Environmental migration and conflict dynamics: focus on developing regions

The world's population is increasing by 90-100 million every year, and it may double during the next half-century, with most of the added population coming from developing countries. 700 million people are malnourished and 40,000 die of hunger and hunger-related diseases each day. Most of the developing countries are extremely dependent on their renewable resource base to sustain their economic activities. Therefore, environmental changes and the loss of resources has dire implications for developing countries. This includes loss of arable land and lack of water, which lead to decreased food production. An area of about 1.2 billion hectares (almost the size of China and India taken together) has endured modest to severe soil degradation since World War II because of human activity. Air pollution can also directly affect crop production, lowering crop, wheat, soybean, and peanut harvests in the US. Rapid climate change triggered by the greenhouse effect would also inflict disproportionately more suffering on developing countries. The rise in sea levels caused by climatic change may severely affect densely populated coastal areas in China, Egypt, and Bangladesh. The loss of living space and livelihood could lead to the migration of people as it has happened throughout human history. The definition of environmental migrants is controversial and the other terms used include environmental refugees, ecological refugees, and resource refugees. Economic migrants are those who move to economically affluent regions responding to both the push and pull factors. In contrast, environmental migrants are forced to move--as a result of the loss of livelihood and space--to the nearest possible location. The scarcity induced by environmental migration may lead to acute conflict at three levels in the developing society: state vs. state (large-scale trans-border migration may trigger armed conflicts); state vs. group (rapid urbanization); and group vs. group (nativism).     

Privileged Exclusion in Post-Soviet Kazakhstan: Ethnic Return Migration,Citizenship, and the Politics of (Not) Belonging

This article explores issues of citizenship and belonging associated with post-Soviet Kazakhstan’s repatriation programme. Beginning in 1991, Kazakhstan financed the resettlement of over 944,000 diasporic Kazakhs from nearly a dozen countries, including Mongolia, and encouraged repatriates to become naturalised citizens. Using the concept of ‘privileged exclusion’, this article argues that repatriated Kazakhs from Mongolia belong due to their knowledge of Kazakh language and traditions yet, at the same time, do not belong due to their lack of linguistic fluency in Russian, the absence of a shared Soviet experience, and limited comfort with the ‘cosmopolitan’ lifestyle that characterises the new elite in this post-Soviet context.     

Eastward bound: A case study of post-soviet labour migration from a rural Ukrainian town

This case study uses ethnographic interviews and survey data to explore temporary work migration from Komsomolsk, a rural town in central Ukraine. At the time of the Soviet collapse, experts expected temporary work migrants to orient toward labour markets in Western Europe but our data show that in 2002 the majority of temporary migrants made trips to Russia and parts of the former Soviet Union from Komsomolsk. Women were less likely than men to engage in temporary work migration, yet those women who did migrate for work were more likely to migrate west. Men, particularly older, ethnically Russian men, sought work in the east. Ethnographic data indicate language skills and knowledge of the Russian labour market influenced migrants' choice of destination. Social contacts, such as recruiters from Russian construction firms, helped to bring Ukrainian workers east. Survey data show that younger ethnic Russians and ethnic Ukrainians from all age groups were more likely to seek work within the country or in Western job markets than in Russia.     

Iraqi Refugees in Syria: causing a spillover of the Iraqi conflict?

This article explores the implications of the Iraqi refugee crisis for Syria, which is believed to host up to 1.5 million Iraqi refugees. Many policy makers, activists and analysts, sometimes inspired by the conflict repercussions of refugee crises witnessed elsewhere, have warned against the regional security impact of the Iraqi exodus and consequently speculated about a possible spillover of the armed conflicts in Iraq to its neighbours. The article presents an analysis of the characteristics and composition of the Iraqi refugee population and provides an assessment of responses to the refugee crisis in Syria. Its main finding is that fears for a spillover of Iraq's violence cannot be corroborated. The relative absence of refugee violence can be explained in reference to Iraqi refugees themselves. Given their specific demographic and social traits (including age composition, educational levels and professions, and to some extent religious affiliation), in addition to refugees' sectarian segregation, an overwhelming majority of Iraqi refugees are and remain victims of the violence in Iraq; they are unlikely to become its perpetrators abroad. In this sense the Iraqi refugee crisis constitutes a strong reminder that, in order to assess the propensity of violence among refugees and their purportedly contagious impact on their places of refuge, an understanding of the causes of their flight and their roles in the conflict they are fleeing is essential. It is finally argued that security challenges are likely to come from a different source. Socioeconomic destitution among refugees and the failure to provide adequate humanitarian assistance and protection are and will be causing tensions between them and the host state and host communities.     

Migration trends in Central Eurasia: Politics versus economics

The post-Soviet ethnic migration wave was quickly followed by the contraction of population territorial mobility. The growing role of socioeconomic factors in defining the character and intensity of migration flows, including the expansion of temporary, labor and undocumented migration, has been especially pronounced.These changes indicate the evolving relationship between migration and conflicts developing in Central Eurasia. Initially as an indicator of ethnic tensions and discrimination of minorities, migration is becoming a mechanism of market transition, providing for the economic survival of population under crisis conditions. With the depletion of the number of ethnic Russian migrants, the influx of ethnic aliens, moving primarily from Central Asia and the Transcaucasus to Russia, is increasing in importance.The present paper discusses the impact of new migration flows on the economies, welfare mechanisms, financial systems, labor markets, and societies of Central Eurasia. Special attention is given to the governmental response to migration phenomenon—from labor migration criminalization to attempts to stimulate the flow of specific migrant groups.     

Nationhood and the minority question in Central Asia. The Russians in Kazakhstan

This article aims to present the situation of the Russian minority in Kazakhstan and to stress the political, social and identity evolutions in this country since independence in 1991. It develops three main points: the non-homogeneous nature of Russians in Kazakhstan; the development of non-ethnic allegiances that could explain the failure of the local Russian political parties; and the difficulties the leaders have in choosing between the defence of the political rights and the cultural rights of the country's first minority. In order to examine these issues, this article focuses on a series of issues: the place of the national question in the Kazakh public debate; the process of linguistic and ethnic Kazakhisation; the political activities of the Russian minority; the Cossack issue and the stakes of autonomist claims; and, finally, the issue of emigration and the narrative of the ‘return’ to Russia.     

Russian Economic Nationalism during the First World War: Moscow Merchants and Commercial Diasporas

While accounts of the end of the Ottoman and Hapsburg empires have often stressed the rise of Turkish and German nationalisms, narratives of the Romanov collapse have generally not portrayed Russian nationalism as a key factor. In fact, scholars have either stressed the weaknesses of Russian national identity in the populace or the generally pragmatic approach of the government, which, as Hans Rogger classically phrased it, “opposed all autonomous expressions of nationalism, including the Russian.” In essence, many have argued, the regime was too conservative to embrace Russian nationalism, and it most often “subordinated all forms of the concept of nationalism to the categories of dynasty and empire.” Recently, two authors have challenged the predominantly pessimistic portrayals of the extent of Russian national identity in late imperial Russia, focusing on peasant responses to the First World War. Scott Seregny makes a strong case that while peasants may not have been full “Russians” by 1914, the spread of politics and literacy to the countryside through the zemstvos was rapidly integrating peasants into a broader civic identity. Josh Sanborn argues that even though responses were varied and in fact protest against the war quite frequent, the important thing is that both positive and negative responses were expressed within a single national political framework and discourse. In response, S. A. Smith grants that the war strengthened rather than weakened national identity, but thinks Sanborn and Seregny underestimate the degree to which nation, empire, and class pulled in different directions from 1916, concluding that “by the summer of 1917, politics had become polarized between an imperial language of nation, used mainly by the privileged and educated strata, an anti-imperial language, used mainly by the elites of the non-Russian nationalities, and a language of class, used mainly by the subaltern classes.”     

Forced migrant “compatriots” from Ukraine: Accessing legal residency and citizenship in the Russian Federation

This paper examines the Russian migration and citizenship regime as encountered by forced migrants from Ukraine who fled to Russia during the period of 2014–2016. Based on legal and other official documents, media articles, and interviews, it gives an account of these migrants’ reception in Russia in theory and practice. Russia made great efforts to accommodate them, and in Russian media they were often spoken of as an easily integrated labor resource and as potential citizens. In 2015–2016, around 165,000 Ukrainians acquired Russian citizenship. While ethno-cultural similarity does privilege Ukrainian migrants in Russia, full asylum has been granted sparingly, and citizenship is not unconditionally granted. As this paper shows, Russian authorities have rather tried to control and distribute these forced migrants for the benefit of the state, according to principles of selectivity and economic interests – giving privileged access to permanent residency and citizenship to working-age people willing to settle in regions where population growth and more workers are deemed necessary. However, permanent residency and citizenship are also available to those able to circumvent or pay their way through the obstacles encountered – taking advantage of the flexibility inherent in a system that is not totally consistent.     

Anticipating demographic superiority: Kazakh thinking on integration and nation building

"In order to understand and to forecast what kind of nations will take shape in the new states of the former Soviet Union it is important to focus on the express objectives and actual strategies of the nation builders.... In this article I will concentrate on the ideological aspect, that is, on official and semi-official statements outlining the idea of ?the Kazakhstani nation', as Kazakhstani nation builders would like to see it develop." Particular attention is given to the changes in the ethnic composition of the country due primarily to the different demographic characteristics of the main ethnic groups that make up the population, the ethnic Kazakhs and Russians, and to the political implications of the growth of the Kazakhs from a minority to a majority ethnic group.     

Migrants,refugees and foreign policy: prevention and intervention strategies

The authors discuss policy development options to deal with migrants and refugees to developed countries. "Our principal argument--perhaps to state the obvious--is that international migration and refugee movements are foreign policy, not simply domestic, issues. Nevertheless, citizens and policy makers are all too often unaware that if they want to secure their borders against unwanted population flows, this cannot be done simply by unilateral decisions to regulate entry." The focus is on Germany and the United States.     

Changing perception of homeland for the Kazakh diaspora

There is a sizable Kazakh diaspora living in Turkey and Europe. Since their initial migration, these Kazakhs have been involved in actions aiming to preserve their group's cultural and ethnic boundaries. By studying these actions and related discourses, this article seeks to explain how these groups formulated and reformulated their identities and loyalties in their host states over generations. Many Kazakhs in Turkey and Europe originally came from Eastern Turkestan (Xinjiang) and considered this area their homeland. However, Kazakhstan's independence in 1991 led to an important change in their homeland orientation and, after 1991, the activities of an increasing number of Kazakh diaspora organizations shifted toward Kazakhstan as the homeland. Therefore, this article focuses mainly on two periods: the period before and the period after Kazakhstan's independence. The fieldwork was conducted in Turkey, Germany, France, and the Netherlands and includes interviews with leaders of Kazakh diaspora organizations and other members of the diaspora.     

Neither Here Nor There

Abstract

Since 1917 all Puerto Ricans, whether island- or mainland-born, are United States citizens. Physical proximity and relatively affordable transportation encourages Puerto Rican migration to the mainland United States. Puerto Rican migration takes three forms: the “one- way migrants,” who move permanently to the mainland; the “return migrants” who migrate to the mainland but after many years return to the island and reestablish residence; and the “circular migrants” who migrate back and forth between the island and the mainland spending substantial periods of residence in both places. The following analysis emphasizes the conditions that instigate the departure of Puerto Rican migrants from both the island and the mainland, and discusses the implications of Puerto Rican circular migration for social work and the provision of social welfare programs and services.     

Asylum Seekers Along the U.S.-Canada Border

Abstract

Given the large numbers of people fleeing their homelands, social workers are likely to encounter refugees from all over the world. Although the social work profession has a mandate to work with disenfranchised populations, limited attention has been paid to providing services to refugees. Residents of the largest refugee shelter in the U.S. were interviewed about their claims. These findings can help social workers understand the situations refugees come from as well as processes they go through in applying for legal status. With this information, it is possible to identify roles social workers can play with this vulnerable population.     

Internal migration in Turkey: Socioeconomic characteristics by destination and type of move, 1965–70

Based on examination of internal migration in Turkey during the 1965-70 period, the demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of migrants and the variation in these properties by type of move undertaken (first, repeat, and return migration) and by choice of destination are described. The volume, rates, and differentials of migration are discussed in this context. A very rapid rural-urban migration occurred in the 1950-70 period; urban population increased from 18.8 to 35.8% of the total. The emphasis on industrialization, the mechanization and relatively slower growth of agricultural production, the scarcity of new lands to cultivate, and the construction of a large road network connecting cities with their hinterland and rural communities contributed to this increased movement. The 1970 Turkish census questionnaire included a question on "place of usual residence 5 years ago" for the 1st time. Along with information on place of birth and usual residence in 1970, the census provides information on place of residence at 3 points in time. The study is based on a 1/1000 sample selected from the household records of the 1970 Population Census of Turkey. Discussion is restricted to the migration of the adult population; the migration of children (up to age 15), which is viewed as involuntary is excluded. The working file contains 20,602 cases. Variables analyzed include age, sex, education, labor force status, occupation, and place of residence in 1970. The migration-defining variables are province of birth and usual residence in 1965 and 1970. Census data indicated that 9.2% of the population 15 years of age and older changed their place of residence during the 1965-70 period, moving to another province. An additional 4% moved to another place within the same province. There were strong indications of stage migration, if movements both within and between provinces are considered. All urban places showed population grew through intraprovincial migration. Only large metropolitan cities have grown through interprovincial migration. Migrants from rural areas 1st move to towns and cities within the same province and then make a 2nd move to other, mostly larger, urban areas and metropolitan cities. The majority of the interprovincial migrants (60%) were interurban movers, and only 1/5 were rural to urban migrants. +a large group of repeat migrants who moved primarily between urban places, were relatively older, better educated and skilled, and more likely to be employed in white-collar occupations than their counterparts. Although interprovincial migration was dominated by young and single males, there was considerable variation in migrant properties according to the type of move made and the place of destination. Socioeconomic characteristics of the 2 basic migration types are included.     

Immigration: perspectives from receiving countries

The author examines the issue of international migration from the standpoint of receiving countries. He attempts "to understand how and why migrant-receiving countries respond as they do, and to suggest some of the new issues in international migration that arise in a world in which the supply of would-be migrants and refugees is now greater than receiving countries are willing to accept."     

The Great Game Revisited: Three Empires Collide in Chinese Turkestan (Xinjiang)

During the second half of the nineteenth century, British and Russians fought, sometimes violently, in an Asian front that ranged from the Caucasus Mountains to the west to China's Xinjiang Province to the east. This rivalry, known as the Great Game, nearly erupted into a full-scale war in 1885. Following the Russian Revolution and Civil War, the rivalry between the Soviet Union and Great Britain re-emerged. This article describes the Anglo–Soviet rivalry in troubled, war-torn Xinjiang during the 1920s and 1930s, a time when Britain was a declining power and the Soviet Union a new ascendant power.     

Counting the Soviet Union’s War Dead: Still 26–27 Million

Abstract

How many Soviet citizens died because of World War II? A new estimate of the Soviet war dead is 42 million. This figure, from Russian historian Igor’ Ivlev, is at least 15 million more than the 26–27 million previously estimated by Russian demographers Andreev, Darskii and Khar’kova and widely accepted for a quarter of a century. I consider the implications of the two estimates for the Soviet demographic accounts, contrast their sources and methods, and conclude that the new figure lacks substantial foundations. On existing knowledge, the best estimate of Soviet war dead remains 26–27 million.     

The third wave: mixed migration from Zimbabwe to South Africa

Migration from Zimbabwe has recently been described as an archetypal form of “mixed migration” in which refugees and migrants are indistinguishable from one another. This paper argues that such a state-centred understanding of mixed migration oversimplifies a far more complex reality and fails to adequately account for the changing nature of Zimbabwean out-migration. Based on data from three separate Southern African Migration Programme (SAMP) surveys undertaken in 1997, 2005 and 2010 at key moments of transition, the paper shows how the form and character of mixed migration from the country has changed over time. The country’s emigration experience since 1990 is divided into three periods or “waves”. The third wave (roughly from 2005 onwards) has seen a major shift away from circular, temporary migration of individual working-age adults towards greater permanence and more family and child migration to South Africa. Zimbabwean migrants no longer see South Africa as a place of temporary economic opportunity for survival but rather as a place to stay and build a future for themselves and their families.     

Higher education and peacebuilding – a bridge between communities?

As the Syrian civil war enters its fifth year, with over four million refugees and no solution in the near future, the international community must better consider long-term planning in regards to the plight of refugees and services to support them, not just short-term emergency responses. Critically, higher education is all too often ignored when addressing refugee crises, pushed aside in favor of primary education, and effectively disempowering those best suited to eventually rebuild and reconstruct after war’s end. This paper examines the often less considered aspect of refugee access to higher education, using Duhok, located in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, as a case study, and hypothesizing that refugees’ inclusion in Duhok’s local higher education system can serve as an invaluable peacebuilding tool, bridging host and refugee communities, while empowering refugees to promote peacebuilding and development. We chose to focus on higher education because we agree with the idea espoused by Watenpaugh, Fricke, and Siegel that ‘university graduates … include Syria’s brightest and most ambitious young people … the human capital that will be critical to the rebuilding of Syrian society after the conflict has ended’. This study investigates Duhok area residents’ perceptions of the Syrian refugee crisis and the refugee population, refugees’ attitudes toward the host community and higher education, and personal views regarding intergroup relationships and the role of higher education, drawing primarily on field research conducted in 2013. Approached as a qualitative study, field research was conducted by a two-person team, with members representing the University of Duhok and New York University, and with the aim of actively working with research participants in the hopes of generating policy-related and practical recommendations.     

The Fortress and the Frontier: Mobility,Culture, and Class in Almaty and Astana

As the seat of the Kazakh government and a booming city since 1998, Astana has attracted hundreds of thousands of migrants. As a cultural and financial capital, Almaty has also continued to boom, drawing comparable numbers of migrants from different regions of Kazakhstan. However, varying historical trajectories and historically constructed notions of the urban and rural, as articulated by the cultural elites and policy-makers, as well as different preparedness of the government for migration flows in the 1990s and the 2000s in Almaty and Astana respectively, have resulted in quite diverse attitudes toward mobility and different perceptions about how urban order should be achieved.