论我国内幕交易法律规制

本文以对内幕交易的构成及认定为切入点,分析了我国内幕交易的立法现状以及监管过程中存在的问题,并结合我国实际提出了加强内幕交易行为规制的建议。     

内幕交易若干问题浅析

近年来我国证券市场内幕交易行为屡屡发生,公司的高管频频"出轨",大量的内幕交易事件破坏了证券市场正常的交易秩序,也影响投资者的信心。本文从我国对内幕交易行为主体、内幕信息的范围特征及形成时间、获利数额等方面的规定来分析立法中的缺陷及实践中存在的问题,进而提出一些自己的观点,以期进一步促进我国相关立法的完善,维护证券市场的繁荣和稳定。     

内幕交易民事责任的立法完善

我国证券市场起步较晚 ,证券立法相应地也不完善 ,就内幕交易的法律规制而言 ,立法最不完善之处就是缺乏对受害人的民事救济。因此 ,加强内幕交易的民事责任研究 ,就成为现实的需要。一、内幕交易民事责任的立法现状内幕交易的民事责任主要是指由于内幕交易而给一般投资者及上市公司造成财产损失 ,内幕交易者所应承担的赔偿责任。纵观世界各国之证券立法 ,关于内幕交易民事责任的规定甚少。究其原因 ,不外乎两点 :一是证券交易中投资者多换手率高 ,难以证明谁是内幕交易的真正受害人 ;二是证券市场瞬息万变 ,难以准确计算内幕交易的损害赔偿…     

内幕交易、泄露内幕信息罪主体比较研究

各国都高度关注内幕交易,从逻辑上说,对证券内幕交易进行打击,首先要对内幕人员的合理范围进行法律界定。美国以内幕交易归责理论为理论基础追究内幕交易行为主体的法律责任,犯罪主体范围随归责理论的发展逐渐宽泛。我国禁止内幕交易的立法较晚,刑法理论界对内幕交易、泄露内幕信息罪主体是特殊主体还是一般主体存在争议,核心问题是我国对内幕交易主体的界定范围过于狭窄。     

禁止内幕交易立法理念转换及其体系效应——从反欺诈到市场诚信

基于反欺诈理念和市场诚信理念所建构的禁止内幕交易法律制度存在根本区别,前者注重保护投资者个人利益,后者则着眼于证券市场诚信的维护,进而导致二者在行为构成要件和法律责任设置等核心规则方面的重大差异。随着证券市场实践的深入发展,反欺诈立法难以克服的功能障碍和结构缺陷日益凸显,造成禁止内幕交易执法和司法实践面临诸多困境,故此逐渐为世界主要经济体所抛弃。顺应国际趋势,以市场诚信维护作为禁止内幕交易制度的立法理念并依此重构制度体系,或能实现逻辑自洽与体系完整,似为提升我国证券市场核心竞争力的应然选择。     

内幕交易规制的立法体系进路：域外比较与中国选择

内幕交易监管全球化背景下,当代世界各国规制内幕交易的立法体系可以归纳为信义进路与市场进路。信义进路的发展历史,就是一部不断拓宽信义义务人范围边界与判断其交易主观状态的历史;市场进路的发展历史,就是一部限缩或废除内幕交易认定的主体与主观要件与完善内幕交易客观构成要素的历史。中国资本市场内幕交易难以禁止的现实困境,实则是内幕交易行为构成体系逻辑混乱的一个映射,并已对内幕交易行为认定与责任追究构成妨碍。就内幕交易规制立法体系变革方向而言,我国目前不宜引入信义进路,而市场进路或许更适合我国法制传统和资本市场实际。在市场进路指引下,任何不当使用内幕信息的行为皆应被认定为内幕交易,废除现行法中关于内幕交易行为构成的主体要件和主观要件,同时完善客体要件和客观要件,既能推助内幕交易规制立法的功能实现,又可彰显证券法的核心宗旨和基本原则,或为契合本土实际并体现世界最新立法趋势的内幕交易立法改革方案。     

探析内幕交易民事责任的立法完善

本文通过对内幕交易民事责任立法意义的论证,在分析了内幕交易行为性质的基础上,结合国外立法的先进经验,对内幕交易民事责任中原被告的界定、归责原则的确立以及损失赔偿的计算等问题进行了探讨。     

证券、期货内幕交易刑法规制与评价

内幕交易(Insider trading)始称内幕人交易,后称知内情者交易.是指掌握内幕信息的人员利用内幕信息进行证券、期货交易,其目的是获取利益或减少损失.在证券、期货市场中,投资者的信心是市场的基石.内幕人员进行内幕交易获取暴力或避免自我损失,直接损害投资者的信心,影响市场的稳定,必须严惩.要惩罚内幕交易者,仅依靠民法、行政法的规制是不够的,必须加强刑事立法,用刑罚的手段进行规制,以保证证券、期货市场稳定,保证社会主义市场经济的顺利发展.本文通过对世界主要国家及我国关于证券、期货内幕交易刑事立法的介绍和比较,分析其特点,对其作出评价,为我国关于内幕交易的刑事立法和执法工作提供理论借鉴.     

中美内幕交易界定的比较研究

内幕交易可谓是证券市场上的"毒瘤",随着对其危害性认识的不断深入,各国纷纷立法对其加以规制。但如何准确界定内幕交易这一证券交易欺诈行为,对于各国监管者而言却非一件易事。通过对中美两国相关立法及判例的比较研究,要对内幕交易有一个准确的认识,至少应从内幕人员、内幕信息和内幕交易行为三个方面加以深入把握。     

试析构建我国内幕交易的民事赔偿制度

内幕交易作为一种危害证券市场的行为,是各国证券法律监管的对象。目前我国的证券立法还未建立起切实可行的内幕交易民事赔偿制度,难以维护证券投资者在遭受到内幕交易时的损失。本文试从内幕交易的实质要件和民事诉讼赔偿程序的构建两方面来进行分析,结合美国证券法律的相关规定,探讨我国内幕交易民事赔偿制度的建立。     

反内幕交易法的公平性基础——从内幕交易“无损害”假说谈起

内幕交易是否违反法律的公平 ,多有争议。内幕交易“无损害”是反对以法律方式禁止内幕交易的逻辑起点。本文在介绍无损害性假说并对之提出针对性的批判之后 ,循着“以人为中心的公平”的论证体系 ,对内幕交易的不公平性作了分析 ,为反内幕交易法的公平性基础提供了新的理论构架。     

证券内幕交易主体识别的理论基础及逻辑展开

在我国法律制度中,规定证券内幕交易主体的法律用语有"内幕信息的知情人"、"非法获取内幕信息的人"和"任何知情人",但主体范围并未清晰界定。内幕交易主体立法应以"信息平等理论"为基础、以"(任何)知情人"为统一立法用语、以"行为识别主义"为实践导向和主体类型化依据,其内在逻辑方为畅达,我国现行法律制度应据此作出修改。     

内幕交易犯罪识别路径研究:从发行人许可的“内幕交易”谈起

近年来,部分美国学者主张允许发行人许可的内幕交易,在我国执法环境中,上述行为大概率将被认定为具有行政违法性,但是否当然地引发对当事人刑事责任的追究则有待商榷。本文对我国内幕交易犯罪的法益识别理论进行了反思,主张根据以信义义务为基础的反欺诈理论对内幕交易中值得刑法保护的法益加以甄别。司法机关应当对内幕交易案件进行独立判断,在发行人许可并对特定内幕信息知情人参与交易的行为及时予以披露的情形当中,即便在超额收益与行为人所具备信息优势地位间存在可被证明的因果关系,因不存在对发行人和股东的欺诈,仍应考虑非犯罪化处理的可能。借此希望为司法实践提供一种有效、稳定且克制的裁判路径,缓解当前由行政机关把握内幕交易"入罪"节奏的实践难题。     

Insider trading and the public enforcement of private prohibitions: some complications in enforcing simple rules for a complex world

Accepting the argument made by Manne, Epstein and others that firms wishing to allow their employees to insider trade should be permitted to do so, this article shows that there is still a crucial role for government in regulating insider trading. In particular, allowing employees to profit by insider trading is a form of employee compensation that, in contradistinction from conventional forms of equity compensation, results in unknowable and effectively unlimited costs to the company. Since providing employee compensation in this form causes the company to lose control of its compensation expense, even if insider trading were legal, virtually every company would rely on conventional forms of employee compensation and prohibit its employees from insider trading. But, pace Manne, Epstein and others, companies lack the means to detect insider trading by their employees, and even when they do catch employees insider trading, companies can impose only mild contractual sanctions, generally not exceeding disgorgement of profits and dismissal. As a result, although an efficient agreement between a company and its employee would prohibit the employee from insider trading, this prohibition cannot be effectively enforced by the company. Government, with its usual law enforcement powers, is better able to detect insider trading and can impose more severe sanctions on violators, including criminal penalties. Government should thus enforce a ban on insider trading in those instances, which will be virtually all instances, in which a company prohibits its employees from insider trading. The efficient solution is thus a hybrid system of private prohibition and public enforcement. Such a system is not unusual but the norm. Employers prohibit employees from embezzling their money and stealing their property, and employees are subject to contractual sanctions and dismissal for violating these prohibitions, but we still need statutes against theft to generate an optimal level of deterrence. This is all the more true when the employee misappropriates information, which is much harder to detect than a theft of money or property.

     

内幕交易民事责任的价值平衡与规则互补——以美国为研究范本

内幕交易的民事赔偿责任不同于普通的侵权责任。如何应对内幕交易的民事诉讼、是否应对该类诉讼进行适当限制是各国制度建构所面对的共同问题,在此方面,美国的经验具有重要的借鉴意义。在内幕交易民事责任的追究中,存在着远非单一的多元价值,补偿投资者利益只是要实现的若干目标之一。制度构建的重要任务是要对相互冲突的价值目标进行恰当的协调和平衡,其中包括:威慑、监控内幕交易行为、保护投资者信心与防止滥诉、保护公司利益之间的平衡;补偿投资者损失与防止民事责任成为投资者保险之间的平衡;保护受害者诉讼权利与抑制过度诉讼之间的平衡等。同时,为实现法律的目标,内幕交易民事赔偿的各种法律规则之间需要功能的互补和相互的配合,包括刑事、行政、民事责任的互补配合,程序法和实体法的互补配合等。     

The Effectiveness of Insider Trading Regulation in Italy. Evidence from Stock-Price Run-Ups Around Announcements of Corporate Control Transactions

All developed countries and most emerging countries restrict insider trading in the belief that it may undermine investors' confidence and the integrity of financial markets.Such regulation, however, has proved to be relatively ineffective almost everywhere, as shown by the records on convictions in the last few decades and by the pervasiveness of insider trading signalled by stock-price run-ups around announcements of private information.Identifying illegal insider transactions may be difficult: the private information must be material, i.e. price-sensitive, and in some countries prosecutors have to prove the use of such information by corporate insiders. Moreover, the investigative powers of the enforcing Authority may be weak and the deterrence of criminal sanctions may be diminished by lengthy proceedings, especially when alternatives, such as administrative fines and civil actions, do not exist.To date, the Italian legal system has experienced great difficulty in detecting and punishing illegal insider trading. Since they were first enacted in 1991, the insider trading rules have led to two convictions and to a very low ratio of prosecutions to allegations of illegal trading. Moreover, leakage of private information appears to be widespread, given that news about firm-specific events seems to be incorporated in stock prices long before it is disclosed in public announcements.This paper examines the effectiveness of Italian insider trading legislation by focusing, among other things, on the stock-price run-up around announcements of corporate events. In particular, after a brief survey of earlier research on legal and illegal insider trading and on the most important weaknesses in the Italian legal framework, standard event-study methodology is used to analyse stock-price run-ups around 29 announcements of corporate control transactions in the period 1998–2000. Indicators of the leakage of non-public material information are then constructed, showing that securities prices follow similar patterns regardless of whether insider trading is likely to have occurred. This evidence raises questions as to the efficacy of Italian insider trading regulation and the paper concludes with some suggestions as to how it could be improved.     

Difficulties in the criminal prosecution of insider trading—A clinical study of the Bekaert case

If the enforcement of insider trading prohibition is of crucial importance to ensure the integrity of financial markets, then the current criminal prosecution in Europe fails in reaching this goal. This article illustrates several difficulties in prohibiting and prosecuting insider trading by using a clinical study of the Belgian industrial company Bekaert, NV. It is shown that courts currently seem to lack knowledge of the functioning of financial markets to assess an insider trading case. Therefore their decisions give little guidance to future litigants. Using, a law and economics framework, this clinical study is clarifying in several aspects compared to a traditional legal analysis. The analysis focuses on two aspects of an insider trading case. First, the price-sensitive character of the information is examined. Second, the standard of proof is examined. JEL classification G14 · K22 · K42     

韩国资本市场法上内幕交易规制研究

韩国通过制定、实施资本市场法,进一步完善了对内幕交易行为的规制力度。该法扩大了内幕人员和内幕信息的范围,强化和完善了对公开收购、大量取得或处分股份过程中的内幕交易行为的规制,完善和强化对内幕交易行为的民事、行政和刑事责任等。在我国完善证券法、期货交易法律、刑法等立法过程中,韩国资本市场法的许多规定和做法均值得我国借鉴。