The Spiritual Teacher and His Truants: The Influence and Relevance of Abu Mohammad al-Maqdisi

Abu Mohammad al-Maqdisi is one of the most important spiritual fathers of the ideology and movement that has come to be known as Salafi-jihadism. Based on primary source materials produced by al-Maqdisi and other important relevant actors at different times and places, this article shows how he developed the ideas that have influenced his disciples and protégés, most prominently Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi, the founder of Al Qaeda in Iraq and “godfather” of the Islamic State, and Turki al-Binali, the Islamic State's current Grand Mufti. It also explains how and why, in later years, his disciples turned against him and, despite his repeated efforts, refused to allow him to play the role of the “critical friend,” much less regain control of the movement. The article seeks to expose the intra-jihadist frictions and debates involving al-Maqdisi during different times and contexts, especially the more recent ones between him and Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. Indeed, it becomes obvious how al-Maqdisi has been trying to regain his lost influence and relevance among the most radical strands within his chosen movement for years. What this shows is that, amidst the fast-changing environment in which Salafi-jihadism has evolved, praxis trumps theory, and a reputation of steadfastness, zealousness, and unwavering convictions matter more to prospective radicals than a reputation of religious knowledge and scholarship.     

“Martyrdom is Life”: Jihad and Martyrdom in the Ideology of Hamas

This article analyzes the articulation of the doctrine of “Jihad of the Sword” and martyrdom by the Islamic Resistance Movement of Palestine, Hamas, as a central pillar of Palestinian identity and as a major source of political mobilization and national empowerment. As part of this concept Hamas presents martyrdom as the epitome of jihad and of Islamic belief. The end-goal of jihad is the destruction of Israel and the elimination of the Jews. By emphasizing the centrality of “Jihad of the Sword” Hamas's ideas reveal a certain similarity to, or inspiration by, radical Salafi-jihadist Islamic movements. While Hamas adopted a pragmatic approach on short-term tactics, these doctrines impose constraints on the scope of a profound ideological transformation it can undergo.     

Religious Basis for Islamic Terrorism: The Quran and Its Interpretations

Extreme religious interpretations of the Quran and the movement of Islamic Revivalism influence the emergence and progression of violent Jihad in contemporary times. Islamic “terrorists” are able to legitimize their movement as an act of violent Jihad permitted by the Quran essentially because of religious sanctions that permit the use of violence as an act of defense and to preserve the will of God in Islamic communities. The Quran systematizes this use and relates it to other aspects of the Shariat through its discourse on revivalism. Based on the Quranic principle of ijtihad, terrorists emphasize the Quran's tenets on violence and revivalism in their religious interpretations and present it as a legitimate premise for the use of excessive aggression. According to ijtihad Muslims can interpret and determine the extent of their Islamic practices individually as long as these are directed toward ensuring the will of God in an Islamic community. Thus terrorists use ijtihad to emphasize Quranic clauses that sanction the use of violent Jihad as a method ordained by God to preserve the Shariat in an Islamic community. The manner in which terrorists use ijtihad to contextualize geopolitical factors as a cause for violent Jihad is determined by their extreme interpretations of the Quran. These interpretations also determine the extent of violence used in a Jihad for religious amelioration. The religious legitimacy of this violence prevails until the cause and course of violent Jihad correlates with the Quran's discourse on violence and revivalism. In contemporary times an extreme interpretation of the movement of Revivalism ¹ 1. Refers to the contemporary movement of Islamic Revivalism. that is inspired by “revivalism” also provides an organized premise for Islamic terrorism. When implemented, this causes variations within specific geopolitical conditions and in different Jihadi groups. However a common understanding of religious doctrines determines the extent of Revivalism in Islamic communities because this movement relies heavily on the Quranic discourse for its existence. Thus, the religious basis for Islamic terrorism is primarily found when extreme interpretations of the Quran's tenets on violence and revivalism are directed toward obtaining an equally radical version of Revivalism in specific geopolitical conditions. In this manner, extreme Quranic and Revivalist interpretations ensure the ideological persistence of Islamic terrorism as a religious effort to preserve the will of God in an Islamic community. The aim of this article is to show the manner in which religion can cause the emergence of Islamic violence as it is known today. The discourse on Islamic violence and counterterrorism needs to be urgently studied given the numerous instances of violent Jihad in contemporary times. Many writings on Islamic violence and statements released after an act of Islamic violence allude to the impact of religion on violent Jihad, but they rarely explore it or present a premise for its existence. This exploration will be conducted based on research of the author's on the Kashmir crisis and the insurgency in it. Thus, examples from insurgency in Kashmir will be used on occasion to illustratively develop this argument. In his book The Clash of Civilizations, Samuel Huntington states that a theory must be causal and simple. Using the words of Thomas Kuhn, he explains that “to be accepted as a paradigm [it] must seem better than its competitors but it need not, and in fact never does, explain all the facts with which it can be confronted.” ² 2. Samuel Huntington, Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order (New Delhi: Penguin Books India, 1996), p. 30. Furthering such simplicity and exploration, will be the central effort of this discourse. The sources for this exploration will be mainly derived from theoretical and practical understandings of terrorism, Islamic religion and theology, and the movement of Islamic Revivalism. A comparison between Islam and other religions will not be presented when evaluating the impact of Islam on violent Jihad. It will essentially present religious premises for violent Jihad from a Muslim rather than non-Muslim or “Western” perspective; although it is accepted that parallels in the understanding of “violence” do exist in the Muslim and non-Muslim world. Non-Muslim perspectives on violence and terrorism are relevant and known to the author. However a perpetual emphasis on these factors or a failure to acknowledge them limits the scope of the study of Islamic terrorism itself. The aim will be to present an Islamic perspective on violent Jihad. Then, it is accepted that a complex interplay between religious understandings and geopolitical events influence the emergence of Islamic violence in contemporary times. Thereafter, it must be stated that extreme psychological and sociological factors intrinsic to the Jihadis influence the religious choices that cause violent Jihad. An analysis of these factors is outside the realm of this discourse, which remains political in its scope. Further, on occasion a lack of empirical data and non-circumstantial evidence is encountered to substantiate some contentions mentioned ahead. As it has been suggested previously ³ 3. Nancy C. Biggo, The Rationality of the Use of Terrorism by Secular and Religious Groups available at (http://www.dissertations.com), 2002. this is mainly because there is a dearth of such data and reliable evidence pertaining to religious terrorism. At certain points, it becomes difficult to validate external opinions mainly because of the right to individual interpretations vested by the Quran in all Muslims. The validity of these opinions is vested in the fact that they are taken from informed Muslims who practice moderate and radical interpretations of Islam. Any reader may be expected to believe that any kind of terrorism is unjustifiable. However, in order to address these movements effectively, they must be studied from all possible dimensions and especially from the cultural contexts from which they arise.     

Every Kingdom Divided Against Itself Will Be Ruined: A Reflection,a Deflection,and a Qualified Reinterpretation of the Global Jihad

Much analytical commentary implies that a generic West is the principal target of jihadist activism. This study contends that this is a misconception fostered by jihadist groups like Al Qaeda in order to accentuate their stature in the Islamic world and to obscure their true aims, which are first and foremost to secure the dominance of the Salafist interpretation of Islam. The analysis situates Al Qaeda in the tradition of Islamic reform movements and shows that a violent Sufi/Salafist conflict pervades nearly all current examples of strife within the Muslim world. In these conflicts, the role of the “West” is instrumental, not central to the struggle. Consequently, this study offers a qualification to notions of a “global jihad” and suggests this has important considerations for policymakers in determining the nature of the threat posed by Islamist militancy.     

Whole Soyinka and the Poetry of Isolation

This paper provides a glimpse of Islamic scholarship in Mirriah, Niger Republic, at a particular point in time, 1974–1975, before some of the latest currents of religious unrest erupted in West Africa. Through interviews with local scholars, it examines the degree to which they participated in a West African “core curriculum” shared with other Islamic scholars across the Sahel. It also explores the history of the malamai class in Mirriah, noting significant ties to the Bornu empire. Both the ruling dynasty and Mirriah itself also exemplify the process of “becoming Hausa”: people of diverse origins have come to define themselves as Hausa, adopting the Hausa language and the religion of Islam.     

Let's Play a Video Game: Jihadi Propaganda in the World of Electronic Entertainment

This article argues that video games have become a valid and increasingly significant means of jihadist digital propaganda. “Gaming jihad” has recently shown interesting alterations, mostly due to actions undertaken by the so called Islamic State and its cyber-partisans, which have discovered new ways of using this flexible and immersive medium. Similar to more conventional forms of its online propaganda, which have been imitated by other Islamist terrorist groups for years, the “Caliphate's” exploitation of electronic entertainment software may be a forerunner for the increased interest of other violent extremist organizations in this medium.     

Spain as an Object of Jihadist Propaganda

The purpose of this article is to look at the importance and treatment that Spain receives in jihadist propaganda. This study offers a series of empirical observations based on a content analysis of a sample of propaganda produced by jihadist groups between January 1994 and September 2008. The analysis of this material, the context in which it was spread, and a comparison with other Western countries leads to the conclusion that the role played by this country in jihadist propaganda can only be understood by taking into account “structural factors” that have little to do with a greater or lesser level of interference in “Islamic affairs.”     

(Gendered) War

Kurzman (2004) Kurzman, C. 2004. “Conclusion: Social movement theory and Islamic studies”. In Islamic activism: A social movement theory approach, Edited by: Wiktorowicz, Q. 289–303. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.  [Google Scholar] argued that social movements research and Islamic studies “followed parallel trajectories, with few glances across the chasm that have separated them.” This article will illuminate one influential process that has relevance to both these areas, the use of small groups for the purpose or radical mobilization. Specifically, it examines the impact of the use of small Islamic study groups (usroh and halaqa) for fundamental and radical Islamic movements. Although small-group mobilization is not unique to Islam, the strategic use of these study groups empowered by the Islamic belief system has yielded significant returns in capacity building for high-risk activism.     

Leadership and innovation in the administrative state

The field of public administration, as well as the social science upon which it is based, has given little serious attention to the importance of vigorous leadership by career as well as non-career public administrators. The field tends to focus on the rigidities of political behavior and the obstacles to change. To reclaim an understanding of the importance of individual leadership the author suggests the use of biography and life history. The behavior and personality of the entrepreneur is an especially helpful perspective on the connection between leadership and organizational or institutional innovation. The case of Julius Henry Cohen, who played a pivotal role in the development of the New York Port Authority, is used to illustrate the connection between the entrepreneurial personality or perspective and innovation.

In the social sciences—and especially in the study of American political institutions—primary attention is given to the role of interest groups and to bureaucratic routines and other institutional processes that shape the behavior of executive agencies and legislative bodies. In view of the powerful and sustained pressures from these forces, the opportunities for leadership—to create new programs, to redirect individual agencies and broad policies, and to make a measurable impact in meeting social problems—are very limited. At least this is the message, implicit and often explicit, in the literature that shapes the common understanding of the professional scholar and the educated layperson in public affairs.⁽¹⁾ For administrative officials, captured (or cocooned) in the middle—or even at the top—of large bureaucratic agencies, the prospects for “making a difference” seem particularly unpromising. In his recent study of federal bureau chiefs, Herbert Kaufman expresses this view with clarity:… The chiefs did not pour out important decisions in a steady stream. Days sometimes went by without any choice of this kind emerging from their offices … If you need assurance that you labors will work enduring changes on policy of administrative behavior, you would do well to look elsewhere. ⁽²⁾

There are, of course, exceptions to these dominant patterns in the literature. In particular, political scientists and other scholars who study the American presidency or the behavior of other national leaders often treat these executives and their aides as highly significant actors in creating and reshaping public programs and social priorities. ⁽³⁾ However, based on a review of the literature and discussions with more than a dozen colleagues who teach in political science and related fields, the themes sketched out above represent with reasonable accuracy the dominant view in the social sciences.

The scholarly field of public administration is part of the social sciences, and the generalizations set forth above apply to writings in that field as well.⁽⁴⁾ (Indeed, Kaufman's book on federal bureau chiefs won the Brownlow Award, as the most significant volume in public administration in the year it was published.) Similarly, the argument regarding scholarly writing in the social sciences can be extended to the texts and books of reading used in courses in political science and public administration; what is in the scholarly works and the textbooks influences how we design our courses and what messages we convey in class. The provisional conclusion here, then, is that in courses as well as in writings the public administration field gives little attention to the importance of vigorous leadership—by career as well as noncareer administrators. Neither does it give much attention to the strategies of leadership that are available to overcome intellectual and political obstacles which impede the development and maintenance of coalitions which support innovative policies and programs.⁽⁵⁾

The further implication is that students learn from what we teach, directly and indirectly. Students who might otherwise respond enthusiastically to the opportunities and challenges of working on important social programs learn mainly from educators that there are many obstacles to change and that innovations tend to go awry.⁽⁶⁾ And there the education often stops, and the students go elsewhere, to the challenges of business or of law. Those students who remain to listen seem to be those more attracted to the stability of a career in budgeting or personnel management. Public administration needs these people, but not them alone. If career officials should have an active role in governance and if the general quality of the public service is to be raised, does it not require a wider range of young people entering the service—including those who are risk-takers, those who seek in working with others the exercise of “large powers”?

Taken as a class, or at least in small and middle-sized groups, scholars in the fields of public administration and political science tend to be optimistic in their outlook on the world. Informally, in talking with their colleagues, they tend to convey a sense that public agencies can do things better than the private sector, and they sometimes serve (even without pay) on task forces and advisory bodies that attempt to improve the “output” of specific programs and agencies and that at times make some modest steps in that direction. Why, then, do public administration writings and courses tend to dwell so heavily on the rigidities of political behavior and the obstacles to change?

One reason may be our interest, as social scientists, in being “scientific.” We look for recurring patterns in the complex data of political and administrative life, and these regularities are more readily found in the behavior of interest groups and in the structures of bureaucratic cultures and routines. The role of specific leaders, and perhaps the role of leadership generally, do not as easily lend themselves to generalization and prediction.

Perhaps at some deeper level we are attracted to pathology, inclined to dwell on the negative messages of political life and to emphasize weakness and failures when the messages are mixed. Here, perhaps more than elsewhere, the evidence is impressionistic. ⁽⁷⁾

Some of the concerns noted above—about the messages conveyed to students and to others—have been expressed by James March in a recent essay on the role of leadership. He doubts that the talents of specific individual managers are the controlling influences in the way organizations behave. He, however, questions whether we should embrace an alternative view—a perspective that describes administrative action in terms of “loose coupling, organized anarchy, and garbage-can decision processes.” That theory, March argues, “appears to be uncomfortably pessimistic about the significance of administrators. Indeed, it seems potentially pernicious even if correct.” Pernicious, because the administrator who accepts that theory would be less inclined to try to “make a difference” and would thereby lose some actual opportunities to take constructive action.⁽⁸⁾

March does not, however, conclude that the “organized anarchy” theory is correct. He is now inclined to believe that a third theory is closer to the truth. Administrators do affect the ways in which organizations function. The key variable in an organization that functions well is having a “density of administrative competence” rather than “having an unusually gifted individual at the top.” How does an organization come to have a cluster of very able administrators—a density of competence—so that the team can reach out vigorously and break free from the web of loose coupling and organized anarchy? Here March provides only hints at the answer. It happens, he suggests, by selection procedures that bring in able people and by a structure of motivation “that leads all managers to push themselves to the limit. “⁽⁹⁾     

CACOPHONIES IN THE CONTEMPORARY CHORUS ABOUT CHANGE AT PUBLIC WORKSITES,AS CONTRASTED WITH SOME STRAIGHT-TALK FROM A PLANNED CHANGE PERSPECTIVE

The New Public Management (henceforth NPM) has coalesced into a movement in a short period of time, virtually worldwide. Thus, inter alia, we hear about the allegedly-new focus on the “customers” of public services, which are to be provided by “public intrapreneurs” as well as by cadres of employees at all levels who are “empowered.” And so on and on—through the conventional organizational litany including cross-training, total quality, performance measurement, and eventuating in strategic planning. These emphases make for a pleasing, even convincing, organizational libretto.

If the “chorus” proclaiming the NPM libretto is both ubiquitous as well as insistent, however, the chanting is often loosely-coupled, curiously directed, and at times even contradictory—at times so much so as to alert one's native cunning about what forces are really at work. Hence, the reference here to the “chorus” and also the “cacophonies” this essay detects in NPM's ardent vocalizing. This reflects our judgment that, in equal measure, NPM combines ubiquity, too much of some useful things, unreconciled diversities, and issues at sixes-and-sevens.

But this essay also urges that NPM can “walk its talk.” In effect, several emphases will at once help explain how NPM was all-but-predestined to experience serious shortfalls, as well as prescribe how NPM can rise about these limitations. Particular attention gets directed at appropriate guidelines interaction and structural arrangements.

Four emphases relate to these critical-cum-constructive ambitions. In preview, NPM 1. seldom even attempted detailing a useful approach to applications;

2. typically neglected systemic or millieu characteristics within which applications occurred;

3. usually did not specify a useful front-load in designs: i.e., training in values, attitudes, and interaction skills that would facilitate developing a “cultural preparedness” for appropriate applications; and

4. seldom specified supportive structural/managerial arrangements.

This essay proposes to do better.

This essay takes a direct if dual approach to describing the New Public Management “chorus” and its “cacophonies.” To begin, introductory attention goes to NPM as a “liberation” of theory and practice beyond the classic conservatisms of Public Administration. Then, four limitations of this NPM “chorus” will be detailed, and this quartet of “cacophonies” also implies ways to enhance NPM applications, as well as urges a stark warning against overselling.     

The Changing Security Agenda in Southeast Asia: Globalization,New Terror,and the Delusions of Regionalism

One of the distinguishing features of international terrorism the past fifteen years has been the resurgence and proliferation of terrorist groups motivated by a religious imperative. Such groups are far more lethal than their secular counterparts, regarding violence as a divine duty or sacramental act conveyed by sacred text and imparted by clerical authority. Moreover, religious terrorism is not restricted to Islamic terrorist groups exclusively in the Middle East. The same characteristics—the legitimization of violence based on religious precepts, the sense of profound alienation and isolation, and the attendant preoccupation with the elimination of a broadly defined category of “enemies”—are also apparent among American Christian white supremacists, among some radical Jewish messianic terrorist movements in Israel, and among radical Sikh movements in India. Finally, as many of these groups embrace strong millennialist or apocalyptic beliefs, we may be on the cusp of a new and potentially more dangerous era of terrorism as the year 2000—the literal millennium—approaches.     

A Dialectical Approach to Online Propaganda: Australia’s United Patriots Front,Right-Wing Politics,and Islamic State

Abstract

This article examines how the United Patriots Front (UPF), an Australian far-right organization, has communicated its ideology with reference to right-wing politics in Australia, Western Europe, and the United States, and through allusions to Islamic State. The investigation uses critical discourse and documentary analysis and a framework derived from the theory of Pierre Bourdieu to analyze textual and audiovisual postings on UPF Facebook pages, YouTube channels, and Twitter accounts. Relevant to the discussion are Bourdieu’s interdependent theories on “doxa” as a condition in which socially constructed phenomena appear self-evident, and “habitus” and “field,” which explain how structures and agents, through their reflexive behavior, become dialectically situated.     

Decisionism and action: changing perspectives in organization theory

The neglect of moral discourse in mainstream organization theory during the past four decades may be attributed to the dominance of the “decision,” popularized by Herbert Simon, as the field's primary unit of analysis. Underwritten by an epistemology derived from the logical positivists’ analytical distinction between value and fact, the idea of decision has come to be uncritically accepted as a morally neutral and empirically self-evident beginning point for organizational analysis. The ethnomethodological writings of Harold Garfinkel, coupled with insights from contemporary philosophy of language, radically challenge the value-fact distinction, pointing to an epistemology of everyday life in which value and fact are initially fused. The inherent fusion of value and fact provides the basis for an alternative epistemology for organization theory—termed the “action” or “process” perspective—which fundamentally alters the empirical understanding of organizational life and, consistent with the writings of Mary Parker Follett, enables the recovery of organization theory's moral center.

Commenting on the effects of technology on modern consciousness, Manfred Stanley has noted that:

Of all the upheavals of history and culture, it is difficult to imagine any of greater scope than the decline and fall not of some one vision of the good, but of the good itself. The rise of the notion that there is no such phenomenon as the good in the objective nature of things must be the most ironic anticlimax possible to centuries of bitter conflict between those who felt themselves empowered to define it.⁽¹⁾

For Stanley, the problem is not technology as such, but “technicism”: the implicit, even unconscious, belief that the humanly possible is synonymous with the technologically available. In technicist consciousness, technology is no longer a means for attaining the good, because “means” presupposes a prior moral or practical end in whose service that means is applied. Should any conception of the good be embraced at all, he argues, it ironically can merely be an artifact of what has been made available by technology.

Technicism has become the predominant attribute of modern consciousness, producing what William Barrett, speaking in a slightly different context, calls “the illusion of technique.”⁽²⁾

In the collective infatuation with technology, Barrett argues,

... we have come to regard it [technology] as the source for the discovery of human meaning. The tragic consequence of this is the inevitable alienation of man from himself and his estrangement from others. The irony of technicism to which Stanley alluded earlier may be summarized as a reversal of a familiar aphorism—invention has now become the mother of necessity—albeit one devoid of moral content.

Stanley sees the rise of technicism as concomitant with the emergence of liberal society, whose institutions have achieved coherence and legitimacy explainable in terms of three themes that have dominated Western thought since the seventeenth century. The first is the general desanctification or secularization of the political economy exemplified ... in the transformation of human skills and the earth itself into objective commodity resources for commercial production.⁽³⁾ The second theme is the ascendancy of the market principle as the chief basis of socioeconomic organization, wherein interests are privately held by individuals rather than shared by communities or other larger collectivities. Finally, there is the theme of pluralistic representation in political decision making, where the expression of individual (and group) interest is tolerated in the hope of achieving a balance among them.

Taken together these themes have produced a pervasive sense of nihilism in Western society insofar as they seem to exclude the possibility “of grounding collective standards of value priorities in anything more transcendent than the simplest shared utilities like power, wealth, and the security of one's immediate personal circumstances.”⁽⁴⁾

The consequence of the three themes of liberal society, profoundly abetted by technicist consciousness, is nothing less than the loss “of a sense of common human community in the West”⁽⁵⁾and also of the moral possibility of a common, transcendent good.     

Online as the New Frontline: Affect,Gender, and ISIS-Take-Down on Social Media

ABSTRACT

Using a dataset of more than 80 accounts during 2015, this article explores the gendered ways in which self-proclaiming Twitter Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) supporters construct community around “suspension.” The article argues that suspension is an integral event in the online lives of ISIS supporters, which is reproduced in online identities. The highly gendered roles of ISIS males and females frame responses to suspension, enforcing norms that benefit the group: the shaming of men into battle and policing of women into modesty. Both male and female members of “Wilayat Twitter” regard online as a frontline, with suspension an act of war against the “baqiya family.” The findings have implications for broader repressive measures against ISIS online.     

Out with the Old and … In with the Old? A Critical Review of the Financial War on Terrorism on the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant

ABSTRACT

The aim of this article is to critically consider the effectiveness of the “Financial War on Terrorism” on the funding streams of the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL). The article begins by identifying that the origins of the “Financial War on Terrorism” can be found in the international efforts to tackle money laundering. It then moves on to consider if the “Financial War on Terrorism” is able to tackle the funding streams of ISIL. The article concludes that the “Financial War on Terrorism” is no longer fit for the purpose to tackle the funding streams of ISIL.     

Exploring the “Root Causes” of Terrorism

This article attempts to clarify what is meant by “root causes” and considers if their analysis helps to explain and describe how, where, and why terrorism occurs. In attempting to explore—but not definitively resolve—these challenges, the article will attempt to delineate “root causes” into qualitative and quantitative variables that can be empirically tested in relation to contemporary terrorist activity. In so doing, it considers the relative merits of different methodologies for approaching “root causes.” The article concludes that indirect and underlying sources of conflict are significant to understanding specific incidents of terrorism and certain categories of terrorism; that “root causes” are less helpful in describing and explaining terrorism as a general phenomenon; and that root causes are of analytical use only in conjunction with precipitant factors.     

The “Forest Jihad”

Recent Al Qaeda threats and related jihadi propaganda potentially herald a new weapon in the terrorist arsenal: the deliberate setting of forest fires and other conflagrations both to terrorize society and wreck untold economic damage. Beyond the immense, new burdens that would be placed on emergency response personnel, these fires could also create grave environmental crises causing severe pollution from gases escaping into the atmosphere. The strategy of “Forest Jihad,” now being championed by Al Qaeda strategists, is supported and justified theologically by radical Islamic scholars. With this new weapon, the terrorists believe, maximum physical and financial damage can be inflicted to targeted countries at comparatively little risk.     

What Does the “Terrorist” Label Really Do? Measuring and Explaining the Effects of the “Terrorist” and “Islamist” Categories

Many scholars and practitioners claim that labeling groups or individuals as “terrorists” does not simply describe them but also shapes public attitudes, due to the label's important normative and political charge. Yet is there such a “terrorist label effect”? In view of surprisingly scant evidence, the present article evaluates whether or not the terrorist label—as well as the “Islamist” one—really impacts both the audience's perception of the security environment and its security policy preferences, and if yes, how and why. To do so, the article implements a randomized-controlled vignette experiment where participants (N = 481) first read one out of three press articles, each depicting a street shooting in the exact same way but labeling the author of the violence with a different category (“terrorist”/“shooter”/“Islamist”). Participants were then asked to report on both their perceptions and their policy preferences. This design reveals very strong effects of both the “terrorist” and “Islamist” categories on each dimension. These effects are analyzed through the lenses of social and cognitive psychology, in a way that interrogates the use of the terrorist category in society, the conflation of Islamism with terrorism, and the press and policymakers' lexical choices when reporting on political violence.