The non-reversal of delegation in international standard-setting in finance: The Basel Committee and the European Union

International non-majoritarian institutions (NMIs) in finance have proliferated over the last decades. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) is the main international NMI in finance and the European Union (EU) is one of its core jurisdictions. Despite the far-reaching effects of international banking standards in the EU, especially the Basel accords, there has been limited politicization of delegation to the BCBS and no attempt to reverse it. Why? By taking a “soft” principal-agent approach, this paper points out two explanatory factors: the composite nature of both the principal and the agent. It also identifies a pattern that can be generalized to other international NMIs in finance. Thus, following the initial delegation of international standard-setting to the BCBS, this international NMI considerably increased its activities, going beyond what certain elected officials wanted; the response from elected officials was limited to the use of relatively weak ex-ante and ex-post controls, including delayed compliance.     

Public and elite opinion on international human rights law: Completing the causal chain of the domestic compliance mechanism

Why do states comply with international human rights law? Scholars have looked to domestic politics to suggest a constituency-driven domestic compliance mechanism. However, it is unclear if strong public support for compliance leads to greater willingness to comply among elected officials. This study is the first to empirically demonstrate the complete causal chain of a constituency-driven domestic compliance mechanism. Using a survey experiment, this study first finds that a strong state commitment to UN Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations (RTNC) increases public support for compliance. Using a parallel lab-in-the-field experiment of sitting legislators, the study then finds that a strong state commitment to RTNC is similarly associated with increased elite support for compliance. Finally, the study finds that public demand for compliance is associated with even greater elite support for compliance. Public demand for compliance seems to elicit elite willingness to comply by raising reputational concerns.     

Domestic legislatures and international human rights law: Legislating on religious symbols in Europe

This article examines the dynamics of domestic legislatures' application of international human rights law. Specifically, this article asks the following: What factors shape how domestic legislatures apply international human rights law while they enact national law and policy? Lawmakers have a variety of motives for invoking and deliberating international law. Given these motives, the article identifies two factors — civil society actors and legal experts and the flexibility of international law — that are likely to contribute to if and how national legislatures interpret and apply international human rights law while legislating. These factors are examined through case studies on religion in schools in the United Kingdom, Germany, and France. This article argues civil society actors and legal experts and the flexibility of international law inform lawmakers' estimation of political costs related to compliance and thus how they apply international human rights law to domestic legislation.     

“It's the Central Government's Fault”: Elected Regional Officials' Use of Blame‐Shifting Rhetoric

This article investigates regional officials' use of blame‐shifting rhetoric in times of heated public criticism of unpopular regional policy decisions. Based on a content coding of nearly 500 political accounts from elected regional officials it is shown that “it's the central government's fault” is the most frequently used excuse when regional officials publicly defend unpopular decisions to cut public health care. The article finds that this excuse is used more by regional leaders (mayors and chairmen of regional boards) than by other elected officials and that partisan competition affects how often this excuse is used.     

Representative Bureaucracy and Partisanship: The Implementation of Election Law

Studies of representative bureaucracy argue that public administrators hold attitudes that are generally representative of the public and will implement policy in accordance with those attitudes. However, studies of representative bureaucracy generally have not considered the partisanship of local administrators. Many local election officials affiliate with a political party, and there is concern that partisan officials will manipulate election procedures to help their party. The authors analyze a survey of local election officials about their attitudes toward provisional voting. Findings show that Democratic local election officials have significantly more positive attitudes toward provisional voting programs in highly Democratic jurisdictions and significantly less positive attitudes in highly Republican jurisdictions. No such relationship occurs for Republican administrators. In addition, positive attitudes toward provisional voting are associated with more provisional votes being cast and counted in the 2004 presidential election. This work questions whether representative bureaucracy—when it concerns partisanship—is always a desirable outcome.     

These rules are made for spending: testing and extending the law of 1/n

What is the influence of the rules of political representation on local spending? This research tests the law of 1/n in the Portuguese local context and finds that the law fails to apply. We suggest an alternative measure—the density of representation—to assess the impact of the rules of city council representation on local public expenditures. Density of representation is defined as the number of elected officials in the city council divided by city population. We find an S-shaped relationship between the density of representation and the level of local government expenditures. The level of municipal spending initially declines with increases in the density of representation, reflecting an increase in the ability of constituents to monitor their elected representatives. At higher levels of representation density, the relationship becomes positive, suggesting that the dynamics of the budgetary commons become salient. The relationship becomes negative again for extremely high density of representation owing to increases in the transaction costs of legislative decision-making. This paper discusses the implications of our findings for the reform of local government institutions and the rules of political representation.     

Europeanization and the “Needle's Eye”: The Transformation of Employment Policy in Germany1

What have been the impacts of Europeanization in European Union (EU) member states in the domain of employment policy from a gender perspective? The essay explores this question for one of the traditional “male breadwinner–female caretaker” gender policy regimes in the EU—the case of Germany. Since German women's employment status is behind the status of women in many other EU countries, it has been expected that the impact of European (EC) equal opportunity and equal treatment norms on domestic policy change has remained minimal (Ostner & Lewis, 1995). This, however, is not the case any more. On the contrary, it is argued that Europeanization, although against considerable domestic resistances and with delays, helps to “gender” German public employment policy, namely in three respects: with respect to underlying gender norms, regarding the distinction of gender specific target groups and scope, and the introduction of innovative gender‐sensitive policy instruments. This claim is illustrated by three examples. An explanation for these shifts is developed that accounts for member state change despite misfits with EU norms, not as a consequence of legal compliance mechanisms, but as an outcome of a combination of three mechanisms—the politicization of controversial issues, shifts in dominant discourses, and political advocacy building—conducive to the “gendering” of Europeanization.     

Promiscuously Partisan? Public Service Impartiality and Responsiveness in Westminster Systems

Public servants in Westminster countries are being drawn into the limelight by demands from their political masters that they publicly defend policies. Critics suggest these conditions undermine the capacity and willingness of senior public servants to manage the enduring Westminster tension between serving elected governments and remaining nonpartisan. Interviews with senior officials from Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom challenge this pessimistic view, showing that officials consistently stress the importance of not “crossing the line” when dealing with their elected masters. Two exploratory case studies are presented—one of an Australian ministerial department (Treasury) and another of a Canadian quasi‐autonomous agency (Statistics Canada)—in which public servants faced pressure to defend controversial government policies. These cases show how contemporary public servants actively interpret, establish, and defend the line between appropriate responsiveness and inappropriate partisanship in Westminster systems.     

Responsibility to Be Enthusiastic? Public Servants and the Public Face of “Promiscuous Partisanship”

Contemporary public service leaders are no longer the anonymous mandarins of Westminster folklore. Whether giving public speeches to outside organizations or communicating directly with the media, senior public servants are emerging from anonymity to become public actors in their own right. This article undertakes a comparative study across four Westminster jurisdictions—Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom—to examine the formal rules and guidelines that apply to public servants when making public statements in their official capacity. Drawing on the late Peter Aucoin's notion of “promiscuous partisanship,” the article argues that public servants are expected to demonstrate a new level of enthusiasm when explaining or justifying government policy to the public. This has implications for the extent to which nonpartisanship can continue to effectively function within Westminster systems.     

Subnational Responses to Fracking in Canada: Explaining Saskatchewan's “Wild West” Regulatory Approach

This article assesses the regulatory response to fracking by Saskatchewan, Canada's second largest oil‐producing province. Public officials and industry representatives claim fracking regulations are “comprehensive” and “robust”; however, there has been no comparative assessment of this claim. To address this gap, we outline the dominant regulatory pathways of U.S. states and Canadian provinces, ranging from applying existing regulations with minimal revisions, to enacting broader revisions or bans. We account for this variation using a framework from Davis ( 2012 ) emphasizing governments’ dependence on the oil sector, the level of support for fracking among elected officials and policy makers, and the influence of key “constituencies.” The article then traces the growth and impact of fracking in Saskatchewan and analyzes new trends in the province's regulation of fracking. Given the province's application of existing regulations with minimal revisions and active weakening of enforcement, we identify Saskatchewan as taking Rabe and Borick's ( 2013 ) “conventional” regulatory approach, typical of Davis's “energy dominant” states.     

Beyond the Voting Rights Act: White Responses to Black Political Power in Tchula, Mississippi

This article is a case study of the legal and political harassmentof a black mayor in Tchula, Mississippi. The case illustratesin the extreme the peculiar challenges that can be confrontedby local black elected officials in small southern jurisdictions,even where the population is predominantly black and the reachof the federal government otherwise assures black residentstheir rights to vote and hold public office. Effective enfranchisementof blacks in such communities is difficult because blacks possessfew resources with which to translate votes into economic developmentand because historic patterns of race relations in such backwaterareas stand as major cultural barriers to change.     

On the Meaning of Survey Reports of Roll‐Call “Votes”

Contemporary efforts to evaluate representation often compare survey measures of how citizens say they would vote on legislation to what elected officials do in office. These comparisons generally suggest poor representation. We argue here that this common design is unlikely to effectively evaluate representation because responses to survey questions differ in important aspects from voting in legislatures. Measurement error and construct validity undermine the comparison. Three survey experiments show that providing partisan and nonpartisan information readily available to legislators materially changes respondents' expressed preferences on roll‐call votes. With information, expressed policy positions are both less centrist and more closely matched to legislator behavior in their preferred party. Respondents also appear aware of their own lack of knowledge in evaluating roll‐call policy votes. The treatment effect of information decreases in confidence judging policy in that area. We show similar patterns for respondent opinions on Supreme Court decisions.     

Regulatory Analysis Procedures and Political Influence on Bureaucratic Policymaking

Well‐known theories suggest that administrative procedures may be used as mechanisms of political control of the bureaucracy. This study investigates whether three common regulatory analysis procedures—cost‐benefit analysis, risk assessment, and economic impact analysis—lead to greater influence by political officials on bureaucratic policymaking. Multivariate analyses of data from a unique survey of state administrators indicate that regulatory analysis requirements are associated with decreases in the perceived influence of elected political officials on the content of administrative rules. This association is particularly evident in cases where proposed rules are subjected to a cost–benefit test. These findings contradict prominent theories of administrative procedures, but are consistent with recent research on the political power of administrative agencies.     

Local Government Restructuring: Privatization and Its Alternatives

Local government restructuring should no longer be viewed as a simple dichotomy between private and public provision. A 1997 survey of chief elected township and county officials in New York shows that local governments use both private and public sector mechanisms to structure the market, create competition, and attain economies of scale. In addition to privatization and inter‐municipal cooperation, two alternative forms of service delivery not previously researched—reverse privatization and governmental entrepreneurship—are analyzed here. Logistic regression on the 201 responding governments differentiates the decision to restructure from the level and complexity of restructuring. Results confirm that local governments are guided primarily by pragmatic concerns with information, monitoring, and service quality. Political factors are not significant in the restructuring process and unionization is only significant in cases of simple restructuring (privatization or cooperation used alone). Fiscal stress is not a primary motivator, but debt limits are associated with more complex forms of restructuring. Restructuring service delivery requires capacity to take risks and is more common among experienced local officials in larger, higher‐income communities. Restructuring should be viewed as a complex, pragmatic process where governments combine public and private provision with an active role as service provider and market player. © 2001 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

我国亟待出台防止利益冲突法

利益冲突是市场经济国家滋生腐败的主要根源。防止利益冲突法是国家为了避免公职人员公权私用、以权谋私，从而厘清公权与私利的界限，保证公职人员廉洁从政的法律规范；它是防微杜渐、防患于未然，从源头上预防腐败的基础性法律制度。我国出台防止利益冲突法是解决现行防腐败制度不尽人意问题的必然选择，是遏制当前腐败易发多发势头的必要举措，是巩固党的执政地位的迫切需要。它有利于促进社会公平，有利于恢复我国的国际形象，也是我国政府的国际义务。     

Conflict and Compliance in Swedish Health Care Governance: Soft Law in the ‘Shadow of Hierarchy’

Soft law, or non‐legislative modes of policy making, is becoming increasingly common today. The Nordic countries have a long tradition soft law, not least in central–local relations, where non‐binding agreements are frequently used to coordinate policies. A key question springing from soft law theory is that of compliance. Why do independent actors comply if they are not formally obliged to do so, and what happens if they do not comply? This article addresses the question of how compliance can be achieved during policy conflict between actors at different governing levels by investigating a case of health care reform in Sweden. An important finding in the study is that compliance was reached ‘in the shadow of hierarchy’. The central government resorted to the threat of regular legislation to force the county councils to comply. This finding points to the fact that sanctions and the presence of a hierarchical order may play an important role even in soft law governance. The study also shows that an additional important reason that the voluntary agreement between the county councils and central government was honoured in the end by both parties can be attributed to the efforts of a mediating actor: the organization representing the county councils in their negotiations with the government. Finally, the study also illustrates how various forms of informal social pressures such as shaming, peer pressure and moral responsibility can help enforce local compliance in a case of open policy conflict. Arguably, all these compliance mechanisms also have relevance outside the Nordic setting.     

Encouraging Local Compliance with Federal Civil Rights Laws: Field Experiments with the National Voter Registration Act

Can state officials increase local officials’ compliance with an important federal civil rights law with subtle interventions? The National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA) requires voter registration services at certain government agencies, but many counties fail to comply with the act. Working with officials in two states, the authors conducted field experiments to determine whether two methods commonly used by state officials increase compliance with the NVRA. Findings show that although the effects of the methods on output were sizable relative to recent performance, agency performance remained poor overall, with many offices continuing their history of registering no voters. The authors also discovered that gains in performance were largest for the offices that had performed best in the past. These findings suggest that while subtle interventions by state officials can produce increased compliance, stronger tactics may be needed to secure implementation of this federal law by local government agents.     

Reversing delegation? Politicization,de-delegation,and non-majoritarian institutions

Elected governments and states have delegated extensive powers to non-majoritarian institutions (NMIs) such as independent central banks and regulatory agencies, courts, and international trade and investment organizations, which have become central actors in governance. But, far from having resolved the balance between political control and governing competence or removed certain issues from political debate, NMIs have faced challenges to their legitimacy by elected officials and sometimes attempts to reverse delegation through “de-delegation”. Our special issue studies the politicization of NMIs, and then whether, why and how it leads to de-delegation through reducing the formal powers of NMIs or increasing controls over them. In this article, we examine how to analyze de-delegation, how politicization of NMIs has developed, and how it has affected de-delegation. We underline not only institutional rules that constrain elected officials but also the actions of NMIs themselves and their relationships with other NMIs as part of multi-level governance systems. We find that politicization has varied, but even when strong, elected officials have not introduced widespread and long-lasting de-delegation; on the contrary, they have frequently widened the powers of NMIs. Insofar as elected politicians have sought to curb NMIs, they have often preferred to use existing controls and non-compliance. Finally, we consider the wider implications of the combination of politicization and lack of de-delegation for broader issues of governance such as the division of powers between the elected and unelected and democratic accountability.     

Long–Serving City Managers: Why Do They Stay?

The literature on council–manager government often mentions the political difficulties that city managers face with their elected officials and constituent groups. In addition, the generally accepted route to success for city managers is to move to larger and better–paying cities. As a result of these push–and–pull factors, the average tenure of city managers is short. There are, however, a relatively small number of city managers who enjoy long tenure in single cities. The authors identified the 146 city managers who are serving and have served for at least 20 years the same city and sought to determine the factors leading to their long service. The survey indicates that long–serving city managers are more likely to be found in smaller cities that are homogeneous and politically stable. The majority of these city managers are white males with above–average educational levels, strong support from elected officials, and personal commitments to the cities they serve.     

Romanticizing bureaucratic leadership? The politics of how elected officials attribute responsibility for performance

A core task for elected officials is to hold bureaucratic leaders responsible, but how do they determine if public managers actually influence outcomes? We propose that partisan and leadership heuristics affect how politicians apply a logic of individualized responsibility, that is, focus on individual bureaucrats rather than situational factors to explain organizational outcomes. We match survey data of local elected officials in Denmark with individual partisan variables and objective performance data about the schools they oversee. We provide evidence that partisan beliefs matter, with conservative elected officials more willing to pursue a logic of individualized responsibility. We also find that elected officials are more likely to assume that bureaucratic leaders determine organizational outcomes where performance is very high or low, a leadership attribution heuristic previously established in private sector studies. We argue that our findings have important implications for contemporary governance, given the growing reliance on performance metrics to assign responsibility.