PTSD,Endophenotypes, the RDoC,and the DSM-5

The search for endophenotypes that stand between genetics and disease has been applied to the diagnostic entity of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). Advances are being made in understanding the pathway to disorder in PTSD in terms of brain regions, neuronal networks, stress-related systems (e.g., the hypothalamic–pituitary–adrenal (HPA) axis), and their underlying genetic and neurogenetic bases. The latter are affected by gene–environmental interactions and epigenetic effects, and the environment and context reciprocally interrelate with them, as well. Therefore, a primary focus on (neuro)pathophysiological intermediates in the disease pathway, as appears emphasized in the research domain criteria (RDoC) approach to etiology of psychiatric disorder, and to which the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 5 (DSM-5) subscribes, might detract from a more inclusive biopsychosocial approach that would be more applicable in the case of PTSD. The paper undertakes a comprehensive review of the recent literature in the areas of endophenotypes, neurogenetics, epigenetics, neural networks, HPA axis, neuronal networks, pathways, the PTSD five-factor model, allostasis, and the RDoC criteria for psychiatric diagnosis, and then returns to the topic of endophenotypes. Neuronal networks constitute one integrating area that could help in arriving at an appropriate model of PTSD endophenotype. Pathway analysis provides a rich field for discerning individual differences in PTSD development, more so than the static approach of using DSM-5 symptom criteria. A model of endophenotypes is presented, which considers these factors in relation to PTSD. The paper concludes with implications for the DSM-5, for practice and for court, especially that it would be premature to seek individual biomarkers of PTSD given the current state of knowledge, even if it is burgeoning.     

The good, the bad, the ugly, and the Colombian peace plan

Among the many wars thatColombia is fighting, there are two that itis definitely losing – those forgovernment legitimacy and against poverty.Although the country has always shown anearly infinite capacity to turn itselfaround, its traditionally praised democracyshows fresh signs of erosion that lookalmost impossible to reverse. With solidinstitutions no longer standing, theguerrillas, the paramilitary, the corruptjustice system, and the drug producerscontinue to thrive like perennial weeds.Massacres, bombings, kidnappings and thedestruction of infrastructure continue toproduce a devastating effect on theColombian psyche. The good, the bad and theugly mix together in a pitiable realismbetween civil society and state. Theoutcome is poverty, dissatisfaction, andlack of legitimacy and hope.     

Gender, sexuality, and HIV/AIDS: the what, the why, and the how

The focus of Geeta Rao Gupta's plenary presentation of 12 July 2000 at the XIII International AIDS Conference is on the what, why, and how of gender, sexuality, and HIV/AIDS. Dr Rao Gupta discusses the factors associated with women's vulnerability to HIV; and the ways in which unequal power balance in gender relations increases not only women's, but also men's, vulnerability to HIV-despite, or rather because of, their greater power. She then addresses the question of how one is to overcome the seemingly insurmountable barriers of gender and sexual inequality. How can we change the cultural norms that create damaging, even fatal, gender disparities and roles? According to Dr Rao Gupta, an important first step is to recognize, understand, and publicly discuss the ways in which the power imbalance in gender and sexuality fuels the epidemic. She provides examples of sensitive, transformative, and empowering approaches to gender and sexuality and concludes that, in the final analysis, reducing the imbalance in power between women and men requires policies that are designed to empower women--policies that aim to decrease the gender gap in education, improve women's access to economic resources, increase women's political participation, and protect women from violence.     

Punishing the Awkward, the Stupid, the Weak, and the Selfish: The Culpability of Negligence

Negligence is a problematic basis for being morally blamed and punished for having caused some harm, because in such cases there is no choice to cause or allow—or risk causing or allowing—such harm to occur. The standard theories as to why inadvertent risk creation can be blameworthy despite the lack of culpable choice are that in such cases there is blame for: (1) an unexercised capacity to have adverted to the risk; (2) a defect in character explaining why one did not advert to the risk; (3) culpably acquiring or failing to rid oneself of these defects of character at some earlier time; (4) flawed use of those practical reasoning capacities that make one the person one is; or (5) chosen violation of per se rules about known precautions. Although each of these five theories can justify blame in some cases of negligence, none can justify blame in all cases intuitively thought to be cases of negligence, nor can any of these five theories show why inadvertent creation of an unreasonable risk, pure and simple, can be blameworthy.     

The Teamsters, the White House, the Labor Department

This paper examines the instrumental networks established between organized criminals and national politicians. Its major focus centers on the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, the Department of Labor, and the Reagan Administration. We explore the organized crime influence that affected President Reagan's selection of Raymond Donovan as Secretary of Labor. The choice of Donovan resulted in several related investigations into Donovan's association with organized criminals primarily in the construction industry in New Jersey and New York. We explain and critique the investigations thereby establishing the instrumental quality of the networks and the politics of law enforcement. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

The Defense Lawyer,the Accused,and the Procurator

As the matter is generally conceived, it is the accused who needs a defense attorney. Of course, it is he who needs a lawyer above all. But lawyers for the defense are no less essential to the Soviet state in its administration of justice. The administration of justice, the prosecution, and the defense are three functions, clearly differentiated from each other, that are implemented respectively by the court, the procuracy, and the institution of advocates. Together, they are called upon to assure the smooth functioning of the mechanism of struggle against crime.     

The Dead, the Law, and the Politics of the Past

This article explores the role of law in cultural and political disputes concerning dead bodies. It uses three interconnecting legal frameworks: cultural and moral ownership, commemoration, and closure. It begins with a critique of the limitations of the private law notion of 'ownership' in such contexts, setting out a broader notion of cultural and moral ownership as more appropriate for analysing legal disputes between states and indigenous tribes. It then examines how legal discourses concerning freedom of expression, religious and political traditions, and human rights and equality are utilized to regulate the public memory of the dead. Finally, it looks at the relationship between law and notions of closure in contexts where the dead have either died in battle or have been 'disappeared' during a conflict, arguing that law in such contexts goes beyond the traditional retributive focus of investigation and punishment of wrongdoers and instead centres on broader concerns of societal and personal healing.     

Core Values, the Magistracy, and the Auld Report

In this article I shall first examine the core values underlying criminal justice about which there is some consensus. I then briefly review the current arrangements and decision making processes in magistrates courts in England and Wales before relating the core values to those arrangements and processes. This leads me to certain conclusions about the magistracy that I contrast with Auld's conclusions and recommendations.     

Immigration,Association, and the Family

In this paper I provide a philosophical analysis of family-based immigration. This type of immigration is of great importance, yet has received relatively little attention from philosophers and others doing normative work on immigration. As family-based immigration poses significant challenges for those seeking a comprehensive normative account of the limits of discretion that states should have in setting their own immigration policies, it is a topic that must be dealt with if we are to have a comprehensive account. In what follows I use the idea of freedom of association to show what is distinctive about family-based immigration and why it ought to have a privileged place in our discussion of the topic. I further show why this style of argument neither allows states to limit nearly all immigration nor requires them to have almost no limits on immigration. I conclude by showing that all states must allow some degree of family-based immigration, and that this is a duty owed not to ‘outsiders’ seeking to enter, but rather to current citizens.     

Arthur Ripstein,Equality, Responsibility,and the Law

Law and Philosophy -     

Doing,Allowing, and the State

The doing/allowing distinction plays an important role in our thinking about a number of legal issues, such as the need for criminal process protections, prohibitions on torture, the permissibility of the death penalty and so on. These are areas where, at least initially, there seem to be distinctions between harms that the state inflicts and harms that it merely allows. In this paper I will argue for the importance of the doing/allowing distinction as applied to state action. Sunstein, Holmes, Vermeule and others have presented influential arguments for the claim that where the state is concerned the doing/allowing distinction has no moral significance, even if it does elsewhere. I show that these arguments can be resisted. In doing so, I defend some important distinctions and principles that help us understand the state’s role in protecting people from harm.     

Judges,Conflict, and the Past

Drawing upon interviews with senior judicial figures in Northern Ireland, South Africa and elsewhere, this article considers the role of the judiciary in a political conflict. Using the socio‐legal literature on judicial performance and audience as well as transitional justice scholarship, the article argues that judges in Northern Ireland ‘performed’ to a number of ‘imagined’ audiences including Parliament, ‘the public', and their judicial peers – all of which shaped their view of the judicial role. In light of ongoing efforts to deal with the past in the jurisdiction, and the experiences of other transitional societies, the article argues that the judiciary can and should engage in a mature, reflexive and, where appropriate, self‐critical examination of the good and bad of their own institutional history during the conflict. It also argues that such a review of judicial performance requires an external audience in order to encourage the judiciary to see truth beyond the limits of legalism.