What the Age of Populism Means for Our Liberal Democracy

Populism has leapt from fringe protest to shaping, even dominating, mainstream politics in just a few years. Behind this political and social upheaval is an economic and political settlement that has failed to deliver good jobs, life chances and sustainable communities in many parts of the country, particularly outside urban centres. The failure of mainstream political parties to build a new settlement following the financial crash in 1998 has left a vacuum which now threatens the foundations of liberal, representative democracy. Progressive politicians need to build a new pluralist settlement based on a radical devolution of power that allows decision making to become less remote, more responsive and brings capital under greater democratic control.     

Democracy,interrupted: Regime change and partisanship in twentieth-century Argentina

Electoral volatility is much higher in new than in advanced democracies. Some scholars contend that weak partisan ties among the electorate lie behind this high volatility. Political parties in new democracies do not invest in building strong linkages with voters, they claim; hence partisanship is not widespread, nor does it grow over time. Our view is that democratic processes do encourage the spread of partisanship and hence the stabilization of electoral outcomes over time in new democracies. But this dynamic can be masked by countervailing factors and cut short by regime instability. We expect that, all else being equal, volatility will decline over time as a new democracy matures but increase again when democracy is interrupted. We use disaggregated ecological data from Argentina over nearly a century to show that electoral stability grows during democratic periods and erodes during dictatorships.     

Uninterested Youth? Young People's Attitudes towards Party Politics in Britain

Following the outcome of the 2001 and 2005 general elections, when the numbers of abstainers outweighed the numbers of Labour voters on both occasions, much attention has focused upon the state of British democracy and how to enthuse the electorate, especially young people. Whilst the government is exploring ways to make the whole process of voting easier, it may be failing to tackle the real problem – that youth appear to find the business of politics uninviting and irrelevant. This paper examines data derived from a nationwide survey of more than 700 young people in order to shed light on what lies at the heart of young people's apparent disengagement from formal politics in Britain – political apathy or a sense of political alienation. The findings reveal that they support the democratic process, but are sceptical of the way the British political system is organised and led and are turned off by politicians and the political parties. However, there is no uniform youth orientation to politics, and the data indicate that views differ according to social class, educational history and also gender. However both ethnicity and region of the country in which young people live seem to have little influence in structuring political attitudes and behaviour.     

Not Big Brand Names but Corner Shops

ABSTRACT

Does New Labour's model of a centrally orchestrated and national-centric political communication strategy effectively engage the electorate? Drawing on interviews with those active in politics “on the ground,” this paper argues that the centralised party model has become unpopular. Furthermore, as these activists tell us, the model is also causing the electorate to reject the democratic process and become apathetic about the political system. Many in Britain, therefore, look to a more locally focussed model, one that has proved successful for the Liberal Democrat party. This model allows communication to be managed at the local level and for the candidate to interact with the local context. An effectively marketed, locally contextualised strategy allows politics to connect with the electorate and, we would suggest, will become more widespread with the realisation that top-down politics does not engage with voters.     

Populism as a Spectre of Democracy: A Response to Canovan

The literature on populism used to depict the phenomenon as an alternative to the standard path from traditional to modern society; as a way to enfranchise the underclass; or as an anomaly vis-à-vis class politics and liberal institutions. More recently, the debate has shifted into something of a terra incognita as a result of the growing interest in the connection between populism and democratic politics. One of the more intriguing contributions to this debate is an article by Margaret Canovan, if only because it makes this unknown territory less confusing. Her argument draws from Michael Oakeshott's claim that political modernity is characterised by the interplay of two distinct styles – the politics of faith and the politics of scepticism . She renames them the redemptive and pragmatic faces of democracy and suggests that populism arises in the gap between them. This establishes a relation of interiority between populism and democracy. The former will follow democracy like a shadow. At times, however, the theoretical status of the gap is somewhat uncertain, as it seems more appropriate for thinking politics (particularly radical politics) in general. The political valence of the shadow could also be specified further to show the undecidability between the democratic aspect of the phenomenon and its possible ominous tones. This paper looks into this in some detail to engage in a friendly interrogation of Canovan's claims.     

Valence politics and electoral choice in a new democracy: The case of Taiwan

After two peaceful alternations of political power in a single decade, Taiwan is a democratic success story, demonstrating levels of party competition, turnout rates and patterns of civic engagement similar to those in mature Western democracies. What factors drive electoral choice in Taiwan's new democracy? This paper addresses this question by testing rival models of voting behavior using the Taiwan Elections and Democratization Study (TEDS) 2008 presidential election survey data and the 2010 mayoral election survey data. Analyses show that, similar to their counterparts in mature democracies, Taiwanese voters place more emphasis on the performance of political parties and their leaders in delivering policies designed to address valence issues concerning broadly shared policy goals than on position issues or more general ideological stances that divide the electorate. Findings demonstrating the strength of the valence politics model of electoral choice in Taiwan closely resemble the results of analyses of competing models of voting behavior in Western countries such as Great Britain and the United States.     

Democratic Performance of Parties and Legitimacy in Europe

This article analyses the development of legitimacy across 20 European democracies (1990–2010). The claim is that the democratic performance of parties affects levels of legitimacy. A conceptual and empirical discussion is presented to establish this relationship. Democratic performance is characterised by trusting parties to be responsive to the electorate and responsible in government. Legitimacy is defined as a composite measure representing satisfaction with parties, compliance with the rule of law as well as voter turnout and willingness to protest. The responsiveness of parties appears less representative on public concerns and governmental responsibility appears closer to party interests than to the general interest. Hence, a ‘democratic deficit’ seems to have emerged across Europe, manifested by more electoral volatility, new parties and alternation in government and lower survival rates of governments. This negatively affects trust in parties, parliament and government efficacy. Hence, party behaviour has not strongly contributed to political legitimacy since the 1990s.     

网络民主热的冷思考

网络民主热潮的背后,折射出了现实政治的诸多困境.它的“一枝独秀”很大程度上缘于现实参与渠道的不畅通、多元民主力量的缺失以及代议机构功能不足等,它的有效治理取决于现实政治的容纳和对接,有赖于多元民主力量的壮大,以及各种民主形式之间的优势互补.     

Institutional Inconsistency and Political Instability: Polity Duration, 1800–2000

This article examines how political institutional structures affect political instability. It classifies polities as autocracies or democracies based on three institutional dimensions: election of the executive, constraints on executive decision-making authority, and extent of political participation. It hypothesizes that strongly autocratic and democratic regimes will exhibit the greatest stability resulting from self-enforcing equilibria, whereby the maintenance of a polity's institutional structure is in the interest of political elites, whether through autocratic or democratic control. Institutionally inconsistent regimes (those exhibiting a mix of institutional characteristics of both democracy and autocracy) lack these self-enforcing characteristics and are expected to be shorter-lived. Using a log-logistic duration model, polity survival time ratios are estimated. Institutionally consistent polities are significantly more stable than institutionally inconsistent polities. The least stable political systems are dictatorships with high levels of political participation. The most unstable configuration for polities with an elected executive is one where the executive is highly constrained, but the electorate is very small.     

Electoral competition and minority alienation in a plurality system: Sri Lanka 1947–77

Till recently, Sri Lanka was distinctive amongst the less developed countries for having a parliamentary democracy based on regular and fair competitive elections. The present article analyses the long-term impact that the plurality system of elections had on the consolidation of political alignments and cleavages in Sri Lanka in its post-independence period. The study finds that the very success of the plurality system in encouraging popular participation, bi-polar competition, political cohesion and stability contributed to engendering their unacceptable extremes in Sri Lanka's resource-scarce context. In the longer run, the increasing radicalization of the electorate, acute party competition for control of the state, ethnic sectarianism, and absolute parliamentary majorities served to undermine the democratic aspects of the system.     

Accountability in World Politics1

World politics has never been a democratic realm. Now, with interdependence and globalization prompting demands for global governance, the lack of global democracy has become an important public issue. Yet the domestic analogy is unhelpful since the conditions for electoral democracy, much less participatory democracy, do not exist on a global level. Rather than abandoning democratic principles, we should rethink our ambitions. First, we should emphasize, in our normative as well as our positive work, the role played by information in facilitating international cooperation and democratic discourse. Second, we should define feasible objectives such as limiting potential abuses of power, rather than aspiring to participatory democracy and then despairing of its impossibility. Third, we should focus as much on the powerful entities that are the core of the problem, including multinational firms and states, as on multilateral organizations, which often are the focus of criticism. Finally, we need to think about how to design a pluralistic accountability system for world politics that relies on a variety of types of accountability: supervisory, fiscal, legal, market, peer and reputational. A challenge for contemporary political science is to design such a system, which could promote both democratic values and effective international cooperation.     

Party Organizational Elites in Norwegian Politics: Representativeness and Party Democracy*

The question raised is why ‘secondary’ representativeness of political elites, i.e. the degree of similarity in socio-demographic background between elite and electorate, is considered important in debates on democratic polities. Three answers are considered: to improve long-term ‘primary’ representtativity. i.e. the representation of public opinions; to build systemic legitimacy: and to encourage the participation of low-mobilized groups. From this perspective new data on the party organizational elites in Norway are presented: The party elites are socially skewed in terms of present position. but fairly broad based in terms of parental background. They reflect the traditional cleavage structures of Norwegian politics, even though the high shares of women and public employees indicate potentially emerging cleavage structures. Particularly the women in party positions are disproportionately recruited from the lower ranks of the public job market.     

Democracy in Britain: Retrospect and Prospect

The EU referendum has raised questions about the nature of democracy, which is not just majority rule. It is wrong to claim that direct democracy has now replaced representative democracy, as Parliament is required to answer all the questions that the referendum did not. The conduct of the referendum reflected the worst aspects of Britain's political culture of sterile adversarialism. Both left and right have shared assumptions about governing that have made it difficult to develop a culture of democratic citizenship. The political system still reflects its pre‐democratic origins (as in the survival of a House of Lords and the obsession with titles) and the role of money in politics represents a form of corruption. Institutional reforms depend for their success on the nurturing of a democratic culture, which is a task for many hands.     

历史唯物主义重建之下的民主观念

伍德把民主视为超越资本主义的一种力量。她虽然肯定在资本主义条件下,政治民主有所发展,但更为根本的是,经济并不是民主的,而是充满压迫与强制的。因此,民主的发展,必然要超出资本主义社会。为此,她对历史唯物主义的一些基本范畴进行了重新思考,包括经济"基础"与上层建筑的关系。她不同意把经济与政治视为截然分离的两个领域,而是把资本主义社会所特有的这种分离视为资本主义本身政治功能的分化。伍德的民主理论,是力图从马克思主义视角来回应当代资本主义的民主理论,与所谓的后马克思主义有着重大的差别。     

Carbon democracy

Abstract

States that depend upon oil revenues appear to be less democratic than other states. Yet oil presents a much larger problem for democracy: faced with the threats of oil depletion and catastrophic climate change, the democratic machineries that emerged to govern the age of carbon energy seem to be unable to address the processes that may end it. This article explores these multiple dimensions of carbon democracy, by examining the intersecting histories of coal, oil and democracy in the twentieth century. Following closely the methods by which fossil fuels were produced, distributed and converted into other forms of socio-technical organization, financial circulation and political power, the article traces ways in which the concentration and control of energy flows could open up democratic possibilities or close them down; how connections were engineered in the post-war period between the flow of oil and the flows of international finance, on which democratic stability was thought to depend; how these same circulations made possible the emergence of the economy and its unlimited growth as the main object of democratic politics; and how the relations among forms of energy, finance, economic knowledge, democracy and violence were transformed in the 1967–74 oil–dollar Middle East crises.     

The new public management paradigm and the search for democratic accountability

Can we permit empowered, responsive civil servants to make decisions and be innovative and still have democratic accountability? This important question haunts those who would advocate a “new public management.” The proponents of a new public management paradigm emphasize performance the ability of their strategy to produce results. But they cannot ignore the troubling question of political accountability. They must develop a process that not only permits public managers to produce better results but also provides accountability to a democratic electorate.     

Kritik und Neubewertung politischer Repräsentation: vom Hindernis zur Möglichkeitsbedingung politischer Freiheit

In participatory democratic theory we see a positive reassessment of political representation these days. Whereas until recently representation has at best been accepted as an unavoidable substitute for direct democracy, newer theories regard representation as constitutive for democratic political action. Such a turn in the assessment of representation has become possible by dismissing an autonomy-oriented concept of democracy that goes back to Rousseau, and of which a modified version is represented by Jürgen Habermas today. The new interpretations understand representation not in the sense of an as perfect as possible transmission of the will of the represented to the representative, but as a relation of difference which allows for plural acting and political judgment in the first place. Although the discussion of these theories shows that they can offer an interesting theoretical reconstruction of representative democracy, they remain very vague in specifiying concrete possibilities of political action and democratic participation for the represented.     

Institutional Characteristics and Regime Survival: Why Are Semi‐Democracies Less Durable Than Autocracies and Democracies?

Previous studies report that semi‐democratic regimes are less durable than both democracies and autocracies. Still, mixing democratic and autocratic characteristics need not destabilize regimes, as three highly plausible alternative explanations of this correlation remain unaccounted for: (a) semi‐democracies emerge under conditions of political instability and social turmoil; (b) other regime characteristics explain duration; and (c) extant democracy measures do not register all regime changes. We elaborate on and test for these explanations, but find strikingly robust evidence that semi‐democracies are inherently less durable than both democracies and autocracies. “Semi‐democracies are particularly unstable political regimes” should thus be considered a rare stylized fact of comparative politics. The analysis yields several other interesting results. For instance, autocracies and semi‐democracies are equally likely to experience “liberalizing” regime changes more specifically, and once accounting for differences in degree of democracy, there is no robust evidence of differences in duration between military and single‐party regimes.     

The Politics of Inclusive Agreements: towards a Critical Discourse Theory of Democracy

This article offers a critical assessment of Jürgen Habermas's discourse theory of democracy. It suggests that the main thrust of a discursive account of legitimacy is the attempt to show how the demands of maximal democratic inclusion might be reconciled with a politics of reasoned agreements. While this aim is endorsed, the thrust of the argument is that a critical theory of democracy requires that normative frameworks that bring certain substantive features of democratic life into focus should supplement Habermas's procedural approach. First, the account of maximal inclusion has to be developed in a way that clarifies the egalitarian demands of distributive justice. Secondly, the account of a politics of reasoned agreements has to be connected to a theoretical analysis of the bonds of solidarity that could underpin such a form of political engagement. These developments contribute to a critical theory that gives a more adequate account of the motivational basis of discursive democracy.     

Postmodernists,pragmatists and the justification of democracy

According to current wisdom, we have entered a new ‘age of democracy’. The new global popularity of the democratic ideal appears likely to pose new challenges to democratic theory, adding yet more formulations and nuances to existing categories. Just as some key questions about democracy–such as ‘why is it a good (or the best) political system?’ and 'precisely what does it demand of us, and owe to us, as citizens?' – become daily more urgent, some worry about the RESOurces of political theory to cope with them, given the apparent shift towards scepticism and a suspicion of large-scale, encompassing claims about politics. This article focuses of four arguments from postmodernist and pragmatist writers who have given democracy a prominent part in their work. It asks whether the writers examined provide convincing justifications for the democratic ideal.