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1.
Following the collapse of the old communist regimes, 28 post-communist countries chose from among three main foreign security arrangements: commonwealth of independent states (CIS)/collective security treaty organization (CSTO) membership, north atlantic treaty organization (NATO) membership, or neutrality. What explains these choices? We are most interested theoretically in the role played by regime type. The alliances literature typically uses a narrow institutional theory of the effects of regime type, which implies that more democratic regimes are more attractive alliance partners than more authoritarian regimes. Post-communist area specialists will be aware that this institutional theory fails to explain the apparent tendency of more authoritarian post-communist regimes to join the CIS/CSTO. We develop a broader ideological theory of how regime type affects alliances, in which political institutions are complemented by substantive ideological and policy goals. Applying the ideological approach to the post-communist world, we define and measure two main ideological regime types – liberal nationalist regimes and neo-communist authoritarian regimes. Multinomial logit regressions indicate that more democratic, liberal nationalist regimes are more likely to affiliate with NATO, whereas more authoritarian, neo-communist regimes are more likely to join the CIS/CSTO. Moreover, the desire of neo-communist authoritarianism regimes to affiliate with the CIS/CSTO is as strong or stronger than that of neo-liberal democracies to affiliate with NATO – largely because NATO is more reluctant than Russia to accept aspirants. We conclude that the ideological approach to regime type may offer significant explanatory value as a refinement of the institutional approach.  相似文献   

2.
    
Since the collapse of Communism, Russia and some other post-Soviet states have attempted to pursue socioeconomic reforms while relying upon the political institutions of neopatrimonialism. This politico-economic order was established to serve the interests of ruling groups and establish the major features of states, political regimes, and market economies. It provided numerous negative incentives for governing the economy and the state due to the unconstrained rent-seeking behavior of major actors. Policy reform programs revealed these institutions to be incompatible with the priorities of modernization, and efforts to resolve these contradictions through a number of partial and compromise solutions often worsened the situation vis-à-vis preservation of the status quo. The ruling groups lack incentives for institutional changes, which could undermine their political and economic dominance, and are caught in a vicious circle: reforms often result in minor returns or cause unintended and undesired consequences. What are the possible domestic and international incentives to reject the political institutions of neopatrimonialism in post-Soviet states and replace them with inclusive economic and political ones?  相似文献   

3.
    
Autocracies in developing countries are more likely to collapse during economic crises. Some influential works and popular media extend this argument to oil-rich autocracies, but cross-national empirical studies find little evidence to support this view. Yet, while the causes of their stability during boom periods are well understood, how oil-rich autocratic regimes remain stable during busts is underexplored. This article advances an explanation that refines and complements existing accounts. I argue that we need to take into account three interrelated factors that currently are likely to stabilize oil-rich autocracies: considerable savings, policy learning, and sustenance of coercive capacity. Leveraging evidence drawn from 40 original interviews, documents, news media, and academic literature, I investigate the role of these factors through a comparative case study of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan during the 2008 global economic turmoil. The findings highlight the ruling elites’ ability to amass sizeable savings that later provide safety cushions, to update their know-how through drawing lessons within and beyond fiscal policy, and to sustain coercive capacity without resorting to overt repression. Through economic crises, they may learn to not escape the “resource curse,” but to escape despite the “resource curse.”  相似文献   

4.
    
For decades Singapore’s ruling elite has sought to legitimate its rule by claiming to be a talented and competent elite that has made Singapore an exception among its neighbours – an exemplar of success and progress in a sea of mediocrity. In this article it is contended that this basis of legitimation has been irreversibly damaged. In essence, it is suggested that the governing People’s Action Party has lost control of the national narrative, and its achievements are increasingly regarded as being “ordinary” by the electorate. The mystique of exceptionalism, which was the basis on which the government was widely presumed to be above the need for close scrutiny and accountability, has collapsed. This collapse has substantially levelled the political playing field, at least in terms of expectations and assumptions. The government can and probably will continue to win elections and rule through its control of the instruments of institutional power, but the genie of scepticism and accountability has been released from its bottle, and it is hard to see how it can be put back in. This fundamentally changes the condition of Singapore politics: the narrative of exceptionalism is dead and the Singapore elite finds itself struggling to cope in a new and critical political environment.  相似文献   

5.
    
The 2015 elections in Ethiopia had a predictable outcome, showing an entrenched system of one-party dominance that self-referentially enacts the political order created by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) since 1991. EPRDF spokespersons continued to defend the party’s hegemony as inevitable, grounded in a logic of technocratic authority and with reference to ‘stability’ and ‘development’. This paper describes the electoral process not in the light of democracy theory but of hegemonic governance theory. Elections seem to have lost relevance in Ethiopia as a means of political expression and are only important as a performance of hegemonic governance and as ‘global impression management’ – showing state skills in securing a smooth electoral process as a major organisational feat in itself. Contradictions that the political process creates between the Ethiopian party-state and domestic constituencies, and between the attitudes/policies of certain donor countries, are downplayed or avoided, but problematic in the long run.  相似文献   

6.
    
This paper examines the consolidation and maintenance of hegemonic authoritarianism in post-Soviet Azerbaijan. Hegemonic regimes are characterized by their nearly total lack of political competition. Despite the presence of opposition parties and regular elections, the incumbent in these cases is reelected with 70% or more of the vote. What does it take to sustain overwhelming margins of victory in regular elections in the face of institutionalized opposition? Previous studies have suggested that either violent repression or institutionalized co-optation of opposition groups is central to securing long-term hegemonic regime stability. These mechanisms explain how rulers forestall potential opposition. Upon coming to power in 1993, however, Heydar Aliyev – like many post-Soviet leaders – inherited a genuine, existing opposition in the Popular Front movement. I suggest that in the presence of an intractable opposition, Azerbaijan's rulers have taken a different approach with regard to regime maintenance. Drawing on over 50 original interviews conducted during 6 months of field research, I identify the mechanisms by which the government has “hidden the opposition in plain sight” by making it effectively difficult for existing opposition groups to function as credible political parties. Since the mid-1990s, the Aliyev regime has used informal measures to prevent these groups from aggregating and articulating the diverse interests present in society from visibly competing in elections and from serving effectively in government to craft and implement policy. These practices have rendered the opposition technically legal, but completely ineffective. Besides weakening the opposition, these measures produce a series of mutually reinforcing effects – including noncompetitive elections by default and a politically disengaged society – that sustain long-term regime stability. The paper concludes by examining this argument in comparative perspective. Hegemonic regimes have proliferated in the post-Soviet region, and I suggest that this strategy is an important factor in sustaining many of these regimes.  相似文献   

7.
    
The concept of accountability enjoys wide and growing appeal, its advocates submitting both normative and functional arguments for institutions limiting discretionary powers of political and economic elites. This development is seen as facilitative of democratisation, especially in post-authoritarian societies. Yet it has gone almost unnoticed that not all authoritarian regimes have dismissed accountability reform and some are adopting reforms in its name. This article contrasts the patterns in Malaysia and Singapore on a specific accountability institution – human rights commissions – offering explanations for why the former has established one and the latter not. It is argued that intra-state conflicts associated with Malaysian capitalism have created pressures and opportunities for accountability reform not matched in Singapore where there is a more cohesive ruling elite. Moreover, the PAP's acute ideological emphasis on meritocracy concedes no space for horizontal political accountability.  相似文献   

8.
Why do some countries with presidentialist constitutions feature more political closure than others at a given time? A quantitative study of post-Soviet countries since independence finds that much of the observed variation in political closure reflects timing, or the particular point at which a country happens to be within a regime cycle, rather than structural or other factors usually cited to explain regime change. Specifically, how much time a president has had to coordinate rivalrous networks around his or her authority is at least as strong a predictor of the level of regime closure as are economic development, economic growth, resource rents, proximity to Europe, and key cultural factors, even when controlling for the level of closure in the preceding year. This pattern is not found among countries with divided-executive constitutions, indicating it is related to the constitution rather than a general phenomenon.  相似文献   

9.
    
ABSTRACT

Democracy is backsliding throughout Southeast Europe but there are no signs of full democratic breakdown. Instead, political parties and their leaders incrementally undermine challenges to governmental authority while keeping electoral contest largely intact. This article introduces a special issue that aims to examine and explain democratic decline by looking at the prevalence of illiberal politics across countries and issues. In order to overcome the limitations of fixed regime classification we adopt a procedural lens and look into governing practices that gradually tilt the electoral playing field. Utilizing the concept of Illiberal politics allows us to examine sets of policies enacted by political parties in government with the aim to remain in power indefinitely. By tracing democratic decline in Serbia, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Albania, and Croatia we observe different patterns of weakness, but also common causes arising from weak institutions and inherited governance practices that preserve executive dominance, patronage, and informality.  相似文献   

10.
This article presents the results of a historical research on the creation of the Swiss Political Science Association in 1959. A first attempt of creation had failed eight years before, despite a favourable international context and the important scientific work of Marcel Bridel. Although Bridel was supported by several leading figures of the early political science, his proposal was met by the hostility of his colleagues, who had a historical, philosophical or juristic background. On the other hand, a few years later Jacques Freymond managed to create the Association in an almost administrative way and without any scientific discussion. The contrast between these two attempts illustrates the ambivalence of the institutionalisation process of Swiss political science since 1959. The institutional logic was more important during the creation of the Association than the scientific dimension, but has nonetheless been a useful basis to promote further scientific efforts. This initial ambivalence has had durable effects on the discipline, which obtained academic legitimacy without clearly taking position neither on its basic object, nor on its specificities with respect to the other social sciences or even ordinary discourses on politics. This has led to a disciplinary identity that is contingent, uncertain and fragile, and which calls for an epistemological reconsideration of the intellectual autonomy of political science.  相似文献   

11.
The response of the Nicaraguan government to the COVID-19 emergency is an extreme case of disease denialism. Such denialism is a major threat to public health, so understanding the sources of this attitude is paramount. Three explanations are offered: (a) the autonomous logic of a polarised political conflict; (b) an explanation based on an economic rationale; and (c) the regime's mystical and religiously-inspired discourse. The denialist response of the government is inexplicable without referring to the characteristics of the political regime, its political discourse and its recent developmental trajectories since the massive 2018 protests and the ensuing political conflict.  相似文献   

12.
    
The literature on regime shift suggests that Japan, and perhaps also Switzerland, have experienced a shift in their political systems. In this contribution, it is argued that both political systems underwent considerable change. However, this change did not represent regime shift in terms of a break with the past. Compared to other established democracies in the OECD country group, the changes to various aspects of the political systems have been similar in magnitude and type in both countries. Among OECD members, similar new elements have been layered on to stable cores of pre‐existing institutions, actor constellations and policies differing vastly in international comparison. Therewith, most countries moved in comparable directions without significantly changing their relative position within the group of established democracies  相似文献   

13.
    
This paper examines how, in post-Soviet Kazakhstan, both channels of elite and banal nationalism (such as sports and higher education) serve as instruments to promote the country. Through these channels, Kazakhstan is portrayed as an open, dynamic and successful country, an image which is in serious disjuncture with the authoritarian nature of the regime. Taking advantage of massive oil revenues, the government organized a significant OSCE general conference in 2010, while chairing the institution. In addition, it created the Astana professional cycling team, which rapidly became a world leader in the sport. Last but not least, Nazarbayev University, attracting prominent Western scholars, is now designed to make the country compete in the international arena of academic rankings. Domestic and international performances are thus treated as instruments to promote the legitimacy of the state at national and global levels. But this would not be possible without the help of individual actors who actively participate in this process. A close investigation shows that their social capital is based on global connections in various spheres (sports, finance and academia). This paper draws on evidence gathered through qualitative methods of enquiry (participant observation and semi-structured interviews). Finally, Astana is treated as a Latourian actor-network that has its own life and agency, thanks to the global association of various human actors and material objects.  相似文献   

14.
Two constitutional features frame Mexico’s arrival to democracy: the creation of credible electoral institutions and the preservation of rules corresponding to the authoritarian regime inherited from the decade of the ‘30s in the twentieth century. These two sets of rules clash with each other, a fact which explains the low levels of democratic governance and the low quality of legislation and public policies. The political debate over this contradiction seems to have reached the lowest point and several different alternatives have been formulated to break the deadlock; nevertheless, the necessary political agreements that may clearly define a political path have not been reached. The article describes these processes and lays out the alternatives in dispute as well as possible outcomes in the near future.  相似文献   

15.
ABSTRACT

President Erdo?an and the AKP government initiated a comprehensive restoration process immediately after the failed coup in mid-July 2016. In fact, the country has been experiencing a very comprehensive and violent regime transformation since this time. I assert that recent political developments paved the way for institutionalization of a ‘plebiscitary presidential regime’ that depends on a particular combination of supreme power of the leader, an extremely weak parliament, and elections of a plebiscitary character. In this context, the paper aims to shed light on the role of the new strategic legalism which allows rule of law to be replaced by a rule by law approach, the executive prerogative principle to be dominant, and the law to be used for demobilization, all playing a highly critical role in the suppression of democratic opposition.  相似文献   

16.
This article analyses the dominant patterns of political culture among West Africa's state elites in an attempt to understand what standards, beliefs and principles they cherish. We suggest that although there are significant differences across the region's states, the dominant political culture can be characterised as neopatrimonial, that is, systems based on personalised structures of authority where patron–client relationships operate behind a façade of ostensibly rational state bureaucracy. In order to explore these issues the article proceeds in four parts. After providing a definition of political culture and why it is an important topic of analysis, we examine the central characteristics of the political culture held by state elites in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) region. The section ‘The Nigerian factor’ briefly discusses some of the malign effects that this culture has had upon governance and political economy issues in the regional giant, Nigeria. The final section explores whether the region's elites are living up to their own claims that they are embarking upon a serious attempt to engage in state reconstruction or are instead simply searching for alternative ways to sell their more traditional concern with regime protection. We conclude that, without a fundamental recasting of the political culture guiding the region's elites, a security culture that prioritises democracy and human security is unlikely to emerge within ECOWAS.  相似文献   

17.
    
ABSTRACT

This paper aims to accomplish two goals. First, to present recent empirical evidence supporting the claim that Serbia is on the path towards embracing a more radical version of electoral authoritarianism. This is accomplished by examining most recent illiberal politics aimed at controlling electoral processes and the media sphere, and extracting public funds for partisan purposes. I claim that the incomplete design of democratic institutions in Serbia set up between 2001 and 2012 is primarily responsible for the democratic decline. The second goal is more general and aims to emphasize the importance of extracting public funds for hybrid regimes. Extractive institutions matter because they directly impact other critical segments of electoral authoritarianism (notably, elections and media freedom), but also because they explain the type of leadership they promote in politics. If public resources remain without proper institutional oversight and are simply ‘up for grabs,’ this will attract leaders more willing to dismantle democratic institutions and violate democratic procedures. Serbia serves as a good and current example of this linkage.  相似文献   

18.
Much of the recent academic literature that assesses democracy in Israel labels it either as incomplete or flawed, yet such literature employs minimal systematic analysis of how the state is actually governed. Since the 1990s, there has been a tendency to describe the Israeli political regime as an ethnocracy. This article argues that the term ‘ethnocracy’, when applied to Israel, has certain weaknesses and instead proposes the concept of ‘multicracy’ (multiformocracy) as a more appropriate term by which to describe Israel's political organization. It will demonstrate that existing Israeli democratic institutions do not control the state's policymaking in full and that several politically important processes are controlled or at least influenced by various other politically active forces. Whilst these forces can influence, stimulate, inhibit, and otherwise change governmental decisions and actions, they can be labeled as kratiae. While the capacity of Israel's democracy to govern is weak, these other kratiae can intervene in policymaking and the state's regime acts as democracy-dominated multicracy.  相似文献   

19.
新加坡:权威主义,还是精英民主?   总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2  
在新加坡的政党制度类型上,有些学者同意亨廷顿的观点,认为新加坡实行一党制,因此是权威主义国家.笔者不同意这种观点.本文从新加坡的政党制度是一党独大制入手进行研究,认为新加坡是有限民主国家,又由于新加坡在治国实践上奉行精英主义,因此认为它是精英民主国家.  相似文献   

20.
    
Can Switzerland still be seen as an extreme case of federal consensus democracy, as illustrated by Arend Lijphart (1999)? A reanalysis of Lijphart's study of the Swiss political system from 1997 to 2007 clearly demonstrates that a consensus democracy has emerged that bears strong tendencies toward adjustment and normalization of the original exceptional Swiss case to the rest of the continental European consensus democracies. Switzerland can be considered a typical, rather than extreme, case of consensus democracy.  相似文献   

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