Making a Difference? NGOs and Civil Society Development in Russia

The role of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in the development of Russia's civil society has been the focus of academic study since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. In light of this literature, this article aims to assess the impact of the movement that has most often been seen as very promising for Russia's future civil society development—the environmental movement—by utilising research undertaken in Samara Oblast’ of the Russian Federation. While the results do reveal some positive contributions to civil society development in Russia, they also exhibit many similarities with other studies in the extant literature, illustrating the relative weakness of Russia's social movements in the area of civil society development.     

Challenges for EU governance through Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership: the values/security nexus in EU–Belarus relations

Whereas the European Union (EU) has had some effect on political and economic reforms in the Ukraine and Moldova, it almost completely failed to impress the regime and population of Belarus. Despite growing consensus at the EU level that the Union's policies for Eastern Europe cannot succeed without Belarus, few attempts have been made to account for the failure of EU governance in Belarus. Having recalled the current legal and institutional set-up of EU–Belarus relations, this article introduces the notion of the ‘values/security nexus’ to explain the limited impact of EU governance in Belarus. It argues that the highly contradictory normative objectives in the Union's current Neighbourhood Policy towards Belarus effectively undermine the EU's credibility in the country: idealist values of ‘winning the hearts and minds’ of the Belarusian population increasingly collide with traditional realist goals of protecting EU interests and the stability of the Belarusian state. By way of conclusion, the article highlights the challenges facing the EU's new Eastern Partnership, including Belarus.     

Historical aspirations and the domestic politics of Russia's pursuit of international status

What determined Russia's national interests and grand strategy in the first decade after the Cold War? This article uses aspirational constructivism, which combines social psychology with constructivism, to answer this question. Central to aspirational constructivism are the roles that the past self and in-groups, and their perceived effectiveness play in the selection of a national identity and the definition of national interests. This article explains why Russian political elites settled on a statist national identity that focused on retaining Russia's historical status as a Western great power and hegemon in the former Soviet Union and in engaging the country in bounded status competition with the United States.     

Battle for Perceptions: Projecting Russia in the West

The article provides an analysis of Russia's image that the Kremlin has been projecting in Western countries in the years of Vladimir Putin's presidency. The negative character of Russia's image in the West was recognised as one of the major security threats for the country, and an energetic public relations campaign was launched to improve it. The article explores the core elements of this ‘constructed’ image, and examines how they are related to the self-images of Russia held by Russian political elites. Finally, it considers the implications of the ambition to create this ‘desired’ image for Russian foreign policy.     

Russia's quest for respect in the international conflict management in Kosovo

This article examines the emotion-based status-seeking logic in Russia's foreign policy vis-à-vis the West, presenting the example of Russia's reactions to NATO's military campaign against Serbia in 1999. It is argued that Russian assertiveness in combination with expressive rhetoric must be understood as a result of the ruling elite's need to have Russia's identity and self-defined social status as an equal great power in world politics respected by its Western interaction partners. Russia's reactions to NATO's intervention, which was not authorized by the UN Security Council, must be read as a strategy coping with the emotion anger about the perceived humiliation and provocation of status denial and ignorance by the West. We find various elements of such a coping strategy, among them the verbalization of the feeling of anger among Russian political circles and the media; uttering retaliation threats, but no ‘real’ aggressive, retaliatory action; minor and temporary activities aimed at restoring Russia's image and status as an influential an equal power. On the surface, the Kosovo episode did not result in any visible break or rift in the Russian–Western relationship. However, emotionally it has lead to a significant loss of trust in the respective partner on both sides.     

Russian Regions in Expanding Europe: The Pskov Connection

BARGAINING OVER POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC POWER between the federal government in Moscow and the 89 subjects of the Russian Federation is now widely considered as critical to the success of Russia's democratic and free market reforms, if not to Russia's enduring viability as a state.1 The key challenge to Moscow, and to Russia as a whole, is how to harmonise different levels of political control so that economic growth could be accelerated and social tensions eased in the regions. This challenge is aggravated by the absence of reliable institutions (understood as enforceable rules of the game) regulating centre-periphery relations and the ideological and organisational disarray at the centre itself. In the regions along Russia's post-Soviet borders in particular, this problem is further complicated by a tension between geopolitical insecurity and powerful incentives for trade and economic development coming from outside Russia's borders. Relations between Moscow and the outlying regions thus become a truly 'intermestic' issue, affecting both Russia's internal post-Soviet institution building and the mode of Russia's integration into the global economy. The politics that shape relations between the Russian regions and Moscow are therefore part and parcel of Russia's evolving relations with the outside world, and the policies of regional elites are part and parcel of an increasingly complex fabric of Russia's foreign relations.     

Muslim leaders in Russia's Volga-Urals: Self-Perceptions and Relationship with regional authorities

Islamic politics in Russia's Volga-Urals has been affected by the self-images of some of the regional communities, such as Tatarstan as ‘the cradle of Russian Islam’, Astrakhan as ‘Russia's southern outpost’, and Perm and Buguruslan as remote peripheries of the Islamic world. Moreover, some regional authorities, such as Astrakhan and Orenburg, have tried to use Muslims to stabilise the ethnoconfessional situation of the regions and also make them a bridgehead for economic ventures on the Caspian rims and western Kazakhstan. In contrast, the authorities in highly industrialised and politically stable Saratov and Perm have not been interested in intervening in regional Muslim communities. Thus, Islamic politics in Russia may have much wider and varied political connotations than is usually conceived under the term ethnoconfessional politics.     

The EU's Relations with Moldova: Governance,Partnership or Ignorance?

This article examines recent EU–Moldova relations under the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the Eastern Partnership (EaP) in order to assess the EU's policies and their (limited) effectiveness over the past decade. I draw on the ‘external governance approach’ and develop the ‘partnership as cooperation perspective’ to examine which approach prevails in the theory and in the political practice of EU–Moldova relations. Whereas the external governance approach focuses on the expansion of EU rules to assess the effectiveness of the EU's external relations, the partnership perspective draws attention to effective cooperation based on mutual concessions in areas of converging preferences.     

“Soviet mentality?” The role of shared political culture in relations between the Armenian state and Russia's Armenian diaspora

Russia's Armenians have begun to form diaspora institutions and engage in philanthropy and community organization, much as the pre-Soviet “established” diaspora in the West has done for years. However, the Russian Armenian diaspora is seen by Armenian elites as being far less threatening due to a shared “mentality.” While rejecting the mentality argument, I suggest that the relationship hinges on their shared political culture and the use of symbols inherited from the Soviet Union in the crafting of new diaspora and diaspora-management institutions. Specifically, “Friendship of the Peoples” symbolism appears to be especially salient on both sides. However, the difference between old and new diasporas may be more apparent than real. The Russian Armenian diaspora now engages in many of the same activities as the Western diaspora, including the one most troublesome to Armenia's elites: involvement in politics.     

The relationship between religious and national identity in the case of Transylvanian Saxons (1933–1944)

Hitler's coming to power in Germany had its key consequences upon the fate of the German minorities in Central and Eastern Europe. The German community in Romania constituted no exception. After 1933, a process of radicalization can be noticed in the case of the Transylvanian Saxons, one of the several German-speaking groups in Romania. The phenomenon has already been analyzed in its political and economic dimensions, yet not so much in its social ones. This article looks at the latter aspect, its argument being that the Nazification of the Transylvanian Saxon community can be best comprehended by using a conceptual framework developed by political scientist Donald Horowitz in the early 1970s. The analysis uses a series of contemporary sources (diaries, issues of the official periodical of the Lutheran Church in Transylvania, Kirchliche Blätter), but also a wide range of secondary sources, academic and literary. Consequently, the article shows that especially after 1933, the Lutheran affiliation, highly relevant for the production and reproduction of the traditional model of Transylvanian Saxon identity, shifted from the status of a criterion of identity to a mere identification indicium. At the same time, the attraction of a (Pan-) German identity, with its Nazi anchors, became stronger and the center of gravity for Transylvanian Saxon identity radically moved towards German ethnicity, in its National-Socialist understanding.     

The limits of EU governance: Belarus's response to the European Neighbourhood Policy

The article examines some conceptual and practical tensions related to the application of the external governance framework to the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in less motivated states, such as Belarus. First, it critically analyses the foundations of the external governance framework – from M. Smith's perspective – in order to suggest that the failure of the ENP to legitimize in Belarus should not be solely attributed to the vices of Lukashenko's regime. Second, it argues that an understanding of specifically Belarusian ‘boundaries of order’ – geopolitics and culture – is essential for tailoring a more nuanced policy that will be able to accommodate the needs and interests of ‘less motivated’ ENP partner states. In conclusion, it is suggested that a new policy framework – of extended partnership – should be more technical and less political, based on horizontal networks of cooperation rather than on hitherto hierarchical governance by conditionality that has found little appeal in the less motivated neighbourhood. Can an Eastern Partnership framework become such an alternative?     

The changing nature of the transatlantic link: U.S. approaches and implications for Central and Eastern Europe

This article examines the changing security, economic and diplomatic components of the transatlantic link, with a particular focus on Washington's approach and implications for Central and Eastern Europe. The United States continues to play an essential role as security underwriter in the region, but the military dimension of the transatlantic relationship is transforming and will result in greater burdens on Europeans. Economic links between the U.S. and Central Europe are developing more strongly than generally understood, and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership is likely to drive both political and economic ties. Unconventional gas developments are enhancing U.S. engagement in European energy markets. Finally, the U.S. remains keen to engage its European partners on a broad agenda of global and regional issues and retains its own interests in working particularly with Central and Eastern European countries to lend stability to ‘wider Europe’.     

Glamorous politics or political glamour? Content analysis of political coverage in Russian glossy magazines

This article analyzes political and social themes of Russia's glossy magazines which represent the few remaining public spaces for surviving freedom of speech and expression in that post-communist country. As authoritarian nature of Russian political system deepens, the democratic openings often appear in unexpected places. Content analysis of two glamour monthlies, one (GQ-Russian Edition) intended for male audience, another (Cosmopolitan-Russia) – for female readership, shows consistently oppositional (anti-Putin) thrust of both publications, but also persistent political gender stereotypes. Analysis of these publications, intended for Russia's nascent urban class – traditionally a social strata most associated with democratic impulses – provides an important explanation behind recent democratic protest activities in Moscow and St. Petersburg.     

Book reviews

Historically speaking, the self-identification process of Russia has revolved around the West–East axis. However, there has been a considerable asymmetry in the impact of these two poles. In this article I will argue that “the West” was a dominating concept in the self-narration of Russians and “the East” was mostly a function of the interaction between Russia and the West. The difference in the level of attention and emotions which Russia manifests towards the West and the East has been caused by the religious factor, which was crucial for shaping Russia's identity and her sense of uniqueness. While the West and Western Christianity presented a challenge to the Orthodox fundamentals of Russia's self-image, China was neutral in terms of religious identity. The negligible importance of the religious factor added to rationality in Russian policy towards China. In the article I analyze the Chinese factor in Russia's self-identification process in the context of Moscow's attitude towards the West and the East by using two main elements: identity and fear. Comparing the historical pattern with the present one, I attempt to determine the consequences of these two factors for the Russian Federation.     

Pussy Riot as a feminist project: Russia's gendered informal politics

This article considers Pussy Riot as a feminist project, placing their actions and the regime's reactions in the context of three post-9/11 developments in gender and sexuality politics in Russia. First, I assert that Pussy Riot's stunts are a logical reaction to the Kremlin's masculinity-based nation-rebuilding scheme, which was a cover for crude homophobic misogyny. Second, Pussy Riot is part of the informal feminism emerging in Russia, a response to nongovernmental organization (NGO) feminism and the regime's repression of NGO feminism, albeit likely to be outflanked by regime-supported thuggery. Third, the members of Pussy Riot were so harshly prosecuted because they – swearing, covered up and disloyal – violated the political cleaner role that the Kremlin has given women in the last few years. Feminist social scientists have long looked for politics outside of formal institutions and processes. The Pussy Riot affair makes clear how much gender is central to the informal politics that gender-blind observers of Russia have come to see as crucial to understanding Russia's regime.     

The Arab Spring: last episode of the Cold War

Using the Regional Security Complex Theory and developing its regime-related dimension, this article analyses the involvement of external powers in Arab Spring conflicts. Libya, Syria and Bahrain are used as case studies showing that Western support for the incumbent regime or for its adversaries was not based on a choice between democracy and authoritarianism. Rather, it was motivated by a pattern of amity and enmity inherited from the Cold War period. The surprising survival of this pattern was due to the three authoritarian regimes’ inability to reform; to the ensuing preservation of their Cold War era perception in the West; and to Russia's new availability as an external patron. Consequently, the article argues that the Arab Spring can be perceived as the last, belated episode of the Cold War. However, its political consequences put an end to the last features inherited from the pre-1989 period and open a new Middle Eastern era.     

Political incrementalism: Political lessons from China's 20 years of reform

The recent crackdown by the Chinese Communist Party government on the efforts of Chinese dissidents to organise the China New Democratic Party has raised a serious question among scholars: why has the Chinese leadership been so reluctant to initiate democratic reforms? But an equally important question is: how has the Chinese political system been able to accommodate drastic socioeconomic changes? Although Chinese leaders from Deng Xiaoping to Jiang Zemin have strongly opposed the Western style of democracy, they have continuously adjusted the country's political system to prevent socioeconomic chaos from occuring, chaos that has troubled many former communist states and Third World countries. This paper explores China's political incrementalism and explains how incremental political reforms have worked. It argues that, although Chinese leaders have so far been successful in accommodating social changes through incrementalism, they are still uncertain about how to cope with increasing social demands for political reform and democratisation.     

Conflicting patterns of thought in the Russian debate on transition: 1992 – 2002

After a paradigm shift in Russian economics around 1990, in the period 1992 – 2002 Russian economists increasingly returned to the path-dependent shared mental models that had prevailed earlier in their country. In particular, after the liberal reform concept seemed to have failed to solve the socio-economic problems of transition, the old debate between ‘Westernisers’ and Slavophiles was forcefully revived. The conflict between these camps has not yet been settled. This makes it difficult to predict the further development of Russia's economic and political order.     

Prospects for Managed Democracy in Russia

The 2003 Duma election resulted in the victory of the party of power, thereby strengthening managed democracy in Russia. Since then, political trends in Russia's regions and rural politics provide considerable evidence of the increasing ability of pro-Kremlin forces to maximise their electoral fortunes in national contests. These political trends make it likely that United Russia will not only emerge as the dominant party in the 2007 Duma election, but will provide the Kremlin and Putin's successor with a compliant lower house. The outcome is that Putin's successor will find the political infrastructure to continue managed democracy.     

Interpretations of Eurasianism: Justifying Russia's role in East Asia

This article examines the concept of Eurasianism in relation to Russia's East Asian policy from Yeltsin to Putin. It argues that there are three main interpretations of Russia's Eurasianist identity in the foreign policy discourse regarding East Asia: Pragmatic Eurasianism, Neo-Eurasianism, and Intercivilisational Eurasianism. Each interpretation emphasises a different aspect of Eurasianism with different policy implications. However, they all share an instrumentalist nature, of being used to justify Russia's Great Power status and a greater role for it in East Asia. Moreover, it is the pragmatic and geoeconomic aspects of Russia's Eurasianist identity that are being stressed most by the Putin administration, especially on energy and transport links.