论公众人物隐私权的让渡

隐私权作为公民重要的人格权,涉及的是公民隐秘的个人私生活,具有保密性和排他干涉性,应该给予法律的充足保护。但是,公众人物作为一个特殊的群体,其隐私权往往是与社会公共利益、社会公共讯息等息息相关的。本文试图通过对公众人物隐私权的分析,在公众人物隐私权让渡与保护中找到一个平衡点,以解决公众人物隐私权利益与社会公共利益的冲突问题。     

论公共视频监控系统对公民隐私权的影响

视频监控技术是一把＂双刃剑＂,它在给社会带来便利与安全的同时,也将在一定程度上影响到相关人的私生活,尤其是滥用公共视频监控信息必将构成对公民隐私权的侵害。本文从相关的基本范畴谈起,尤其结合中西方的相关法律规定,深入分析和探讨我国在公共场所安装、使用视频监控系统对公民隐私权的影响,     

公民隐私权的法律保护问题初探

隐私权，也称私生活秘密权，是指公民个人活动自由和控制个人生活秘密，排除他人非法干涉的权利。隐私权作为法学概念，最先由美国法理学家沃伦和布兰代斯于1890年在《哈佛法学评论》上发表的论文《关于私生活的权利》中提出。他们提出隐私权的概念和设想，认为是一个法律上的原则，可以用来保护公民个人的秘密免受大众化的新闻事业、摄影、记者或者其它现代设备拥有者录取景象或音响，或者将录音录像重播等行为的侵犯。到本世纪中期，这一理论被许多国家接受，隐私权的法律保护制度开始形成并发展起来。七十年代美国就制定了与保护隐私权有…     

我国隐私权的立法审视与完善

隐私权作为一种人格尊严权利,我国宪法与民法、刑法、行政法、诉讼法等法律都作出了保护性规定,并初步形成了以部门法尤其是民事保护为核心的权利保障体系.当下需要明确隐私权与名誉权、人格权之内在本质与差异,确立宪法上的隐私权以及保障机制,明确隐私权就是个人对私人领域内的各种隐私信息享有独享权与私生活不被非法或不正当侵扰的独处权的概念与基本内涵,从而才能有效地对隐私权予以保障与救济.     

司法保护视角下的隐私权类型化

隐私权作为抽象概念有利于保护新兴的隐私利益,但也因其内涵的概括性和外延的不确定性造成司法实践中法律适用的不安定和侵权责任的判定困难。类型化的分析方法具有划定隐私权的保护范围、区分隐私权具体类型、克服其不确定性弊端的功能。以司法案例为基础并厘清其选取范围后,以权利客体为主要标准将隐私权侵权类型分为侵犯私生活安宁、侵犯私生活秘密和侵犯个人一般信息,根据侵权行为、权利主体等要素再进一步划分下位类型,具体分析每一类型的判定基准和侵权责任,以期为立法完善隐私权保护体系奠定基础,为司法裁判隐私权案件提供参考。     

公民隐私权与知情权的冲突与平衡

一、隐私权的界定自从美国学者塞缪尔·D·华伦与路易斯·D·布兰帝斯在哈佛大学《法学评论》上发表的《隐私权》论文中首先使用隐私权(therightofprivacy)一词以来,得到了许多学者的赞同,但它的定义是什么,迄今为止却没有一致的定论,即使在最初承认隐私权的美国,也没有统一的说法。概括起来,学者们认同的隐私权都涉及这三个方面:(1)个人私生活情况,指个人日常生活、社交活动、夫妻间性生活等一切个人的、与公益无关的、私人不愿公开的活动和事实。(2)个人私生活领域,指个人居所、个人书包、旅客行李等私人空间。(3)个人数据资料,指有关个…     

论公民隐私权的法律保护

隐私是个人身体和私生活的秘密。隐私权则是以隐私为调整对象的法权形式,它包括个人身体的自由权和私生活的秘密权,以及当这些权利受到侵犯时获得司法保护的权利。与其它法权形式一样,一方面隐私权的内容,形式及其调查方法受不断发展着的社会物质生活条件的制约;另一方面,它又反作用于社会对社会的发展产生影响。     

基因隐私权的民法保护

以传统隐私权保护为基点的现行立法与司法,无法完成现代隐私权,特别是个人信息隐私权所强调和要求的保护架构.在权利配置上,无法实现对传统隐私权按照个人信息处理程序的不同阶段进行权利增设与重置.在保护机制上,无法通过司法能动主义建立个人信息隐私权,特别是基因隐私权所要求的公共监督框架.因此,在后基因组时代,应当坚持以个人信息法作为个人信息(包括基因信息)保护的基本制度框架,在个人信息法的范围内,对作为高度敏感个人信息的基因信息予以特别处理.     

略论我国公民隐私权的法律保护

随着社会的不断进步，公民隐私权问题越来越成为法律工作者探讨的课题。隐私权的产生和确立是基于对个人作为权利主体的尊重，是对一种个体利益的保护。由于我国尚未将隐私权确立为一项公民的单独的民事基本权利，对公民隐私的法律保护十分有限，使得实践中侵害他人隐私权的案件时有发生。本文试就公民隐私权的法律保护问题略抒己见。一、公民隐私权的法律特征隐私，英语为Ｐｒｉｖａｃｙ意为不受干扰的独处；秘密；私生活、私事。《现代汉语词典》解释为“不愿告人或不愿公开的个人的事。”国内稍早时学者们把隐私与阴私等同起来，现在则一…     

计算机时代的隐私权

隐私权，又称私生活秘密权，是指公民对自己个人生活秘密和个人生活自由禁止他人干涉的一种人格权。隐私权集个人通信自由、生活自由、肖像、姓名、名誉为一体，主要包括以下权利内容：个人生活自由权、个人生活情报保密权、个人通信秘密。它是公民保持人格尊严和从事社会活动所不可缺少的条件。简而言之，隐私权就是私人不与他人联系的权利。隐私权被视为一种民事权利并受法律保护，是现代法律制度的产物，其概念随着历史的发展也有了很大的变化。目前我国有关隐私权的法律规定还比较少，还没有完整的法律保护体系。究其原因，一方面是由于…     

Without Peers

Abstract

This writing will, in two parts, trace the development of Anglo-American law in regard to women and jury service from the early Anglo-Norman jury to the present American system. In this long history, women were largely excluded from the public world of the legal system. As criminal defendants, they did not face a jury of their peers. The first part, contained in this edition, examines the limited participation of women in the legal system in medieval and early modern England, colonial America, and the new American nation ending with their entry into the public world and the victory of women's suffrage in the United States. Within this setting, this first section traces the evolution of trial by jury. The second part, to follow, will examine the twentieth century legal, and political, struggle for women's full participation in the American jury system.     

Rape Without Consent

This article is a defence of a differentiated offence of rape.A differentiated offence is an offence which can be completedin a number of different ways that cannot be captured in a simpledefinition. It is argued that such an offence would meet severalconcerns that have been expressed in the feminist literatureabout the law of rape. It would assist certainty, it would reducethe extent to which the offence focuses on the conduct of thecomplainant, it would allow the law to express that violenceis central to the offence of rape where violence is present,but it would also allow convictions of rape where there is noviolence. The argument is developed through critical engagementwith the law of rape as set out in the Sexual Offences Act 2003.The Sexual Offences Act, it is argued, fails adequately to meetthe concerns outlined above.     

Imperatives Without Imperator

Schmitt’s theologisation of sovereignty has been subjected, 50 years later, to a ‘quarter turn’ by Foucault’s move from issues of domination to issues of government. After a further 30 years, radicalising Foucault, Agamben’s archaeology of economy adds another ‘quarter turn’: the structure that emerges once the old European conjugality of facticity and validity, of praxis and being, emptied of all bonds, links, and loops, gives way to the bare opposition ‘bipolarity’. The new constellation provides the old legal-theoretical (kelsenian) problem of rules unsuspended from a ruler who would authorise them, with a new, unexpected, political content and with a change of epistemic paradigm.     

Recklessness Without the Risk

Criminal Law and Philosophy - Risk is at the core of criminal recklessness, but its exact constitution comes into focus only in unusual cases. In rethinking criminal law, Larry Alexander and...     

Anti-Discrimination Rights Without Equality

Anti-discrimination rights are nearly always thought to be justified or explained by equality, although the precise nature of this relationship is rarely considered. In this article I consider the two most plausible relationships, both of which are commonly at least implicitly asserted: that anti-discrimination rights are deontic equal treatment norms, and that anti-discrimination rights are instrumentally aimed at achieving telic equality. I try to show that, as a conceptual matter, anti-discrimination rights are not equal treatment norms: they do not require that all people (perhaps in a certain category) are treated the same. They allow for different treatment, but they prohibit different treatment only on some grounds. Although the suggestion that anti-discrimination rights are instrumentally aimed at telic equality (in some dimension) is conceptually plausible (like all instrumental relationships), it is most unlikely that anti-discrimination rights can be justified on this ground.