度的一种表决权行使机制,与表决权限制制度不同,公司表决权例外排除制度有其独特的价值取向和行使规则。我国公司法对此一制度予以借鉴和移植,将对完善公司内部治理结构,保护中小股东利益,促进公司经营的稳定,甚至对推动我国资本市场的理性运作等均具有重要的理论与实践指导意义。     

股东大会表决权制度与中小股东权益的保护

股东表决权是公司股东享有的最重要的权利,此种权利是否有效行使直接关系到中小股东的合法权益能否得到保护。为了矫正大股东与中小股东的利益失衡,应当要求大股东在行使其表决权时履行诚信义务,同时规定出席股东大会会议的最低法定人数及限制大股东表决权,并通过具体制度架构确保中小股东的合法权益。     

论股东表决权排除的制度价值及其局限

“表决权,乃股东对于股东会之决议得参与决议之权利。申言之,表决权系对股东会的决议事项为可决或否决之意思表示,藉以形成公司意思之权利。”①在现代经济中,表决权已成为公司所有与公司经营的连接点。“一方面,它不但维系着公司所有者与经营者的关系,还控制着经营者的权力。另一方面,它也反映着股东之间的内部关系,既是控制股东对中小股东进行控制的工具,也是不同股东之间争夺公司控制权的工具。”②所以,有人认为,表决权是较之于股东有限责任的公司法的第二性征,③具有独立的制度价值。④但是,在各国(地区)的公司法中却普遍地存在股东表…     

论我国股东表决权排除制度的构建及完善

股东表决权排除制度体现了现代公司法所追求的实质公平,在客观上具有确保股东大会决议内容之公正、维护公司利益、保护中小股东利益的重大意义。我国公司法修订后初步确立了限制股东表决权的相关规定,但存在较大的局限性,尚未形成真正的制度规范,因此对股东表决权制度有进一步完善之必要。     

股东表决权:公司所有与公司控制的连接点

美国学者Berle和Means于1932年系统地分析了在公众公司中存在的公司所有与公司经营相分离的现象后,在经济学和公司法学中都产生了重大的影响。根据该理论,在公众公司中的股东对经营层失去了控制,表决权也没有任何意义了。对此,基于所有权结构的有效性分析,本文认为股东对管理层并没有失去控制,而是由某一个或者几个大股东控制着公司。在两权分离过程中,表决权扮演着极为重要的角色,它是公司所有与公司经营的连接点。它不但维系和控制着公司所有者与经营者的关系,还是不同股东之间争夺公司控制权的工具,是控制股东对中小股东进行控制的工具。为了顺应这一工具主义趋势,表决权与股份之间出现了分离倾向的同时,表决权本身也出现了客体化趋势,在表决权的救济上也已经从损害赔偿为主的救济方式走向了撤销公司决议为主。     

资本多数决原则与控制股东的诚信义务

以上市公司“一股独大”为背景考察控制股东滥用控制权问题 ,其制度原因在于 ,作为资本企业集中股东意志的必然选择资本多数决原则 ,本身却也存在着制度上的缺陷 ,从而导致其在公司实践中产生异化。为了矫正控制权滥用而导致的控制股东与中小股东的利益失衡 ,应当要求控制股东行使控制权时承担诚信义务 ,并通过具体制度架构确保其诚信义务的履行。     

表决权代理人的资格分析

表决权代理在方便股东行使表决权、制约"内部人控制"和保护中小股东利益方面有重要意义,但由于代理中存在着代理成本和道德风险,征集人的资格设计必须对此予以充分的考量。本文从征集成本、道德风险的角度,分析不同情况下表决权代理人资格设计的不同重心和要求,试图梳理出较为细化的立法框架。     

公司控制权的法律规制

对公司控制权的法律规制,应从其配置和行使着手,使控制权得到合理的分配和正当行使,防止控制权的拥有者为私人利益的追求而不当地滥用控制权,损害他人利益。使公司控制权在控股股东、管理层和中小股东间找到一个合理的配置点,得到正当行使,进而促进公司的发展。     

控制权溢价的法律规制

公司控制权是对一个商业组织的管理或经营政策施加控制性影响的权力,拥有控制权的人可以借此获得控制权溢价,对于溢价的产生来源学者提出了不同的学说;控制权交易对中小股东产生不利影响,控制股东应当承担溢价披露义务和溢价分享义务;我国完善立法保护中小股东利益,合理规范控制权溢价。     

股东表决权诉讼:公司和谐发展的司法保障

股东表决权是股东干预公司经营决策最为积极有效的手段,是公司利益平衡的有力工具。但如果缺乏司法的保障,股东表决权的这一作用就很难得到有效发挥,抑或会沦为管理者或控股股东滥用权力的工具。股东表决权诉讼则是保障股东表决权实现,维护公司利益平衡与和谐发展的基本保障。     

Disputes about corporate expression absorption and their legal remedies

Corporate expression is the expression that a company gives to the outside in its capacity as a legal entity. Often referring to resolutions made by shareholder meetings and the board of directors, based on good faith and bound by contractual spirit, a company must be held liable for its expression. Corporate expression absorption refers to the corporate behaviors and situations wherein the majority voting shareholders and directors replace the will of the minority voting shareholders and directors within their own will. Among them, the majority voting shareholders at a shareholders’ meeting (shareholders’ general meeting) are decision-making shareholders, and directors, managers and other senior management staff that decide corporate affairs are called decision-making members. Corporate expression absorption consists of two sorts: absorption by shareholders’ meeting and absorption by the board of directors. Shareholders’ meeting is a company’s authoritative organization; when the voting rights of some shareholders exceed the statutory limit, they will be able to manipulate the expression of shareholders’ meetings and replace the will of other shareholders with that of their own. The expression absorption by the board of directors refers to the practice wherein the majority directors decide on important corporate matters in accordance with the majority rule. Thus, it can be seen that the corporate expression absorption is a double-edged sword, not only capable of uplifting operational efficiency but also likely to help decision-making shareholders achieve personal gains and transfer corporate interests. As for the disputes of corporate expression absorption, the following legal remedies might be adopted: (1) Limit the voting rights of decision-making shareholders. (2) Provide shareholders with veto power over specific events. (3) Ask the chambers of commerce (industry associations) to arbitrate specific events. (4) Preserve the market value of shares held by dissenting directors. (5) Expand cumulative voting; (6) Provide shareholders the right to exit. (7) Legal remedies for corporate deadlock. (8) Shareholders’ derivative lawsuits. __________ Translated from China Law, No. 4, 2005     

论证券投资基金所持股份之表决权的行使

证券投资基金所持股份之表决权理应由基金管理人代表基金份额持有人自由行使,但由于证券投资基金持股数额一般较大,且该表决权的行使具有权义复合性和双重共益性,故基金管理人在行使基金持股之表决权时应尽忠实、勤勉义务。建议我国立法对基金持股之表决权进行一定的规制,以维护基金份额持有人的利益,并更好地发挥基金作为机构投资者在股份公司治理中的作用。     

隐私权的经济分析

隐私本质上是私人信息,隐私权是个人控制其私人信息的权利。无论隐私是否涉及到个人名誉,从对隐私的成本——收益分析来看,在权利的初始配置的意义上,都应当将控制私人信息的权利配置给信息生产者而形成隐私权。隐私权不能仅仅囿于人格权的范畴,而应该向其财产权性质方面着力发挥。将私人信息的权利配置给个人,个人就能够控制其私人信息从而形成对其私人信息的财产权,进而实现对隐私权更为切实的保护之目的。     

论股东大会的概念

股东大会作为由公司全体股东组成的对公司重大事务进行决策的机制在本质上并不是＂机构＂,而是一种制度,是股东民主的制度形式。股东大会与政治国家中的立法机关（议会）具有本质性的差别,在理论上不能将其类比为立法机关（议会）,而应当将其视为一种类似于＂全民公决＂的重大事项决策机制。股东大会作为股东民主的制度形式只能采用多数决的规则,决定了股东大会制度面临着与政治民主制度同样的问题,即如何保护少数派（股东）的利益。     

论中国股东权制度的立法完善——以公司契约理论为视角

公司契约理论的契约自由精神在我国新《公司法》中得到了一定程度的体现。《公司法》提高了授权性规范在条文中的比例,一定程度上扩大了股东及其他公司参与者的自由空间。然而,从公司契约理论的视角来看,我国股东权制度仍然存在一些问题,由此,建议《公司法》修订中应使用规范用语、正确区分强制性规范与任意性规范、进一步减少强制性规范、进一步完善股权转让权制度以及表决权制度。未来的股东权制度有待于建立《公司法》的动态适应机制,以保持《公司法》的高度适应性。     

第三人的货物控制权人地位探究

海上货物运输合同下的货物控制权常为合同的第三人所享有,FOB合同下卖方的权益因其货物控制权人的地位而得到保护。第三人在海上货物运输合同领域中的货物控制权以其在国际货物买卖领域内的对货物间接占有的权利为基础,由此可解决当提单已为买方占有时,卖方是否仍然可以行使货物控制权以完成其中途停运权的问题。第三人所享有的货物控制权较之其以往在海上货物运输合同这一为第三人利益合同下作为第三人所享有的其他权利更为广泛与深入,从而构成对合同相对性原则的又一突破。     

Corporate Financial Performance and the Use of Takeover Defenses

This paper tests the hypothesis that the threat of a contested takeover improves corporate performance. This is done by a cross-sectional analysis of listed Danish firms with and without effective takeover defenses. Takeover defenses adopted by Danish firms mainly consist of dual class voting rights often in combination with foundation ownership. Using simultaneous equation estimation to deal with the problem of causation, the results show that unprotected firms do not outperform protected firms. This suggests that management in unprotected firms are disciplined by other corporate governance mechanisms than the market for corporate control, including the legal protection of shareholders.     

LEGAL PROTECTION FOR MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS IN CHINA

In view of the increasingly severe exploitation of minority shareholders and the existence of double agency costs in China,it is necessary to provide strong protection for minority shareholders in China in order to build an investor-friendly system.By enabling minority shareholders to prevent misconducts of majority shareholders and managers,legal system has made significant progress in the past twenty years.     

Shareholder Coordination Costs, Shark Repellents, and Takeout Mergers: The Case Against Fiduciary Duties

When a bidding corporation succeeds in obtaining voting control of a target corporation through a hostile tender offer, many commentators argue that it is unfair to allow the bidder to exercise its voting power to set the price terms of a second-step takeout merger in which the bidder purchases the shares of the remaining target shareholders. This concern is inappropriate because it treats a unitary acquisition between adversaries as if it were two separate transactions–the second of which involves abuse of power by fiduciaries–and also because it assumes that shareholders of the target corporation are incapable of protecting themselves from the power of a successful bidder. Moreover, imposition of fiduciary rules may impose either prohibitive costs or absolute barriers to some takeovers, even if such transactions would be wealth producing. While there is a risk that some takeovers may exploit the “prisoner's dilemma” facing target shareholders threatened with an unattractive takeout threat, target shareholders are capable of responding to that threat with devices to coordinate their response. So-called “shark repellent” amendments that raise the proportion of votes required to approve second-step mergers or that limit the terms of such mergers can function as coordination devices to alleviate the prisoner's dilemma. Commentators' fears that such devices may unduly burden the market for corporate control appear to depend to a large extent on unfounded assumptions that all takeovers are wealth producing and that takeovers are never motivated by potential gains flowing from exploitation of the lack of coordination among target shareholders. However, empirical studies indicate that adoption of such coordination rules can benefit target shareholders and that it is unlikely that shareholders will approve voting rules so restrictive that they would preclude wealth-creating acquisitions. The usual notions of shareholder apathy are simply inapplicable to takeout mergers.