Playing the game: corporate social responsibility and the games industry

This paper provides an exploratory review of both the corporate social responsibility (CSR) agendas and achievements being publicly addressed by the world's leading games companies, and offers some wider reflections on the ways these companies are constructing and pursuing CSR strategies. The paper begins with a short discussion of the origins and characteristics of CSR and a thumbnail sketch of games and the games industry. The empirical material for the paper is drawn from the CSR material posted on the Internet by the world's top 10 games companies. The findings reveal that although the majority of the top 10 games companies provide some information on their approach to CSR, only a minority claim to be integrating CSR into their core business activities. Although the companies emphasize their commitment to promoting responsible gaming, they offer little if any commentary on what many critics see as the potentially damaging human consequences of the irresponsible development and playing of games. The majority of the top 10 games companies also address a wide range of impacts within the marketplace, the workplace, the environment and communities in which they operate. Although the leading games companies generally adopt a positive stance towards CSR, the independent external assessment of the reporting process is limited. More generally, the paper offers some critical reflections on the CSR agenda currently being pursued by the games industry. The paper provides an overview and some reflections on the CSR agenda being pursued by some of the world's leading games companies, and as such, it will interest academics in business and management, and information systems and media departments, a range of people working in management positions within the games industry and those professionals who work with the industry. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Origins of Conflict in Polycentric Governance Systems

Natural resources are governed by polycentric systems, which can be conceptualized as an “ecology of games” in which policy actors participate in multiple policy forums governing interdependent issues. This article analyzes why actors perceive different payoffs across the forums in which they participate, ranging from mutually beneficial games of cooperation to conflictual zero-sum games in which one actor's gain means another actor's loss. The authors develop hypotheses at the level of the individual, the forum, and the overall polycentric system and test them using survey data collected in three research sites: Tampa Bay, Florida; the Paraná River delta, Argentina; and the Sacramento–San Joaquin River delta, California. The empirical findings suggest that levels of conflict in policy forums are higher when the actors who participate in them are concerned with hot-button issues, when the forums have large and diverse memberships, and in systems with a long history of conflict. The results shed new light on the drivers of conflict and cooperation in complex governance systems and suggest ways to manage conflict.     

Exploring the dynamics of policy interaction: Feedback among and impacts from multiple,concurrently applied policy approaches for promoting collaboration

The prisoner's dilemma and stag hunt games, as well as the apparent benefits of collaboration, have motivated governments to promote more frequent and effective collaboration through a variety of policy approaches. Sometimes, multiple kinds of policies are applied concurrently, and yet little is understood about how these policies might interact with each other. This study uses a simulation approach to examine one such case, when policies focused on increasing collaboration competence interact with those that motivate parties to collaborate based on payoff and non‐payoff incentives. Theoretically, our findings suggest seven testable hypotheses for future, rigorous research. Practically, our initial findings suggest that increasing competency generally improves the performance of incentive‐based policies, but not always. Exhortation policies can go too far and may be more prone to doing so when the target population's competency is higher. This means that decision makers are more at risk of applying too much exhortation effort, especially if they are also concurrently applying a competency‐building approach. © 2011 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

The meanings of production(s): showbiz and deep plays in finance and DIYbiology

Drawing on anthropological theories of play, deep play and games, as well as sociological interaction theories of risk, this paper develops a theory of consequential games. This paper suggests that in the United States much expert or entrepreneurial activity can be seen as a competition over creating the rules of games that others must play. In turn, whatever peril lies in these consequential games is the province of the saps that have to play, and whatever reward or prize comes from the game is captured by the expert or entrepreneur. The perspective that this paper advances, in turn, renders domains of life often seen as discrete (say private equity investing and biotechnological tinkering) comparable and in fact similar types of phenomena, all caught up in the crazy apocalyptic vitality that is contemporary capitalism.     

Competition and cooperation in artificial intelligence standard setting: Explaining emergent patterns

Efforts to set standards for artificial intelligence (AI) reveal striking patterns: technical experts hailing from geopolitical rivals, such as the United States and China, readily collaborate on technical AI standards within transnational standard-setting organizations, whereas governments are much less willing to collaborate on global ethical AI standards within international organizations. Whether competition or cooperation prevails can be explained by three variables: the actors that make up the membership of the standard-setting organization, the issues on which the organization's standard-setting efforts focus, and the “games” actors play when trying to set standards within a particular type of organization. A preliminary empirical analysis provides support for the contention that actors, issues, and games affect the prospects for cooperation on global AI standards. It matters because shared standards are vital for achieving truly global frameworks for the governance of AI. Such global frameworks, in turn, lower transaction costs and the probability that the world will witness the emergence of AI systems that threaten human rights and fundamental freedoms.     

Parents,public policy,and youth smoking

This paper jointly examines the importance of parental influences, prices, and tobacco control policies on the smoking behavior of youths. Data are drawn from the Audits & Surveys (A&S) 1996 survey of high school students across the United States from “The Study of Smoking and Tobacco Use Among Young People” to examine the impact of parental influences on the probability of youth smoking in the context of both specific observable parenting behaviors and in terms of youths' perceptions of the importance of their parents' opinions. The key finding is that specific parental influences (such as communication/bonding (extent of discussions about daily issues between parent/adult and child), limit‐setting with regard to free time, home smoking rules, and parental smoking behavior) and the extent to which teenagers value their parents' opinions play a significant role in youth smoking decisions. Our results by age reveal that specific modifications related to improving communication channels and implementing home smoking rules and more general changes that improve the quality of the parent‐child relationship so teens place a higher value on their parents' opinions are likely to be particularly effective in the early teen years. © 2005 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

Politics and Unemployment in Industrialized Democracies

This paper provides an empirical appraisal of the influence ofpolitics on the evolution of unemployment rates in 13industrialized democracies (12 European Union countries andthe U.S.) from 1960 to 1999. We conduct new tests ofopportunistic and partisan business cycle models, using richerdata and more general specifications than previous studies. Incontrast to most previous studies, we pay particular attentionto the importance of labor market structure in conditioningthe influence of politics on unemployment. We also investigatethe relationship between political stability and economicstability. The results suggest the existence of partisan effects, withhigher unemployment rates prevailing under ``right'' partiesthan ``left'' parties. There is more support for ``rational''partisan models that embody transient partisan impacts thanfor models with permanent effects. We find evidence that unionpower is associated with higher average unemployment rates,but that centralized bargaining institutions tend to lowerunemployment rates. The evidence also suggests that morefragmented coalition governments are associated with higherunemployment rates than single party governments.     

浅谈体育游戏在中学体育与健康课教学中的运用

体育游戏对于促进学生智力的发展,促进学生身体的生长发育,培养运动兴趣具有重要意义,对于提高中学体育与健康课的教学质量,顺利完成教学任务,具有积极的作用,体育游戏是进行中学体育与健康课教学的手段之一,是体育与健康课教育的重要方法。根据游戏的特点和价值,结合中学教材内容,正确科学选择游戏并合理组织实施,既能充分调动学生的情趣,又能很好地辅助教学任务的完成。     

Standing Tiebout on his Head: Tax Capitalization and the Monopoly Power of Local Governments

Unlike other governmental units, statelottery agencies publicly acknowledge thattheir primary objective is revenuemaximization. This claim and the inherentmonopoly power of lottery agencies providesa unique arena to test for Leviathan. Withdata obtained from United States' lotterygames, I perform a Laffer curve analysis toderive the optimal lottery tax rates fordifferent categories of games. Theseoptimal tax rates and Monte Carlosimulations are then used to test whetherthe current tax structure of lottery gamesis indeed the revenue maximizing structure. I find strong empirical evidence for the``Leviathan Lottery''.     

Vote trading: An experimental study

This essay reports the results of ninety 3-person and 5-person bargaining experiments using several alternative vote trading scenarios. These experiments are designed to test: (1) Riker and Brams' controversial hypothesis that vote trading can yield inferior outcomes as against the alternative hypothesis that vote trading induces ‘market-like’ efficiency in voting bodies; (2) the relative adequacy of several game theoretic solution concepts for vote trading games without a Condorcet winner (core); and, (3) the adequacy of the core itself. First, on the basis of eighteen experiments with binding commitments, we find some support for Riker and Brams' hypothesis: in nine trials, subjects first trade to a Pareto dominated outcome. In five of these trials, however, these outcomes are eventually displaced by Pareto efficient ones. Without binding commitments, however, we find little support for the ‘paradox of vote trading’ hypothesis. Specifically, while six of seven trials of a 3-person game yield ‘equitable’ outcomes, seventeen trials of several 5-person games without binding commitments strongly support the competitive solution as a cooperative game solution concept, and suggest that the V-set and M ₁ bargaining set are either redundant or useless. Seven trials each of six 5-person games with a condorcet winner (core), however, suggest that usual static solution concepts may be inadequate for treating games with any interesting degree of strategic complexity.     

Romania and EUrope: Roma,Rroma and Ţigani as sites for the contestation of ethno-national identities

ABSTRACT

In November 2002 a Romanian journalist published an editorial attacking the Romanian authorities for 'playing the democratic card' and failing to prevent 'thieves, hooligans and criminals' from going to the West and disgracing all Romanians. The journalist, Lia Epure, entitled her article 'Rromania', a play on the Romanian government's spelling of Roma (i.e. 'Rroma'), and concluded that, if Romanians 'continue to accept identification with abnormals, then we will be become Rromania'. In response to vocal Romani and human rights group protests, Epure published a second article defending her right to say what 'even the president of the European Commission knows', that Romanians are not accepted as EUropean 'because of ?igani'. Woodcock explores how both elite and popular levels of Romanian discourse blame Romania's continued marginalization in EUrope on the actions of the ?igan, a fantastic Other, historically constructed out of ethno-nationalist Romanian discourses at moments of crisis for national identity. The discursive struggles for meaning with regard to the constructed ethnic Other highlight the paradox of post-socialist Romanian ethno-nationalism in an era of European Union accession: in order to be recognized as EUropean, Romanian discourse must relinquish the ?igan Other, even when it is this precise construction that has historically enabled Romania to claim a European identity.     

Cooperation among egoists in Prisoners' Dilemma and Chicken games

Axelrod has developed an evolutionary approach to the study of repeated games and applied that approach to the Prisoners' Dilemma. We apply this approach, with some modifications in the treatment of clustering, to a game that has the Prisoners' Dilemma and Chicken as special cases, to analyze how the evolution of cooperation differs in the two games. We find that the main barrier to the evolution of cooperation in Chicken is that cooperation may not always be correctly thought of as socially optimal, but that strong forces do push the players toward socially optimal action. We derive some of the results on mixed populations for any game with pairwise interaction.     

Asymmetric payoffs in simultaneous and sequential prisoner’s dilemma games

We investigate the role of payoff asymmetry in laboratory prisoner’s dilemma games. Symmetric and asymmetric games are examined in simultaneous and sequential settings. In the asymmetric sequential games, we study the impact of having payoff advantaged players moving either first or second. Asymmetry reduces the rates of cooperation in simultaneous games. In sequential games, asymmetry interacts with order of play such that the rate of cooperation is highest when payoff disadvantaged players move first.     

Business,social responsibility,and corruption

This paper explores the role of corporate social responsibility and the reporting thereof in the fight against corruption. A special focus is laid on the international endeavors to improve transparency through reporting, and the paper elaborates extensively on the United Nations Global Compact (UNGC), the Organisation for Economic Co‐operation and Development (OECD) Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and the Global Reporting Initiative's (GRI) Sustainability Reporting Guidelines. Voluntary initiatives, such as the UNGC, the OECD guidelines, and the GRI guidelines, are considered to play an important role in providing the trust‐based informal social norms, without which markets and societies cannot function. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

'Fundamentalism', modernity and the new Jacobins

This paper offers an interpretaion of 'Islamic fundamentalism', especially the Iranian Revolution, in the context of sociological debates about 'modernity'. The problematic nature of both these terms is acknowledge. It criticizes explanations of 'fundamentalism' that begin from the assumption of a dichotomy between fundamentalism and modernity, arguing instead for a more nuanced understanding of both Islamic revivalism and the modern. The paper begins by offering a model of modernity as a set of bi-modal tensions within which Islamic 'fundamentalism' could be understood as a form of modernist revolutionary populism. This argument is then developed through a comparison betwen the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the Jacobin phase of the French Revolution. It argues that there are parallels between the idea of Islamic revolution and the Jacobin revolutionary imagination, which demonstrate with some observations on Islam, and the closure of the Jacobin revolutionary project.     

Efficient,Adaptable Simulations: A Case Study of a Climate Negotiation Game

Instructors may be reluctant to adopt simulations because of time, labor, or material constraints, or perceived incompatibility with large classes. In fact, simple games can cover multiple key concepts with minimal time and effort by the instructor. Simple games are also adaptable to other topics and classes, including large lectures. This article presents a simulation in which students negotiate a global greenhouse gas reduction agreement. Three scenarios model basic climate change mitigation, follow-on agreements for climate stabilization, and the surprise withdrawal of signatories after a domestic leadership turnover (e.g., the 2016 U.S. presidential election). The simulation teaches key concepts such as anarchy, collective action, preference divergence, and commitment problems. Concepts such as institutions, identity, and levels of analysis arise organically from game play. The exercise has extremely low cost and setup time. It can be run in 15 minutes or extended for a full class period. The game may also be repurposed to simulate other bargaining or collective action issues. This case study shows that simulations can be efficient and adaptable. Instructors can create their own simple games to enhance comprehension of key concepts.     

Trade unions,nonneutrality and stagflation

The claim that in policy games nonneutrality and a stagflation bias emerge in equilibrium if the unions care about inflation, per se, is discussed. This assumption is shown to be not necessary to obtain a stagflation bias; the same applies to nonneutrality if a government acts in the economy. The question of whether unions should be envisaged as “institutions” (i.e., interested in variables unrelated to wages and employment) is also addressed. Two model-based alternatives providing “microeconomic” foundations versus “macroeconomic” foundations to unions' behaviour are presented. The conclusion is that the modelling of unions remains an unsettled problem.     

The Contradictions of Rational Abstention: Counterfinality,Voting, and Games without a Solution*

This paper considers the theory of rational abstention from the angle of Elsrer's categories of social contradictions. It is demonstrated that Downsian expected utility maximizing voters will be trapped in a state of counterfinality, which is one of these categories. Realizing this, citizens may alter their behavioral assumptions, and come to base their decisions on strategic thinking. However, this leads into another contradiction in Elster's sense, since in general, the Voting Game has no solution. The latter conclusion is shown to hold true regardless of the number of candidates involved, and irrespective of the number of rounds in the election. The lesson to draw is that neither Bayesian decision theory nor the theory of games can provide satisfactory advice for the rational citizen in voting situations, and, by implication, decision criteria other than those offered by these theories may be of some relevance However, several possible criteria exist, and unless satisfactory predictions can be made as to how the various criteria are distributed in the electorate, the theory must remain indeterminate as far as predictions of voter turnout are concerned.     

Liberalism,Multiculturalism and the Problem of Essentialism1

This article focuses on key themes in the liberal philosophical debate over multiculturalism, as well as the responses of Canadian social and political actors to the September 11, 2001 attacks in New York and Washington. Since September 11, there has been a renewed popularity of arguments positing a 'clash of civilizations' between Muslim and Christian societies, and a new legitimacy advanced for 'ethnic profiling' in the name of security. The rapidity with which this has happened in Canada is particularly striking because of the country's liberal-democratic and multicultural tradition. The introduction of a national policy of multiculturalism in 1971 provided a new understanding of Canadian citizenship that was more inclusionary of immigrants and ethnic and racial minorities. Multiculturalism has also become a hotly debated ideal among Canadian, American and European political philosophers concerned with addressing the possibilities and limits of liberalism given ethnic diversity, and the limits of ethnic diversity given liberalism. Multiculturalism is typically presented as a 'problem' for liberal politics and ethics. Building on how multiculturalism policy in Canada has provided a more inclusionary discourse around citizenship, a defence of multiculturalism is advanced which rejects the essentialist treatment of 'culture' and 'cultural' groups. It is suggested that the unfolding discussions in Canada since September 11 demonstrate the ongoing tension between cultural essentialism and liberal individual rights. The Canadian experience points to the value of an anti-essentialist multiculturalism in challenging discrimination given that neither liberalism, nor liberal democratic states, are neutral in their allocation of resources and legitimacy among more and less powerful ethnic groups. It is argued that rather than multiculturalism, it is essentialist thinking, imagery and ideas which present the greatest 'problem' to the ethics of liberalism and the politics of liberal democracies like Canada.     

The Strategic Shuffle: Ethnic Geography,the Internal Security Apparatus,and Elections in Kenya

For autocrats facing elections, officers in the internal security apparatus play a crucial role by engaging in coercion on behalf of the incumbent. Yet reliance on these officers introduces a principal‐agent problem: Officers can shirk from the autocrat's demands. To solve this problem, autocrats strategically post officers to different areas based on an area's importance to the election and the expected loyalty of an individual officer, which is a function of the officer's expected benefits from the president winning reelection. Using a data set of 8,000 local security appointments within Kenya in the 1990s, one of the first of its kind for any autocracy, I find that the president's coethnic officers were sent to, and the opposition's coethnic officers were kept away from, swing areas. This article demonstrates how state institutions from a country's previous authoritarian regime can persist despite the introduction of multi‐party elections and thus prevent full democratization.