Phasing out nuclear energy in Germany

The German Red‐Green government decided to phase out all nuclear power stations and stop the reprocessing of German nuclear fuel in Britain and France. The coalition agreement between the Greens and SPD set out a well‐defined timetable for the implementation of this policy, involving new legislation within the first 100 days and the negotiation of a consensus with the electricity utilities to be achieved within 12 months. While these deadlines passed without political results, an agreement between the government and the nuclear utilities was reached in mid‐June 2000. This analysis of the genesis and development of the policy of phasing out nuclear power focuses in particular on the difficulties of the Green Environment Minister, Jürgen Trittin, to put the anti‐nuclear policies of his party into practice. It is argued that the Greens faced a ‘no win’ situation in their attempt to design a constitutionally and politically viable phasing out policy. The party remains caught in the middle between the radical anti‐nuclear movement that continues its protest against all nuclear operations and an intransigent electricity industry fighting for its commercial self‐interest to keep nuclear stations running as long as possible. A range of theoretical approaches that could help the understanding of these processes is discussed, with an ‘advocacy coalition’ approach appearing to be the most promising option.     

From “Endemically Pro‐Israel” to Unsympathetic: Australia's Middle East Policy, 1967–1972

The hardening of Australian Middle East policy toward Israel in the early 1970s is often attributed to the election of Gough Whitlam as Prime Minister. Whitlam's December 1972 victory may well have opened a new, problematic chapter. But the evidence suggests that a deterioration in Australia‐Israel relations occurred gradually in the aftermath of the 1967 Six Day War. This deterioration reflected changes in Australia's political leadership and change at the top of the Department of External Affairs (renamed Foreign Affairs in 1970). Individual decision‐makers such as Whitlam did play a significant role in determining Australian Middle East policy. As Prime Minister, Sir John Gorton was willing to put aside advice from External Affairs not to antagonise and risk disrupting trade relations with Arab states, and to offer heartfelt support for Israel. His successor Sir William McMahon vacillated under opposing influences of a department determined to secure Australia's trade interests on the one hand, and Australian Jewish leaders and Israel's envoys in Australia on the other. With the support of the Australian Jewish community, Israel sought to influence Australian political leaders — especially within the ALP — from turning away from Israel.     

The British Foreign Office and Israel: At a Crossroads in 1976

The article examines the complex relationship between the British Foreign Office and Israel. It argues that in 1976 was a year of transformation in the relationship as the Foreign Office shifted towards a more critical approach towards Israel following the resignation of the British Prime Minister Harold Wilson. It makes use of newly available documentary sources from the National Archives in London, which illustrate how the Foreign Office used the resignation of the widely perceived pro-Israel Wilson, and the arrival in power of James Callaghan, to quietly shift British policy towards the Arab–Israeli conflict to fall more into line with the policies of Britain's European Partners.     

‘Alliance with the Enemy’: Why the CDU and the Greens Formed Their First Coalition in a Large German Federal State

This article seeks to explain the 2013 coalition between the CDU and the Greens in the German federal state of Hesse. It applies traditional office-seeking and policy-seeking coalition formation theories to the case alongside a new explanation underscoring the influence of past behaviour on coalition partnership; namely, the negative impact of a pre-electoral commitment breach on future coalition formation. The results show that pure office-seeking cannot explain the coalition outcome. Instead, as the analysis of textual data extracted from political parties' manifestos shows, there has been a constant process of policy approximation between the CDU and the Greens in Hesse. Additionally, we find evidence suggesting that the SPD's breach on their promise not to rely on support by the Left Party in 2008 shaped the CDU's refusal to coalesce with the SPD in 2013. The findings add to our understanding of the interplay between office-seeking and policy-seeking motivations as well as the personal enmities of key actors in shaping the coalition formation. The study further offers insights into the new German coalition option between the Greens and the CDU, which can serve as a blueprint at the national level.     

Obstructive all the way? British policy towards German unification 1989–90

British policy towards German unification has been judged to be at best reluctant, at worst obstructive. This article seeks to revise that perception, using documents from the Federal Chancellor's Office and the author's interviews with British and German diplomats and politicians. It distinguishes between the rhetoric of the British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and the policy of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The latter played a leading role in the Two Plus Four talks that resolved the external issues involved in German unification, and made a particular contribution to devising the formula for the termination of Four Power Rights over a unified Germany.     

The Australian Greens: Party Organisation and Political Processes

The Greens challenge the Australian two‐party system by promoting an alternative political agenda and by facilitating democratic processes. Their recent successes in federal and state elections suggest that the party itself deserves closer scrutiny. This paper shows how the Greens are organisationally different from other parties currently active in Australian politics due to both their internal processes and their parliamentary practices. Recent theories of parties argue that party organisation has changed significantly for major parties, adopting an electoral‐professional or cartel model that centralises power and decision‐making in party representatives within parliaments. This paper shows how a smaller party uses identity formation processes to establish a distinctive organisational style. We examine the Greens' party organisation by analysing the interdependent relationships between the party membership, the state and national offices, and Green MPs. The paper is based on original research including in‐depth interviews undertaken with state and federal Greens members of parliaments.     

Where Greens Support Conservatives: Lessons from the Rundle Minority Government in Tasmania 1996–98

This paper examines the Greens’ support of the conservative Liberal Rundle minority government in Tasmania (1996–98) in the context of Tasmania's political greening, and with an interest in the operation and experience of this government, and its policy impact in a number of key areas. Although Green support of a conservative government is a unique experience thus far in Australia's history, it is not unknown for Greens to support or even to serve in conservative governments elsewhere at the subnational and the national level. The paper begins by examining these circumstances, before turning to account for Tasmania's political greening, the Liberal‐Green minority government experience, its breakdown, policy impacts, and lessons relevant to the broader literature. It addresses the lack of attention to minority government and support parties in political scholarship, 1 and the experience of green parties participating in government at the subnational level.     

Lloyd George, Curzon and the Control of British Foreign Policy 1919-22

This article revises the accepted narrative about British foreign policy in the aftermath of the First World War, which portrays the Foreign Secretary and Foreign Office as subservient to a dynamic and interventionist Prime Minister inthe formulation of foreign policy. It argues that the relationship between Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, Lord Curzon of Kedleston, was far more complex than that suggested by the historical consensus, shaped, in part, by David LloydGeorge's political opponents and Curzon's enemies. Comparisons are drawn between Curzon's influence over policy towards specific geographical areas, and between Curzon's experiences under Lloyd George and his eventual successors as Prime Minister, Andrew Bonar Law and Stanley Baldwin.     

Reinventing Green Politics: On the Strategic Repositioning of the German Green Party

Whilst environmental issues, most notably climate change, have recently been more prominent in public debate than at any earlier time, Green parties are confronted with a fundamental challenge: The agenda of ‘new politics’ that had once been their original project has meanwhile become largely exhausted, and the profound transformation of societal structures, value preferences and party political competition necessitates a comprehensive reinvention of Green politics. Focusing on the German Greens, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, this article spells out the thesis of the exhaustion of the Green project and investigates how since the end of the Red–Green coalition under Chancellor Schröder the party has tried to forge a new, electorally attractive, programmatic profile. Detailed analysis of its evolving environmental and social policy position and of its relationship to the specific concerns and priorities energising late-modern consumer societies suggests that whilst in principle Germany's new five-party system offers favourable opportunity structures for Bündnis 90/Die Grünen to regain executive power, there is as yet little evidence of a successful reinvention of Green politics.     

‘Sowing the Seeds of Love’? Determinants of Local Coalition Formation and Termination between the CDU and the Greens, 1994–2016

Drawing on empirical evidence from 11 CDU–Green coalitions in large German municipalities, this article investigates the determinants of formation and termination of black–green minimal winning coalitions. Such coalitions are likely to be formed if the mayor is a party member of either the CDU or the Greens, if one of the two parties dominates the local party system, and if the SPD suffers from severe vote losses. Furthermore, the results indicate that CDU–Green coalitions are primarily formed if neither the CDU nor the Greens have gained a parliamentary majority with their ‘usual’ coalition partners. Ideological connectivity, however, does not play a major role. Regarding coalition stability, Christian Democrats and Greens are able to govern successfully for an entire legislative term in most of the cases. If a coalition is terminated early, however, this is due to a party breaking the coalition agreement by voting on specific policies together with the SPD in the local council.     

Accomplices with Reservations: German Diplomats and the Preparation of the Polish Campaign of September 1939

This paper examines the role of the conservative foreign policy establishment in the decision-making process leading to the Nazi invasion of Poland in September 1939. Post-war statements by German diplomats portrayed the conservative elite as reluctant participants in Hitler's drive to war. However, an examination of the foreign policy views of German conservatives reveals a significant degree of convergence with Nazi goals in their desire to revise Germany's post-Versailles borders with Poland. In order to understand the role of the German diplomatic elite, it is also necessary to understand the degree to which foreign policy was subject to the same "polycracy" of decision-making instances that characterised the structure of the "Third Reich" in general. While Hitler had relied on the conservative elites, including the Foreign Ministry and the military, their influence on decision-making was waning by 1938–1939.     

Golda Meir,Israel's Fourth Prime Minister (1969–74)

The article deals with Golda Meir, who was a prominent leader of Israel and the Prime Minister during the Yom Kippur War (1973). Its main points are:

1. Her road towards the national leadership during the “Yishuv” period.

2. Her political role under David Ben-Gurion and Levi Eshkol as Minister of Labor (1949–1956) and Minister of Foreign Affairs (1956–1966)

3. Meir as political leader: the way she lead her party and how she was a symbol of the national agreement

4. Meir as diplomatic leader: her attitude during the negotiation attempt with Egypt (The Secretary of the State's Plan – 1970 ; Moshe Dayan's intention to open the Suez Canal – 1971)

5. Meir as social leader: the strengthening of the welfare – state

6. Meir during the Yom Kippur War: The War as a result of her policy; Her leadership during the crisis

     

National Identities and Mass Belief Systems on Foreign and Security Policy in Germany

The article analyses how German citizens' national identities are linked to their belief systems regarding foreign and security policy. Previous research has pointed out that citizens' belief systems are not unconstrained, but organised hierarchically. Especially domain-specific predispositions have been shown to structure policy attitudes. Against the backdrop of the prominence national history is granted in public discourse, the article argues that in Germany national identities influence both predispositions and attitudes concerning foreign and security policy. Using data from a representative telephone survey of German adults, a structural equation model is used to test this hypothesis. The results show that different types of national identities have distinct effects on domain-specific predispositions and attitudes towards the German participation in the ISAF mission in Afghanistan.     

‘Bid’ for Altalena: France's Covert Action in the 1948 War in Palestine

Based on documents recently discovered in French archives, the article sheds new light on the role of France, especially of its Foreign Minister Georges Bidault, in providing arms and ammunition to the Etzel – the pre-state underground Zionist movement in Israel. The ship Altalena, which was sunk by the newly-formed Israel Defence Forces in the midst of the 1948 War of Independence, remains a centre of historiographical and political controversy in Israel. France's role in this affair is examined in the wider context of its clandestine intelligence, military and diplomatic assistance to Israel, as well as its rivalry with Britain in the Middle East. The article argues that Bidault's decision was intended to undermine Britain's secret support during the war in Palestine for King Abdallah of Jordan's occupation of Jerusalem. Documents, including a report of a committee of inquiry of the French Ministry of Defence into the Altalena affair, are annexed.     

Varieties of Joint Decision Making: The Second Federal Reform

Germany recently experienced another federal reform, shortly after a previous modification to the German federal system. Has the second federal reform brought substantial change instead of the gradual change that literature on joint decision making would lead us to expect? This article analyses the reform in three stages: agenda setting, negotiation, and ratification; and suggests that at best the new restrictions upon public debt brought about by the second federal reform can be seen as a substantial change, but only if actors comply with them. Furthermore, this note argues that varieties of joint decision making can be identified in German constitutional policy, as they can in German public policy and EU policies. Patterns of joint decision making vary, depending on agenda setting and negotiations, so that the article argues for a differentiated view of joint decision making, the joint decision trap and exits from the joint decision trap.     

伊藤博文与日英同盟

缔结日英同盟是近代日本外交史上的一个重大事件，当时伊藤博文是元老中的主导者，在外交事务上拥有极大的发言权。伊藤博文对日英同盟采取了怎样的态度、在同盟交涉中起了什么样的作用，对此史学界是众说纷纭。本文主要利用日英同盟的提出及交涉期间，伊藤与首相桂太郎、外相小村寿太郎、元老井上馨、驻英国公使林董等之间的信息交流资料，来探讨一下伊藤的态度及其在整个过程中所起的作用。伊藤博文不反对日英同盟，但主张先进行日俄协商，协商结束后再推进日英同盟。而桂太郎内阁则趁伊藤出访海外之机，全力推进缔结同盟，事实上将伊藤置于决策之外，使其处于被知会者地位，打破了长期以来伊藤博文、井上馨等对日本外交的垄断局面。     

Obstructive or promoting? British views on German unification 1989/90

Six years after unification German public opinion still regards Britain as the ‘No‐saying’ nation which not only holds up further European integration but also never really wanted German unity to happen. This article argues that British attitudes to the process of German unification in 1989/90 were more diverse and generally more positive than an undue concentration on the views of Margaret Thatcher and her advisers may suggest. An analysis of Foreign Office policies and an examination of public and published opinion as well as of the debates in both Houses of Parliament reveal a constructive British stance on German unity and a substantial and real contribution of British diplomats to the Two‐plus‐Four process. Whereas the Foreign Office and Downing Street agreed on the major effects German unity would have on Britain's international standing, they differed about the way Britain should respond to the new challenges.     

British Policy in the Arab–Israeli Arena 1973–2004

British policy has oscillated between a ‘Diplomatic’ and a ‘Strategic’ orientation. The Diplomatic orientation regards the Arab–Israeli conflict as the most important element in Middle East policy, while the Strategic orientation views the conflict as less important than the need to contain radical anti-Western forces in the region. The Strategic orientation is associated with a mutually reinforcing combination of ideological sympathy for Israel, a pro-US orientation and the Prime Minister, while the Diplomatic orientation is associated with a mutually reinforcing combination of ideological sympathy for the Palestinians, the Foreign Office, a pro-European orientation and, to a deceasing extent, commercial interests. Since 1973, in an attempt to manage its declining power, Britain's has sought to ‘bridge’ the widely differing EU and US approaches, in order to achieve maximum influence and relevance. On occasion, this strategy has succeeded, however Blair's ambition to be the pivot at the centre of international involvement in the region is completely unrealistic. For while ‘bridging’ allows Britain the satisfying sense of ’punching above its weight’ in the Middle East, it often produces the appearance, rather than the reality, of substantive influence.     

Reconstituting European social democracy: Germany's pivotal role

After a long period of dominance by the centre‐right, social democracy is once more in the ascendancy in Europe. At the same time social democracy is cross‐cut by competing ideological paradigms, ranging from an unreformed or ‘traditional’ model through to the neo‐liberal tinged ‘Third Way’ agenda. With social democratic‐led governments in power in France, Germany and Great Britain, this ideological competition has to a certain extent been mapped onto these member states’ statecraft agendas. The article makes three points. First, that there is a high degree of institutional ‘fit’ between of the Federal Republic and the European Union and that this potentially favours the successful transfer of German policy initiatives to the EU level. Second, that the ‘Red‐Green model’ of political co‐operation between the SPD and Greens is grounded within the parameters of sub‐national politics and is not easily adapted to the demands of the national and supranational levels. Third, that as a result of this, any distinctively ‘German’ social democratic agenda for Europe is more likely to have the ideas of the ‘Neue Mitte’ at its core.     

Consolidating right-wing hegemony: the Israeli election 2015

Following the premature collapse of an eclectic right-wing and centre-left government, Israelis went to the polls on the 17 March, 2015. Despite what appeared to be a clear-cut right-wing victory, the thirty-fourth government of Israel was constituted 14 May, 2015, over two months after incumbent Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s apparent electoral triumph. This profile examines the contours of Israel’s recent election campaign and formation of a new government, assessing the triumphs and pitfalls of Israel’s major political parties during the election period. Similarly, this profile delineates the major political issues and dominant personalities featuring throughout the campaign. Subsequently, this profile traces the often-frantic coalition negotiations that led to formation of the thirty-fourth Israeli administration. Finally, the domestic and foreign policy implications of an increased hegemony of right-wing parties in the current government are outlined. Conversely, the narrow majority of the new government suggests ideological homogeneity may come with a price of increased political instability for Prime Minister Netanyahu.