Wasting or saving time? How government and opposition parties use time during legislative debates. Evidence from the Italian case

The use of plenary time during legislative debates has consequences for the enhancement of party goals. Hence, parties have different preferences on how legislative time should be managed: while some parties would like time not to be ‘wasted’ on the floor, other parties may instead try to ‘consume’ as much time as possible. Speeches delivered in the plenary signal these preferences. Focusing on plenary debates on legislation, this paper proposes a theory for explaining party speech-making behaviour that takes into consideration parties’ preferences on the use of time and their incentives related to the divide between government and opposition. The theoretical argument also emphasises the role of issue salience and party cohesion, which interact with the incentives faced by government and opposition parties. Hypotheses are tested against data from over 21,000 speeches delivered in the Italian parliament. Results highlight the importance of considering the different incentives faced by government and opposition parties when analysing speech making in parliamentary settings, and suggest some interesting avenues for future enquiry.     

Party Effects in State Legislative Committees

Legislative scholars have theorized about the role of committees and whether they are, or are not, tools of the majority party. We look to the states to gain more empirical leverage on this question, using a regression discontinuity approach and novel data from all state committees between 1996 and 2014. We estimate that majority‐party status produces an 8.5 percentage point bonus in committee seats and a substantial ideological shift in the direction of the majority party. Additionally, we leverage a surprisingly frequent, but as if random occurrence in state legislatures—tied chambers—to identify majority‐party effects, finding similar support for partisan committees. We also examine whether the extent of committee partisanship is conditional on party polarization or legislative professionalism, but we find that it is not. Our results demonstrate that parties create nonrepresentative committees across legislatures to pursue their outlying policy preferences.     

Representation,Competing Principals,and Waffling on Bills in US Legislatures

Legislators are often placed in the position of representing the interests of their constituents against the preferences of their own party leaders. We develop a theoretical framework indicating that these cross‐pressured legislators are more likely to initially support legislation and subsequently change their minds than are legislators whose constituents and leaders share similar preferences. Moreover, we expect this pattern to be most pronounced among members of majority parties than minority‐party members. We test our expectations using data on bill cosponsorship and final passage votes from 46 lower state legislative chambers and the US House, finding considerable support for our theory.     

The Sound of Rebellion: Voting Dissent and Legislative Speech in the UK House of Commons

Using data on the content of debate associated with votes in the UK House of Commons from 1992–2015, this article examines how government party MPs employ language in legislative speech when they vote against the party line. We find a robust statistical association between dissent on votes and the use of first-person pronouns, simpler language, and giving longer speeches. Using a random forest algorithm for classification, we find that these language covariates are predictive of rebellion. The use of simpler, first-person language has implications for political representation and offers new insight into how MPs use votes to distinguish themselves from their party, perhaps reflecting attempts to connect with constituents.     

Protesters,Parliamentarians, Policymakers: The Experiences of Australian Green MPs

This article details the distinctive style and political commitments that Green members of parliament (MPs) bring to representative democracy in Australia. Based on in-depth interviews with 16 sitting federal and state Green MPs, it examines the extent to which the political culture, grassroots organisation and values of this left-libertarian party influence the parliamentary role orientations and legislative behaviour of its MPs, and how this fits with existing research on parliamentary representatives. The analysis reveals mixed results: while the legislative priorities and representative focus of MPs appear to be influenced more by previous social movement and parliamentary experience rather than overarching party orientations, the party's culture has had a strong impact on MPs' views regarding issues of conscience and their style of representation. Drawing on the comparative experience of Green parties throughout Western Europe, this article utilises the prism of role orientations to assess the conflicting imperatives Australian Green MPs face in staying true to their movement origins while their party becomes increasingly professional and influential in the parliamentary arena.     

Improving the Relevance of Parliamentary Institutions: An Examination of Legislative Pre-budget Consultations in British Columbia

This study examines the influence of the Select Standing Committee on Finance and Government Services in the budgetary process in the Canadian province of British Columbia. The mandate of this committee is to conduct pre-budget consultations every year to seek the opinion of the population on the content of the next provincial budget. Many have recommended increasing use of legislative committees to bring back relevance to parliamentary institutions in Canada. It is believed that legislative committees provide an environment that is less conducive to partisan confrontations and can help in building the policy expertise of parliamentarians. Using interviews with committee members and a survey among participants in pre-budget consultations, this was found to be the case. The main finding points to the potential of legislative committees in performing a representative function because they can put forward the views of the public as part of the budgetary process.     

Electoral foundations of parliamentary questions: evidence from the European Parliament

Parliamentary questions (PQs) provide a useful tool for members of the European Parliament (MEPs) to control the executive at supranational level and to promote their reputation among relevant groups (party, interest groups and constituency). Previous works have just focused on macro-functions of questions, neglecting the opportunity for MEPs to use them as a re-election and re-selection strategy (micro-functions). In this article, it is argued that PQs are a relevant instrument in the hands of parliamentarians in order to increase their reputation and build up their political image. In particular, it is considered how variation in electoral systems might affect legislative behaviour and, especially, the number of questions asked. Using a new data set on oral and written questions to the European Commission and the Council, the article demonstrates how candidate-centred electoral systems incentivise MEPs to ask more questions than legislators elected under party-centred systems.     

Who Benefits from the Party Organization? Evidence from Republican House Members' Attendance at Caucus Meetings

As the role of US congressional parties in the legislative process has increased, so has the importance of understanding the institutions within these organizations. In this article, we examine the weekly caucus meetings held by Republican House leaders with their rank‐and‐file. We consider how members’ characteristics relate to their decision to attend based on the collective and private benefits that caucus participation affords. Using interviews of members and staffers as well as members’ attendance records at these meetings from 2007 to 2013, we find, among other things, that members who vote less with their party or who have more seniority are less likely to attend while those in leadership positions or who are electorally vulnerable are more likely to do so. Together, these findings provide additional insights on the relationship between party leaders and their members and which members benefit from this central party‐building activity.     

Due North? Do American Theories of Legislative Committees Apply to Canada?

Several theories of legislative organisation have been proposed to explain committee selection in American legislatures, but do these theories travel outside the United States? This paper tests whether these theories apply to data from the Canadian House of Commons. It was found that the distributive and partisan models of legislative organisation explain committee composition in Canada. In many cases, committees in the House of Commons are made up of preference outliers. As predicted by partisan models, it was also found that the governing party stacks committees with its members, but this is conditional upon the strength of the governing party.     

Oversight Effectiveness and Political Will: Some Lessons from West Africa

The purpose of the present note is to advance two theoretical claims. The first claim proposed is that the impact of the availability of oversight tools and of the most broadly understood legislative capacity (availability of material, technical, financial resources; availability of well-trained staff) on the effectiveness with which legislative oversight is performed is conditional. The second claim put forward, after reviewing a rich body of work on executive–legislative relations and legislative oversight in West Africa, is that, of the various conditions that promote or prevent the effective use of oversight tools and capacity, political will is the single most important. These claims have both theoretical and practical relevance, for if political will is as important as is claimed for the effective performance of the oversight function, then international organisations may have to reconsider their approach to legislative strengthening.     

Rules and Speeches: How Parliamentary Rules Affect Legislators' Speech‐Making Behavior

By extending existing theories of legislative speech making, this study explores the importance of parliamentary rules governing floor debates for government and opposition parties. An original data set including speeches of members of the Italian Chamber of Deputies between 2001 and 2006 is used to test two hypotheses under different institutional scenarios, that is, rules either restricting or granting open access to the floor. Parliamentary rules are found to affect allocation of speaking time within both governing and opposition parties. Governing parties' leaders exploit their agenda control to a higher degree when allocating speaking time. Under restrictive rules, government party leaders control their MPs by essentially limiting the number of speeches and allocating them to frontbenchers. Restrictive rules give opposition party leaders an important chance to select MPs who are closer to their own position.     

Party Unity in the Swiss Parliament: The Electoral Connection

This study investigates the connection between legislative and electoral politics in Switzerland. The authors postulate that party unity is higher in an election year, and more specifically in votes on issues that are important for the party platform and that are of greater visibility to voters. The authors analyse the entire voting record of the Swiss parliament (lower house) on legislative acts between 1996 and 2007, which consists of roll call votes as well as unpublished votes. The authors find a strong effect of elections on voting unity among certain parties, and also find encouraging support for the hypotheses that this effect is mediated by the visibility of the vote and related issue salience.     

Parliamentary Rule: The US Senate Parliamentarian and Institutional Constraints on Legislator Behaviour

This article analyses the extent to which institutional rules constrain member behaviour in the United States Senate by examining the evolution of its parliamentarian. Interestingly, the US Senate parliamentarian has received surprisingly little scholarly attention given the important role she performs in the legislative process. The subsequent analysis thus provides a new understanding of the parliamentarian's role in the legislative process and the interplay between institutional rules and member behaviour in the Senate. To this end, the following analysis is situated within the context of the two primary theoretical approaches to understanding how institutional rules constrain member behaviour: path dependency and majoritarianism. These contrasting approaches provide expectations about the extent to which members will defer to the parliamentarian's interpretation of Senate rules rather than exercising their own discretionary control over those rules. Examining the evolving relationship between the parliamentarian and individual members affirms the centrality of institutional rules as a constraint on member behaviour over the past several decades. Yet such an examination also yields two surprising, and potentially contradictory, observations. First, individual senators in both parties have increasingly deferred to the parliamentarian to interpret the Senate's rules. This is surprising given that the Senate has simultaneously become more individualistic, partisan, and ideological over the same period. Second, the majority party has recently disregarded the norm of parliamentary constraint reflected in past practice and demonstrated a willingness to ignore Senate rules when doing so was necessary to achieve legislative success. This could signify a potential shift in how majorities view the constraints imposed by Senate rules if current trends of legislative dysfunction continue.     

Multilingual Sentiment Analysis: A New Approach to Measuring Conflict in Legislative Speeches

Comparative scholars of legislative politics continue to face the challenge of measuring a key theoretical concept: conflict at the level of legislative bills. We address this challenge with a multilingual sentiment‐based approach and show that such a measure can effectively capture different types of parliamentary conflict. We also demonstrate that an automated translation of the dictionary yields valid results and therefore greatly facilitates comparative work on legislatures. Our applications show that a sentiment approach recovers government‐opposition dynamics in various settings. The use of a simple, translatable sentiment dictionary opens up the possibility of studying legislative conflict in bill debates across languages and countries.     

Party Strategies,Constituency Links,and Legislative Speech

This article examines how parties organize legislative speech. Electoral incentives and legislative institutions affect speech participation. When electoral systems create personal vote‐seeking incentives, parties are less concerned with screening speeches and more supportive of members seeking to garner name recognition. But in many countries, legislative rules and norms constrain opportunities for individual position taking during the lawmaking debates. We argue that parties resolve this dilemma by organizing speech participation into nonlegislative speeches and lawmaking debates. In each instance, different types of legislators are more likely to speak. We examine the case of Chile and test the implications of our theory with data on congressional speeches.     

Invisible Politics: Institutional Incentives and Legislative Alignments in the Russian Duma, 1996–99

Previous analysis of legislative voting has focused on the behavior of nominal legislative parties, regardless of whether the country under examination was an established democracy or a newly democratized country. This approach is inadequate for countries with young party systems. To establish the extent to which legislative coalitions are party based, scholars must allow for the possibility that institutional incentives predominate over party influence. For this study, I applied a Bayesian discrete latent variable method to identify the legislative coalitions in the 1996‐99 Duma. I found that legislative alignments cut across party lines: electoral incentives and support for the president contribute to divides within parties that lack coherent platforms. Here I present a novel methodological approach to the identification of intraparty divisions and the major determinants of legislative coalitions in many legislative settings. This approach allows a comparison of the importance of party influence relative to other institutional incentives. It is especially useful for analyzing legislative voting in young party systems and where constitutional frameworks and electoral systems subject legislators to competing pressures.     

Legislative Strengthening Meets Party Support in International Assistance: A Closer Relationship?

Recent reports recommend that international efforts to help strengthen legislatures in emerging democracies should work more closely with support for building stronger political parties and competitive party systems. This article locates the recommendations within international assistance more generally and reviews the arguments. It explores problems that must be addressed if the recommendations are to be implemented effectively. The article argues that an alternative, issue-based approach to strengthening legislatures and closer links with civil society could gain more traction. However, that is directed more centrally at promoting good governance for the purpose of furthering development than at democratisation goals sought by party aid and legislative strengtheners in the democracy assistance industry.     

我国法定继承制度的立法构想

值此我国《继承法》正在讨论修改之际 ,本文分析了我国法定继承制度存在的不足 ,借鉴国外立法经验 ,结合我国实际 ,试拟法定继承制度的立法建议稿 ,并对立法理由予以分析说明 ,以供我国立法机关参考     

Balancing Competing Demands: Position Taking and Election Proximity in the European Parliament

Parties value unity, yet members of parliament have incentives to deviate from the party line. This article examines how members of the European Parliament (EP) respond to competing demands from national parties and European party groups. We examine ideological shifts within a single parliamentary term to assess how election proximity affects party group cohesion. Our formal model of legislative behavior suggests that when EP elections are proximate, national party delegations shift toward national party positions, thus weakening EP party group cohesion. Our Bayesian item‐response analysis of roll calls in the 5th EP supports our theoretical predictions.     

Frogs,mice and mixed electoral institutions: party discipline in Italy's XIV Chamber of Deputies1

Through the analysis of nearly 5,700 electronic votes cast by members of the Italian lower house, this article focuses on the electoral incentives shaping legislative behaviour in assemblies elected under mixed electoral rules. The study finds that the incentives indirectly engendered by the interaction between the majoritarian and proportional components of the Italian mixed system strengthen party discipline, which is high for every legislator type regardless of mandate and specialisation. Legislators elected in single-member districts are equally, if not more, susceptible to pressures to stick to the party line as their colleagues elected from a party list. Moreover, indicators of ‘electoral path’, like relative seat safety and dual candidacy, matter to party discipline more than simple seat type.