The aid orphan myth

The term ‘aid orphan’ refers to a developing country forgotten or abandoned by the development community. This metaphor has featured prominently in the development assistance policy and research literature over the past decade. Development practitioners, policy makers and researchers have defined aid orphans in manifold ways and often expressed concern over the potential fate or impact of such countries. In this paper we first examine the many definitions of aid orphans and then review the main concerns raised about them. Next we empirically examine more than 40 years of bilateral aid data to identify aid orphan countries and their common characteristics. Our findings suggest that very few countries meet the definition of aid orphan and fewer still raise the concerns collectively expressed about the orphan phenomenon. We conclude by suggesting researchers and practitioners abandon the orphan metaphor and instead focus on issues of equitable aid allocation.     

The Taliban: a new proxy for Iran in Afghanistan?

Abstract

Iran has pursued a highly contradictory policy towards Afghanistan. On the one hand, it became a significant beneficiary of the overthrow of the Taliban regime by the US-led military intervention in 2001 in Afghanistan. The new Afghan government established cordial ties with Iran, allowing it to expand its political, economic and cultural influence in the country. Yet Iran has also provided significant support to the Taliban in its campaign to violently upend the political, social and economic processes in the country. This article examines the underlying domestic and regional security dynamics that contribute to this contradictory behaviour. It offers an assessment of how tensions between the United States and the Islamic Republic, as well as Tehran’s growing threat perception following the rise of the Islamic State – Khorasan in 2014, impact on Iran’s policy towards the Taliban. The paper argues that Tehran views the Taliban as an instrument to disrupt the influence of other actors in Afghanistan. The instrumentalisation of the Taliban, however, is likely to be counterproductive for Iranian security in the long run as it contributes to Afghanistan’s instability and insecurity and undermines Iran’s own long-term interests.     

China’s foreign aid system: structure,agencies, and identities

China’s rise as a (re)emerging donor has attracted attention over the last decade, with a focus on Chinese development assistance as a challenge to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) aid norms. Knowledge of China’s domestic aid structure is needed to understand Chinese aid abroad. This paper addresses gaps in the literature and challenges the accepted nostrum that China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) dominates China’s aid programme. Building on the authors’ experience as Chinese aid practitioners and scholars over more than a decade and drawing on over 300 interviews, the paper explores China’s aid decision-making processes by examining the main agencies, identities and informal interactions. We argue that the Chinese aid system is characterised by fierce and ongoing competition for influence among actors, especially MOFCOM, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Ministry of Finance (MoF), as well as the companies responsible for implementing Chinese aid projects.     

Foreign Aid and Illegal Immigration

Abstract

Gaytán-Fregoso and Lahiri (2000) claim that foreign aid may increase the level of illegal immigration. This comment reconsiders their perverse findings under endogenous as well as exogenous income repatriation. Furthermore, modifying Gaytán-Fregoso and Lahiri's model, in which aid is allotted in a lump-sum fashion, it is suggested that the actual amount of foreign aid should depend on the source country's performance, i.e., on the number of illegal immigrants, since such a policy will further reduce the number of illegal immigrants.     

Between willing and reluctant entrapment: CEE countries in NATO's non-European missions

The article focuses on Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries' experiences related to Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya, three non-European theatres of Western military operations, in predominantly Muslim lands, in the decade between 2001 and 2011. CEE countries readily became involved in two of these foreign missions (Afghanistan and Iraq) because of their deep ties to Western politico-economic structures, without direct security interests compelling them to do so, but not without normative convictions regarding what were seen by them as virtues of the two missions. In Libya, however, they were reluctant to join the Western intervention. In light of this, the article is interested in examining how political elites within the region relate to the generally constrained security policy agency that they have. A key argument advanced is that such agency may be located in how external hegemony is mediated in elite discourses of threat and legitimacy construction. This as well as the three case studies outlined in the article show that the seeming changes in CEE countries' behaviour in fact boil down to a simple set of rules guiding their behaviour. Having identified this “algorithm” as an implicit pattern of CEE foreign policy behaviour, originating in the intra-alliance security dilemma within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the article formulates its conclusions about the alliance policy of these countries largely within a neorealist framework.     

阿拉伯海湾国家对外援助的战略、特点与影响

阿拉伯海湾援助国是新兴援助国的重要成员,在国际发展援助中的贡献与日俱增。援助国的实践服务于政治、经济与文化战略需求,与石油红利、君主制政权、历史地缘关系、伊斯兰文化的宗教属性及地区安全环境密切相关。从外交战略看,援助政策被纳入国家总体战略,在保持对战略重点区域持续投入的基础上向全球扩展,主要体现为团结援助和南南合作;从经济战略看,在全球范围内部署和循环利用石油财富,旨在加速推进国家经济多元化政策;从文化战略看,宣扬伊斯兰传统文化中慷慨施舍的精神,达到提升国家地位、塑造地区影响力之目的;从援助特点看,以王室和中央政府主导的援助政策,兼顾双边和多边的援助渠道,援助分配聚焦受援国经济与社会发展领域、积极对接国际发展合作新机制。援助不仅通过人道主义援助缓解了贫困国家的发展难题,而且彰显了其在国际发展合作中的多重作用,与中国深入践行合作共享的发展理念息息相通。     

Old bottle new wine? The evolution of China’s aid in Africa 1956–2014

Abstract

China’s aid is frequently portrayed as a challenger to established Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) norms, but it is unclear when the distinct ‘Chinese-model’ of aid emerged and how it has evolved over time. Using new historical data on Chinese aid in Africa and the case of Ethiopia, we have three main findings. First, China developed a distinct model of mixing ODA-like aid and commercial forms of economic engagement only after the mid-1990s, reflecting institutional reforms for allocating and managing foreign official finance. Second, social sectors have played a much greater role in China’s aid programme than is commonly perceived. Finally, Chinese aid to productive sectors has changed substantially whereas in social sectors it is relatively consistent.