2002年东亚经济的前景

2001年世界各地经济大多陷入或迈向衰退,东亚各地除中国、越南等外亦陷于深度的衰退与停滞之中.2002年下半年或晚些时候,随着美国经济逐步走向复苏,亚洲各地经济亦将逐步恢复与反弹.然而由于美国资讯科技投资过度,"后遗症"的化解尚需时日,使得东亚各地今后必须更多地依靠内部需求,自力自强,加强合作,步向经济稳定增长的轨道.     

2002年亚太地区形势讨论会在京举行

20 0 2年 1 2月 2 6日 ,中国社会科学院亚太研究所 2 0 0 2年亚太地区形势讨论会在北京举行。来自各研究机构及政府部门的 4 0余位专家学者参加了会议。与会的专家学者们对亚太地区政治经济形势进行了回顾与展望 ,并就一些地区的热点问题进行了深入的讨论。关于地区经济形势 ,学者们认为亚太地区的经济形势总体较好。尽管在亚太地区经济中占比重最大、影响面最广的美国经济持续波动 ,第二大经济体日本的经济处于停滞状态 ,但在高速发展的中国经济的带动下 ,亚太地区的经济复苏趋势仍较为明显。学者们认为 2 0 0 3年的国际形势虽存在一些不稳…     

印尼伊斯兰教育中的政治因素

伊斯兰教育体系是印尼穆斯林社会的重要组成部分,在传播伊斯兰宗教知识与信仰方面发挥着重要作用.印尼独立后,随着国家向世俗化与现代化方向转变,印尼的伊斯兰学校也经历了前所未有的转变."去伊斯兰教化"与"去政治化"成为印尼政府改革伊斯兰教育体系的重要方针.在苏哈托推行"新秩序"时期,改革伊斯兰教育成为政党斗争的一个焦点.一方面,印尼的传统伊斯兰学校在政府的打压下渐呈萎缩与衰落之势;另一方面,传统伊斯兰学校也被迫朝着"世俗化"与"现代化"的方向改革,求得继续生存与发展.20世纪80年代以来,随着全球伊斯兰复兴运动的发展,伊斯兰学校的宣教运动也逐渐高涨,对推动当代印尼伊斯兰激进主义的发展有着不可忽视的作用.     

美国的农村金融体制及借鉴意义

本文对美国农村金融体制进行考察,对其农村金融组织体系及配套的扶持政策进行评介,并通过与中国农村金融的比较,指出中国农村金融体制改革应积极发挥市场机制的导向作用,建立农村资金良性循环机制,同时政府应承担主导作用,建立多层次、全方位的农村金融体制。     

The Nakba in Palestinian Memory in Israel

Changes in the international, regional and domestic arenas in the late 1990s resulted in discursive change with regard to interpretation of the Al Nakba in the political and civil societies of the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel. Apart from fuelling a discursive challenge to the Israeli dominant discourse about the 1948 events, this reinterpretation allowed the Palestinian Arab citizens to discuss the historical roots of the problems they experienced within the Israeli political and civil societal spheres. This article analyses the nature and significance of discursive change of the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel on the Nakba by referring to its impact on their identity politics as well as their political and civil societal activities.     

Islam in Mali in the neoliberal era

If before 11 September 2001, many praised Mali as a model ofdemocracy, secularism and toleration, many have now begun toexpress concern about the rise of Islamic fundamentalism inMali. I consider a number of recent public debates in Mali overmorality, so-called women’s issues, and the proposed changesin the Family Code and show how the perspectives of many Malianson these issues are not new but rather relate to longstandingand ongoing debates about Islam, secularism, politics, moralityand law. What is new is the way in which some Muslim religiousleaders have been articulating their complaints and criticisms.Since the guarantee of the freedom of expression and associationin the early 1990s, there has been a proliferation of independentnewspapers and private radio stations and new Islamic associationswith a coterie of increasingly media-savvy activists. I explorehow some Muslim activists have used such outlets to articulatethe concerns of some ordinary Malians, who face the contradictionsof living as modern Muslim citizens in a modernizing and secularizingstate where, in this age of neoliberal governmentality, theallegedly un-Islamic seems to be always just around the corner. Portions of the paper have been presented at the workshop, ‘Islam,Society and State in West Africa’, Rutgers University,New Brunswick, 29 March 2003; at the symposium, ‘Constructionand Dissemination of Islamic Knowledge in Africa’, IndianaUniversity, Bloomington, 19 April 2003; and at the conference,‘Governance and Insecurity in West Africa’, NorthwesternUniversity, 13–15 November 2003; and at UniversitätBayreuth. ^1. United States Agency for International Development, ‘Assistanceenvironment’, in USAID MALI: Country Strategic Plan 2003–2012(USAID, Bamako, Mali, 2002), p. 11. ^2. Economist Intelligence Unit, ‘The political scene’,in EIU Country Report: Mali (EIU, London, March 2002), p. 47. ^3. See Joshua Muravchik, ‘Freedom and the Arab world’,The Weekly Standard, 31 December 2001. ^4. ‘Overview’. USAID MALI: Country Strategic Plan 2003–2012(USAID, Bamako, Mali, 2002), p. 18. Such sentiments were alsoexpressed in journalistic accounts published shortly after 11September 2001. See, for example, Douglas Farah, ‘Mali’sMuslim clerics send troubling message: fragile democracy seenas vulnerable to extremism’, Washington Post, 30 September2001, p. A24; Kader Konaté, ‘Mali. Le danger islamiste’,Le Continent, 14 September 2001, p. 1. ^5. See Joan Baxter, ‘Challenging tradition’, BBC Focuson Africa Magazine, January-March 2002, pp. 48–50. Otherexamples include Nicolas Colombant, ‘Mali’s Muslimssteer back to spiritual roots’, Christian Science Monitor,26 February 2002, p. 8. ^6. These included various Western media outlets and several Maliannewspapers. ^7. James Ferguson and Akhil Gupta, ‘Spatializing states:toward an ethnography of neoliberal governmentality’,American Ethnologist 29, 4 (2002), pp. 981–1002. ^8. For critical perspectives on the fashionable civil society approachto ‘good governance’ in Africa, see John L. Comaroffand Jean Comaroff (eds), Civil Society and the Political Imaginationin Africa (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, 1999);Béatrice Hibou and Richard Banégas, ‘Civilsociety and the public space in Africa’, CODESRIA Bulletin1 (2000), pp. 39–47. ^9. For example, Sunjata, the mythical founder of the medieval Malianempire, Mansa Musa, the Muslim rulers of Macina (r. nineteenthcentury), al-Hajj Umar Tall (d. nineteenth century), the Kuntashaykhs of the Timbuktu region, and Shaykh Hamallah (d. twentiethcentury), to name only some of the most prominent. ^10. For an example of how such ‘orthodoxy’ changes overtime and space in Mali, see Benjamin F. Soares, ‘Muslimproselytization as purification: religious pluralism and conflictin contemporary Mali’ in Abdallah A. An-Na’im (ed.),Proselytization and Communal Self-Determination in Africa (Orbis,Maryknoll, NY, 1999), pp. 228–45. ^11. Two studies that have received quite a bit of attention areAnna L. Tsing, In the Realm of the Diamond Queen: Marginalityin an out-of-the-way place (Princeton University Press, Princeton,NJ, 1993); Charles Piot, Remotely Global: Village modernityin West Africa (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, 1999). ^12. See Gregory Starrett, ‘The political economy of religiouscommodities in Cairo’, American Anthropologist 97, 1 (1995),pp. 51–68. ^13. On these developments, see Robert Launay and Benjamin F. Soares,‘The formation of an "Islamic sphere" in French colonialWest Africa’, Economy and Society, 28, 4 (1999), pp. 497–519;Benjamin F. Soares, ‘Islam and public piety in Mali’,in Armando Salvatore and Dale F. Eickelman (eds), Public Islamand the Common Good (Brill, Leiden, The Netherlands, 2004);Benjamin F. Soares, Islam and the Prayer Economy: History andauthority in a Malian town (Edinburgh University Press, Edinburghand the University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 2005). ^14. Malians with access to satellite television have a wider arrayof choices, which are hard to quantify. ^15. Some of the themes in this section are treated at greater lengthin my book, Islam and the Prayer Economy. ^16. Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and Its Fragments (Princeton UniversityPress, Princeton, NJ, 1993). ^17. See Seydina Oumar Diarra, ‘Haut Conseil Islamique du Mali’,Info-Matin, 18 January 2002, p. 5. ^18. Benjamin F. Soares, Islam and the Prayer Economy, p. 212. Seealso David Robinson, Paths of Accommodation: Muslim societiesand French colonial authorities in Senegal and Mauritania, 1880–1920(Ohio University Press, Athens, OA, 2000); David Robinson andJean-Louis Triaud (eds), Le temps des marabouts: Itinéraireset stratégies islamiques en Afrique occidentale françaisev.1880–1960 (Karthala, Paris, 1997). ^19. Many Malians also regularly apply diverse principles from ‘custom’,which is often referred to as laada (from the Arabic) in theregion’s vernaculars. ^20. For one example, see Benjamin F. Soares, ‘Notes on theanthropological study of Islam and Muslim societies in Africa’,Culture and Religion, 1, 2 (2000), pp. 277–85. ^21. Ahmad Uthman Bah, Diya’ al-ghasaq manzuma nasihat al-shabab(Matba’at al-najah al-jadida, Casablanca, Morocco, 1992). ^22. See, for example, Amadou Tall, Dimensions de l’Islam (DarEl Fikr, Beirut, Lebanon, 1995–1996). ^23. On Haïdara and his career, see Soares, ‘Islam andpublic piety’ and Soares, Islam and the Prayer Economy.Cf. Dorothea Schulz, ‘"Charisma and Brotherhood" revisited’,Journal of Religion in Africa, 33 (2003), pp. 146–71. ^24. See Louis Brenner, Controlling Knowledge: Religion, power andschooling in a West African Muslim society (Indiana UniversityPress, Bloomington, IL, 2001). ^25. Cf. Olivier Roy (trans. C. Volk), The Failure of Political Islam(Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1994); Olivier Roy, GlobalizedIslam (Columbia University Press, New York, NY, 2004). ^26. Cf. Armando Salvatore, ‘Social differentiation, moralauthority and public Islam in Egypt: the case of Mustafa Mahmud’,Anthropology Today, 6, 2 (2000), pp. 12–15. ^27. For a discussion of Haïdara and his association’srelation to Sufism and Sufi orders, see Soares, Islam and thePrayer Economy. ^28. This was also a topic of discussion in some print media. See,for example, Cheick Sidya Diombana, ‘La jeunesse et lafoi en l’Islam’, La Roue, 25 October–3 November1993, p. 5. ^29. I am grateful to Roman Loimeier for making his copy of thissign available to me. ^30. See, for example, ‘Déclaration finale des associationsislamiques du Mali concernant les valeurs islamiques et àpropos du programme d’action de Beijing rélatifaux droits des femmes’, La Roue, 22–31 January 1996,pp. 3–5. ^31. For a discussion of some of the controversy around excision,see Bettina Shell-Duncan and Ylva Hernlund (eds), Female ‘Circumcision’in Africa: Culture, controversy, and change (Lynne Rienner,Boulder, Colorado, 2000). For campaigns against excision inMali, see Claudie Gosselin, ‘Handing over the knife: Numuwomen and the campaign against excision in Mali’, in BettinaShell-Duncan and Ylva Hernlund (eds), Female ‘Circumcision’in Africa, pp. 193–214; Jean Sanou, ‘Lutte contreles mutilations génitales feminines’, Le Soudanais,22 November 2000, p. 3; Yousouf Camara, ‘Réligionet excision’, Le Tambour, 22 June 2001, p. 3; MamadouBlodin Sissok, ‘Religion et excision. Quand les chrétienss’engagent contre les mutilations génitales féminines’,Info-Matin, 29 June 2001, p. 8. ^32. See, for example, Mady M. Dembélé, ‘L’excisionest un poids des traditions, elle n’a rien de religieux’,Les Echos, 18 July 2001, p. 5. ^33. See C.H. Sylla, ‘Interview exclusive. Le Présidentdu Collectif des islamistes parle’, Le Républicain,16 May 2001, pp. 1, 4–5; Mohamed Kimbiri, ‘L’excisionau Mali. La position des musulmans’, Nouvel Horizon, 30January 2001, p. 5; Mohamed Kimbiri, ‘Interdire l’excisionest une atteinte grave’, Le Républicain, 31 January2001, p. 5. ^34. ‘Brèves’, Le Politicien Musulman, 18 March–18April 2002, p. 8. ^35. Leaflets produced and distributed by AISLAM (Association islamiquedu salut) in the author’s possession. ^36. See Mamadou Keïta, ‘Les imams à l’affûtdes jouisseurs’, Nouvel Horizon, 23 November 1998, p.4. ^37. Mohamed Kimbiri, ‘Boycottons "Miss Cedeao" ’, NouvelHorizon, 16 October 1998. See also Mamadou Keïta, ‘MissCedeao’, Nouvel Horizon, 2 November 1998, p. 5. ^38. Yoro Sow, ‘Incertitudes pour la tenue du Congrèsdes homosexuels’, Sud Info, 8 December 1999, p. 4. ^39. However, some prominent Muslim religious leaders, most notablyChérif Haïdara, would eventually take positionsin support of condom use. See Benjamin Soares, ‘Mali:Im Visier der Islamismus-Fahnder’, INAMO 41 (2005), pp.16–18. ^40. Talal Asad, ‘Religion, nation-state, secularism’,in Peter van der Veer and Hartmut Lehmann (eds), Nation andReligion: Perspectives on Europe and Asia (Princeton UniversityPress, Princeton, NJ, 1999), p. 191. ^41. Djibril Traoré, ‘El Hadji Mahmoud Dicko,’Le National, 2 October 2000, p. 5. ^42. El Hadj Mahmoud Dicko, ‘Declaration du Collectif des associationsislamiques du Mali’, Info-Matin, 7 May 2001, p. 7. Seealso El Hadj Mahmoud Dicko, ‘Déclaration’,Le Républicain, 4 May 2001, p. 7; Amara Diapy Diawara,‘Meeting du Collectif des associations musulmanes du Mali’,Info-Matin, 13 February 2001, pp. 4–5. ^43. See, for example, Michael Taussig, Mimesis and Alterity (Routledge,New York, NY, 1993); Homi Bhabha, ‘Of mimicry and man’,in The Location of Culture (Routledge, New York, NY, 1994),pp. 85–92. ^44. On this heightened sense, see Dale F. Eickelman and James Piscatori,Muslim Politics (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ,1996). For Malian press coverage of the OCI meeting, see, forexample, ‘Organisation de la Conférence islamique.Le monde musulman’, Liberté, 3 July 2001, p. 4. ^45. See the extensive coverage of the meeting in a special editionof Le Continent, 2 February 2001. ^46. For a discussion of some of the proposed reforms and specificcontroversies, cf. Benjamin F. Soares, ‘The attempt toreform family law in Mali’, in Margot Badran (ed.), Genderand Islam in Africa (Brill, Leiden, The Netherlands, forthcoming);Dorothea E. Schulz, ‘Political factions, ideological fictions:the controversy over family law reform in democratic Mali’,Islamic Law and Society, 10, 1 (2003), pp. 132–64. ^47. Birama Fall, ‘Islam et politique. La colère desislamistes contre le pouvoir’, Le Républicain,23 April 2001, p. 1; Belco Tamboura, ‘Le front religieux,un front de plus pour Konaré’, L’Observateur,14 June 2001, p. 6. ^48. C. H. Sylla, ‘Code de la famille et excision. La dernièrevictoire des islamistes sur Alpha’, Le Républicain,10 June 2002, p. 5. ^49. See Christian Coulon, Le marabout et le prince: Islam et pouvoirau Sénégal (Pédone, Paris, France, 1981). ^50. Boukary Daou, ‘Code de la famille et excision. Les musulmansdisent non à Alpha’, Le Républicain, 5 June2002, p. 1. ^51. Cf. Michael Bratton, Massa Coulibaly, and Fabiana Machado, ‘Popularviews of the legitimacy of the state in Mali’, CanadianJournal of African Studies 36, 2 (2002), pp. 197–238;Michael Bratton, Robert Mattes and E. Gyimah-Boadi, Public Opinion,Democracy and Market Reform in Africa (Cambridge UniversityPress, Cambridge, 2005).     

近年越南的外商投资

受亚洲金融危机的影响,越南外商投资减少.由于越南政府调整了外资政策,外资出现回升势头,投资来源结构、投资产业结构也发生了变化.估计今明两年越南外商投资会继续增长.     

近年蒙古国经济形势分析

文章分析了蒙古国经济近年来出现再次回落的原因,阐述了有利于经济发展的一些积极因素,指出蒙古国经济发展还要经历艰难的历程.     

战后印度尼西亚橡胶种植业发展问题探析

印度尼西亚是世界上重要的橡胶生产、出口国之一,目前其橡胶产量位居世界第二,仅次于泰国.虽然橡胶的生产与出口一直是印尼国民经济收入的重要来源,但是印尼橡胶种植业战后的发展却是一波三折.本文主要探讨20世纪50年代印尼橡胶产业所遇到的重大问题,希望以此个案展示发展中国家经济发展问题的复杂性.     

印尼廉政建设中的文化因素

从文化角度考察印尼腐败问题长期存在和反腐失效的原因,是全面研究印尼腐败问题的必要之举。爪哇传统文化中的尊敬与重视社会和谐的价值观,以及在此基础上形成的以等级制为特征的政治文化,是庇护制和主公制度形成的文化基础,也是腐败问题在印尼长期存在的重要原因。在建立健全的反腐法律机制的同时,弘扬传统文化中的积极因素,构建本国特色的廉政文化,对于印尼长期的反腐工作具有重要意义。     

2002年东亚经济回顾

东亚经济在 2 0 0 2年保持了较快的增长。这主要归功于出口迅速增长 ,内需保持强劲 ,适度宽松的财政货币政策的刺激等因素。但是 ,东亚内部仍存在产业结构调整滞后、金融和公司部门的重建尚未完成、公共部门债务负担加重等问题 ,这些问题如不能很好解决 ,可能阻碍中长期经济增长。虽然面临着许多不确定的因素 ,各大机构对 2 0 0 3年的东亚经济增长仍然抱有较为乐观的预期。     

清代东南亚的广东会馆

清代旅居东南亚的广东人 ,为了联谊乡情、团结互助 ,纷纷仿效故土的地缘会馆组织在海外建立会馆。清代广东会馆遍布东南亚 ,是了解广东人在海外发展的重要窗口 ,也是检阅广东人在海外分布的一个索引。会馆维护了海外广东人的利益 ,其开展的各类活动传播了中国文化。